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Abstract
As computers absorb an ever-increasing proportion of corporate resources, and spread
into every sphere of business activity, the issue of achieving benefits from investments
in information technology (IT) is assuming major importance. Research evidence to
hand suggests that IT investments are failing by orders of magnitude to provide appro-
priate levels of payback. A major part of the difficulty lies in the fact that management
appears to lack a framework or even a language for addressing the issues, and are bewil-
dered by the speed and impact of the changes that are taking place. This is particularly
apparent in smaller and medium-sized organisations.
This thesis examines the causes of the problem, and suggests that it stems mainly from
an undue emphasis being placed by management on finance-based techniques, a legacy
from an earlier and much different environment. It seeks to establish that such techniques
are not only inadequate, but potentially counter-productive. Using established research
methodologies, a framework is developed which seeks to address the key issues
involved in achieving business benefits from IT, yet which is understandable to, and
applicable by, managers in medium-sized organisations. Uniquely among IT investment
frameworks, the concept of business reengineering or business process redesign is intro-
duced as a formal evaluation criterion, reflecting the degree of business transformation
currently being experienced, and the central role of IT in that transformation. The frame-
work is then validated and refined through being applied in actual investment decision
making processes undertaken by five organisations covering a range of business arenas.
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Part I Background to the Research
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 The Business and Social Impact of Information Technology
1.1.1 The coming of a new age
There are rare occasions, perhaps as rare as two or three times in a millennium, when
society undergoes a change which is so profound and rapid that in the space of a few
decades it exceeds that which occurred over the preceding centuries. This is described
by Drucker. "Within a few short decades, society rearranges itself - its worldview, its
basic values, its social and political structures, its arts, its key institutions. Fifty years
later there is a new world. And the people born then cannot even imagine the world in
which their grandparents lived and into which their own parents were born" (1).
The invention of the printing press by Gutenberg in 1455 illustrates this. By enabling
books to be printed it resulted in an explosive growth in the dissemination of knowledge,
rapid and wide advances in education, literacy and scientific discovery. Fifty years later
America had been "discovered", and Martin Luther had launched the Reformation.
Geopolitics and society had changed beyond recognition. The invention of the steam
engine in 1776 set in train (no pun intended) the Industrial Revolution, and decimated
the workforces in traditional industries such as boat building and agriculture, to name but
a few. Wriston has shown how such fundamental transformations of society have a num-
ber of characteristics in common, even when separated by several centuries (2):
(a) Economic entities and professional activities, fundamental to the old order, in the
new order either disappear completely, or incur a vast diminution in importance, for
instance the impact of the steam engine on horse-based transport and on the canals.
(b) New economic entities and professional activities emerge and become paramount.
For instance, engineers and the factory were unknown before the advent of the steam
engine.
(c) The scale of political and social change matches that of economic change. The
social, political and economic picture of Europe in 1825 was utterly different to that of
1775, as was that of the early sixteenth century to what had applied fifty years earlier.
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(d) During the course of the transition, awareness of the significance of the changes is
limited, understanding even more so. Many of the key expositions have only appeared
at the end of the phase.
1.1.2 The birth of the Information Age
There is every reason to believe that the latter years of the twentieth century have wit-
nessed the onset of another epoch-forming phase. The political evidence is underlined
by the breathtaking collapse of Communism, the speed of which was unimaginable a lit-
tle more than a decade ago. With equal suddenness, seemingly impregnable corpora-
tions such as IBM, Pan American Airways and General Motors either collapsed, or
began to incur unimaginably large losses. Yet it was as recent as 1975 that a respected
commentator like Rex Malik could make a seemingly plausible argument that IBM was
set to take over the world (3).
The indicators of this change have been catalogued by Rolph & Bartram, Moss Kanter,
and others (4). Company structures are transforming from the hierarchical to the flat,
shedding vast numbers of employees in the process. As unemployment grows, and those
in employment adopt new values and attitudes to work, trade union power ebbs away.
Traditional manufacturing industry goes into decline, while services and knowledge-
based industries grow. The collapse of trade and tariff barriers brings in its wake oppor-
tunities but also casualties. The tried and tested methods of the past no longer appear to
work. In attempting to adapt, companies take measures unimaginable only a few years
previously, engaging in mergers and take-overs, or even collaboration with former rivals.
Many leading academics and business commentators suggest that only those who recog-
nise what Drucker calls the 'decisive factor of production' will be able to adapt (5). This
'decisive factor of production' is information. We are at the beginning of the
Information Age.
Tapscott and Caston, for instance, identify information and information technology as
central to these developments. "Faxes provide students demonstrating in Tienanrnen
Square with information about what is happening in their own country.. thousands of net-
worked personal computers become key battleground weapons (in the Gulf War).
Global communications networks energise the metabolism of world commerce and
move us inexorably toward Marshall McLuhan's global village" (6).
Cash, McFarlan and McKenney, in assessing the impact of IT on organisations over the
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previous 30 years, state that "new departments have been created, massive recruitment
of new types of staff has occurred, major investments have been made in computer hard-
ware and software, and systems have been installed that have profoundly affected how
firms operate and compete" (7). They add that "IT's impact has not been confined to
large corporations; in its current form it influences mid-size and very small .. firms as
well". Rolph and Bartram state that "in the troubled nineties, many global corporations
face one central issue on their information agendas - how to find and use the appropri-
ate information to drive strategic change. This is especially urgent in view of the fact
that many of the old business rules no longer apply" (8).
1.2.1 The IT payback paradox
This realisation has contributed to the explosive growth in the expenditure on informa-
tion technology (IT), (IT being defined as computers, telecommunications, and the relat-
ed software). For instance, this expenditure has grown by a compounded rate variously
estimated as between 200% and 350% during the 1980s, (a rate far in excess of normal
business growth) and now amounts to 50% of all new capital expenditure in companies
in the US (9). In 1995 expenditure on IT by business and public sector organisations was
estimated at £33.6 billion (10). Even developing countries are spending huge sums on
IT, with Brazil, for example, expected to spend $10.2 billion in the 1993-2000 period
(11). By 1992 in the US the computer equipment and services sector was larger than
automotive steel, mining, petrochemicals and natural gas combined - a truly staggering
realignment in the profile of industry (12).
While allowing that definitions of productivity might differ, figures claim that over the
same period, white collar productivity (the focus of the bulk of IT expenditure) has risen
by about 15% in manufacturing industry, and 3% in the services (13). Some studies sug-
gest that at least 20% of expenditure is wasted, and that 30-40% of IT projects realise no
net benefits, however measured (14).
It is suggested therefore that a huge and growing investment in IT seems to be failing to
provide anything approaching a satisfactory return. The widespread disenchantment
with the returns from IT among business manager should not therefore be surprising.
For instance, Computerworld reports that "fewer than half (48%) .. said they were get-
ting their money's worth from their organisation's IS spending"(15).
The remarkable nature of these statistics is underlined by the fact that the period referred
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to has been characterised by orders-of-magnitude increases in the price/performance
ratio of computers (see Figs. 3.2.and 3.3).
1.2.2 The need for a new approach
The position could therefore be summarised as one in which a colossal ongoing invest-
ment in IT facilities has given rise to relatively small gains in productivity, at a time
when the price/performance ratio of computing has shown dramatic improvement.
Furthermore, with the conventional solutions no longer supplying the answer in overall
business terms, an examination of the effectiveness of existing IT investment approach-
es seems called for. This is consistent with our being in the state of transition to a new
epoch. Flinging computing power at the current business problems under the old para-
meters may be analogous to the attempt to breed bigger and faster horses to overcome
the challenge posed by the steam and internal combustion engines. A new approach
reflecting these developments seems to be called for.
1.2.3 Will a new approach be applied?
One would expect that, given the scale of the expenditure on IT, and the vast disparity
between the growth in productivity and the growth in this expenditure, IT investment
appraisal techniques would have been an issue of prime concern for business managers,
and that imaginative new ways of evaluating IT projects would be in widespread use.
One would also expect that the adoption of new forms of appraisal would have been
given added impetus by the fundamental nature of business change taking place in recent
years.
However, the contrary seems to be the case. For instance a study by Peat Marwick in
1989 showed that 75% of companies lack any effective evaluation procedures for new
IT initiatives, (16) and a wealth of material underlining the predominance of traditional
finance-based criteria is available (17). Yet, as Farbey et al show, the widespread per-
ception that such (traditional) techniques are inadequate, has lead to a lack of confidence
in appraisal techniques in general (18).
1.3 Summary
There is evidence therefore to suggest that the situation could be summarised as one in
which a radical transformation of the economic and social climate is taking place, a
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transformation which raises doubts about the relevance and effectiveness of traditional
approaches to business organisation. Information, enabled by information technology
(IT), has played, and is playing, a crucial role in this transformation. Yet the evidence
suggests that investment in IT has failed by orders of magnitude to deliver an appropri-
ate level of payback. Despite this, traditional methods of appraisal continue to dominate
the investment process.
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Chapter 2. Research Objectives
The objectives of the research are to develop a _framework for IT investment appraisal
appropriate for present conditions, and to test the acceptability and suitability of the
framework in a range . of organisational settings.
The need for acceptability and suitability in research projects is emphasised by Remenyi
and Williams when they state "some research studies stop at the stage of theoretical con-
jecture, perhaps having developed some hypothesis or empirical generalisations. It is
argued that at this stage a contribution has already been made to knowledge and this may
well be so. However, if the newly discovered knowledge is to be more widely useful,
then it is usually necessary to progress to a further stage in the research in which the new
thesis is tested against a larger sample population" (19). With this in mind, the research
was conducted on an iterative basis on a broad sample in order to achieve the objectives
of acceptability and suitability (see below ).
2.1 Research Strategies
2.1.1 Overview of Research Methodology
In view of the relatively broad scope of the subject, together with its potential to overlap
with general business issues, a wide-ranging literature review was seen as the starting
point. This identified relevant work to date and associated research methodologies. This
review established that a number of investment criteria predominated, and formed part
of the majority of the frameworks reviewed. These were then evaluated against the
objectives of the research, i.e. to what extent did they provide the basis for a compre-
hensive framework, one which would appeared appropriate for a business setting.
The review also took in the literature on organisational theory, business management,
and the organisational impact of IT. The purpose of this was to map the business suc-
cess factors presented against those factors identified in the review of the investment
appraisal literature. The steps in deciding on a new theory are represented diagramati-
cally in Fig 2.1. This process revealed a significant omission (Process Redesign) from
the methodologies reviewed, suggesting the need to develop a new theory. This is
analysed in detail in Chapter 9.
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Fig 2.1 Definition of Requirement for New Theory
Investment appraisal research review
Business organisation research review
Once the requirement to develop a new theory was established, an initial theoretical
framework was developed. Case and action research in a small number of organisations
followed, and the findings were supplemented with the author's own work papers from
earlier assignments, and by structured interviews with practitioners in the field, primar-
ily in the business sphere, but also with academic sources. This lead to refinements and
extensions of the theoretical framework, which was then further re-tested using the same
process. This feedback loop was supplemented in three other ways:
(a) a survey of investment practices among 42 medium to large-sized organisations with
a view to relating the fieldwork exercises to a broader context
(b) National Institute for Management Technology (NIMT) workshops with corporate
clients on investment appraisal and IT strategy
(c) Seminars and conferences where the author presented papers on the theme of the
research
This process closely relates to a research framework (right hand alternative) developed
by Galliers, Jarvenpaa and Land which is shown in diagrammatic form on Fig. 2.2.
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Fig, 2.2.  Development of Theory
2.1.2 Fieldwork methodology
The first step in the field research was to identify a sample of organisations which would
provide a representative cross-section of IT users. Having selected the organisations, a
number of key staff were identified and asked to take part in the research. Prior to inter-
views taking place, the research objectives were described. Due to the innovative con-
cepts (at least from the participants' perspective) being applied, some additional back-
ground material was generally provided (an example of this is provided on Appendix II).
The interviews and discussions took place at site locations, and were recorded by way of
note-taking and workpapers. Following the interviews, supplemental notes and obser-
vations were contemporaneously recorded by way of tape recorder, and a summary of
each interview was subsequently prepared. It was found impractical to use the same
interview protocol for all managers, but there were no major differences. No standard
protocol could be applied to the case/action research and theory testing, as these took
place in radically different environments. As a final check on the research, participants
were shown a write-up of the findings, and where applicable, changes were introduced.
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2.1.3 Research techniques applied
Case Research 
Case studies are seen as an essential element of this research. Benbasat eta! define case
research as a study which "examines a phenomenon in a natural setting, employing mul-
tiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities (peo-
ple, groups or organisations). The boundaries are not clearly evident at the outset of the
research, and no experimental control or manipulation is used" (20). The latter condi-
tion obviously raised an issue in this research, in that, while there is no "control or
manipulation", the author's involvement could not be described as passive. Apart from
this however, the framework proposed by Benbasat et al is useful, and offers practical
aid to researchers in understanding and implementing case research.
Their advise covers unit of analysis, single versus multiple case designs, site selection,
data collection methods, and finally data analysis and exposition. The paper identifies a
number of possible weaknesses relevant to case research, including absence of clear
objectives, ambiguous data collection, and an absence of the details of data collection
methods, and the rare use of triangulation to increase data reliability.
Quantitative Methods 
Scientific or quantitative methods are commonly used to test models or hypotheses.
They rely on gathering quantitative data usually via questionnaires and subsequent
analysis of the data using statistical techniques. The questionnaire usually applies scales
or graded responses to each question. Typically, Likert scales are used with five step
options from total disagreement to agreement with a given statement.
In order to obtain a more precise response, more refined data is gathered. A typical
approach is to use semantic differential pairs (satisfied versus dissatisfied, reasonable
versus unreasonable) with graded responses between these two extremes. Quantitative
data collected usually includes demographic data as well as the responses to the specif-
ic topic under research.
Qualitative Methods 
Considerable use was made of qualitative methods during the course of this research.
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These methods rely heavily on structured data collection (structured interviews, ques-
tionnaires) but the questions and interviews are often open-ended. The subsequent
analysis is more deductive and interpretative with theories being developed from the
data. Hypotheses are often formulated and reformulated during the analysis, with the
data being used to pose and resolve research questions.
Kaplan and Duchon see immersion in the context and a detailed involvement of the
researcher in the natural setting as key elements of this research method (21).
The authors go on to identify a number of advantages deriving from the combination of
quantitative and qualitative techniques which they experienced:
qualitative analysis revealed interpretations not initially perceived through pure-
ly quantitative methods. Subsequent quantitative analysis showed new correla-
tions confirming the interpretation.
the use of multiple methods increases the robustness of case research through tri-
angulation or cross-validation when different kinds and sources of data converge
and are found to be congruent.
Action Research 
There are many definitions of action research. Cohen and Mannion describe it as
"essentially an on-the-spot procedure designed to deal with a concrete problem located
in an immediate situation. This means that the step-by-step process is constantly moni-
tored (ideally, that is) over varying periods of time and by a variety of mechanisms
(questionnaires, diaries, interviews and case studies, for example) so that the ensuing
feedback may be translated into modifications, adjustments, directional changes, redefi-
nitions, as necessary, so as to bring about lasting benefit to the ongoing process itself'
(22).
This definition is enhanced by that of Brown and McIntyre who state that "The
researcher/actor, at an early stage, formulates speculative, tentative general principles in
relation to the problem that has been identified; from these principles hypotheses may be
generated about what action is likely to lead to the desired improvements in practice.
Such actions will then be tried out and data on its effects collected; these data are used
to revise the earlier hypotheses and identify more appropriate action that reflects a mod-
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ification of the general principles. Collection of data on the effects of this new action
may then generate further hypotheses and modified principles, and so on as we move
towards a greater understanding and improvement of practice. This implies a continu-
ous process of research and the worth of the work is judged by the understanding of, and
desirable change in, the practice that is achieved" (23).
A problem commonly associated with action research is the weakness in the process of
theory formulation, and the approach recommended by Baskerville and Pries-Heje has
been incorporated to strengthen the approach taken (24). The most common methodol-
ogy for introducing scientific rigour into action research is the five phase cyclical
approach proposed by Susman and Evered (25).
The fist step, Diagnosis, seeks to identify the problem to be addressed - an important
concept here being to interpret in a holistic sense On relation to the organisation) rather
than through reduction and simplification. Based on the initial theoretical framework,
researcher and practitioners collaborate on the Action Planning phase, which seeks to
establish the target and the approach to achieving the target. This approach is then
applied in the Taking Action phase. After the action is completed, the Evaluation phase
takes place, which seeks to establish whether the theoretical effects of the action were
realised, and the extent to which the original problem was improved by these effects,
with care being taken to ensure that the improvements can reasonably be assigned to the
theory-inspired action. In the event of there being an unsuccessful application of the the-
ory, it must be amended for the next iteration of the action research cycle. The final
activity, Specifying Learning, is usually an ongoing process, although "this learning
must be formalised as a concluding stage in the action research cycle".
Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory differs from other forms of research in that it "begins with an area of
study and allows relevant theory to emerge from that area" (26). Its objective has been
defined as the development of "a theory that is 'grounded', that is, closely relevant to the
particular setting under study. Using the grounded theory approach, the researcher first
develops conceptual categories from the data and then make new observations to clarify
and elaborate these categories" (27).
According to Strauss and Corbin, analysis in grounded theory research is composed of
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three groups of coding procedures, open, axial, and selective coding (28). The goal of
open coding is to reveal the essential ideas found in the data. This requires each discrete
incident or idea to receive a label that represents the phenomenon, and that categories of
concepts also be identified and labelled. The goal of axial coding is to develop a deep-
er understanding of how the categories relate to one another. This is achieved by con-
necting categories in terms of a sequence of relationships, which are then referenced
against the data for validation. The objective of selective coding is to develop the theo-
ry that best fits the phenomena being studied. This calls for the development of a nar-
rative that reveals the central phenomenon being studies, and validating its relationships
to other categories.
Limitations in integrating the grounded theory and action research have been identified
by Baskerville and Pried-Heje (29). In particular, they point out that the narrative (essen-
tial to selective coding in grounded theory) is to an extent already pre-defined in action
research. They state that "typically a grounded theory approach is unfettered by such
initial predilections and is initially oriented towards exploratory discovery of this first
theoretical framework". The authors do acknowledge however that considerable bene-
fit can be achieved by combining the two approaches, and this was found to be the case
with this research.
2.2 Definition of selected approach
The overall approach to the research will therefore closely resemble that as defined by
Remenyi and Williams in Fig. 2.3., but action research predominated for the following
reasons.
It is based on the researcher initially formulating a theory or hypothesis to be vali-
dated/improved in practice
It focuses on a specific problem located in an immediate situation
It is an iterative process which seeks to apply the findings of field research and other
forms of research to improve practice
It allows an active role for the researcher
However, as Bell has stated "classifying an approach as quantitative, qualitative, ethno-
graphic, survey, action research or whatever, does not mean that once an approach has
been selected, the researcher may not move from the methods normally associated with
that style (30). Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses and each is particularly
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Grounded theory
suitable for a particular context. The approach adopted and the methods of data collec-
tion will depend on the nature of the inquiry and the type of information required".
Fig. 2.3 steps in the Research Process (Remenyi and Williams)
Literature Review
i
Assessment of Established
theoretical frameworks
Theoretical Conjecture
i
Hypotheses/Empirical
Generalised Formulation
i
Measuring Instrument
1
Sampling
1
Testing/Analysis
1
Confirmation of theory conjecture and
development of fuller/refined theory
Summary
In summary therefore, it can be said that rich resources of research methodologies are
available, and elements of most were incorporated into the chosen methodology as
appropriate. The first issue to be established was whether a need for a new theory was
required. Once established, this was validated and refined in a field setting. While action
research has been the predominant approach adopted, it was supplemented with other
forms and methods as demanded by the circumstances. The research approach recog-
nised the requirement for frequent cross-referencing of findings between individual
managers and companies. In other words, specific research findings, or conclusions
drawn, in one company, were to be applied in others, with the intention of establishing
the scope for general applicability.
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Chapter 3. Historical Development of the IT Payback Paradox
3.1 Introduction
The rate of growth of information technology (IT) in the thirty years or so leading up to
the mid 1990s has been extraordinary, in its sustained growth surpassing by many orders
of magnitude that achieved by any other technological advance throughout history. The
rapidity of this growth, and its related impact on business and organisational structures,
may have contributed to what many see as an inadequate return on the related IT invest-
ments and thus on investment appraisal methods. A wide range of phases has been iden-
tified in tracing this evolution, from as few as two to as many as seven (31). For the pur-
poses of this review, a four-stage model is proposed, as it accurately reflects the signifi-
cant changes, and parallels the four decades of the time frame under review.
3.2 The Four Phases of Evolution
3.2.1 Phase 1: The automation of existing departmental functions (1960s)
3.2.1 (a) Characteristics:
Computers were acquired to automate specific business or organisational functions, usu-
ally those involving large volumes of repetitive transactions. Typical applications would
be payroll or order processing. Individual departments would specify their require-
ments, which would in turn have been derived from goals assigned to these departments
at corporate level. A vast gulf separated the IT (or Data Processing, as it was known
then) staff from their colleagues in the user departments. Not alone was there a physi-
cal separation, but DP staff knew virtually nothing about business issues, while users
knew even less about computer matters - and were not encouraged to (32). This
inevitably led to misunderstandings on both sides. The author has attended numerous
meetings characterised by furious disagreement and mutual recriminations. It is little
wonder then that disappointment was frequent, but one advantage was the simplicity
which followed from the fact that the computer system invariably replaced its direct
manual equivalent - even the forms and reports were often replicates of the manual ver-
sions (33). Despite the mutual incomprehension therefore, once IT understood the
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mechanics of the task, the development of the resultant system was comparatively
straightforward.
3.2.1 (b) Investment appraisal techniques
The objective of the systems deriving from this process would be to eliminate paper-
based processing (or more accurately, replace this with its computer-based equivalent),
reduce headcount, while increasing speed and accuracy. These factors would form the
justification for each project, with the most significant being direct, tangible savings
(34). In Ford at this time only direct costs such as headcount or overtime savings would
have been accepted, and other companies with whom Ford had backup site arrangements
had similar policies.
It was relatively easy to establish what processes could be automated, and the impact of
the automation in terms of savings. Thus a company's payroll may have been handled
by ten clerks, many of whom would work overtime at peak periods. Automating the
process could mean that the manpower requirements might now be reduced to two
clerks. The salaries, indirect labour costs (pensions, insurance, office space etc.) and
overtime payments of the eight eliminated clerks would represent the system savings.
Cougar has shown how the corresponding cost of developing and running the resulting
computer system were less rigorous (35). Even companies with sophisticated financial
procedures such as Ford confined costs to the direct and indirect labour expense associ-
ated with development, operations, data preparation and input, together with direct mate-
rial costs such as stationery and (if applicable) punch cards. Amortising the hardware,
relating anticipated savings to opportunity cost, or evaluating in time/value terms
(Internal Rate of Return, Net Present Value) do not seem to have been widely taken into
account when cost justifying a project during this Phase. These could have been indi-
rectly addressed by the utilisation of a "throw facto?', i.e. a factor by which savings must
exceed costs. In other words, a 40% throw factor (a common figure in the author's expe-
rience) would require savings of £140,000 where development and operational costs
were estimated to be 1100,000.
Conventional appraisal standards applied to hardware purchases. In fact, exhaustive tests
were performed on comparative hardware. Processor speeds, storage device capacity,
input/output performance, and printer throughput were examined in detail, but individ-
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ual application proposals were assessed in basically crude terms. The whole emphasis
was on minimising cost (36).
3.2.2 Phase 2: Cross-departmental integration of applications (1970s)
3.2.2 (a) Characteristics:
Instead of automating existing business functions as would have been the case at Phase
1, Phase 2 systems integrated data, and sometimes processing, between different busi-
ness functions (37). For example, a single Creditor file might support the accounting,
inventory control and purchasing functions, a development facilitated by advances in
database technology at around this time. The drawbacks occasioned by the gulf between
systems and user staff was by now being seen as an impediment, and improvements
began to be identified. For example, the author attended a Hoslcyns systems analysis
training course in 1972 which incorporated the "revolutionary" concept of the systems
analyst not just understanding the details of the task to be automated, but of the user's
business objectives as well.
Considerable benefits resulted therefore. These primarily related to more consistent
data, a reduction in manual input requirements, and reduced storage requirements due to
less duplication. The capacity to integrate data from different departments resulted in a
major leap forward in terms of management information systems. For instance a sales
report could advance from reporting actual sales figures to incorporate cost (and there-
fore gross profit) data, as well as information on stock levels and outstanding purchase
orders (38).
There were disadvantages however. Phase 2 systems, being more complicated, incurred
longer development lead times and increased incidence of software and operational
errors. Of greater long-term significance, their increased size and complexity resulted in
reduced flexibility, which in turn reduced the capacity to adapt to business change.
There was also some resistance to sharing data between departments. Osterman
showed clear direct benefits from the introduction Phase II systems, with investment
appraisal methods being well understood (39). Primrose also supports this position (40).
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3.2.2 (b) Investment appraisal techniques
The main change from Phase 1 in assessing project feasibility appears to have been an
increased application of discounting techniques which addressed the concept of the time-
value of money. This could have been a reflection of the high inflation rates which
applied in the 1970s, and/or a realisation that more sophisticated techniques were
required. (Discounted Cash Flow Return was introduced as an element of IT investment
appraisal by Ford of Europe in 1982.) These however failed to address some new issues
which Phase 2 introduced.
For example, while the shared database referred to may have saved some time in elimi-
nating the duplication inherent in the previous configuration, the main benefits might
have related to the provision of more consistent and up-to-date data - benefits which did
not lend themselves as easily to quantifiable analysis. Organisational matters, the own-
ership of data, faint blurring of functional boundaries, and information as a justification
in its own right were identified as issues to be addressed, and at about this time at Ford
the concept of "intangible" benefits was introduced. At Ford (and there is little reason
to believe this was the exception), "intangible" was a dirty word in terms of identifying
benefits. This was due mainly to the widescale practice on the part of users of using the
intangible portion of the cost justification exercise as a balancing figure to build to the
required value. This discrediting of the intangible concept was unfortunate, in that the
emerging potential for real, if non-quantifiable organisational benefits was undermined.
Nonetheless, although now less clear-cut, it was still possible in most circumstances to
quantify direct savings. Weill stated that "this type of IT investment is quite well under-
stood, and a history of successful implementations exists in most sizeable firms" (41).
The process was facilitated to a considerable degree by the introduction and rapid growth
of what is known today as packaged software. Software was developed by third parties
(often the suppliers of the hardware) on the basis that most companies had basically sim-
ilar processes, particularly in areas such as accounting, and that once developed, such an
application could be sold on many times. Many of the uncertainties which bedevilled
in-house software development were now eliminated, and although the implementation
of bought-in software introduced a new set of problems, it seems likely that in terms of
performing a cost/benefit analysis, it represented an advance.
21
100
80
60
40
20
111 Matvocessor
Mantrame
I
3.2.3 Phase 3: The growth of personal and distributed computing (1980s)
3.2.3 (a) Characteristics
Phase 3 is represented by the explosive growth in personal and distributed computing
which followed the introduction of the PC by IBM in 1981. Prior to its introduction (i.e.
at Phases 1 and 2), users with "dumb" terminals could access computer-based data, but
even the simplest tasks called for the mastery of a complex (by the standards of non-
technical staff) set of commands, although the introduction of question-by-example
(QBE) at this time did partially address this problem. Mainframe and mini-based sys-
tems punished mistakes, and the lack of sympathy for end users amongst IT profession-
als was legendary. The introduction of the PC calls to mind W.B. Yeats "all is changed,
changed utterly, and a terrible beauty is born".
Few could have imagined the extent of the changes its introduction would trigger off,
least of all IBM. Its policy of making the operating system available on competitor's
hardware meant that so-called clone manufacturers were in a position to produce
machines much more cheaply than IBM. As prices plummeted, users, hardware manu-
facturers, software developers, and training specialists leapt onto the PC bandwagon.
Everyone, it seemed, was either using a PC, or was in the PC business. This was under-
standable, as Phase 3 presented the following:
Quantum leap in processing power and the price/performance ratio. Computer power
exceeding in many ways that of 1960's mainframe could now be had for less than
£10,000. Systems previously ruled out because of lack of capacity at the central com-
puter faci!ity now became feasib!e. The reative growth in the performance of main-
frames and PCs is shown graphically on Fig. 3.1., which shows that a single micro-
processor will outperform a mainframe in terms of MIPs (millions of instructions per
second) by the year 2000.
Fig. 3.1 Relative Performance of Mainframes and Microprocessors: (Tapscott and Caston)
1975 1 1980 I 1985	 1990	 1995 I 2000
arre.110?•20
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Ready-made software: Users, hitherto used to lead times of up to a couple of years,
could now buy off the shelf software packages, which often possessed superior func-
tionality to those produced in-house. Spreadsheets in particular afforded users dramati-
cally improved independence in data manipulation and report generation.
Cheaper software: The cost of software underwent a similarly radical transformation.
Typically, an integrated accounting package, which may have entailed up to ten or even
twenty man years to produce in-house, (in financial terms, maybe up to half a million
pounds) was now available for a couple of thousand pounds. The relative price move-
ments for computers and other forms of expenditure, based on Loveman's figures
(Lovemen, Gary, "An assessment of the Productivity Impact of Information
Technologies") are shown on Fig. 3.2.
Fig, 3.2 Deflated Price Movements for Computers (Loveman)
Year Price deflator for computers Price deflator for others
1950 93046 25
1955 32543 29
1960 11739 35
1965 3715 35
1970 1264 41
1975 637 58
1980 167 84
1984 63 105
User-defined systems: Within a couple of years of the introduction of the PC, simplified
application development tools, designed for inexperienced computer users, became
available. It seemed that the days of users specifying their requirements and being dis-
appointed with the results from the systems staff might be over. In addition, the plum-
meting costs of processing power and disk storage reduced performance degradation
which could have resulted from unprofessional development techniques.
Faster and better information: Monthly reports, presented three weeks after the event
on continuous stationery, began to look hopelessly passé in the new world of the PC.
Instantaneous screen-based inquiry became the order of the day, and easily-used report
generators enabled customised, attractive printouts to be obtained and modified without
difficulty.
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Staff mobility: The (almost) homogeneous world of the PC created a new breed of com-
pany-independent computer operators. The hitherto crippling dependence on specialists
of one sort or another was vastly reduced. For example, a company running one of the
well known PC-based accounting packages would find it relatively easy (and inexpen-
sive) to find staff experienced in the operation of the computer and the software package
used.
3.2.3. (b) Investment appraisal techniques
Phase 3 saw the first real attempts at breaking away from accounting-based investment
criteria. This stemmed from the growing realisation of their inadequacies, and what
progress there was stemmed largely from the academic and research institutions.
Cost/benefit analysis was enhanced by the concept of Direct Labour Cost Substitution,
published by AT Kearney in 1987 (42). This method, based on industrial engineering
techniques, while perhaps more suited to Phases 1 and 2, did provide a more reliable
framework for assessing labour substitution benefits. Michael Porter's Value Chain
Analysis went much further, in that it sought, by identifying and isolating the key com-
ponents of a firm's value creation process, to break away from the straight-jacket of
cost/benefit analysis (43) . Even though some critics argue that Porter had only repack-
aged traditional value added techniques, his work did result in IT investments being seen
in a new light. One of the most influential writers of this period was Paul Strassman.
His book "Information Payoff' (44), published in 1985, broke new ground by shifting
the focus for payback from technology to organisational, cultural and people issues.
Cathleen Curley of North-eastern University and John Henderson of Boston University
introduced the concept of differing payback at different levels of the organisation - the
individual, the division, and the corporation (45).
These new approaches all had one characteristic in common - they recognised that the
new business environment called for an evaluation framework above and beyond the tra-
ditional accounting based techniques in general use. Evidence of their successful appli-
cation in a business environment remains thin however. Two causes appear to predom-
inate in explaining this. The first is that a convincing, practical methodology had not at
this stage been developed. Schwartz and Sassone cite examples of companies which
tried up to a dozen different methods for evaluating the benefits of an office automation
project, with minimal success (46). The authors add, quoting a 1986 survey of the
Fortune 500 companies by Executive magazine, that almost 89.5% of executives encoun-
tered "great difficulty" in quantifying intangible benefits, while 61.2% found that
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"uncertainty of benefits" made justification methods hard to apply.
Research by Meyers and Boone also supports this position (47). The second cause
derives from the dominant influence of the finance department on IT issues which,
though now in decline, applied during Phase 3 (48). The natural tendency in the finance
department would be to apply techniques which were familiar and consistent with invest-
ment appraisal in other areas. This tendency was reinforced by the difficulty in evaluat-
ing intangible benefits, and the consequent disillusion among executives (49).
The net result was that while new approached had been developed, few had been suc-
cessfully applied in practice. A 1995 research paper from Remenyi and Williams on this
issue as it applied in the UK finds that "in spite of the fact that a wide range of techniques
specifically intended for the evaluation of IT projects are available, very few had been
used (50).
3.2.4 Phase 4: IT as an enabler of business process reengineering (1990s)
3.2.4 (a) Characteristics:
Phase 4 represents today's environment, and is characterised primarily by the transition
from IT applications per se to IT as the enabler of new ways of doing business, under-
lined by the virtual equalling of hardware costs by organisational costs - a dramatic
transformation from Phase I (51).
Reflecting the recognition that the business environment is being fundamentally changed
by IT, there is increasing emphasis on viewing business as a series of processes, which
can and must be fundamentally redesigned and simplified by the imaginative application
of IT. This approach is commonly referred to as business reengineering, business
process redesign, and other designations, but all have as their core the need to view busi-
ness in terms of processes, and to seek improvement through fundamental redesign, fre-
quently using IT as a key enabler (52). The concept is treated in detail in Chapter 8 and
from this the following definition of a process is taken:
"A process is a series of tasks designed to achieve an added-value objective". Typically
the tasks involved in a process will transcend departmental boundaries, and quite possi-
bly organisational boundaries, i.e. they might extend beyond the individual firm. A typ-
ical process would be order fulfilment, which would not only involve tasks from inter-
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nal departments such as sales, finance and distribution, but quite possibly take in links
to suppliers and/or customers as well. For a process-based organisation to be effective,
the process team must not be subject to the control of whatever department he or she
might be in. The "first loyalty" is to the process. Thus a credit controller in the finance
department who is a member of the order fulfilment process team should be more con-
cerned with meeting customer orders (within specified guidelines) than with the minuti-
ae or procedural niceties of credit control.
The implications for IT applications are immense. Speed and flexibility in applications
development, in the context of end-user empowerment, are paramount, which in turn
means that existing "legacy" systems act as a liability. The requirements of speed and
flexibility call for the widespread application of rapid-development software tools (53).
The resulting applications are likely to have a shorter life (Chorafas cites applications in
financial services with a lifespan as short as a few weeks, although these would hardly
be typical) (54). The twin demands of rapid development and short lifespan call for an
appropriate underlying systems architecture. These may have to contain much of the
functionality which in earlier Phases resided at application level, such as database
access, screen and report builders, and structured queries. This functionality is likely to
be built on server technology, whereby different data types will be managed by dedicat-
ed servers, and by object-oriented tools, such as those for building the user interface
(55). These issues are covered in more detail in Chapter 10.
3.2.4 (b) Investment appraisal techniques
The currency of the issue, the speed of technological change, and the fundamental trans-
formation of the business environment mean that the development of appropriate
appraisal techniques in Phase 4 is very much an ongoing process. Much progress has
been made at an academic and theoretical level, but, as stated in 1.2.3, evidence of prac-
tical application of such techniques remains slim. Probably the most important charac-
teristic of this Phase is that, despite the fundamental change in the role and capacity of
IT, the commonest criteria for investment appraisal remain financial, or occasionally, as
research by Peat Marwick has shown, unsubstantiated "acts of faith" deemed necessary
for competitive reasons (56). A review of the literature has failed to show up any indi-
cation of advanced techniques being applied on- a widespread basis, and research by
Willcocics and others reveals an absence of practical application of new measures (57).
Commenting on a survey undertaken by the Kobler Unit which showed that only 16%
of managers rely on rigorous methods to evaluate IT benefits, the authors suggest that
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the explanation for this low figure is due at least in part to the fact that "the majority of
managers simply do not have adequate tools at their disposal" (58). Research by the
author in a range of private firms, government departments, and semi-state companies
(i.e. those in which the state has a controlling shareholding) revealed that the dominant
criteria were financial, or the feeling that "we must have it, irrespective of the cost jus-
tification".
In effect therefore, the finance-based measures used in Phase 1 continue to predominate
in relation to Phase 4 investment decisions. Given the scale of change in the period
under review, the effectiveness of such measures, and their relevance in the new busi-
ness environment, must be open to question. Many of the findings from research under-
taken by the Diebold Research Group support this contention (59). This organisation
conducted an investigation between 1988 and 1991 into how companies justify and mea-
sure IT investments. They may be summarised as:
- Although it is used by a very high proportion of the companies surveyed, cost dis-
placement and avoidance are no longer adequate grounds for assessing investments.
Factors such as revenue generation, organisational and strategic issues are generally
more important.
- benefits can be optimised by reengineering business processes. This in turn requires
companies to evaluate their investments in terms of increased effectiveness and busi-
ness value added, rather than purely financial considerations.
- The most realistic appraisals incorporated a balanced approach, technology and busi-
ness considerations, hard and soft benefits.
- The survey established that the most successful investments appeared to have rigor-
ous performance measurement systems directly linked to business consequences
3.5 Some speculation on the causes of the IT payback paradox
Over the time frame spanning the four Phases there has therefore been a confluence of
two powerful forces for productivity improvement, viz., an increase in IT expenditure
greatly exceeding that of investment in general, and dramatic improvements in the
price/performance ratio of computers. Had the IT spend remained constant at its com-
paratively low level, the price/performance ratio (which enabled not just the same, but
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much more to be achieved at a much lower cost) in itself may not have given rise to sig-
nificant productivity gains. But the figures cited in (1.2.1) suggest the spend on IT has
been enormous. By all logic, productivity gains should have been huge. But, as was
suggested in that section, productivity gains have been minimal, at a little over 3% as
expenditure grew by 350%.
One important factor to be noted here however is that measures of GNP and other forms
of productivity seldom if ever quantify the value of information per se. Thus for exam-
ple, Keen cites a bank which spent $1 billion in developing a database, yet that database
has no official value in the bank's accounting records (60). Similarly, it will not appear
in GNP or most other productivity figures. Such computations represent another part of
the problem being addressed here, being geared for a different age, an age when physi-
cal goods and services represented wealth. Thus the apparent proof of the payback para-
dox is in itself a partial reflection of that paradox, and is treated in more detail in the next
section.
3.5.1 Phase 1
It appears likely that payback generally was achieved on applications during this Phase.
This claim can be made as systems were straightforward and discrete, being almost
invariably justified on the basis of cost savings. The evaluation procedure was not com-
plicated by issues such as business alignment, controlling the chaotic end-user comput-
ing environment, or the need to implement business process redesign, as was the case
with later Phases. A review of the literature suggests that the Ford Motor Co. procedure
used would have been fairly typical for this time (61). This consisted of a relatively sim-
p!e cost/benefit analysis, conEnec l. to the specific applicae; on. The benefits would usu-
ally relate to personnel savings, either headcount (a favourite term at the time) or over-
time savings. The costs were categorised as development and operational. Development
related to systems analysis and programming time, and operational costs related to com-
puter operators' time to run the application, consumables such as stationary, and a
notional cost allocation for computer processing time. A contingency figure was built in
to cater for inaccurate estimates.
The big impediment would have stemmed from the primitive development environment
at this time compared to that applying today. For example, the author developed appli-
cations at this time on a mainframe with 64k of memory, and over 200 disk drives of
500k each. An average PC today would have capability hundreds of times greater than
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this. (See 3.2.3) The effect of such restrictions was that applications had to be developed
by way of writing a large number of small programs - a recipe for errors and problems
of integration. Furthermore, the memory limits frequently called for programs, or parts
of programs (called sub-routines) to be written in the Assembler language, coding for
which is slow and difficult. Another common problem arose when errors were detected
at testing time or initial "live" running. As individual programs were usually written
close to the limit of available memory, correcting such errors often resulted in memory
being exceeded. This in turn called for either a substantial rewrite of the program(s), or
an additional program for the suite. Either way, the risk of system failure was increased.
Compiling and testing facilities were primitive, which frequently resulted in program-
mers taking the "it will be all right on the night" approach to modifications. These fac-
tors, compounded by the general lack of practical experience (computers were new, there
was little or nothing by way of collective experience), meant that the risk and incidence
of operational - particularly hardware - failure was high. On balance it appears that dur-
ing Phase 1, the simplicity of the applications more than compensated for the difficult
development environment.
3.5.2 Phase 2
The Complexity Issue
The integration of what had been standalone applications in Phase 1, together with those
coming on-stream in Phase 2, called for new skills in managing the cross-functional
implications of the integration. Even though major advances had been achieved in data-
base technology and performance early on in Phase 2, their practical application was
limited due to lack of familiarity on the part of systems staff, and an existing applications
portfolio based entirely on an earlier development environment. The major part of the
task therefore related to integrating Phase 1 standalone applications with one another, the
remainder to integrating Phase 1 and Phase 2 applications.
This called for a new range of issues to be addressed. The author recollects the follow-
ing issues at Ford and the Cadbury backup contingency site: (62)
(a) Consolidation of files: There would normally have been several customer and sup-
plier files.
(b) Consolidation of coding structures: Code for employees, customers, components,
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may have been in a different format in each application.
(c) Reconciliation of data definitions: Typically, a sales figure may have included VAT
in one application, excluded it in another.
(d) Identification of potential update/concurrency problems: During Phase 2, particular-
ly at the earlier stages, the bulk of applications were processed in batch mode as distinct
from real-time. This could give rise to operational errors when both applications used
the same master file.
(e) Introduction of new levels of security and access control: With cross-functional sys-
tems, security, access control, and confidentiality become more complex and fluid, call-
ing for more than technical skills for resolution.
(f) Implementation of enhanced audit capability: Cross-functional systems called for
more complex and intelligent audit procedures, and systems audit trails. This had to be
accomplished while maintaining adequate levels of confidentiality.
(g) Resolving issues of data ownership: The integration of applications introduced
potential inter-departmental conflicts over data ownership.
This is by no means an exhaustive catalogue of the issues involved in integration, but it
serves to establish the potential complexity of the task. Strassman has used the laws of
complexity to underline how rapidly problems of integration can assume enormous pro-
portions, as shown on Fig. 3.3. Taking his figure of 1,000+ for the number of informa-
tion systems in a typical major corporation, the scale of the problem can be seen, and
must surely have been a major factor in at least partially offsetting the advantages of
integration and continued improvements in the price/performance ratio (63).
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Fig, 3.3 Complexity and Integration
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Compounded maintenance and operational costs
The compounded nature of costs related to systems maintenance and operational support
was one of the most profound and influential determinants of IT performance during
Phase 2 (and indeed during later Phases). Peter Keen has highlighted the full signifi-
cance of this phenomenon, and described it in terms of great clarity (64). In essence, his
message is that every dollar spent in systems development, will automatically generate
$0.4 in maintenance, and $0.2 in operating costs in each of the following five years.
Therefore a $1 million expenditure will generate follow-on costs of $600,000 per year to
support the investment. The full implications of this will be reviewed shortly, but first
the numbers used to support such a dramatic claim must be questioned.
The first reservation would be that different industries, and different companies within
the same industries, could have widely varying ratios between development costs and
subsequent operations and maintenance. The second, based on the author's experience,
supported in recent discussions with other IT Managers, is that data relating to opera-
tions and maintenance costs for individual applications would have been very hard to
isolate. Keen addresses the first by stating that the figures are based on his work under-
taken over many years in a range of industries, and, given his reputation, this must be
credited with great weight. He does acknowledge that wide variances exist between
companies, but that the figures quoted represent a broad average. He addresses the sec-
ond reservation in a somewhat circular way, by in effect claiming that as such figures are
not tracked, he cannot be disproved!. While not having work papers available with
which to substantiate Keen's figures, in the informal discussions with DP Managers
referred to above, the consensus was that the figures mentioned were not out of line.
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(The IT Manager at Nissan Ireland, in a recent conversation with the author, recollects
that up to the mid 1980s, maintenance and operations costs on their in-house mini-based
applications consumed virtually the whole IT budget).
This scrutiny was deemed necessary, as Keen's thesis, if true, goes some way towards
explaining the lack of payback from IT investments during Phase 2, and indeed the•
impact continues to be felt through the persistence of so-called "legacy systems". The
full implications, analysed in the context of four alternative strategies, are brought home
in (Figs. 3.4 to 3.7).
Fig, 3.4 Strategy 1:  Maintain a Level Budget of $40 Million
Key	 Total Budget
Development Budget
Total Operations and
Maintenance Budget
Fig 3.5 
10.0 4.0 —1.6- 1.0 0.7
36.0 38.4 39.0 30330.0
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Result: Development has been cut by 93% but the overall budget remains the same.
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Fie 3.5 Strategy 2: Keep development level at $10 million
52.0
58.0
64.0
10.0
•
10.0
46.0 10.0
40.0 10.0
10.0 42.0 48.0 54.0
36.0
30.0
•
Year 1
AN,
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Result: Compounded budget growth of 15% per year, but no extra development.
Development has dropped from 25% of the total budget to 18%.
Fig 3.6 Strategy 3: Grow development by 10% a year
71.9
62.8 14.4
54.3 13.3
47.0 12.1
40.0 11.0
10.0
30.0 36.0 42.0 48.0 54.0
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Result: Compounded budget growth of 18% a year for just 10% growth in development.
Development now 20% of total budget.
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83.0
57.6
40.0
	.1
48.0
	nIn
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
ELILatrigza:
 Grow development by 20% a year
69.1
Result: Keeps development at 25% of total budget and rate of growth of both develop-
ment and total at 20%. This provides a steady balance between total budget growth and
development growth.
Strategy 1, which maintains a consistent overall budget, will virtually eliminate new
development over a period of five years. Increasing or even maintaining expenditure on
development would increase the budget by orders of magnitude over the same period.
Keen puts the natural rate of growth for applications development at 20% annually - on
face value a not unreasonable figure. The implication therefore is that this demand can-
not be met without enormous annual increases in IT spend. It partially explains at least
why the compounded rates of expenditure of 15% referred to above have not resulted in
appropriate financial returns.
While Keen does not offer a definition of maintenance, his inference is that it is essen-
tially unproductive. This is not always the case, in that some of what is called mainte-
nance could be classed as a form of development. For example, the provision of a new
report for an existing system might come under the maintenance umbrella, but in reali-
ty it is a form of development. Nonetheless, it can be said that maintenance is general-
ly understood to refer to tasks such as changing tax rates and pricing calculations, adapt-
ing systems to new platforms, integration issues etc., and it is undoubtedly this classifi-
cation to which Keen refers. While necessary, the work involved cannot be said to be
adding to the functionality of the system as originally specified. There is also the point
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that such a level of maintenance means that new developments can only be undertaken
in the context of major increases in budgets.
Strategic Alignment
Strategic alignment is defined in a Butler Cox Foundation Report as "a state of harmo-
ny between the goals and activities of a business, and the computer systems that support
them" (65). The report adds that it is self-evident that strategic alignment is a goal worth
pursuing, as "the most advanced and sophisticated computer systems are of no value
unless they deliver business results, which implies a degree of strategic alignment". In
Phase 1, strategic alignment was not an issue, as computer systems were largely confined
to automating existing manual tasks. These tasks, be they payroll administration, order
processing, or inventory control, were undertaken by clerks until the computer systems
were ready for introduction. This would normally be followed by a period of parallel
running between the manual and computer systems, during which the output between the
two were reconciled, until such time as the manual system was allowed to lapse. In such
circumstances, strategic alignment was not an issue - the systems were demonstrably
meeting a specific business need. This assumes of course that the manual work being
replaced was not itself obsolete.
Phase 2 was different. As businesses and their environments change, so does the need
for the supporting systems to change. Manual methods were flexible in this regard.
Clerks were merely instructed to undertake their duties in a way which addressed the
new requirements. The situation with computer systems was very different, especially
Phase 1 and Phase 2 systems. These could not be adapted or modified easily. The main
reasons were those of comp:exity (often deriving from socia: or po:itica: initiatives) and
compounded maintenance and operational costs described above, and other factors
would have been inadequate structures for handling the cross-functional aspects of Phase
2 applications, as well as inadequate (by today's standards) software development, in
that applications were invariably developed using third generation languages.
Strategic alignment thus became a problem, and it was a serious problem, although the
full implications do not appear to have been fully realised at the time (66). Businesses
were changing, but the capacity of the computer systems to support the change was inad-
equate. This was a key consideration in explaining why IT expenditure continued to
grow during this period.
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3.5.3 Phases 3 and 4
In that the installed base of Phase 1 and 2 systems would have carried over into Phase 3,
and indeed still exist in large numbers in Phase 4, many of the factors outlined above as
contributing to the Payback Paradox would have carried over into the later Phases as
well. This would be particularly true for strategic alignment, which assumes increased
significance, and poses additional challenges, as the rate of business change increases.
However, factors specific to the latter two Phases have emerged.
Information Management Issues 
(a) Data accuracy: Tibbets and Bernstein see difficulties in balancing end-user flexibil-
ity with the need for data accuracy and security (67). While many of the data controls
and verification procedures demanded by data processing administrators were seen by
users as bureaucratic and unnecessary (and may have been, to some extent), these con-
trols generally ensured a fairly high standard of data accuracy. Accepted norms of devel-
opment ensured that systems were designed to reconcile input, processing and output,
often by program to program verification techniques. Erroneous transactions were omit-
ted from the run, and returned for correction.
PC users were invariably unfamiliar with such requirements. Applications were devel-
oped in an unstructured manner, enabling inaccuracies to creep in. Once in, the lack of
a structured environment could result in the erroneous data infecting existing valid data-
bases.
(b) Data IntegriV: The causes of the data inaccuracy referred to above were basically
the same as those giving rise to problems of inadequate data integrity. Lack of training
in system design standards resulted in the same data entities being identified as differ-
ent, and different entities being regarded as the same.
Referring to user-developed database and spreadsheet applications, Bray suggests that
"these are usually riddled with inaccuracies, and the data they hold is either so disor-
ganised that nobody else can find it, or so insecure that it may fall into the wrong hands"
(68).
(c) Duplication of development effort: The new free-for-all placed users in the position
of being able to provide for themselves those long requested and rejected applications so
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important to their work. In the rush of development that followed, duplication of devel-
opment effort, and reinvention of the wheel became common (69). Typically, different
sections of the sales, purchasing and accounting functions might have need of a flexible
inquiry system for the product master file. Each would develop its own, independently
of the other. While each might require minor differences, many of the basic require-
ments would be similar.
(d)Misapplied usage of development tools: One of the most welcome arrivals in Phase
3 was the rich body of easily-used development tools. Spreadsheets, Fourth Generation
Languages (4GLs), report generators and PC databases represented development func-
tionality unknown in the mini/mainframe world. Undoubtedly, untold numbers of high-
ly beneficial applications were produced which, in the absence of these tools, may never
have seen the light of day (70).
But in the hands of inexperienced users, these tools could be applied with less than
impressive effectiveness. The National Institute for Management Technology repeated-
ly encounters, in the course of consultancy assignments, instances of spreadsheets used
for word processing or stock control, relational databases constructed without relation-
ships or indexes.
(e)Reduced systems security: It is bordering on self-evident that security in a PC envi-
ronment is below that applying with centralised systems. The inevitable rework and
erroneous information deriving from this would have given rise to business inefficien-
cies. As Tibbets and Bernstein put it "a vandal with a screwdriver (or a data-sniffer or
virus-infected utility) can cause terrible mischief' (71).
Operational inefficiencies: 
(a) Business disruption: The introduction of PCs, a network, and new software, in a
department of inexperienced users, causes considerable disrupti on, the scale of which
may have been underestimated (72). Direct time loss arises from training related to PCs,
networks and new software products. A lot more time, by many orders of magnitude, is
lost in trying to apply the principles learned on a practical basis in the work environment.
More insidiously, by impacting on the quality of service, this disruption would have had
an adverse impact on relations with other departments and, directly or indirectly, the cus-
tomer,
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(b) Purchasing Inefficiencies: The concept of the end-user handling his or her own pur-
chasing had an attractive ring to it. An end to bureaucratic red-tape, the direct user
knowing the exact requirements, closer relationships between the user of the software
and the supplier, quicker response times. Many, if not all, of these perceived advantages
were, and still are, genuine, but they have a downside:
Lack of integration: This was undoubtedly the most significant consideration. In fact,
the full impact has yet to be fully identified. The lack of integration could occur at a rel-
atively low level, for example, in users acquiring different word-processing packages.
The transfer of an employee to another job might require retraining in a new package,
with the associated costs in terms of lost time and direct training expense. Viewed from
the perspective of the total organisation, such costs could be significant (73).
Foregoing of bulk purchases: The cohesion associated with centralised data centre pur-
chasing does not apply at end-user level. This resulted in the loss of, or significant
diminution in, the opportunity for bulk purchasing discounts. Such discounts can be
very significant. For example, the unit cost for a site licence for a leading spreadsheet
package would represent but a fraction of the cost of the same package purchased on a
once-off basis (74).
Additional Factors for Phases 3 and 4 
(a) User expectations: The transfer of computing power to the user, and the resultant pro-
liferation of packaged applications software and user-friendly development tools gave
rise, to unrealistic expectations. "If I can buy an integrated accounts package for under
£1,000, and can develop a respectable budget variance analysis in a few days on my
spreadsheet, how on earth can the IT section tell me I must wait two years for my appli-
cation, and pay £20,000 for it?"
Such a refrain will be familiar to anyone who has worked in IT in recent years. It was
difficult to counter without appearing to be negative and nitpicking. Systems department
either had the option to stick to their guns, and relinquish further their control of appli-
cation development (and their share of the IT budget), or try to accommodate unrealis-
tic user demands. Too often, they chose the latter.
(b)Peer pressure: While surveys are likely to understate the extent to which purchas-
ing is governed by what the other person is doing (who will be happy admitting to that?),
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Automation of existing functions
i
Cross-departmental integration
i
there can be little doubt that IT usage by other companies, and colleagues within the
same company, plays a role in purchasing decisions.
Many organisations seek out what they perceive to be industry norms as a yardstick for
the level of IT investment. Ratios such as IT spend per employee, IT spend as a per-
centage of sales, or profit as a percentage of IT expense have been used as a basis for
identifying the "right" level of expenditure. Various reports, and annual special editions
of Information Week and Computerworld seek to establish a causal relationship between
such ratios and business performance. But such ratios form an inadequate rationale for
purchasing decisions.
Regarding peer pressure from colleagues, while quantitative evidence is not being pro-
vided, such pressure is self-evident. More powerful PCs, smart new utility programs, the
latest version of software packages, laser printers, all become necessities, not luxuries,
when the people across the corridor are using them, and extolling their virtues over cof-
fee. When the competition has the latest in IT, the pressure becomes all the greater.
A summary of investment criteria over the four phases in shown in diagramatic form in
Fig. 3.8.
Fig, 3.8  Investment Criteria by Phase
Phase	 Investment Criteria
Personal computing
Yi
Business process redesign
Cost displacement
Cost displacement/Intangible benefits
Management information/
Organisational impact
Organisational redesign
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Summary
The scale of change experienced over the four Phases has been nothing short of dramat-
ic. The cumbersome standalone applications of Phase I, developed and operated in the
glasshouse atmosphere of the computer room bear little resemblance to today's norm.
Major milestones along the way have been the virtual demise of said computer
glasshouse, and its replacement by the freewheeling world of distributed computing and
users developing their own applications. Of major significance in terms of IT invest-
ment appraisal techniques has been the sharp decline in the control of IT activities by the
finance department. With this has come a loosening of the heavy emphasis on account-
ing techniques to evaluate and measure investments, which in turn has provided the
opportunity for others to develop more imaginative and flexible methods.
The technology (more correctly technologies) have undergone an even more dramatic
transformation than the applications. Astronomical improvements in the price/perfor-
mance ratio in hardware and communications technologies and major advances towards
open standards have made technically and/or economically feasible innovations which
would a few decades earlier been inconceivable as business options. These develop-
ments have been paralleled by a transformation of the workforce from blue collar to
white collar, from manual worker to knowledge worker.
These decades demonstrate their share of paradoxes. For instance, on the one hand busi-
ness has throughout the period maintained a constant demand for improved systems sup-
port. Yet business has consistently failed to adopt new technologies. Some figures esti-
mate that 80% of all code written in 1992 was COBOL, the epitome of old technology.
Yet this only serves to underline one of the biggest problems in the field of IT invest-
ment appraisal - how to capitalise on the new IT environment while safeguarding exist-
ing IT investments. This issue is likely to represent a major problem for many years to
come.
The biggest paradox of all however must be the low level of IT payback when related to
the improvements in the technology, and the persistence of organisations in applying
appraisal techniques which were appropriate only for earlier Phases. This perhaps can be
at least partly explained by the rapidity and scale of the change, but it is not unreason-
able to assume that, while historical developments may have moved too fast to enable
new methods to be adopted, as Chapter 4 seeks to demonstrate, conventional account-
ing-based techniques on their own are not only inadequate in the new environment, but
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may in fact be counterproductive.
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Chapter 4.
A Review of Conventional Finance-based Evaluation Methods
4.1 Introduction
The history of business computing through the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 4 has
already been delineated. The nature of this transition, specifically the movement from
cost displacement applications to those providing information, rendered the evaluation
of payback from IT investment less clear-cut. As was also demonstrated, the growth rate
in productivity lagged sharply behind the growth in IT expenditure. It was further shown
that finance-based appraisal criteria still predominated in the investment process. This
suggests that a detailed re-evaluation of finance-based criteria is called for.
4.2 An Evaluation of Traditional Finance Based Techniques
The following is a review of the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvan-
tages of the most common finance-based techniques applied in investment appraisal.
The critiques are drawn from a range of sources (75).
4.2.1 Payback
Payback identifies the length of time it takes for a project to pay back the initial invest-
ment, and begin generating positive cash flow. Although useful as a back-up for the
more comprehensive analyses as outlined below, in it's crudest form it is a very limited
method as it does not take into account the overall profit from the project, discounting
considerations, the rate of return on the investment or any of the many other factors
which determine the economic viability of a project.
Advantages of Payback
(a) It is easily understood
(b) It favours projects that offer large immediate cashflows
(c) By emphasising early deliverables, it offers a means of coping with risk due to
increasing low reliability of forecast cashflows as the time horizon increases.
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(d) It acts as an effective means of capital rationing when the organisation has a critical
need to do so.
(e) Due to its simplicity, it provides a means of decentralising capital budgeting deci-
sions by having IS staff and other non-finance staff screen proposals.
Disadvantages of Payback
(a) It ignores all cashflows beyond the payback period
(b) It ignores the time value of money
(c) It does not distinguish between projects of different size in terms of investment
required.
(d) It can be made shorter by postponing the replacement of older hardware beyond the
appropriate replacement date, thus giving rise to misleading interpretations.
(e) It emphasis short-term profitability to the exclusion of long-term profitability.
(f) It ignores salvage value of equipment.
4.2.2 Net Present Value (NPV)
In the context of NPV calculations, net value refers to the benefits of the system minus
the costs. To refer to the present value of a project is to say that the values have been sub-
jected to discounting. The principle of discounting, or the time/value of money is con-
cept is fundamental to both NPV calculations, and to those for Internal Rate of Return,
as discussed in 3.2.3. An understanding of the concept is essential when assessing the
merits and demerits of NPV and IRR.
Advantages of NPV
(a) It does not ignore any periods in the project life, or any cashflows.
(b) It takes into account the time value of money - the main advantage.
43
(c) It recognises the benefits of early cashflows over later ones.
(d) It permits actual versus projected tracking during the life of the project
Disadvantages of NPVr
(a) It is more difficult to apply than Payback.
(b) Being more difficult than Payback, it is less likely to be used by IT and non-finance
staff.
(c) Unless modified by conversion to uniform annual equivalents and converted to prof-
itability index, NPV will give distorted comparison between projects of unequal size
and/or unequal economic lives.
4.2.3 Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
The internal rate of return, sometimes referred to as the discounted cashflow return
(DCFR), represents the interest rate at which the NPV is 0, that is, it measures the actu-
al percentage rate of return the project will achieve. Many companies have what is
known as a "hurdle rate" which is the minimum rate of return
Advantages of IRR
(a) It does not ignore any periods in the project life, or any cashflows.
(b) It takes into account the time value of money - the main advantage.
(c) It identifies a rate of return percentage which management can assess against other
business options.
(d) It favours early cash flows over later ones.
Disadvantages of IRR (DCFR)
(a) It is more difficult to determine than either Payback or (in the common event of non-
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uniform cashflows) NPV.
(b) It does not distinguish between projects of different sizes and/or different economic
lives.
4.2.4 Optimising the use of Payback, NPV, and MR in evaluating IT projects.
There are several ways of looking at this issue.
The Payback Period measures the length of time it takes to recover the investment.
Depending on the particular circumstances of a company, this could be the most critical
condition. It is certainly an important consideration, and as shown, can be refined by
using the system to discount the cash flows, and by basing the Payback Period on the
capital cost of the project. Nonetheless, used in isolation, the Payback Period does not
address either the amount of profit from the project, or the real rate of return. Once a
project's net cash flows have been discounted, the NPV measures the profit generated
in terms of present values. In other words it measures it in absolute cash terms.
The IRR on the other hand measures a percentage rate of return.
So the Payback Period measures the time it takes to recover the investment, the NPV rep-
resents the amount of money at present values a project will earn, and the IRR measures
the effectiveness of the use to which the original capital was put, i.e., the rate of return.
For a single project therefore, both NPV and IRR will give the same answer as to
whether a project is viable or not, because if the NPV is positive, it must have an IRR
greater than the discount rate used in calculating the NPV.
Assuming a choice of projects, an unlimited supply of capital and other resources to
undertake all the projects on hand, it is valid to select all projects with a positive NPV.
The same result would be achieved by selecting all projects with an IRR greater than the
discount rate used in calculating NPVs.
In the more realistic situation of inadequate resources for all the projects available, the
most effective use of capital must be sought. This is done by obtaining the IRR for each
project, and ranking them in order of return. Starting from the one with the highest
return, each project is selected until available capital is used up.
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The value Payback Period, NPV and lRR analyses should not be overstated merely
because they appear to demonstrate precision. They should be seen as an essential first
step, but no more.
4.3 Efficiency versus Effectiveness
The accountancy-based methods described reflect their Industrial Age origins, when
benefits were measured in terms of enhanced input/output productivity - the factory par-
adigm. Strassman describes the wide range of elaborate attempts to apply these tech-
niques to evaluating white-collar productivity (76). These include accounting and finan-
cial data, counting office forms, stopwatch studies, task sampling, computer monitoring
of keystrokes, standard costing techniques. These all suffer from a fundamental misun-
derstanding of what constitutes white collar productivity, which can be measured in such
terms only when it directly parallels factory style operations, for example, repetitive
activities such as invoice production and pay calculations.
But, as has been seen in 3.2, these tasks are now seldom undertaken manually, resources
instead being directed towards providing faster and better data, decision support facili-
ties, enhanced communication, and other Information Age benefits. This represents the
classic mistake of equating efficiency with effectiveness. An example of this confusion
is provided by Meyers and Boone, in which the authors cite a study by Booz Allen which
attempted to quantify management productivity. The study classified as "unproductive
time" such activities as "time spent outside or within a building or waiting for meetings
to start or a machine to become available"(77).
This represents a classical Industrial Age, task-based approach to productivity. No
attempt is made to evaluate the possible insights or inspiration a manager may derive
from taking a walk outside, and can it be said that informal discussions with ones' col-
leagues before or after meetings can on occasion be more productive than the meeting
itself? Another good illustration is that by Strassman, who cited the example of a cus-
tomer complaints system which greatly reduced the number of follow-up calls. This had
the effect, based on strict accounting measures, of reducing productivity, as measured by
number of calls handled by operator. Effectiveness improved, but efficiency disimproved
(78).
This underlines the proposition that conventional measurements may not only be inade-
quate, but may in fact be misleading when it comes to establishing what make an oper-
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ation perform more effectively.
4.4 Misleading Capital Values
Traditional accounting is not geared to capitalising applications development or data-
bases. This reflects the discipline's original purpose, which was to measure physical sys-
tems for delivering products and services. Vast sums of money may be spent on build-
ing such applications and databases. Keen cites the example of a bank which spent close
to $500 million to create its software applications, and well over twice that to build up
the related databases. Neither of these assets, central to the operation of the business,
and costing over $1.5 billion, appeared in the bank's balance sheet, since the accounting
systems treated them as expense items (79). When one considers that a newspaper title
has been deemed acceptable for capitalisation, it seems strange that valuable, long-term
software resources disappear into the black hole of expense accounting.
This question is not one of semantics. Even though they may not qualify as capital for
tax purposes, capitalising these assets can have significant impact. The most important,
as Keen points out, is that senior management, through being appraised of the scale of
the investment, may apply appropriate investment management resources to it. Keen
shows that the amount of time spent by senior management on IT issues bore no relation
to the ratio of capital tied up in IT. Including applications software and databases should
have this effect of making them apply more attention to IT issues. In any event, as
Vincent shows, information now meets most of the qualifications as an asset as demand-
ed by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (80).
4.5 Was agers: iong-ter=. !nvest:-_-ents
Accountancy-based methods have a built-in bias against long terms investments,
because the longer it takes for the financial returns to be made, the lower the present
value (NPV). Whereas this is correct in terms of the time-value of money, it tends to
present potential investments in IT infrastructure in a relatively unfavourable light. This
militates against the formulation of well structured IT strategic planning (see Chapters 6
and 9). Even at the applications level, short term considerations are likely to predomi-
nate, and, as Nolan and Norton and others have shown, benefits often take longer to
achieve than was originally estimated (81). -
4.6 Lack of integration
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As IT becomes increasingly integrated into all essential business processes, and end user
involvement continues to grow, (see 3.4 and 3.5) few applications are truly standalone,
most integrate with the infrastructure, or with other applications in some way, if only to
share a database or a printer via a network. As a consequence, evaluating potential
investments as discrete, standalone events, as accountancy based methods inevitably
must, is likely to provide an incomplete, or even misleading, result.
4.7 Encourages "Mycromyopia"
The terms mycromyopia was coined by Paul Strassman, and refers to the tendency to
derive satisfaction and comfort from "perfection in managing details" (82). While
Strassman's focus was on office efficiency in general, the same principle applies.
Accounting-based techniques bias the evaluation towards the tangible cost elements, and
those benefits which lend themselves to easy measurement. In other words, because
something can be readily quantified it will be included, if it cannot, it will be excluded.
This need not be a problem if it is recognised as such. However, the sheer volume of
statistics, and the precision with which they are applied, can generate a spurious appear-
ance of reliability. As Willcocks and Lester have shown, this can, and does, translate
into an equally spurious feeling of satisfaction amongst those responsible for the evalu-
ation process (83). Key areas of business value-added such as customer satisfaction,
quality, speed to market, and competitive response will never be approved on the basis
of measures which narrow in on the directly quantifiable.
4.8 IT Budgeting
Traditional accountancy based techniques fail to address the complexities associated
with IT expenditure and cost control, just as they do with investment appraisal. This
sterns from three mLn sources:
(a) IT seen as overhead rather than capital
Most literature on the subject today suggests that, apart from costs associated with large
hardware items, in budgeting terms, IT is treated as an overhead rather than as capital
(84).
Among the drawbacks cited by Earl arising from this are a tactical rather than a strate-
gic outlook, a short-term "stop/go" approach to expenditure, and an emphasis on con-
trolling costs rather than managing benefits (85). Earl also provides a taxonomy for mov-
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ing from managing costs to managing benefits.
(b) Failure to incorporate full lifetime costings for IT
As has been shown in earlier, Keen has demonstrated the impact of maintenance and
operational costs in the years following the introduction of an applications. Each dollar
of development cost will result in $0.4 maintenance costs, and $0.2 operational costs in
the ensuing years. Thus, in static budgetary conditions, these costs will inevitably form
an ever growing proportion of total IT costs, progressively squeezing out development
funds within a few years (86). By treating the development cost as overhead, this trend
is likely to be missed. Furthermore, the time-lags associated with realising IT benefits
are not adequately catered for through the medium of monthly/annual costs budgeting
techniques.
(c) By being rigidly focused on departments and divisions within an organisation, tra-
ditional budgeting techniques fail to incorporate the large and growing proportion of IT
costs incurred by end-users. Keen quotes a 1987 Datamation study, which estimated that
40% of IT costs were not included in the IT budget, and Computerworld provides simi-
lar figures (87).
4.9 Depreciation Implications:
The practice of depreciating assets is a normal and necessary part of financial account-
ing, which seeks to continuously represent the value of a firm at a realistic level. It also
has tax implications, in that depreciation charges can normally be offset against tax lia-
bilities. The normal practice is to depreciate assets in line with statutory (taxation)
requirements. For instance, where the asset category is permitted to be written off for
tax purposes over five years, a firm's accounting systems will reflect this. This process
is singularly unsuitable for handling IT assets, due to the unprecedented rate at which
upgrades are being introduced, and prices are falling (see. 3.2.3 (a)).
This is not just a matter of paperwork, it has implications for the effectiveness of a firm's
operations for the following reasons:
(a) Using statutory depreciation criteria, the book value of a firm's assets will be dis-
torted. As 50% of new capital investment may now be IT related (see 1.2.1), this dis-
tortion could be quite significant. The alternative is to keep in effect two sets of books.
While the practice of keeping two sets of books (one for the tax man, the "real" ones for
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private use) is hardly an innovative concept, it does impose operational constraints and
inefficiencies.
(b) Accountants are reluctant to dispose of an asset below its book value. But if, as has
been shown, this may not reflect the market value, IS managers can be constrained from
implementing needed upgrades. Frank Dzubeck, President of Communications Network
Architects of Washington DC is quoted as saying "It's a Catch 22. But that's what
accounting is all about. It's a joke" (88). This is somewhat unfair on accountants, who
in these circumstances may not only have to adjust current and prior financial state-
ments, but also arouse the interest of the revenue authorities, who look askance at the
disposal of assets before their depreciation date, particularly when the disposal incurs a
book loss. The effect however can be to impose constraints on IS operational operations
which are not based on factual criteria.
Summary
This somewhat brief review of conventional accounting based appraisal methods shows
them to be inflexible, geared towards assessing efficiency rather than effectiveness, inca-
pable of incorporating intangible or amorphous benefits, and weak on integration. They
will generally favour the safe, short-term investments as against the longer-term strate-
gic and infrastructure investments. Yet these investments may be essential for business
success. They also neglect the element of risk, which, as will be seen later, can be a
major consideration. These qualities remarkably parallel those which gave rise to the
present poor performance of 72 as detai:ec: earlier in this Chapter. This is to be expect-
ed, as in both cases they reflect their origins in hierarchical, task oriented, organisation-
al structures which are unsuited for today's business environment. These concepts are
treated in greater depth in Chapter 9.
This is not to say that such methods do not have a role. Return on investment, based on
realistic cost benefit analysis, is, particularly when discounted, a vital component of
most evaluation exercises. But it is only one component. The problem today is that the
formalised evaluation process in so many organisations continues to rely on these meth-
ods alone.
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Summary of Part I and Introduction to Part II
The introduction to the research theme focused on the radical business, economic and
indeed social changes which characterise the latter years of the twentieth century. These
changes, which have frequently been driven by dramatic advances in the price/perfor-
mance ratio of information technology, have raised questions as to the suitability of con-
ventional approaches to business organisation, which demand that companies be flexi-
ble, competitive and customer-focused. The period under review also witnessed a fun-
damental change in the role of information technology, from transaction processing to
catalyst for business transformation. The importance of IT in the new business environ-
ment was underlined by its growth in expenditure, which greatly exceeded that of non-
IT products and services.
Despite the increased importance of IT, and the fundamental way in which it was chang-
ing the business environment, traditional methods for evaluating IT investments still
applied. This was all the more surprising in that, despite the quantum improvement in
the price/performance ratio, available statistics suggested that IT investments were fail-
ing to provide a satisfactory return. The following paradoxical situation thus applied:
- business organisation was being transformed, at least in part, through a huge and
rapidly growing investment in IT
- this investment was failing to generate appropriate returns while investment evalua-
tion techniques were largely the same as those which applied in an earlier and very
different time.
The research objective therefore was to develop a framework for IT investment appraisal
appropriate for present conditions, and to test the acceptability and suitability of the
framework (in view of the low take-up rate of modern techniques) in a number of medi-
um-sized organisations. The research methodology was to develop an initial theoretical
framework based on existing methods and a review of the literature and practice, and to
apply this in a number of operational settings which would be used to identify further
refinements. The operational research was to be primarily by way of action research, but
was also supplemented with other forms and methods as demanded by the circum-
stances.
To fully understand the current impact of IT, a review of its evolution, from raw trans-
action processing to enabler of competitive advantage and catalyst for business redesign,
51
was deemed essential. This evolution, spanning thirty years or so from the mid 1960s,
was classified by way of a four-stage model, as it accurately reflected the significant
changes, and parallels the four decades of the time frame under review. The review
traced the evolution from the transaction-processing departmental systems of the 1960s,
through the inter-departmental systems of the 1970s, the dramatic impact of the intro-
duction of personal and distributed computing in the 1980s, into the business transfor-
mation role of the 1990s. Despite these advances, so-called legacy systems, old appli-
cations developed using second generation programming languages such as COBOL,
continued to dominate in terms of staff employed and code written. This served to under-
line one of the biggest problems in the arena of investment appraisal - one which is like-
ly to represent a problem for many more years - namely how to capitalise on the new TT
environment while safeguarding existing IT investments.
The investment appraisal techniques which predominated in each of those periods were
also reviewed. It was clear that the dramatic technical and application advances were
not matched by correspondingly sophisticated investment appraisal techniques, which
remained largely finance-based in practice, notwithstanding the availability of much
original research. In the light of this, a critical review of the main finance-based tech-
niques was undertaken.
The review identified a number of characteristics of these techniques, which were shown
to be inflexible, geared towards assessing efficiency rather than effectiveness, incapable
of incorporating intangible or amorphous benefits, favouring the safe, short-term invest-
ments as against the longer-term strategic and infrastructure investments - which may be
essential in the successful deployment of IT. While these techniques were useful as a
component of the appraisal process, used alone they were not only inadequate, but would
in all likelihood give rise to misleading results.
With the research gap clearly identified, the stage was now reached where theory build-
ing could begin. The starting point was a review of the literature to identify the latest
research and techniques. While a considerable degree of research was available, much
of it was focused on particular aspects of the problem, rather than on developing com-
prehensive frameworks. The main objective was to establish what the researchers and
practitioners saw as the key considerations or criteria to be applied in the IT investment
appraisal process. For each of the methodologies reviewed, the key criteria were iden-
tified, and, were assigned a grade reflecting the relative importance of their role as
assigned by the author/researcher.
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However, it must be emphasised that the objective was not just to identify those key
determinants, but to also identify, primarily for the benefit of the participants in this
research, but also for future practitioners, the key issues associated with each of the
determinants. These issues are examined in detail in Chapters 6 through to 11, with par-
ticular emphasis on their suitability for incorporation into the eventual framework. This
phase concludes with the development of a proposed framework designed to form the
basis of the field research.
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Part II Theory Building
Chapter 5. Review of Current Approaches to Investment Appraisal
Introduction
The central role now played by IT in most organisations, and the difficulties in achiev-
ing appropriate levels of payback, have given rise to a considerable degree of research
in the area. Much of the work however focuses on particular aspects of the problem,
rather than on developing a comprehensive framework for investment appraisal. The
following methodologies are critically reviewed, and the key underlying investment
appraisal concepts, either implicit or explicit, are identified.
5.1 Nolan & Norton 'Grey Cell Analysis'/IBM Strategic Investment Methodology
(SIM)
Nolan & Norton developed an approach to IT investment in the mid 1980s which sought
to identify poor practices in investment appraisal (89). Among the main problems iden-
tified were:
- Taking the short term view, which forces managers to think tactically rather than
strategically, and which fails to take into account that many of the benefits from IT
investments take a number of years to come to fruition.
-. Expensing investments in software. On the basis of their research which showed
only 20% of companies treating software development as assets, Norton & Nolan claim
that viewing IT as an expense places an undue focus on short term issues, and fails to
adequately represent the business value of such investments in the balance sheet.
The authors developed what they called the 'grey cell analysis' approach to identify the
most valuable investments for a firm. This was taken up by IBM and formed the basis
of their Strategic Investment Methodology (SIM). The technique is based on three
matrices. The first relates to a company's business functions and the critical success fac-
tors (CSFs) for that company. Each cell contains the value that the function contributes
to the particular CSF. For example, the supply and distribution function may be assigned
a value of 4 out of a possible 5 in relation to the CSF 'improving customer relations'.
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The second matrix assesses in what function IT investments should be made, based on
how well the investment can leverage that function. Grey cell analysis/SIM categoris-
es investments by type, for example Professional, systems which support key individu-
als, External, systems which link to outside organisations, customers, Infrastructure, sys-
tems which support applications throughout the firm. Thus Professional systems in
Marketing might be allocated a score of 5, as they are seen as vital in leveraging the mar-
keting function.
These two matrices are combined to create a third matrix which shows the strategic
importance of each type of investment in each function. The cells with high values - the
grey cells - identify the types of applications in each function for which investment is
appropriate.
5.2 Clemons and Webster's Seven Step Approach
E.K. Clemons and B.W. Webster provides a seven step approach to IT investments, with
particular emphasis on strategic investments (90). Prior to defining the approach, the
limitation of finance-based techniques are underlined, particularly for strategic invest-
ments. The authors first propose three steps to be taken before the investment decision
is taken:
Rank Alternatives: It is difficult to compute accurate estimates of business benefit,
investments, particularly for strategic IT investments. Accordingly, a form of ranking
may be more appropriate, based on detailed analysis of alternatives.
Use financial analysis where appropriate: As referred to earlier, the limitations of
finance based techniques are identified. However, the authors do see a role for sensitiv-
ity analysis where critical variables can be identified and quantified. This helps deal
with risk and uncertainty. Even though the limitations of traditional finance-based
approaches are made clear, the authors see a role for sensitivity analysis, especially
where critical variables can be quantified.
Balance many forms of risk: The authors identify five forms of risk: financial, techni-
cal, project, functionality and systems-related risk. They recommend that these be eval-
uated separately, with the capacity to manage the most severe risk being the main deter-
minant in the investment decision.
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The authors go on to make recommendations for optimising the investment once the
decision is taken. They recommend non-technical resources should be leveraged (on the
basis that the technology on its own seldom produces competitive advantage), that the
possibilities of co-operative development with other companies (even competitors)
should be investigated, and that, given the turbulence and unpredictability of today's
business environment, that maximum flexibility should be preserved for future courses
of action, which they see as a function of strategic systems and the underlying architec-
ture.
5.3 Peter Weil: Justifying Infrastructure (Architecture) investments
Peter Weill, in a 1992 study explores the justification of investment in infrastructure
(91). He defines infrastructure as "the base foundation of IT capability budgeted for and
provided by the information systems function and shared across multiple business units
or functional areas. The IT capability included both the technical and managerial exper-
tise required to provide reliable services". Chapter 10 will seek to demonstrate that this
definition is consistent with the term "Architecture" as used in the course of this
research.
Weill sees infrastructure investments as particularly difficult to justify, as they seldom
provide direct or immediate benefits, and such benefits may be dispersed throughout the
organisation. His research identified three perspectives commonly applied for invest-
ing in infrastructure.
An independent perspective, which views an investment in infrastructure as a utility,
being built by the IS function as an enabler or enhancer of their own operations. It takes
little or no account of the firm's strategic direction.
A reactive perspective is where an infrastructure investment is taken in response to a par-
ticular strategic initiative. While it may be based on a strategic initiative, its value is
measured by the immediate benefits it produces in relation to that initiative.
An interdependent perspective is taken by organisations that develop and enhance their
infrastructure in line with the firm's strategies. Costs associated with these investments
are seen as a business investment, rather than as an expense item, as would be the case
with the other perspectives.
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Weill therefore identifies three types of expected benefit:
1. Improved productivity of user groups
2. Leveraging other IT investments made by user groups
3. Enabling business needs to be made more effective
Weill finally proposes a model for of the role and value of infrastructure investments. In
discussing the limitations of conventional finance based measures for evaluation pur-
poses, he shows that these methods are particularly unsuited for assessing infrastructure
investments. The model envisages such investments being justified in four ways.
1. Where the investment is firm-wide, it leverages other IT investments made by busi-
ness units.
2. Where business units make infrastructure investments, they provide benefits such as
flexibility, shorter time to market, and reduced marginal costs of other IT investments
made by the business unit.
3. Business units can achieve operational benefits from infrastructure investments due
to their capacity to enable a process view of business operations to be undertaken (see
Chapters 9 and 10), which in turn provides better productivity, fewer defects, and better
customer response.
4. Infrastructure investments can also provide direct benefits, especially when applied
through the reactive perspective.
5.4 Options Theory
The Options Theory approach which has been developed by John C. Henderson and oth-
ers has infrastructure investments as its main focus, and is based on financial options the-
ory (92). In financial terms an option is described in the paper as "a contract giving the
owner the right to buy or sell a s pecified amount of assets at a specify price on or by a
specific date". In the stock market investors using options may pay much more for a
company than NPV calculations would suggest, based on potential for growth or prod-
uct differentiation, with the option of selling the stock, or buying more of it, as circum-
stances demand. Similarly, an investment in a new communications system may give
the opportunity to differentiate products, or make it easier to abandon unsuccessful ones.
A pilot test or prototype is another form of option.
The authors claim that the complex mathematics that underlie the theory enable finan-
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cial values to be placed on these options. They claim in addition that applying the
options theory forces management to address issues frequently avoided or downplayed
in conventional investment exercises. They cite time considerations (the longer the
option can be deferred is a significant plus, as many investments take a long time to
deliver benefits), rigorous risk analysis, strategic alignment (the theory cannot be applied
in the absence of corporate strategic assumptions and forecasts). Referring to the limi-
tations of the commonly-applied 'once-off' approach to investment appraisal, they
emphasis that their theory sees investment as a process, not an event, as taking advan-
tage of an option call requires constant monitoring of the business environment.
5.5 Sassone's Cost/Benefit Theory
Peter Sassone of the Georgia Institute of Technology has conducted research into IT
investment appraisal and measurement for many years, and has developed seven
cost/benefits methodologies based on his research (93).
1. Decision Analysis: Applications in this category would typically be a decision support
systems (DSS), often rule-based, in the areas of routine decision making, such as that
faced by an insurance claims assessor. The assessment method uses operational research
techniques as the basis for assessing benefits, and facilitates the comparison of expect-
ed benefits with those actually achieved. However, operations research techniques have
been shown to be potentially misleading except in factory-style situations, and Sassone
himself concedes that few applications fit neatly into this framework.
2. Structural Modeling: This calls for the modeling of a firm's inputs, outputs and
processes, and the process changes anticipated from the ap plication being evaluated.
The technique seeks to establish a link between the application and the firm's profitabil-
ity, can identify where the impacts are likely to occur, and may identify unrealistic
expectations. The technique appears to have limited application however, due to the dif-
ficulty in establishing convincing links between applications and profitability, inade-
quate source data, and the fact that each model is unique and difficult to explain to senior
management.
3. Break-even Analysis: This technique is applied when costs can be accurately quanti-
fied but one or more key benefits are intangible - a very common occurrence. It calls for
managers to provide a financial value for the intangible benefits. One way involves the
manager stating how much he would pay to obtain the system. This is then compared to
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the costs, which are known. Given the current poor levels of management understand-
ing of IT benefits, this approach is liable to produce misleading results, and should be
used only as an extension to other evaluation methods.
4. Cost Displacement/Cost Avoidance
This represents the traditional approach to justifying investments, and is applicable only
for older type data processing applications. Both the costs and projected benefits (typi-
cally headcount savings or overtime avoidance) can be determined with reasonable accu-
racy, and in this sense it is a useful technique both for evaluation and subsequent mea-
surement. However, appropriate new applications are now becoming increasingly rare.
5. Cost Effectiveness Analysis
This is used when it is not possible to measure or assess benefits in monetary terms, but
can be in terms management understands and accepts. It calls for specific decision-mak-
ing factors to be identified, measured, and weighted. While it may be more realistic to
rely on subjective management opinions rather than exclusively on financial impact,
nonetheless such a lack of rigour must limit its reliability. It is useful for the specific
types of project mentioned, and as an additional input where other measures may also
apply.
6. Times Savings Times Salary
This is a very rudimentary technique which simply takes the percentage of the employ-
ee's sa:ary saved by a system, and app:ies this percentage to the sa:ary to arrive at the
savings. As well as being very basic in ignoring the subtleties of white collar effective-
ness, it relies the questionable assumption that time saved has been applied to effective
activities.
7. Hedonic Wage Models
Sassone's Hedonic wage model stemmed from his research in 1985 among five compa-
nies, which lead him to the conclusion that conventional techniques for measuring the
effectiveness of office automation projects were seriously misdirected. The misdirection
stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the impact of such projects, which, he
showed, had the effect of not just speeding up task processing, but of changing the actu-
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al work practices. This in turn resulted in a mismatch between available skills and those
required to meet the new working environment. Attempting to capitalise on the new sys-
tems with the available skills profile was therefore bound to lead to less than optimum
results.
5.6 Keen's End-user responsibility and anchor measures
Make End-users Responsible
This is one of two approaches espoused by Peter Keen (94). The principle cited is that
in the light of the movement from centralised data processing to end-user focused appli-
cations, it makes sense for the end-users to define and be responsible for the benefits.
Keen puts this in the context of the IT planners being held accountable for the cost of
supplying the systems, but end users should be responsible for the benefits. He cites the
example of a bank which made a major investment in ATM machines. These, and the
related software, were implemented on time and within budget, but failed to demonstrate
satisfactory returns. While this was partly due to the inadequacies of conventional
accounting techniques the primary reason was the failure of user management to imple-
ment the relevant cost-cutting measures enabled by way of the new system. In other
words, they were not responsible for delivering the benefits.
Introduce Anchor-Measures
An anchor measure is defined by Keen as "an operational indicator of performance that
can be used over time to identify .. IT impact". Such measures are based on the overall
objectives of the firm, as defined by what managers deem to be important, for instance
customer relations, transaction cycle time and employee morale. Underlining the impor-
tance of management intent, Keen makes the case that a management team with cost
reductions as a priority would use annual cost of servicing a customer or processing a
transaction as a suitable anchor measure, whereas if market share were the priority, an
appropriate anchor measure for he effect-:veness of the !nvestment coukl be revenue per
customer.
5.7 CSC Index Cost/Certainty Matrix
The CSC Index group have developed a categorisation system to analyse which appraisal
method should be used for each investment (95). This approach is based on the princi-
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Fig. 5.1 CSC Index Cost Certainly Matrix
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pie should be evaluated differently. As shown in Fig. 5.1, systems can be evaluated
under four classifications.
Systems where the cost is low and the possibility of achieving the benefits high are
placed in the comfort cell. More expensive systems with a high degree of certainty of
achieving benefits are placed in the confidence cell. Where the cost and benefits cer-
tainty are both low, the system should be placed in the caution cell. Finally, where sys-
tem have a high cost and uncertain value they should be placed in the confusion cell.
Guidelines are provided for each category. For instance, systems in the confidence cell
are seen as appropriate for conventional finance-based criteria, for those in the caution
cell prototypes and experimentation are recommended, while business reengineering is
seen as typical of a confusion category investment, for which there is little by way of
methodological support.
An earlier report by The Butler Cox Foundation (Getting Value form Information
Technology, Research Report 75, June 1990) which now forms part of the CSC Index
Group, proposed several measures for evaluating IT investments. The approach seeks to
match techniques to the types of projects, and identifies several limitations with existing
techniques. It also identifies limitations with more modern techniques such as user sat-
isfaction surveys. The point is made that whi:e many of these techniques represent an
advance on those currently applied, they should be used with care. The report pays par-
ticular attention here to the use of ratios which relate TT expenditure to other business
performance indicators, such as company size, revenue, operating expenses, and non-
financial indicators such as capacity utilisation, plant downtime and level of warranty
claims.
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Regarding the investment process itself, five main business purposes are identified,
against which matching IT investments can be categorised and evaluated. The main
business benefits from each category are identified, while the main formal aids to invest-
ment evaluation, the importance of management judgement and the main aspects of
management judgement are then applied to determine the value of the investment. The
five categories are mandatory investments, those arising from competitive pressure,
investments to improve performance, investments to achieve competitive advantage,
infrastructure investments and investments in research. One category (Infrastructure
investments) is provided as an example in Fig. 5.2
Fig, 5.2  CSC Index Five Business Purposes
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5.8 Adolph Katz: Seven Point Framework
Adolph Katz proposes a seven point framework for Information Technology Assessment
(96). This framework distills an original set of 120 factors developed by Wilson (97).
1. Productivity. Efficiency of expenditure of IT resources.
2. User utility. Customer satisfaction and perceived value of IT services
3. Value chain. Impact of IT on functional goals
4. Competitive performance. Comparison against competition with respect to infra-
structure components or business measures.
5. Business alignment. Criticality of the organisation's operating systems and portfolio
of applications to business strategy.
6. Investment targeting. Impact of IT investment on business cost structure, revenue
structure or investment base
7. Management vision. Senior management's understanding of the strategic value of IT
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and ability to provide direction for future action.
5.9 Peters' Investment Maps
Based on research carried out in 50 companies in the UK, Glen Peters of Price
Waterhouse recommends the Investment Map approach to investment appraisal (98).
He first identifies three types of benefit:
1 Enhanced productivity, which includes headcount reduction, working and capital
improvements, processing economies, and general efficiency improvements.
2. Risk minimisation, which is seen as coming about through improvements in quali
ty, minimising accounting losses, reducing risks of failure, shutdown or litigation,
greater predictability and consistency of market share
3. Business expansion, which is viewed under the categories of consolidating existing
markets and creating new opportunities.
Peters also sees significance in what he describes as the "relationship or orientation of
the investment towards the business". He identified three broad categories of orienta-
tion.
1. Market influencing initiatives, such as the improvement of distribution channels,
increasing the percentage of repeat sales, and changing customer perceptions.
2. Business operations, such as finance, corporate management, order processing and
office administration.
3. Infrastructure, such as telecommunications, software environment and hardware
environment.
Typically, a company with cashflow problems would have an orientation towards busi-
ness operations, while one planning expansion would have an orientation towards mar-
ket influencing initiatives or perhaps infrastructure. Peters claims that the fact that "most
IT systems cover a range of benefit and investment orientation categories gives rise to
the concept of mapping these systems on a grid composed of the two parameters (i.e.
benefits and orientation)". This composite map will help identify the extent to which
the proposed investment(s) will be consistent with the company's objectives. Peters also
provides a framework for scoring the values for orientation and risk.
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5.10 Hochstrasser's Migration Path
Beat Hochstrasser offers a framework for evaluating infrastructure proposals and a sep-
arate one for non-infrastructure investments (99).
Infrastructure Investments
Hochstrasser's approach here is very basic, in essence proposing that the anticipated
business scenario in 3-5 years time should be defined, and an appropriate migration path
from the current IT infrastructure established. No tools or steps are provided.
Non-Infrastructure Investments 
The author proposes a four module framework for evaluating this category of investment
based on research undertaken at the Kobler Unit at Imperial College in London.
I. Corporate Standards for New IT Initiatives
This module is described by the author as "a set of critical success factors that all have
to be addressed before the proper process of evaluation can begin". He provides a tax-
onomy of such success factors, which include having a business sponsor, a clear defini-
tion of expected benefits, the establishment of responsibilities for data ownership and
provision, and the capacity to avail of existing experience in the company.
2. Awareness of Potential Wider Effects
This module seeks to identify effects not always considered in the IT investment process.
Primacy is given to understanding the true nature and extent of IT costs. The author cites
research which shows that an average of 30-50% of costs occur outside the IT budget,
and that companies consistently underestimate the total costs of IT investments, some-
times to a considerable degree.
Organisational and human costs are seen as particularly important, representing as they
do, according to the author, up to four times the costs of the associated hardware and
software. Again, a taxonomy of costs is provided.
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3. Business Performance Indicators
This module specifies what the author calls "measurable business metrics" (sic). This is
based on what he sees as the need for companies to measure more, particularly in the
area of IT performance. A number of reasons are adduced in support of this position.
The practice of evaluating on a longitudinal basis is recommended. To facilitate the gen-
eration of evaluation criteria and to standardise on evaluation criteria, the assigning of
proposals into one or other of the following groups is recommended.
• Internal projects, systems introduced to increase a company's internal operating effi-
ciencies. These can be frequently be measured in terms of financial savings, but
more frequently in terms of more effective work practices.
• External projects, systems introduced to improve a company's external effectiveness
can be measured by such indicators as market share, better or faster market intelli-
gence, or number of customer contacts.
• Cost replacement projects, systems which directly replace an existing cost, such as a
workflow system which displaces information intermediaries - a process easily mea
sured
• Economy of scale projects, which are systems introduced to enable a company to
handle higher numbers of transactions, another easily measured benefit.
• Economy of scope projects, Systems introduced to enable a company to undertake
an extended range of tasks. These are much harder to measure, but among the met
rics the author recommends are speed of new product development and the provision
of new products or services with same level of resources.
• Customer support projects: Systems introduced to improve customer service can be
measured provided the original objectives are clearly spelt out, for instance faster
response time to queries, fewer rejects, faster and more effective service calls
• Quality support projects, These systems can easily have metrics applied, such as
number of rejects, amount of rework, number of warranty claims etc.
• Information sharing and manipulation projects: These systems can be evaluated by
"relating the system to a thorough information flow analysis of key business goals".
The author recommends the use of a framework developed by the Kobler Unit for
this purpose.
• New technology projects, Systems introduced strategically to exploit the potential of
new technology, for instance home banking or the use of smart cards. The author
recommends a strong risk containment strategy for these investments, and suggests
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that, with them, metrics may have to be more loosely applied as the potential bene-
fits are likely to be much higher.
4. Project priority value
As the title suggest, the fourth module attempts to assign a relative order of priority
amongst projects competing for funds. In doing this it builds on work undertaken in the
previous three modules, particularly in regard to the full awareness of costs and risks. To
an extent the author sees this module as a form of consolidation of the previous three.
The author envisages each project being evaluated on the basis of a weighting which
reflects the company profile. No method for doing this is provided, although, given that
the author states it should be based on "the company's overall business objectives" he
would appear to have strategic alignment in mind. Four dimensions are provided how-
ever against which the investment should be assessed: the primary objectives that the
system is designed to receive, the potential second-order effects (Module 2), the strate-
gic integration into both business and technology architecture, and an assessment of the
risks involved.
The need for a clear set of corporate objectives is seen as essential for this Module -
"Management must agree on a consistent and relevant set of goals and a set of business
criteria against which the investment is to be measured".
5.11 Data Information Services Group: Strategic Systems Evaluation
The Data Ir_forx_atior. Services Group has developed a fra:r_ework specincely for eval-
uation of strategic systems (100). Their approach starts by reviewing the determinants
of a strategic system's value, and uses them as the basis for making the investment deci-
sion. This is supported by the provision of a range of potential risks and advantages of
strategic systems: This is followed by a series of investment appraisal guidelines:
1. Investment decisions can be made on a rational analytical basis, even when the num-
bers required for discounted cashflow analysis cannot be obtained. The primary alter-
native method recommended here is decision tree analysis.
I Thresholds established by sensitivity analysis can be used as trigger points for fine-
tuning a project once it is initiated.
3. Advantage results from unique assets and resources of the implementing firm. This
relates to the extent to which a strategic IT initiative can be replicated by competition.
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Specialised forms of deployment, superior human resources skills, and unique advan-
tages for a firm (such as a dominant market position) reduce the risk of replication.
4. Several types of risk exist, and must be recognised early in the evaluation process.
5. Technology investments may have option and timing value, and unanticipated upside
benefits. This relates to the application of options theory, which recognises that IT
investments provide options for enhancing a firm's assets and resources. The extent of
this potential determines the value of the investment under this guideline.
6. Downside risk arises from rejected IT investments, which then become strategic
necessities through another firm's initiative.
7. Co-operation may be the dominant investment alternative under conditions of strate-
gic necessity.
5.12 Investment Guidelines: Remenyi et al:
Dan Remenyi et al provide a comprehensive framework for evaluation and subsequent
measurement (101). The authors lay particular emphasis on the need to fully understand
the meaning of intangible IT benefits before evaluation is attempted. The authors see
intangibles comprising an ever increasing proportion of IT benefits, and state categori-
cally that "there are two and only two ways of evaluating intangible benefits". The first
is by negotiation, and the second by imputation.
Benefit negotiation is undertaken by asking a user to place a financial value of the ben-
efits anticipated from the investment. To accomplish this, a binary search is recom-
mended. This is conducted on the computer programming model, whereby an extreme-
!), !ow vaLie is frst offered to the user, and when :His is rejected., an extre:ney Hit_ one
is proposed. The binary search is then commenced, whereby the low value is added to
the high, and the result divided by two, with the process continuing until an acceptable
value is agreed.
An imputed benefit value is described as "one which is derived by calculating the
amount a system must be worth to the firm if it is to proceed with the investment and
earn its required rate of return". No guidance on relating the benefit to the required rate
of return is provided however.
The authors propose a five step investment framework:
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1. Select the criteria
2. Associate weights to each criterion
3. Score individual systems in terms of how they satisfy the criteria
4. Calculate a systems rating by multiplying each score by the weight and then
summing the total
5. Select the system with the highest score
The evaluation criteria are seen as being different for each organisation, but a number of
key issues are specifically addressed.
Strategic Value: This relates to the system's potential to create competitive advantage.
Several possibilities are referred to, including Porter's five industry forces, the firm's
own value chain internally, or the industry's value chain.
Critical Value: This relates to the system's capacity to enhance the firm's effectiveness
in the marketplace.
Operational Value: This refers to systems which enhance the efficiency of a firm's oper-
ations.
Architectural Value: This relates to investments which underpin or enhance the capacity
of the firm's IT infrastructure, such as transaction processing computers, telecommuni-
cations, and corporate databases
Investment Value: This identifies the direct financial benefits from the investment.
Risk Assessment: In referring to the importance of risk assessment, the authors refer to
the relative ease of identifying risk, and the relative difficulty in assessing its specific
impact on the proposed investment. They provide a very comprehensive taxonomy of
risk categories, but emphasise that the upside of risk should also be considered - i.e. that
things could turn out better than expected.
A spreadsheet model is provided with which to assist in undertaking the evaluation. This
proposes 25 decision variables, of which the 10 most important are to be selected. These
variables are then weighted in order of importance on a scale of 1 to 10. The final step
is to enter a score of between 1 and 5 to determine the extent to which the proposed sys-
tem meets these variables. The spreadsheet will then calculate a weighted score for the
proposed investment.
5.11 Ward's Portfolio Approach
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John Ward takes the portfolio approach to IT investment (102). The development of this
approach derives form a number of factors. One relates to the perceived failure to iden-
tify the true nature of IT investment contributions. A more important factor is seen as
the application by most organisations of a single method to evaluate all IT investments,
a method which moreover is based on standard capital projects where benefits are gen-
erally well defined.
The portfolio approach is based the 'strategic grid' originally developed by McFarlan in
1984 (103). McFarlan placed system in one of four categories as outlined in Fig. 1.
Whilst Ward alters some of the terms and definitions, the matrix is essentially as origi-
nally developed by McFarlan. (Fig. 5.3)
Fig, 5.3  Strategic Grid Analysis
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Ward provides a series of seven questions, answerable in Yes/No mode, by which bene-
fits can be identified (Example: If the development succeeds will it result in a clear com-
petitive advantage for the business? Yes/No?) and for those responses which are posi-
tive goes on to assign them to one of the four categories in the matrix. This exercise
should identify the relevant quadrant for the application.
Notwithstanding the value derived from classifying potential investments, some reser-
vations must be expressed on this. The seven questions proposed by Ward are, perhaps
of necessity, quite broad in scope. This gives rise to the problem of one question pro-
viding a positive response in two or more of the quadrants. In fact, such an outcome is
quite likely. As Ward himself points out, this can lead to confusion on objectives and
evaluation criteria.
Before finishing with a review of the potential benefits applicable in each of the four
quadrants, Ward seeks to establish linkages between this matrix and the five basic tech-
niques of evaluation identified in Information Economics (see below) Cost/Benefit
Analysis, Value Linking, Value Acceleration, Value Restructuring, and Innovation.
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In setting priorities for evaluating the investments, Ward identifies the need for some
form of 'strategic weighting'. He proposes that a series of objectives (for instance spe-
cific Critical Success Factors, cost reductions) be developed for each application, and a
weighting be established, based on a High/Medium/Low application contribution
towards meeting those objectives. The need for some form of weightings is underlined
by the tendency of, for instance, strategic applications to score heavily on Critical
Success Factors, while economic factors will score heavily on support applications. He
goes on to identify approaches specific to each quadrant. Many of the criteria overlap,
but this is to be expected given the somewhat arbitrary nature of the quadrant classifica-
tion - for instance the exact dividing line between a between a Strategic and Turnaround
application cannot be easily identified.
Ward finishes his methodology with a detailed treatment of the area of risk. The risk fac-
tors as they impact on each of the four quadrants are reviewed in depth, and three fac-
tors, rime, Quality, and Cost are identified as key to successful projects. A rich taxon-
omy of risk categories, factors and potential impact is provided, as are detailed ques-
tionnaires for evaluating the risk. Much useful material is provided in interpreting the
results of these questionnaires.
5.12 Farbey, Land and Targett: Evaluating Investments in IT
In "Evaluating Investments in IT", and in later work, Farbey, Land and Targett look at
how organisations make the decision on whether or not to proceed with IT investments
(104). The paper, which was based on research undertaken in 16 different organisations,
first identifies four objectives which the evaluation process may be seen as serving: The
first and most obvious is to establish whether the system may be justified in its own right
by meeting company objectives. The second enables a comparison to be made between
a number of different projects competing for resources - this on the assumption that the
evaluation is based on a common process. The third sees the evaluation process as a
possible means of controlling the investment during the development and implementa-
tion phases. The fourth objective is to provide a learning mechanism whereby future
appraisal exercises may be improved. They go on to identify seven stages during which
the project may be evaluated.
The system: The authors suggest that the evaluation method should vary according to
the purposes of the system. This must be seen as a questionable assumption, in that it
forfeits the element of consistency, making it difficult to compare systems competing for
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limited resources, and it undermines the organisational learning process referred to ear-
lier.
The authors recommended a five classification approach to the investment process.
Role of evaluation: The role of the evaluation varies according to when it was carried
out (the later it is, the more specific the measurement of costs and benefits) and the level
of the organisation where it was undertaken (the higher in the organisation, the more
strategic the focus).
Decision environment: The historical degree of success or failure had a considerable
impact on the evaluation process. The greater the historical success, the more likely IT
estimates were to be accepted, while a high proportion of unsuccessful implementation
resulted in a much tougher approach by management. Existing corporate culture and
procedures also played an important role in defining the choice of evaluation method.
The system: The authors suggest that the evaluation method should vary according to
the purposes of the system. They quote the example of a system which is proposed sole-
ly as an aid to revenue generation. If the evaluation methodology does not address this
issue, the results of the appraisal process may be misleading.
The organisation: The state of the industry (degree of competitiveness, turbulence) and
the leadership role of the organisation (whether it aims to lead or follow) are seen as fac-
tors affecting evaluation.
Cause' and effect relationships: The degree to which it is possible to predict the impact
of the proposed project is seen as an important factor. They make the contrast between
a payroll system which reduces clerical headcount, and a system which provides man-
agement with 'better' information. Clearly, the degree of benefit predictability varies
considerably between the two proposals.
In its final section the paper provides what is called 'a speculation' into matching a pro-
ject with an evaluation method, in the context of the five factors identified above. This
is done in the form of five 2x2 matrices, one for each factor. At the end of the exercise
these can be overlaid to provide one overall summary matrix. As the authors say, it has
no theoretical foundation, and is not based on any testable rationale. Nonetheless when
completed it provided what the authors called a 'sensible' choice of evaluation methods
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for the differing circumstances encountered.
5.13 Parker and Benson: Information Economics
Marilyn Parker and Robert Benson have developed a very comprehensive framework for
evaluating IT investment. It has achieved wide usage, particularly in the United States.
The theory is propounded in their book Information Economics (105), and has been
applied and extended by other practitioners in the field (106). Before applying the frame-
work, the authors go to considerable lengths to discover the true meaning of 'value' in
the context of information technology, an understanding of which calls for major
changes in perspective from both business and IT managers. To establish value requires
the identification of the net positive impact of the investment, which is the gross posi-
tives (such as improved cashflow, better market positioning), and also the negatives,
such as work disruption, training costs, possible staff demotivation.
The main underlying principle of Information Economics is the 'two domain' model of
the enterprise, comprising of the business domain and the technology domain. The
authors believe that this model will apply in virtually any organisation, joint stock com-
pany, government department, or educational establishment.
5.13.1 Business domain value
The following five classifications of business value are proposed:
Return on Investment, which is the traditional cost/benefit approach, with financial con-
siderations paramount.
Strategic Match is determined by the extent to which an IT investment might
support the strategic goals of the organisation. A taxonomy of Strategic
Alternatives, and related Strategic Focus measures by which IT might support the
Alternatives, is provided.
Competitive Advantage: This classification is based on Porter's principles,
which relate to the creation of barriers and hurdles against inroads by competi-
tors.
Management Information Support is admitted to be the leading example of a
hard-to-quantify benefit. Considerable support for identifying net value under
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this category is provided, and towards this end three sub-divisions are identified:
1. Traditional management support, which enables managers to control operational
areas more effectively
2. Strategic management monitoring, which enables management to monitor the
extent to which strategic objectives are being met
3. Strategy and the management of performance, whereby IT can support management
in differentiating their performance (on the basis that most organisations can replicate
the technical functionality of any IT investment).
Competitive Response refers to the need to invest in IT just to keep pace with
competitive actions
5.13.2 Technology domain value
There is only one category of technology domain benefit, Strategic IS Architecture,
which, "evaluates the degree to which the project is aligned with the overall information
systems strategies".
5.13.3 Business domain risks
Only one business domain risk is proposed, Project or Organisational Risk, which focus-
es on the degree to which the organisation is capable of carrying out the changes required
by the project. This is seen to depend on factors such as management support for change
and the organisation's maturity level in the usage of IT.
5.13.4 Technology domain risks
Definitional uncertainty assesses the certainty to which the requirements and the speci-
fications can be defined. It also assesses the complexity of the area and the probability
of non-routine changes.
Technical uncertainty assesses the capacity of the organisation's technical capacity to
undertake the project. Four categories of assessment are proposed, skills required, hard-
ware dependencies, software dependencies, and applications software.
IS Infrastructure risk assesses the degree of additional investment, over and above that
defined in the project, may be required for a successful implementation. The authors
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have in mind factors such as the provision of data dictionaries and additional telecom-
munications.
5.13.5 Scoring
The allocation by management of scores to the investment criteria described above form
an essential component of Information Economics. Even a clearly quantifiable financial
payback will go into the framework's calculations as a value judgement. This is required
in order to maintain consistency with other variables which are not subjected to quan-
tification, and which are scored on the basis of a value judgement. It underlines an
essential element of this approach which proposes that a financial payback cannot in any
case be viewed in isolation from other business and technology factors.
The scoring process rests on the assumption "that a strategy is in place.... and that it is
clearly stated and sufficiently understood by participants in the scoring process". The
need for consensus is emphasised. It is envisaged that while user department managers
(the business managers) and technical managers may initially score the project from their
own perspectives, 'benefit negotiation' should eventually ensure a final value that is gen-
erally acceptable. The scoring range proposed is 1 to 5, but the authors stress that this
can be tailored to individual company requirements.
5.13.6 Weighting
The factors described above may vary significantly in importance between organisa-
tions. For instance, Competitive Response may be of vital importance to a motor man-
ufacturer, whereas it would hardly be an issue in a government department. Some form
of weighting is therefore required in order to align the scores with organisational priori-
ties.
This calls for the need to define corporate values, and the authors propose two sources
for defining these values and translating them into weights.
Value based on corporate culture 
Corporate culture is here defined as "a shared belief system that consists of the organi-
sation's history, beliefs and values. It also embodies the viewpoint and values of senior
management". They see the need both to have this culture understood and integrated
into the investment decision process. Among the commoner aspects of corporate culture
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as identified by the authors are:
Organisation: Are reporting relationships hierarchical or flat, responsibilities
devolved or centralised?
Systems: Are planning and budgetary processes formal or informal, and moni-
toring and reward systems participative or dictatorial?
Resources: Are the acquisition and deployment of resources bureaucratic or
entrepreneurial?
Culture: what are the decision making processes and attitude to risk? Do long or
short term objectives predominate?
Value as a function of Corporate Mission 
The organisation's stated objectives are a vital source for allocating weights. This may
be obtained from an overall corporate mission statement. The authors cite an example
of a university in which IT proposals prioritised on the basis of scoring, had their rank-
ings radically altered when weightings based on overall objectives were applied.
Information Economics sees weightings initially decided on the basis of high medium
low classifications, but envisages these being translated into numerical values once gen-
eral agreement has been arrived at.
5.14 Strassman's Guidelines
In The Business Value of Computers", Paul Strassman traces the links (or lack of same)
between investments in IT and corporate profitability (107). While he does not propose
a formal methodology for investment appraisal as such, he does offer guidelines, which,
combined with those in an earlier work (Strassman, P.A., "Information Payoff', 1985)
could qualify as such (108). Given his high profile and powerful positions held (e.g.
Head of IT at the Pentagon) his contributions merit review.
In his 1985 work, Strassman provides a series of recommendations aimed at executives
with responsibility for investment appraisal.
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• Link technology investment to strategic goals
• Do not seek specific justification for hardware purchases - rather, see purchases as
part of a corporate project to deliver strategic, marketing, or product development
advantage
• Apply IT to innovation - do not just automate existing procedures
• Take great care not to underestimate personnel costs
• Insist on plans. These to include details of how people will operate after the system
is installed, and will state how the achievement of anticipated benefits can be veri-
fied
• Use IT to improve communication
• Choose investments that allow the user to expand the scope of his/her work, not just
increase the tempo of work
• Integrate IT specialists into the business domain
• Take advantage of vendors' specialised knowledge
• Measure productivity - benefits will be achieved only when they can be measured.
This often requires a new set of metrics
In his later work, Strassman begins by stating that most cost justification exercises fail
because they measure in great detail the costs that can be measured, and ignore or down-
play those that cannot. He adds that a similar problem arises in the benefits side, where
tangibles are emphasised at the expense of intangibles, even though the latter may give
rise to the bulk of corporate advantage.
An important element of his proposed approach is the concept that "each investment pro-
posal is unique". He goes on to suggest that the alignment of the proposed system with
organisational requirements only comes about with a deep understanding of what is hap-
pening within the organisation, and a similarly deep understanding of the impact of the
system on that organisation.
He makes the following recommendations:
• The goals are simple and the aims are in sharp focus
• Realistic financial analysis supports the objectives
• The desired improvements are measurable
• There is enough cash to afford to fix what needs fixing
He next addresses the risk aspect, which he sees as vitally important. "Performing risk
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analysis of computer opportunities is the most urgent challenge facing executives who
must make informed investment decisions" (109). He calls for the development of a risk
profile, which emphasises the need to identify the different levels of risk exposure apply-
ing at each stage of the project - a once-off approach to risk is not sufficient.
Strassman identifies four classes of risk (areas of uncertainty), Supplier Costs, Internal
Technology Costs, Internal Organisational Costs, and Internal Organisational Benefit,
and provides mathematical techniques for minimising uncertainty. These call for exten-
sive use of simulation and probability analysis, and are therefore heavily oriented
towards the quantifiable/financial approach, rather than the qualitative. In fact the author
goes to some length to debunk some of the better known qualitative approaches.
5.15 Other Frameworks
5.15.1 ISIS
IBM introduced Information Strategies for Information Systems (ISIS) in 1987. It is
heavily based on Information Economics, incorporating the two domain approach as
well as classifications of benefits and risk. It does however go well beyond this, in that
the consultancy services offered by IBM take into account the specific financial and
technical conditions applying in the firm using the methodology, and also applies bench-
marking techniques in the evaluation process. The proprietary ISIS model is a standard
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet with data layout templates and predefined computational rou-
tines. These routines ultimately provide a series of solutions designed to optimise
returns over the ensuing four or five years.
Even though it has been described as "the largest programme ever launched to aid man-
agement in evaluating the payoff from computers", ISIS has not been included in the
main body of methodologies for two reasons (110). The first is that, as referred to above,
it is heavily based on Information Economics principles. The second is that it is a tool,
together with related consultancy made available - free of charge - by IBM Marketing
staff. This has been described as IBM's new marketing effort aimed at swaying the
expenditures of its customers away from other capital expenditures and towards invest-
ments in information systems" (111). As such, its value as an independent methodolo-
gy must be open to question.
One valuable contribution it did make to the field however was its emphasis on the resid-
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ual value concept. ISIS models showed that the residual value of an investment at the
end of the evaluation period could vary significantly between projects. In The Business
Value of Computers Strassman says that "the effect of the residual value (calculation) is
remarkable. 59% of the value of the benefits accrues from cash flow beyond the plan-
ning period. Top management should demand large residual values from well conceived
technology investments"
5.15.2 Earl's Four Way Framework
Michael Earl's approach to investment appraisal begins with a comprehensive critique of
conventional finance based techniques. He finds that while these have value in certain
conditions, using them to the exclusion of other methods can be counterproductive and
give rise to misleading results (112). He also emphasises that different types of invest-
ment require their own appraisal mechanisms, and provides what he calls a Four Way
Framework for this purpose: (Fig. 5.4)
The first column represents the classification of the IT application, while the second sug-
gests the kind of goals that these applications might pursue. The third column represents
the nature of each use of the system, while the fourth column suggests the best evalua-
tion technique for the type of project.
Earl provides comprehensive examples of how each element of the framework may be
applied. With regard to Competitive Advantage, for instance, he states "the focus is on
product-market positioning. Goals relate to external as much as internal operations and
the ultimate objective is to cause competitive disequilibrium. Because they are innova-
tive and involve consideration of non-7 factors as wei: as .77 factors, they require com-
mercial judgement for their proposal and support". He adds that some form of strategic
analysis is the best way to validate this investment, but that this could be supported by
prototyping or by testing (e.g. restricted market study).
Fie. 5.4: Earl's Four Way Framework
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5.15.3 Narrower perspectives
A large number of researchers have contributed to the field, but have confined their
approach to a small number of factors, or even one factor. Ballantine et al have con-
centrated on the important issue of whether all investments should be evaluated using the
same technique, or whether different techniques should be applied according to the pro-
posal in hand, and conclude that the issue remains unresolved, and suggests that "a res-
olution of this issue can only be obtained by observation and practice" (113).
Several contributions have concentrated on the risk factor in the investment process.
Willcocics and Margetts "Risk and Information Systems: Developing the Analysis"
(114). The authors provide a framework for addressing risk under external factors, inter-
nal factors, content of the proposal, process (such as user training and commitment) and
outcomes. In what seems to be the most comprehensive review of the literature on risk,
Lyttinen and flirscheim identified 12 categories which explained information systems
failure. Their research suggests that the latest research tends to focus on organisational
issues in systems failure.
5.16 Consolidation of principles
This review of the main researchers and practitioners approaches has shown a wide vari-
ety of themes and principles proposed for investment appraisal. For example, some
approaches address only particular types of investment, as in the case of Weill and
Clemons and Webster, who focus on those related to infrastructure. Others, such as
Ballantine et al, and CSC Index, address the issue of whether the appraisal method
should vary according to the investment. Others concentrate on particular elements of
the process, such as Willcocks in relation to risk. A few (Parker and Benson, Remenyi
et al) provide comprehensive frameworks which seek to address all of the relevant issues
forming part of the appraisal process.
Overall then, a wide range of issues or principles have been identified in the course of
this review, and are summarised in descriptive form in Fig 5.5 and in terms of the impor-
tance assigned by the relevant researchers in Fig. 5.6.
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Fig. 5.5 Summary Descriptions of Key Concepts
CONCEPT RATI
Strategic
Alignment
PaYbWi
Architecture
Risk
Business
Redesign
Weighting
Scoring
Probability
Sensivity
Analysis
Investment
Scope
Timing
The extent to whichthe proposed investment suppotts media-a/longterm
alignmera between a company's goals and activkies and the computers which
support them
The provision. of direct benefits, such as reduced costs and increased revenue
The impact of the investment oaths company's hardware, soltvwe and com
munications facilities in areas such as integration, future-proofing, fleonbility
and security
The risks associated \frith implementing the proposed investment
The cwa.city of the proposed imestrrert to &ciliate or impede business
process reassign
Thu concept of assignil var3rtg degrees of ircportance to each investment
criterion
The concept of managemerd assigning vale judgment scores in assessing the
potential value of the investment
The recogntiontht the chances of some benefits and risks have a grezter
chance of occurring than others, andthe assigning of staisticalfwtors to
reflect this
The concept of applying 'villa-of' scenarios to irportant variables tabs
appraisal =amiss
The issue as to whether rrod.em IT investments can be evaluated as discrete
entities, given tha most undergo conttusus change and integrate with other
applications
The impact oaths timing of the investrnent (e.g. early might tcur technologi-
cal risk, late might mean loss of competitive advantage)
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Fig. 5.6 Relevant Importance Assigned to Key Concepts
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Summary
A consolidation of the main principles emerging from the foregoing review is outlined
on Fig. 5.5., and their implications for the proposed framework are reviewed in detail in
the following six chapters. As referred to in the "Overview of Research Methodology"
(Chapter 2.1.1), the number of approaches to the issue of investment appraisal and pay-
off is extensive, as is the variety of solutions proposed. Nonetheless, as Fig 6.1 shows,
certain criteria predominate. One remarkable conclusion from the foregoing review is
to the effect that few comprehensive methodologies are proposed. Many researchers
address particular aspects of the investment appraisal process, or particular forms of
investment (e.g., strategic or infrastructure), but apart from Information Economics,
ISIS, and the framework proposed by Remenyi et al, there are few really comprehensive
guides taking management through the whole appraisal process on a step-by-step basis.
The primary value of the literature research has been the comprehensive coverage of the
issues affecting the process, and the identification of the merits and demerits of the var-
ious options.
One significant factor has been omitted from all approaches however. That is business
reengineering, or process redesign. While a relatively new concept, its impact on busi-
ness organisation, and in particular its strong dependence on IT, underline its relevance
to the evaluation process. This is discussed further in the next chapter, and in detail in
chapter 9, but the framework deriving from this research differs substantially from all
others in formally incorporated process redesign as part of the evaluation process.
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Chapter 6: Strategic Alignment
6.1 Introduction
Strategic alignment has been described as "a state of harmony between the goals and
activities of a business and the computer systems that support them" (115). This subject
has attracted considerable attention in the literature, and continues to be "amongst the
topics of foremost concern to executives involved with system issues" (116). The fol-
lowing two factors in combination are likely to have contributed to this level of atten-
tion.
(a) that the degree of strategic alignment is a major determinant of payback from IT
investment (117).
A 1991 survey by Prenlcummer and King shows that among 245 firms in a variety of
industries in the US, ranging in size from $500 million to $5 billion annual revenue,
those with strong business/IT alignment performed more effectively in five kinds of
business contribution - return on investment, market share, internal efficiency, sales rev-
enue, and customer satisfaction (118).
(b) very few organisations have succeeded in aligning their business and IT strategies.
A 1990 survey shows the following levels of business/IT linkages (119).
10% inextricably linked
32% somewhat linked
42% only tenuously linked
16% totally isolated
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Fig, 6.1  IT and Business Linkages
And this lack of alignment can give rise to many problems. Ward et cd cite the follow-
ing negative impacts arising from a lack of alignment between IT and business strategy
(120):
• systems and technology investments do not support the business objectives, leading
to lost business opportunities and constraints on business development.
• duplication of effort, inaccuracy, delay, and inadequate information for managing the
business.
• IT priorities are not based on business needs.
• incompatible IT options are selected, and time and money are wasted in retrospec-
tive attempts at integration.
• lack of understanding and agreed directions between users, senior management and
IS/IT specialists leads to Conflict and misuse of resources.
A leading US consultant has stated that "in my experience over fifteen years dealing with
customers, my reading on the matter, and in the opinion of leading scholars on strategic
planning, the major problem confronting business today is the lack of both a strategic
planning process, and the lack of an integrated plan which should include the IS func-
tion as its nerve centre" (121). This suggests that strategic alignment forms a central ele-
ment in the IT investment appraisal process.
6.2 Has Strategic Alignment a future?
A process of identifying management and business objectives along the lines described
is essential, as it is bordering on the self-evident that if firms do not have their own busi-
ness strategies defined, IT strategic alignment must be an impossibility. But the volatil-
ity of today's business environment, and the speed and unpredictable nature of techno-
logical change, make strategic planning for both business and IT a hazardous exercise.
In attempting to link the two, the laws of complexity come into force, making the task
exponentially more difficult. Some commentators argue that the task is impossible.
Alu-am Yosri, a consultant and lecturer at New York University, argues as follows:
"Rapid changes in information technologies, particularly software, coupled with eco-
nomic constraints and fierce market competition are making ... long-range planning
obsolete. Current conditions are just too volatile for anyone to predict technology needs
beyond the short term" (122).
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Certainly, fundamental changes with unpredictable outcomes are underway today. Four
such "paradigm shifts" have been identified by Tapscott and Caston (123).
(i) The change in the world economic and political order. "No one is really sure what that
change is or where it is going... The world is opening up and is volatile".
(ii) "A related shift is occurring in the business environment and marketplace... Markets
and national economics are being transformed. Old rules are disappearing, as are walls
to competition".
(iii) The change in the nature of organisations. Survival in the new environment calls
for the new organisation to be dynamic and flexible. The structure will be flat and team-
oriented, rather than hierarchical. "It is based on commitment rather than control.
Business processes are streamlined for productivity and quality".
(iv) Technology will be the key enabler of the new business paradigm, and technologi-
cal changes parallel the other shifts, becoming open, dynamic and flexible. "It works
like people do, integrating data, text, voice., and provides a backbone for team-oriented
business structures. It blurs walls between enterprises, enabling the recasting of exter-
nal relationships".
These shifts are already taking place. Marchand and Horton cite Citicorp's recent expe-
rience as an example of turbulence: "In a turbulent economy, the identity of a company
may change over time and in turn alter the priority given to its mix of resources. For
example, over the last ten years, Citicorp has shifted its corporate identity from a bank
to a financial services firm, and finally to an information company that provides diverse
financial information and investment services" (124). Galoob Toys has grown to be a
$60 million company with just 115 employees. This is accomplished by having the man-
ufacturing undertaken by contractors, who in turn directly supply the customers via inde-
pendent distribution companies (125). Accounts receivable processing is handled by a
factoring company. This radical approach, and Citicorp's transformation were both
facilitated by, and heavily dependent on, information technology, particularly networks.
The experience of the Irish Electricity Supply Board (ESB) provides an example of a dif-
ferent impact from turbulence - in this case EU competition laws. The IT Training
Department, which provided in-house training in IT issues to ESB staff, were given
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notice in early 1994 that it would have to become self-financing within two years. As
one of their senior staff put it "we had some idea that moves along these lines might be
forthcoming, but never this!". In a short time the unit will have to compete with exter-
nal training companies for ESB business - while carrying a heavy overhead stemming in
no small part from investments in legacy systems.
While acknowledging the significance of these changes, they should not invalidate the
concepts of strategic planning and alignment, only the rigid process that took place every
few years, and which became associated with these concepts. Citing the results of a
major survey into strategic planning practice in the United States, Wilson cites as his
"most provocative conclusion" that organisational and cultural issues have become "crit-
ical ingredients" of the strategic planning process in a way inconceivable using in tradi-
tional methods. He also cites the need to depart from the practice of using a single
methodology for the planning process, with a multi-faceted approach providing the
capacity to tolerate and adapt to the turbulence and unpredictability of today's business
environment (126).
6.3 The Strategic Environment
A large number of frameworks for evaluating the strategic environment is available
(127). The work of Ward et al (which in turn drew on structures developed by John
Constable of the Cranfield School of Management) provides a suitable foundation for
placing the strategic environment in the context of IT investment (128).
7.3.1 The External Business Environment
The Economy
Few businesses are immune to the effects of national and world economic trends.
Wriston shows how economic growth, interest rates, the shift in economic power to the
Pacific rim, developments in free trade/protectionism, and the globalisation of trade all
affect decisions on the location, scope and technologies of IT investments (129).
Society
Societal changes such as demographic trends may need to be addressed in the context of
a business plan. One such trend discernible in the more advanced economies is ageing
of the population (130). This reduces the economically active proportion of the popula-
tion, imposes demands on pensions and health care facilities, as well as introducing
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major changes in buying patterns.
Politics
Political events can have a significant impact on business plans. The changes unleashed
by the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union provide both
opportunities and threats for many businesses, as do such events as the move towards
greater cohesion among trading partners in Europe and North America, and shifts in the
balance of power between right-wing and left-wing governments (131).
Law
Legal changes can not only impact individual companies, but can change whole indus-
tries, as occurred with this Act. There continues to be a strong growth in environmental
legislation, which has potentially major repercussions for such industries as chemicals
and power utilities.
Technology
In no other sphere has the rate of change been so rapid as that in technology, particular-
ly information technology. (See Chapter 3 ) The face of computing has been transformed
over the last ten years, as distributed desktop computing has moved much control from
the computer room to the end user. Of more significance is the capacity for IT to pro-
vide the possibility of significant competitive advantage, and to redesign business
processes. (See Chapters 6 and 8).
Summary
The potential impact on business plans arising from the external environment calls for it
to be Monitored closely and regularly. This underlines the need for managers to have
access to reliable, up-to-date information, with appropriate filtering, presentation, and
decision support capabilities.
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Pressure Groups 
Customers
In today's business environment, customers represent the paramount pressure group
(132). Today, the customer is king. This derives from such developments as deregula-
tion, which has opened up a new world of prices and choice, globalisation, which intro-
duces new sources of supply, often accompanied by more attractive pricing and quality,
while productivity improvements deriving from technological advances have led to
oversupply in many markets. Many analysts believe that the process of defining busi-
ness objectives should begin and end with the customer (133).
Competitors, Suppliers
These also represent important pressure groups, each interacting in its own way. The
variety of potential pressure points is virtually limitless, and would depend very much
on a company's strategic position in the market. For example, General Motors was big
enough to force suppliers to adhere or change to certain computing and EDI standards
(134). Looked at from the perspective of a GM supplier forced to fundamentally alter its
IT architecture, this particular pressure would have major significance.
The Media
There has been an increase in the power, influence, and investigative capability of the
media in recent years, particularly in the case of financial journalists. Company perfor-
mance is being subjected to increasingly rigorous scrutiny, a scrutiny which can trans-
late into direct impact at the Annual Meeting. The media is also taking, almost certain-
ly with good reason, an increasing interest in irregular financial activities and breaches
of environmental and health regulations (135).
Shareholders
Shareholders, particularly those in large public companies, have seldom exerted much
influence in operational or even strategic issues, but this would appear to be changing as
well. Particularly noticeable here is the practice of large institutional shareholders, such
as pension funds and insurance companies to look for credible strategic business plans
before investing. It too early yet to fully ascertain the impact of the rash of privatisa-
tions in recent years, which has significantly changed the profile of the typical investor
(136).
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Government
Government pressure may take the form of taxation initiatives, grants and subventions
(sources of competitive advantage/disadvantage) health and environmental legislation,
trade barriers and import/export regulations.
Financial Institutions
The capacity to lend - and call in - money affords financial institutions enormous pres-
sure on businesses, as does the capacity to adjust interest rates and other lending condi-
tions.
Unions and Employees
As organisations move from factory-based production to information-based services,
and as unemployment levels continue to remain high, the power of unions has declined
markedly, with union membership in the US being at an all time low (137). However,
unions represent a legitimate interest, and still hold substantial power in many industries.
The literature shows that most observers recommend the practice of involving staff and
their representatives as far as is practicable in the formulation of business plans and
when evaluating planned investments in IT.
Summary
This listing of pressure groups shows that, for the most part their capacity to exert pres-
sure is increasing, and that this pressure can be significant. Many of these groups have
an interest in the well-being of the relevant companies, or at a minimum, their involve-
ment is not necessarily hostile. Ward et al are surely correct then in claiming that "in a
competitive environment, the company that understands the needs of external pressure
groups, and reacts to them, or exploits them most effectively, will succeed in the longer
term" (138). Given the extent to which IT has now become part of all essential business
processes, the extent to which these pressure groups are taken into consideration in eval-
uating potential investments in IT is likely to be important.
6.3.2 The Internal Business Environment
Current position of the organisation
The evaluation of the external environment needs to be followed by an evaluation of the
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corporate or organisational position as it currently applies. One approach is to analyse in
the context of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, the so-called SWOT
analysis (sometimes referred to as TOWS analysis). A typical SWOT analysis would
assess a firm in the light of:
• financial status, including debt/equity ratio, liquidity, borrowing capability
• condition of products and services in terms of quality, lifespan (are products or ser-
vices becoming outdated?) and relevance to market
• quality, motivation, and experience of staff
• organisational structures (are these consistent with present day business require-
ments?)
• the relative strength of the firm's position in the marketplace
• the possibility of introducing new products, services, or business units
• the possibility of entering new markets (e.g. arising from international trading agree-
ment)
• the risk of new competitive challenges (drive for increased market penetration, new
products or services, access to home market via international trade agreement)
An alternative, or more accurately supplementary, approach may be to view this issue in
terms of corporate imperatives. Vincent defines corporate imperatives as arising "from
those few key areas of business activity in which positive results are essential to the suc-
cess of the enterprise. They come, consciously or unconsciously, from the corporation's
organising principle, driving force, environment, and market. They are based on the cor-
poration's products, services, goals and objectives, and on management's assumptions"
(139).
Management Objectives
With a realistic set of business objectives now to hand, the next step in the process of IT
investment calls for a mechanism for decomposing them into lower level, more clearly
defined objectives, and thereby focus on potential IT investments.
While many approaches and methodologies are available, one of the most widely used
is the Critical Success Factor (CSF) approach of John Rockart. Rockart defines critical
success factors as "the limited number of areas in which results, if they are satisfactory,
will ensure successful performance for the organisation. Critical success factors are the
few key areas where things must go right, for the business to flourish. If results in these
areas are not adequate, the organisation's efforts for the period will be less than desired"
(140). It can be seen that this definition closely resembles that of corporate imperatives
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quoted above.
As described earlier, a key component of this research is the need to develop an approach
to investment appraisal which will be applicable in an everyday business environment.
This in turn demands that, to the maximum practicable extent, undue complexities are
avoided. A derivative of the CSF/corporate imperatives approach is therefore proposed,
as it is straightforward, adaptable, and, importantly, can be applied at various levels of
the organisation. This latter capability assists greatly in the crucial task of linking busi-
ness objectives with IT opportunities in a consistent manner throughout the organisation.
This is a core requirement for aligning business and IT strategies (141).
A weakness in the formal CSF approach is that it does not account for the possibility of
varying assumptions arising between managers of different departments or divisions. In
the author's experience, a formal strategic plan does not necessarily negate this risk.
Vincent puts it as follows: "executives from (different) functional areas of the business
focus on their critical areas, each assuming that the balance of senior management under-
stands. As a result, when these executives meet and converse, they are making assump-
tions about the knowledge and understanding of the various critical elements of each
functional area. In fact the assumed knowledge and understanding seldom exists"
(142).
6.4 Aligning IT and business strategies
The processes such as those detailed in 2 above in their relevance to today's business and
technological environment resemble in many ways the relevance of the financial
accounting measures (IRR, NPV and cost/benefit analyses) described in Chapter 4. It
was seen that these measures, which originated in more stable and less complex times,
still had a role in the investment process - albeit a much reduced one. It was also shown
that reliance on these methods alone, under the misapprehension that they represented a
comprehensive framework, could give rise to damaging consequences. In the same way,
conventional business planning and alignment strategies require more sophisticated
approaches which reflect the realities of the 1990s.
Some of the key issues are:
Architecture
As discussed in Chapter 9, the architecture is described as "a company's computers, soft-
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ware, databases, telecommunications, programming languages and operating systems
and the relevant standards for each of these entities". The architecture to a large extent
defines what a company can achieve, not only in IT, but also in business terms. Clearly
then, providing an appropriate architecture must be seen as an essential enabler of strate-
gic alignment. Component issues needing to be addresses are those related to outsourc-
ing, centralisation versus decentralisation, the ramifications of open systems and possi-
bly the migration from legacy applications. These are reviewed in more detail in
Chapter 9.
Repositioning the systems activity
Aligning IT in the Phase IV environment (see Chapter 3) requires new skill sets from
systems staff and possibly a repositioning of the systems activity. One research report
states that "systems specialists responsible for systems definition should be part of the
management team in the business units", while Earl describes it as a "embracing the
marketing concept rather than adopting a production mentality" and sees it as a major
challenge for most organisations (143).
Anticipating Technological Change
When one considers the extent to which technology forecasts have traditionally been
wide of the mark, and the increasing rate of development, anticipating technological
change may seem a hazardous exercise. It would appear to be an essential one howev-
er. Ward et al state that "it is precisely because the technology is changing so quickly
that organisations need some form of strategy rather than react to every change in tech-
nology" (144).
Security, privacy and disaster recovery
This in many respects is the Cinderalla issue of many organisations, but it is assuming
increasing importance, principally due to the closer electronic integration between com-
panies, and their ever-increasing dependence on IT (145). Management will increasing-
ly be called upon to define balances between providing adequate cover on these issues,
and minimising the extent to which such measures impede normal business operations.
Senior management sponsorship and involvement
There is universal acceptance in the literature that the active involvement and support of
senior management is essential for successfiilly aligning business and IT strategies, but
as seen earlier, such involvement is by no means guaranteed. This is in many ways the
corollary of the need to reposition the systems activity, and may prove as difficult. Their
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role according to Hickey, is "to set overall policy, objectives, priorities, and - most
importantly - have to decide on allocation of scarce resources" (146). Senior IS man-
agers recognise the strategic significance of this requirement. In a survey of the top 20
strategic IT issues undertaken by the Society for Information Management, "educate
senior management" came second, superseded only by the need to "reshape business
processes" (147).
Summary
As IT takes on a role of ever increasing importance in today's business environment, so
the need to align IT with the business assumes grows more urgent. The rapid rate of
change in both environments poses many difficulties in achieving this however, and
demands profound change in the way such issues have been traditionally approached.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the linkage between effective deployment of IT and
IT's alignment with the business (strategic alignment), demands that this objective be
placed high on the corporate agenda. As with all profound change, it carries risks.
Defining business objectives in the traditional ways, as outlined earlier in this chapter,
are no longer adequate in themselves, representing merely a first step in the process. As
Keen puts it "Instead of focusing or organisational structure, business today needs to
look at the mechanisms that make communication simple, flexible, and natural. IT
makes practical many of the visions of management thinkers" (148). This linkage makes
strategic alignment an essential perspective for IT investment appraisal.
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Chapter 7. Payback
7.1. Introduction
Payback differs from other perspectives in that it seeks to identify direct benefits from
proposed investments, that is, the value of the anticipated benefits less the value of the
anticipated costs. As will be shown, other perspectives have a vital bearing on the
investment process - for instance an investment might provide immediate payback in
terms of cost savings, but may be based on an architecture which has no future in tech-
nological terms, or which does not integrate with existing systems. In such an event, the
architectural perspective indicates that the investment may not be worthwhile, despite
the capacity for payback. Despite this, payback continues to dominate other factors in
terms of investment appraisal (149).
The pervasiveness of information technology provides many opportunities for payback.
As Porter and Millar put it, IT "is permeating the value chain at every point, transform-
ing the way value activities are performed and the nature of linkages between them. It
also is affecting competitive scope and reshaping the way products meet buyer needs"
(150). The payback perspective will therefore examine the nature of the elements that are
seen to contribute towards payback, and categorises the elements of value added. Given
the trend away from so-called "hard" benefits towards those of the more intangible vari-
ety (see below), this chapter seeks to establish firmer criteria for evaluating the latter. An
innovative interviewing technique, developed during the course of the research, is pro-
posed, with particular emphasis on the delivery of benefits for the management process
(see Appendix DI). Finally, techniques for measuring and quantifying benefits, both as
pre and post-implementation activities, are critically reviewed.
7.2 Types of Benefits
7.2.1 Classifications
A remarkable feature of the research into the issue of payback and benefits is the extent
of the dogmatism on the issue by so many contributors to the field. Meyer and Boone,
for instance, state that "there are two very different types of benefits resulting from infor-
mation systems: cost displacement and value added" (151). However, Parker and
Benson claim "there are three types of benefits: (1) tangible benefits; (2) quasi-tangible
benefits, focusing most often on improving the efficiency of the already existing organ-
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isation; and (3) intangible benefits, focused most often on improving the effectiveness of
the organisation" (152). Remenyi et al suggest two categories, tangible and intangible,
while Strassman and others provide still other forms of categorisations (153).
Tangible benefits are defined by Remenyi et al as "those which directly affect the firm's
profitability, while an intangible benefit is described as "one which can be seen to have
a positive effect on the firm's business, but does not necessarily directly influence the
firm's profitably" (154). Most commentators equate a direct or tangible benefit with the
capacity to be quantifiable, but Remenyi et al argue that either form of benefit can be
quantifiable or unquantifiable. A quantifiable tangible benefit is one which "directly
affects the firm's profitability and ... may be objectively measured". Direct cost savings
or revenue generation are cited as typical of this category. An unquantifiable tangible
may be one which improves management information or the security of the firm, but
which cannot be directly measured.
Remenyi et al go on to describe a quantifiable intangible benefit as one which can be
measured, but whose impact does not necessarily affect the firm's profitability.
Examples provided for this category are obtaining information faster, or providing bet-
ter customer service. Finally, an unquantifiable intangible benefit is one that cannot be
measured and whose impact does not directly affect a firm's profitability. Remenyi's IT
Benefit Matrix is shown on Fig. 7.1.
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All benefits however can be accommodated into the dual categorisation of direct (or tan-
gible) and indirect (or intangible).
7.2.2 Tangible (Direct) Benefits
In the early days of computing, investments were made almost exclusively on the basis
of tangible benefits, and these almost invariably related to cost savings of some form or
other (155). The opportunities for such savings have now been greatly reduced (see
Chapter 3). Nonetheless, opportunities do exist, and senior management continues to
look to this area for justification of IT investments. Accordingly it still merits attention
in the appraisal process.
The following represent the more common forms of direct benefits:
Cost Savings 
Cost savings apply where the proposed system reduces or eliminates costs to a degree
exceeding the investment and operational costs. These are the most simple and direct
form of tangible benefit. Strassman divides cost savings into cost Reduction and Cost
displacement (156). The former is described as "a short cut to increasing operating pro-
ductivity" and cites the example of eliminating duplicate data entry in an order process-
ing system as a direct means of lowering overhead expense. Cost displacement he
describes as "the preferred method to simplify a business process through work-enlarge-
ment using computers", and cites the example of a sales order system which handles data
entry, validation, and credit checking - activities previously undertaken by sales repre-
sentatives. He makes the point that in determining the benefits from such a project, care
should be taken to ensure that the result is not simply a transfer of work from one depart-
ment to atother, and that the t!me saved !s appHed !n a way that benefts the company.
Strassman states that it is more difficult to evaluate cost avoidance potential, as "some-
one will always question why there are excess costs to begin with". He argues that for
cost avoidance to make business sense, other possible alternatives should be investigat-
ed, or better again, the underlying validity of the activity should be justified. To illus-
trate this he questions the justification of video-conferencing as a cost avoidance mea-
sure for travel, asking whether the real issue should be the need for so many meetings in
the first place.
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Staff displacement
The most common form of cost saving traditionally related to staff displacement. The
author recollects that in the 1970s and 1980s "headcount reduction" was almost like a
mantra (see Chapter 3). Staff displacement normally occurs when routine clerical or
administrative tasks, such as order processing or inventory control, are computerised,
with related staff losing their jobs or being reassigned. Sometimes the savings may
relate to overtime and/or travel avoidance. Savings can also occur without staff dis-
placement or reassignment when a system allows increased volumes, or greater com-
plexity, to be handled by the same number of staff.
Today, staff displacement no longer applies exclusively to those engaged in routine
administrative tasks. Expert systems and artificial intelligence (while admittedly falling
far short of the hype which accompanied their introduction) have resulted in computers
taking over many of the functions previously undertaken by skilled employees. A good
example here would be the typesetting function for newspapers, while executive infor-
mation systems, by providing senior managers with direct access to their information
requirements, obviate the need for staff associated with retrieval, filtering and presenta-
tion of information (157).
Quality Control
Systems which facilitate improved quality control can and should give rise to direct cost
savings. These can take tangible form by way of reduced reworking, fewer rejections at
final inspection, fewer customer returns, and reduced help-desk requirements.
Reduced computer costs
The general improvement in the price/performance ratio of computers usually means
reduced capital and maintenance costs for new equipment, In addition, software main-
tenance costs generally increase in line with the age of the system (158).
Other Cost Savings
IT provides almost unlimited scope to make savings throughout the value chain.
Inventory control systems can lead to savings on cashflow, floor space and employee
time. Similar savings can be made by way of production control systems, while finan-
cial control systems can generate savings on cashflow and reduce misapplication of
company resources.
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Revenue Creation 
New product introduction
Some systems (particularly in the financial services) enable totally new products to be
introduced, or provide economic justification for hitherto unacceptable products, such as
those identified by Chorafas in the financial services sector (159). While there may be
an intangible element associated with overheads and launch costs, such investments can
be classified as direct revenue earners.
Increased sales revenue
The promise of increased sales appears to be a common justification for IT investments.
Whereas such benefits would normally be classified as intangible, the promise can be
categorised as tangible when, for example, the unit cost of a product can be reduced, pro-
viding additional net revenue for an unchanged level of sales.
7.2.3 Intangible (Indirect) Benefits
As the role of IT changes, benefits of the intangible variety have come to predominate
(see Chapter 3) The scope is almost limitless, but establishing the value from a business
perspective is more difficult. Willcocks argues that this results in such benefits being
"regularly omitted from feasibility proposals and subsequent monitoring, often on the
grounds that they cannot be financially quantified, (and) are not cost justifiable" (160).
As Hares and Royle put it "the ... valuation of intangible costs and benefits has always
been the major area of difficulty for the subject of Investment Appraisal" (161). This
characteristic represents for the authors the difference between the intangible and the
tangible benefit.
The range of potential intangible benefits is wide, with commentators identifying
improved customer service, higher job satisfaction, higher product quality, improved
com muni cati ons, gaining competitive advantage, avoiding competitive disadvantage
improved supplier relationships, exploitation of business opportunities, and faster and/or
more focused product development as among the most common (162).
Management Support
Many commentators see support for the management process as the key opportunity area
for achieving benefits in today's conditions. Strassman has developed a comprehensive
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theory (Return on Management, or ROM) which is based on the premise that "manage-
ment is the essential input to productivity. If a company is profitable, this is because of
management (author's italics) not capital". He goes on to state that identifying
"Management productivity (author's italics) would open the way to exploring the bene-
fits of computers used by their principal customers, the managers of information" (163).
Strassman differentiates the benefit potential of management and operations activities in
the table 7.1:
Fig, 7,1  Differentiation of Management and Operations Benefits
Parker and Benson see what they term Management Information Support as a key ele-
ment in providing payback, even though they class it as "the leading example of hard-
to-quantify information systems benefits" (164). They identify three categories of such
support:
Traditional management support, which they see as benefits arising from management
use of information which are capable of being evaluated in traditional cost benefit terms.
They cite as examples cost reductions, enhanced quality control, budgeting and consid-
eration of alternative uses and deployment of resources.
Strategic management monitoring: benefits in this category arise when IT can enhance
management's capacity to approach competition and establish a company's posture in its
business environment. For example "if a company intends to be aggressive and seeks to
dominate its markets, then management information directed at how the firm is actually
doing and how competition is doing, may be most useful".
Strategy and the management ofperformance: has as its basis the contention that IT "can
make a difference in the execution of strategy, by making management better and
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smarter in pursuing strategy". This in turn is based on the logic that (1) everyone has
computing, (2) with otherwise similar resources, some do better than others, (3) the dif-
ference appears to be management "hustle", which arises "only when an information
system is available to report profitability and performance in the important areas".
Remenyi et al. see improvements in decision making and management productivity as
important intangible benefits deriving from IT investments (165). On the basis that a
decision will only be as good as the information on which it is based, the authors see "a
system which delivers information which is more up-to-date, more encompassing and...
which is processed into a useful format will help a decision maker to make better deci-
sions". The issue of management productivity is discussed below, and while the authors
acknowledge that such productivity is difficult to assess in the case of management, they
provide a good example of how improved management support facilities translated into
business value for a motor firm.
Competitive positioning
Sales support systems : Systems which increase the possibility of additional sales can
take many forms. The capacity to target the most promising customers greatly increas-
es the chances for sales staff to clinch additional sales. Interactive multimedia enables
potential buyers to gain a lifelike appreciation of products while providing information
on prices, specifications and delivery dates. This enables sales staff to concentrate on
the most promising customers, while minimising the time spent on technical and logis-
tical issues. Kaye has provided a range of case studies which show how marketing posi-
tioning can be improved by the use of such techniques (166).
Customer lock-in 
Some of the most successfu: =2 initiatives have derived from their capacity to :ock a
firm's customers in, or otherwise predispose customers to purchase from the firm. A
case study frequently cited is that of the McKesson pharmaceutical distributor. A rudi-
mentary (by today's standards) order processing system transformed what had been a
company in decline (167). The system as introduced in 1976, whereby data collection
devices, powered by car batteries, were wheeled around customers' stores, dramatically
cut order processing costs and timings, and was refined further to enable the orders to be
unpacked in a way which reflected the customers' shelf locations. Supplemented by a
range of further enhancements, the system effectively locked the customers into large-
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scale purchases from the McKesson organisation.
Further Examples of Intangible Benefits
There are almost limitless possibilities for intangible benefits based on IT investments
over and above those already discussed. Hares and Royle cite a higher price for a pre-
mium product or service, more sales from an existing customer, retained custom, addi-
tional sales arising from better marketing decisions or product presentation. Moriarty
and Swartz provide a wide range of benefits deriving from the application of IT to the
Marketing function (168), while Boynton and Zmud have compiled a comprehensive
series of case histories identifying benefits across a broad spectrum of industry group-
ings (169).
A summary of tangible and intangible benefits, leading to value added, is shown on Fig.
7.2
Fig. 7.2 Benefits Summary
Value Added Benefits
7.3 A review of current approaches
Whilst a detailed evaluation of benefits measurement techniques is outside the scope of
this research, it is appropriate in the context of this chapter to identify the potential and
limitations of some of the existing approaches.
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Cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
Even though CBA is not a new approach, it is still widely used, despite an acceptance of
its limitations. Research by Earl, Coleman and Jamieson, Farbey and others identifies the
predominant characteristic of the CBA approach as an emphasis on monetary terms as
the basis for evaluation, usually enhanced by the application of discounting techniques
(see also Chapter 4), (170). The more important of these (which are closely related to the
issues of 'efficiency versus effectiveness' as discussed in 4.3), are detailed below, and
suggest that not only is this technique of limited value in benefits measurement, it can,
in certain circumstances, be counter-productive.
The CBA approach is:
Crude: "Before and after" measures of benefit are crude in that they will be accurate
only if work patterns remain unaltered after the implementation of the system. Apart
from instances where faster hardware is installed to run an existing computer-based sys-
tem, this is unlikely to apply, work patterns almost always change, usually by the elim-
ination of the more routine tasks (171).
Misleading: The introduction of a new computer system involves additional expense in
terms of software and software maintenance, and possibly hardware and other costs.
Except where these can be directly assigned to a specific user department, they must be
absorbed as overhead. Frequently this overhead will not be taken into consideration in
measuring the benefits, and even when it is, the allocation will be the subject of a cer-
tain amount of arbitrariness (172). For example, if there is spare processing capacity,
will the new system be allocated a proportion of processor costs - should it? In the
absence of a consistent approach to these issues, misleading interpretations may result.
Inadequate: Such measures are inadequate for certain types of work, particularly those
in the service sector which is forming an increasingly large proportion of economic out-
put (see Chapter 1). For example, in professional services, with computerised assistance,
an accountant may be able to produce more sets of accounts, or a lawyer more opinions,
in a given time. This would be seen as increased productivity. Yet, depending on the
amount of work on hand, this could actually result in a net reduction in charged time, and
therefore earnings for the practice. Citing an assignment he had worked on, Strassman
showed that, depending on how one approached the issue, productivity gains could be
plus 6.9%, minus 0.7%, or plus 77% (173).
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Cannot accommodate the growth of overheads: Direct material and labour, which pre-
viously represented an overwhelming proportion of the cost of production, have now
been overtaken by overhead costs. In discussing this point, Wriston cites the example of
the microchip, for which material and direct labour now comprise only 11% of manu-
facturing costs - and this percentage is set to fall. This trend renders the unit cost, effi-
ciency approach increasingly less appropriate measure of business value (174).
Leads to incomprehensible complexity: Strassman has used the phrase "micromyopia" to
represent what he saw as the tendency to break a problem down into increasingly small-
er components when it could not at first be understood (175). This theory rests on the
illusion that all office tasks can be broken down into minute, controllable elements. If
this is accepted, all tasks can be evaluated individually, timed and controlled, and there-
fore measured in terms of productivity. This complexity undermines senior manage-
ment's understanding, and opens the way for manipulation by the cognoscenti. Although
this danger is now receding as a better understanding of the dynamics of office produc-
tivity begins to take hold, the idea that deeper analysis leads to deeper understanding still
has adherents (176).
Despite these limitations, CBA continues to be "a common element" in most investment
appraisal exercises (177). While recognising these limitations, Norton concludes that
CBA continues to be used because it is easily understood, and uses a methodology and
language with which finance staff are comfortable (178).
7.4 Other approaches used:
Make End-users Responsible 
This approach to measurement is espoused by Keen and Mathieson (179). The princi-
ple cited is that in the light of the movement from centralised data processing to end-user
focused applications, it makes sense for the end-users to define and be responsible for
the benefits. Keen puts this in the context of the IT planners being held accountable for
the cost of supplying the systems, but end users should be responsible for the benefits.
He cites the example of a bank which made a major investment in ATM machines.
These, and the related software, were implemented on time and within budget, but failed
to demonstrate satisfactory returns. While he sees this as partly due to the inadequacies
of conventional accounting techniques (see Chapter 4) the primary reason was the fail-
ure of user management to implement the relevant cost-cutting measures enabled by way
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of the new system.
The concept of end-users defining and being responsible for benefits is central to this
thesis. Nonetheless, it is practical only for realising the more tangible forms of benefit,
and could be misleading and counter-productive for proposals relating to the reengi-
neering and architecture perspectives. If this approach becomes the standard measure-
ment criterion, such investments will be evaluated from a narrow, short-term perspec-
tive. A possible compromise is suggested whereby end-users agree, and be assigned
responsibility for, specific benefits anticipated from a proposed project. This would
enable the proposal to be evaluated in its entirety, yet assign metrics responsibility for
those elements controllable at end-user level.
Introduce Anchor-Measures
An anchor measure is defined by Keen as "an operational indicator of performance that
can be used over time to identify .. IT impact". Such measures are based on the overall
objectives of the firm, as defined by what managers deem to be important This approach
is also proposed by Gold, who cites as examples customer relations, transaction cycle
time and employee morale (180). Underlining the importance of management intent,
Keen makes the case that a management team with cost reductions as a priority would
use annual cost of servicing a customer or processing a transaction as a suitable anchor
measure, whereas if market share were the priority, an appropriate anchor measure for
the effectiveness of the investment cou'..d be revenue per customer.
Anchor measures are a useful addition to the measurement process in that they offer an
alternative to traditional accounting-based criteria, which have been shown to be inade-
quate. • Furthermore, if closely linked to management's Critical Success Factors, they
will evaluate benefits in terms of what management perceives as the key issues. It would
appear important however that anchor-measures be balanced. For example, a measure
based on transactions processed per employee must be balanced against the possibility
of lower levels of customer support. In a consultancy assignment in the steel industry,
the author saw that while an anchor measure - having essential stock always available -
was achieved, the achievement came at the expense of gross overstocking and stock
obsolescence.
Measure Return on Management
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Return on Management (ROM) is a term patented by Paul Strassman and is based on the
hypothesis that the benefits from IT in today's business environment derive from greater
management effectiveness (181). He demonstrates convincingly that this task has not
been achieved successfully to date (182). Citing a major US IT productivity study, he
reveals that costs of management were omitted from all productivity calculations, yet
these were the most expensive and fastest growing elements, and underlines the point
that this trend will continue. He also shows that traditional financial control methods
reflect their origins in the Industrial Era when capital and labour were the essential com-
ponents of costs and productivity. He shows that this focus continues, despite the fact
that annual costs of corporate bureaucracies were becoming more expensive than the
annual carrying costs of capital. A process for measuring the effectiveness of manage-
ment was therefore called for, a process he calls ROM.
The definition of ROM (Management Value Added divided by Management Costs) is
deceptively simple. ROM calls for an elaborate data collection process which has the
objective of separating out "management value added" and "management costs".
Strassman provides an analytical framework for this, but measures can only be achieved
by the painstaking accumulation and sifting of raw data, a task requiring all business
transactions to be linked or tagged with the ROM classification criteria. The difficulties
involved will vary widely between differing computerised accounting systems.
Nonetheless, Strassman has over 100 companies operating this approach, and claims to
have identified major benefits in terms of directing IT investments.
Perhaps because of the claims made on its behalf, ROM has attracted much comment. It
is a fundamentally new concept. In focusing on management, both as a significant user
of IT in its own right, and as a pivotal determinant of corporate performance, it address-
es aspects which have heretofore been outside the span of formal evaluation methodolo-
gies. Its biggest drawback would appear to be the scale of the effort required to intro-
duce - and maintain - the ROM process. Strassman counters this with the argument that
an undertaking of such corporate importance cannot be expected to be easily accom-
plished, especially given the inadequacies of current cost accounting methods.
Another drawback appears to apply to the IT element of the measurement. The author
has studied Strassman's work in depth, and spoken with him on the matter, yet finds con-
siderable difficulty in isolating the IT content of the ROM performance statistics.
Whereas this does not invalidate the overall ROM metric, it does limit its use in terms
of IT evaluation. A potentially more serious drawback stems from the possibility that
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findings generated by this method may be inaccurate and/or misleading. Professor Tom
Lodahl in conversation with the author stated that Strassman had "simply got his figures
wrong", a result of the inadequacies of underlying accounting systems, and the difficul-
ties of maintaining consistency in ROM categorisations (183).
Correlating I/S Effectiveness with Business Performance 
Measuring the impact of VS on business performance could almost be classed as the
"Grand Unification Theory", so far-reaching and seemingly intractable are its ramifica-
tions. Professor Tom Lodahl and Kay Reddit, operating through the CogniTech Services
Corporation claim to have made a fundamental breakthrough in this area (184).
CogniTech apply three measures of business performance, three measures of VS effec-
tiveness, and seek to establish a correlation.
The three measures of business performance are return on equity, earnings per share, and
the revenue/expense ratio. The three measures of I/S effectiveness are VS contribution
to managerial goal achievement, the range of I/S coverage within the organisation, and
a rating system by users on I/S effectiveness. The VS effective assessment involved
obtaining very large numbers of data points, for example, to measure the contribution to
managerial goal achievement required 800 data points, 80 points from 10 managers.
These data points measure managers' judgement on the extent of 1/S contribution to their
goals. These goals are in turn decomposed into four sub-categories, the actual FS con-
tribution, the potential contribution, I/S contribution relative to other factors, and the
worth of I/S in relation to its cost.
Much of the research focused on establishing the determinants of I/S effectiveness,
defined as contributing to corporate objectives. An early finding showed an I/S organi-
sation optimising efficiency (i.e. seeking to maximise US productivity) could not max-
imise effectiveness as the two require fundamentally different operating and organisa-
tional cultures. The research collected no fewer that 1200 different variables, of which
79 were shown to have significant impact on I/S effectiveness. These were synthesised
into a framework which can be applied (with some modification) to companies in gen-
eral.
One of these measures, VS contribution to managerial goal achievement, achieved a
strong correlation with the business performance indicators. This at face value has major
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implications for the whole field of measurement. Yet some question marks exist As
Paul Strassman put it to the author the CogniTech approach applies statistical weight-
ings, correlation, and standard deviation techniques to subjective opinions, and then
sought to assign statistical validity to the resulting correlation with the "hard" business
performance measures defined earlier (185). Whilst this may offend the purist, and may
not be mathematically valid, it should not detract from the value of the overall thrust of
the findings.
Another possible weakness relates to the judgement by managers as to the effectiveness
of I/S contribution to the achievement of their goals. There must be a suspicion that
managers in the less successful companies would be likely to attribute less value to the
I/S contribution. After all, if the companies are not successful, the instinctive reaction
will be to attribute blame or responsibility to others for this failure. If I/S plays a major
supporting role in their activities it underlines even more clearly their responsibility for
the firm's poor performance. The reverse applies for successful companies, with man-
agers likely to be more magnanimous in their assessment of the contribution by I/S.
Overall however, the research by CogniTech appears to have added significantly to the
current level of knowledge in this area. The scope and scale of their questioning pro-
vides a vast resource of research data, and as their techniques are more widely applied,
further refinements should result.
Measuring End-user Satisfaction 
The increasing difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of IT applications has resulted
in a corresponding growth in the use of user-satisfaction techniques to adc:ress this issue.
User satisfaction is considered by Remenyi and Money to be measurable by a compari-
son of user expectations (or needs) of the application with the perceived performance (or
capability) on a number of different facets of the application (186). There are a number
of instruments designed to measure this effectiveness, one of which has been developed
by Rem enyi and Money (187).
This approach is based on 24 attributes designed to first evaluate the expectations of the
system, and then to establish the extent to which the expectations have been met by the
application. Users first rank the attributes in order of importance (or expectation). The
parameters are Irrelevant, Not Important, Important, and Critical. The same attributes
are then subjected to a post-implementation evaluation of satisfaction, the parameters
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being Very Poor, Poor, Good, Excellent.
Rank, mean, and standard deviations are calculated for expectations and actual perfor-
mance, and mean perceptual gap scores, together with their standard deviations, are also
calculated. The final calculation is a set of correlations between the gap scores and the
satisfaction scores. The findings may be represented graphically by means of a snake
diagram, which highlights the scale of the deviations. Further sophistication is added by
utilising regression analysis to establish the key variables in determining the overall sat-
isfaction scores.
While gap analysis models appear unlikely to offer an explanation of all the variables
(the case study in question explained only about 40%), this should not take from the sig-
nificance of their contribution. The Remenyi/Money model has added advantages in that
it is cheap, quick, and does not require a lot of expertise to administer. This value is
however contingent on the extent to which end-user bias can be reduced.
The Problem of End-user Bias
Of its nature, end-user satisfaction measurement techniques involve a substantial ele-
ment of subjective judgement. This in turn opens the possibility of bias in these evalu-
ations.
Mathieson identifies the following possibilities (188).
1. The application may be satisfactory from the users polled, but may be unsatisfactory
for the organisation at large. This problem is minimised when all potential users partake
in the evaluation.
2. Users may require functionality from the application which was not identified as part
of the original requirements. This may give rise to a negative response, but is not fair or
accurate within the terms of reference.
3. For those applications which automate a valued skill or set of skills, the end-user may
be predisposed to present a negative assessment.
4. Where a supervisor may be known to have a particular attitude to an application, or
to IT in general, those in a reporting position may echo this reaction.
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5. Biased test data can have a significant impact. For example, in evaluating a spread-
sheet, the structure, scope, and composition of the data can result in the test becoming
anything from an enjoyable exercise to one which is difficult and frustrating. Clearly the
reaction of the user will be influenced to some degree by this.
The author has identified the following additional bias factors during the course of var-
ious implementation and consultancy assignments.
1. Reaction by the user may be partly determined by the level of experience. For exam-
ple an inexperienced user with few keyboard skills may become flustered, may find dif-
ficulty in learning the system, and may therefore adopt a negative attitude. Conversely,
a user with low expectations may be unduly impressed by an system's performance.
Bias is involved either way.
2. Career prospects may be enhanced or inhibited by the introduction of the system. This
consideration invariably introduces an element of bias.
3. Some users have strong commitment to specific operating platforms, and may evalu-
ate applications on this platform more highly than an application for a different one for
this reason alone. A common example relates to that of the DOS operating system, with
which users may be comfortable, having invested considerable time and training in
requiring the requisite knowledge. A Windows application introduces a very different
operating environment, and may result in an application receiving less favourable assess-
ment than that on DOS, irrespective of functionality.
4. Moods of individuals can have a significant bearing on evaluations. The author has
undertaken evaluation reviews with individual users when the mood was clearly nega-
tive, and repeated the process when the mood had improved. The evaluations demon-
strated a commensurate improvement!
This wide range of findings suggests that such potential sources of bias must be identi-
fied and addressed as part of the user evaluation process.
7.5 Issues for the Investment Appraisal Process
Measuring the Benefits
109
Given the scale of IT spend, its pervasiveness throughout most organisations, and the
lack of quantifiable payback (see Chapter 1), there would seem to be a strong require-
ment to measure the benefits from IT investments. The issue is neatly summarised by
the 1/S Analyser. "With the increased importance of information technology investments
has come the louder call for quantifying the benefits of these investments. Few compa-
nies take 'before' and 'after' measurements, and even fewer relate information technol-
ogy benefits to business performance. One reason for this situation has been a dearth of
measurement frameworks" (189). The report could have mentioned other reasons as
well (190). Due puts the figure for those companies which do not use any standard to
measure the productivity of their investment as high as 95%, and cites (as does I/S
Analyser) the lack of suitable performance metrics as the primary reason (191).
Due provides four reasons for this lack of metrics:
The first is the time lag between the development of a system and its organisational
impact. The changes that occur over this period weaken attempts to relate development
costs and eventual benefits. The second relates to the high proportion of intangible ben-
efits associated with IT investment. These benefits do not lend themselves easily to
measurement, and must be seen in the context of low overall productivity gains. The
third relates to investment in systems for competitive advantage. These were not fully
evaluated, either beforehand or afterwards, on the basis that they were competitive
necessities. Due makes the point that this often resulted in highly inefficient applica-
tions. The fourth reason relates to the shift from manufacturing to service industries,
with productivity in services being more difficult to measure.
Despite this, there appears to be a widespread belief that benefits need to be measured,
and can be measured. "Measuring the effectiveness of IT" has consistently ranked as one
of the top ten issues in all major surveys, and two-thirds of Fortune 100 companies' chief
executive officers believe that their companies are not getting the most for their IT
investment" (192).
Benchmarking
Benchmarking may be defined as the attempt to compare the performance of one's own
organisation with that of another, with a view to identifying where and how improved
performance could be achieved. It is becoming increasingly popular, and several organ-
isations devoted exclusively to undertaking benchmarking studies have been formed (see
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below) (193). The research undertaken suggests that benchmarldng normally takes place
against acknowledged leaders in the field, against industrial averages, or within special-
ly formed benchmarking groups.
The process does appear to have many attractions. Measuring one's performance against
internally developed and focused criteria, while clearly better than no measurement,
must be less comprehensive, and more subjective, than measuring against one's peers. It
is also clear that, given the rapid rate of technological change, the breadth of an exter-
nally focused set of criteria is likely to provide much needed balance. Several potential
drawbacks have been identified however.
Benchmarking Against The Best
Research in this area suggests that benchmarking against acknowledged high-perform-
ing companies is the most common practice. The objective is to compare one's process-
es against the best, identify the scale and nature of the differences, and implement a pro-
gramme to narrow or bridge the gap. The theory is fine, but the practice may be a lot
less so.
(a) The high-performing companies may not wish to benchmark against a lower per-
former. There is little to be gained by them. When companies gain a high recognition
factor in this area (e.g. Xerox Corp.) they tend to be inundated with requests for bench-
marking. It would be impossible to meet such demand.
(b) Companies seeking benchmarking frequently fail to analyse their own processes in
the required depth. links with other companies then degenerate into what has been
described as "industrial tourism", of general interest, but not leading to concrete pro-
posals.
(c) The impact on staff morale can be significant. Some companies undertake bench-
marking under the understanding that failure to measure up could result in outsourcing
IT Effectiveness Surveys 
These surveys purport to identify the "best" levels of expenditure on IT by collecting
data from a large cross-section of companies. Among the criteria they use are:
• IS budget as a percentage of revenue
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• Value of installed equipment as a percentage of revenue
• Percentage of the IS budget applied to staff
• Percentage of the IS budget applied to training
• Percentage of personal computers and terminals per employee
Based on these findings, attempts are made to identify the optimum levels under each
category. From a benchmarlcing perspective, organisations can then identify where, and
by how much, they deviate from either the optimum spends as prescribed by the maga-
zines, and/or the averages identified. That is, even if the formulations used to evaluate
the optimum spend under the various categories are not accepted, the reasoning is that it
can be instructive to compare one's own performance against industrial averages. This
line of thinking is flawed however, due to the difficulty, if not impossibility, if obtaining
consistency in definitions and data. A brief review of the potential difficulties with the
individual elements may be instructive:
IS budget: The basic elements of an organisation's IS budget are clear-cut_ Infrastructure
elements such as a network backbone, centralised data processing hardware and linked
terminals, DP Consumables such as stationery, IS staff costs, and IS consultancy fees
will almost always be included. Less clear-cut are items such as process control com-
puters and point-of-sale terminals. Yet in some organisations the expenditure on this
kind of equipment can be very significant.
The real problems with quantifying the IS budget however are associated with depart-
mental or end-user computing. PCs, PC software, and training are just some of the items
which may or may not be included in the IS budget. Some organisations include them
others . do not. Even within the same organisation, some departments will include some
items as IS spend, others will not. A 1993 survey estimated that on average between
15% and 20% of companies' overall IS expenditure will not be incorporated in the IS
budget. More significantly from the benchmarking perspective, it shows that such
spending "varies greatly from company to company", and can sometimes go as high as
60% of the IS budget (194).
Value of installed equipment: This category is not as prone to variances (both between
and within organisations) as those for the IS budget, in that it excludes elements such as
training and consultancy. Nonetheless, as the review of the IS budget above shows,
assessing the value of the hardware alone can be problematical.
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Percentage of IS budget applied to staff/training: The difficulties of obtaining a consis-
tent value for the IS budget of necessity undermine any ratios based on it. Such ratios
are further undermined by potential variances related to staff and training costs. For
example, in an end-user environment, a department may need to assign a large propor-
tion of an employee's time to trouble shooting and support for users with lower levels of
IT skills (195). This may or (more likely) may not be included as IS staff costs. The def-
inition of training is very flexible. For example, seminars, conferences, and trade shows
may or may not be included. The author has seen these being included in some
instances, excluded in others, even within the same department in a company.
Percentage of personal computers and terminals per employee: This would clearly be
the easiest category for which to obtain consistent and comprehensive numbers. Even
here however, comparisons can be misleading. Some organisations by virtue of opera-
tional requirements will require a high proportion of IT users (banks, airlines), while oth-
ers will only require a low proportion (a postal service).
The conclusion then would appear to be that benclunarking on the basis of these criteria
is unlikely to be of value. In fact, given that the figures will almost certainly be incon-
sistent, it could be dangerous.
Summary
It is clear that payback, in the form of addressing the direct and indirect benefits from
potential investments, is an essential evaluation perspective. In fact, for many years it
was almost the only criterion for many organisations. With trends moving from manu-
facturing to services, the intangible benefits are increasingly predominating, resulting in
the quantification of payback becoming more difficult. Several leading commentators
have taken radically different approaches to evaluating benefits from IT, and while many
make a valuable and relatively cost-effective contribution, others, such as Strassman's
Return on Management, impose enormous demands on data gathering.
The practice of performing before and after measurement is seen as vitally important by
IS and finance managers but is undertaken by few companies. Comparative inter-com-
pany studies and benchmarlcing have superficial appeal, but can generate misleading val-
ues and conclusions. In general summary, payback remains an essential element in the
investment appraisal process, but quantifying it is becoming increasingly more prob-
lematical.
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Chapter 8. Process Redesign
8.1 Introduction
Numerous researchers have commented on the duration in historical terms of today's
business structures, which remains based on theories originally formulated over 200
years ago (196). The core principle of this theory is the division of labour, by which
workers are assigned narrowly-defined, specific, tasks, ideally of a simplified nature.
Although this theory has been modified and enhanced down the years, in its essentials it
remains unchanged. Whereas it has brought many advantages in the form of clear-cut
operational practices, and lends itself to effective operational control, it is singularly
unsuited to meeting the requirements of the present-day business environment. Among
the characteristics of this environment are short product development and life cycles,
tougher competition, volatility, and a rapid increase in the incidence of mergers/demerg-
ers, acquisitions/divestitures (197).
Given this unsuitability, many firms have felt compelled to reassess their organisational
structures in a fundamental way, that is, by redesign processes from the ground up, and
abandoning all existing assumptions, in particular breaking with the conventional
task-based methods characteristic of traditional hierarchical organisations (198). This
new approach, which has been gaining force in recent years, is variously been known as
business reengineering, business process redesign, and process reengineering. Whatever
the appellation, (and Tapscott and Capston show that there are at least fifty methods and
approaches to what is known as business reengineering (199)) all approaches operate
under the same basic principle, namely, that speeding up the old way of doing business
will no longer suffice. Venkatramenn, for instance, in contrasting the role of IT in the
1990s to that of earlier decades, states that the "dominant strategy theme for the 1990s
will be the recognition and exploitation of IT capabilities for fundamental choices of
business scope and .. organisational reconfiguration" (200). To put this in perspective,
a review of the development of conventional organisational structures is proposed.
8.2 The Development of Conventional Organisational Structures.
8.2.1 Historical Development
The work practices and organisational structures which form the basis of most enter-
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prises today are founded on principles first enunciated by Adam Smith in The Wealth of
Nations, published in 1776 (201). These are based on Smith's studies of the workings
of a pin factory. He found that the number of pins produced could be substantially
increased were each worker, who had previously been involved in all the tasks associat-
ed with pin making, to concentrate on a single step of the manufacturing process.
Whereas the claimed benefits appear to be extravagant (up to 5,000 pins per day apply-
ing division of labour, as against 20 using generalised practices), the book clearly shows
that significant improvements in throughput could be achieved through assigning spe-
cialised tasks to individual workers. Thus was the principle of the division of labour
born, and with it the paradigm for industrial organisation for the next two hundred years.
A major enhancements came by way of Henry Ford, who introduced the assembly line,
which brought the work to the employee, in contrast to the prevailing arrangement
whereby the employee moved to where the work needed to be performed. Ford also sim-
plified the tasks to an unprecedented degree, many being as simple as tightening a nut or
fitting a radiator cap. As the size of Ford's operation grew, major difficulties were
encountered, and these led to the second major enhancement, which was introduced by
Alfred Sloan, of General Motors (202).
Labouring under the same difficulties as Ford, Sloan applied division of labour tech-
niques to management. He did this by splitting General Motors into autonomous divi-
sions, based on models in the GM range, which effectively became companies in their
own right. This was in effect applying the division of labour principle to management,
and Sloan expanded it by having managers specialise in areas such as produc tion, !Mar-
keting and finance - a radical departure for the time.
8.2.2 Strengths of the Hierarchical Structure
Although now questioned by many commentators, the hierarchical structure brought
advantages of the "command and control" variety.
(a) Everything was clearly defined. Job descriptions were closely tied to narrowly
defined tasks (203). For example, up to the time the author left the Ford organisation in
1986 there was a Procedures Manual for every conceivable task in the organisation. This
meant that every employee had clear guidelines under which to work, supervisors knew
exactly what they had to supervise, and minimal time was spent in addressing how to
perform required tasks - it was all "in the book".
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(b) The simplicity of the tasks, and the availability of clear-cut procedures meant that
training costs were minimised, while replacing and transferring staff incurred minimal
disruption.
(c) Control was enhanced through a wide range of comparisons. The Ford system which
applied roughly between the late forties and the late eighties would have been typical of
an advanced multinational at this time. Sophisticated budgeting enabled detailed com-
parisons to be made over the whole business spectrum, month on month, year on year,
unit labour cost comparisons, country by country comparisons - all were facilitated by
the company's common operational and organisational structures. The rigid hierarchical
structure also facilitated clear and incontestable modes of operational control (204).
(d) The operation was scaleable, and thus responsive, in meeting demand fluctuations.
Given the low level of training required, and the clearly defined operating procedures,
new workers (and this also applied to supervisors and management) could be introduced
into the manufacturing process relatively easily.
8.2.3 Weaknesses of the Hierarchical Structure
As tasks became less complicated, their number of necessity grew. In attempting to cap-
italise on economies of scale, companies were also growing, and this added to the con-
trol complexity. This imposed huge demands in terms of controlling and knitting togeth-
er these disparate tasks. "The growing number of people in the middle of the corporate
organisation chart - the functional or middle managers - was one off the prices compa-
nies paid for the benefits of fragmenting their work into simple, repetitive steps and
organising themselves hierarchically" (205).
This led to several serious disadvantages, which became particularly serious in the con-
text of the changing business environment which evolved throughout the 1980s.
(a) Probably the biggest disadvantage associated with this structure is the bureaucratic
apparatus required to administer the increasingly complex process involved in deliver-
ing product or service to the customer. The balance of costs moved from material and
direct labour to overhead (206). It is clearly more difficult to ascertain the value added
(if any) generated by overhead, and one of this system's key benefits (costing and con-
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trol) began to dissipate.
(b) As suggested earlier, while the hierarchical structure was flexible in terms of vol-
umes, in most other respects it was inflexible. Most tasks were governed by Operating
Procedures, and those performing the tasks operated within a rigidly defined reporting
structure. Changes, as the Ford model demonstrates, could only be introduced after a
lengthy intra-departmental consultation process, and one department could undermine
the new arrangements if dissatisfied (207).
(c) As companies grew in size it became increasingly difficult for individual depart-
ments to see the big picture - that is, the overall objectives of the organisation became
obscured. In fact, some companies deliberately fomented a form of "creative tension"
between departments. (See below)
(d) With layer upon layer of management in place, and with staff increasingly focused
internally on meeting departmental goals, the ability to focus on customer requirements
became weakened.
Many of the above weaknesses can be identified in an example from author's experience
of the Dealer Audit activities as practised at Ford. Manufacturers' sales staff frequently
ignored, or even assisted, dealers in making unauthorised claims on the manufacturer. It
made their jobs easier in many ways when dealers were in receipt of such bonus pay-
ments, while the loss of money to the company did not affect them in any way. By way
of contrast, Dealer Audit staff took a narrow and restrictive view of all claims, invari-
ably rejecting those failing to meet "the letter of the law". The spirit of the "law" in such
cases did not count. For instance, a claim for a repair undertaken when a car may have
been only a couple of days out of warranty would be rejected in its entirety. Audit were
only doing their job, which was to strictly apply the terms and conditions under which
payments were made.
Such issues were often resolved only through high-level arbitration and negotiation
internally at the manufacturer, and subsequently with high-level dealership staff as well.
Frequently, the eventual settlement resulted in attempts by the dealer to recoup some or
all of the eventual chargeback from the purchaser of the vehicle. The affect of all of this
on relationships between manufacturer, dealer and customer can be imagined, as can the
amount of time spent on investigating and resolving such cases. Yet, given the organi-
sational structures in place (rigid hierarchies, strict departmental separation, with a con-
sequent emphasis on tasks rather than processes) it is difficult to envisage a radically dif-
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ferent approach which would meet the twin requirements of financial control and cus-
tomer satisfaction.
8.3 Characteristics of Today's Business Environment
It is now appropriate to assess the degree of suitability of traditional organisational
structures in the context of today's business environment by identifying the character-
istics of this environment.
Primary characteristics:
(a) Increased competition
New "mean and lean" start-up companies, unencumbered by outmoded cultural and
organisational structures, are dominating, and sometimes creating, markets as tradition-
al companies struggle to adapt. In less than a decade, IBM has seen its dominance of the
computer industry disappear, while Microsoft has emerged from being a bit-player to
becoming the dominant player in the software industry (208). In retailing, the decline
of Sears has been paralleled by the growth of WalMart (209).
(b)Mergers and acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions (as well as demergers and divestitures) are on the increase as
companies struggle to adapt to the new competitive environment. It is difficult to name
a major corporation which has not been involved, or reported to be involved, in some
form of merger or take-over activity in recent years. This often calls for the fusing of
different organisational and cultural structures, or (as for example, in the case of IBM)
involves business units, previously insulated as part of the mother corporation, cut adrift
to fend for themselves (210).
(c)Shorter product life/faster time to market
In many market sectors, the replacement (and possibly even the replacement for the
replacement) for today's leading edge product is likely to be at prototype stage as soon
as this product reaches the market. The development and introduction of Intel's 286,
386, 486 and Pentium microprocessors provide a good example. In the context of the
financial services sector, Chorafas cites products which require a development process
measured in weeks, and for which the market life may be measured in months (211).
(d) Volatility and unpredictability
Deregulation, globalisation of the marketplace, and economic uncertainty are just some
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of the factors giving rise to an unprecedented degree of business uncertainty and volatil-
ity (212). The airline and financial services industries are noteworthy in this regard, but
the computer industry provides the best example. In the early 1980s, few could have
envisioned the impact of personal computing, the decline of minis and mainframes, and
the catastrophic effects these developments would have had on most of the computer
industry's leading companies.
(e) The customer as king
The days of customer brand loyalty appear to over, or at least seriously in the wane.
"Since the early 1980s, in the US and other developed countries, the dominant force in
the seller-customer relationship has shifted. Sellers no longer have the upper hand, cus-
tomers do. Customers now tell suppliers what they want, when they want it, how they
want it, and what they will pay" (213). For companies accustomed to taking a loyal cus-
tomer base for granted, this new environment has proved to be an unsettling experience.
8.4 The Need for a New Paradigm
These developments have placed unprecedented strains on corporate structures and prof-
it levels. Keen states, for example, that "there is no major industry today where margins
can be expected to increase in the coming decade" (214). It is on corporate structures
however that the greatest impact appears to have been felt. This becomes clear if suit-
ability of traditional hierarchical organisational structures are related to the dominant
characteristics of today's business environment.
This environment as described above could be summarised as being one which is more
challenging, unpredictable, and volatile, and in which the balance of power has shifted
from the seller to the customer. Relating this to characteristics of the hierarchical organ-
isation outlined earlier, it emerges that the strengths are not particularly well suited to
these requirements, while the weaknesses, particularly those relating to inflexibility and
lack of customer focus, are critical in terms of survival in today's market conditions.
This suggests that the hierarchical model may no longer be appropriate. Many firms are
applying Business Process Reengineering (BPR) methods or a derivative in response to
this new and unprecedented challenge. Peppard and Rowland state that "over the past
few years the level of interest in BPR has exploded" (215), while Drucker refers to "the
strenuous efforts of American corporations in the last ten years to re-engineer them-
selves" (216).
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Conclusion 1: Traditional business methods do not adequately meet the challenges
of today's business environment.
8.5. Business Process Redesign (BPR)
8.5.1 Process Redesign Defined
"Business reengineering offers an opportunity to make a step-change improvement in
competitiveness - and then maintain and improve that competitiveness" according to
Bartram (217) while Hammer and Champy describe it as "the fundamental rethinking
and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical,
contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed" (218).
Peppard and Rowlands define it as follows: "BPR is an improvement philosophy. It aims
to achieve improvements in performance by redesigning the processes through which a
organisation operates, maximising their value added content and minimising everything
else. The approach can be applied at an individual process level or to the whole organ-
isation" (219).
8.5.2 Components of BPR
While acknowledging a variety of definitions and methodologies for BPR, most have the
following commonalties:
(a) Starting With a Clean Sheet
If it is accepted that traditional structures are fundamentally ill-suited to meeting current
business needs, it can be argued that experience may often be a barrier to future business
success. Drucker, in fact makes this very point "The greatest obstacles are always the
things you did well yesterday, the things you spent 30 years perfecting" (220). If this is
accepted, it follows that only radical, fundamental change will be successful, and indeed,
most of the leading thinkers on reengineering support this view (221).
(b) Emphasis on Processes not Tasks
The hierarchical form of business organisation operates on the basis of individuals car-
rying out specific tasks, based on division of labour principles. These tasks in them-
selves seldom achieve a given business objective, being merely components of the
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process which achieves the objective. Thus the keying in of a customer order is a task,
but order fulfilment is a process.
A process will frequently transcend functional boundaries within a firm. To take exam-
pie of order fulfilment, the task of accepting the order may be performed by Sales, the
order procurement task by Supply, the pricing task by Finance, and the delivery task by
Distribution. A "process owner" or a "process team" must be empowered to undertake
all the relevant tasks if the objectives are to be met. Clearly, this demands fundamental
organisational change, suggesting that reengineering can only be successful in flat,
process-oriented organisations.
Fig 8.1  Example of Business Process
(c) All Options Open
The concept of reengineering demands that all existing assumptions be questioned, in the
light of the overall objectives of the organisation. Thus Hammer and Champy claim that
"reengineering first determines what a company must do, then how to do it.
Reengineering takes nothing for granted. It ignores what is, and concentrates on what
should be" (222). The corollary to this is that all possible solutions must be accepted for
evaluation, irrespective of the extent to which they depart from accepted norms.
8.5.3 The Benefits of Reengineering
Hammer and Champy cite tru:y c:ramatic improvements in a series of detailed case stud-
ies, among them IBM Credit, Bell Atlantic, Ford, Lucas, and Nabisco Foods. For exam-
ple, Ford reduced the numbers involved in its vendor payment process from 500 to 125,
121
IBM Credit reduced average turnaround time from seven days to four hours without
additional headcount -in fact, a small reduction in headcount resulted. In the UK, Lucas
Industries, Nabisco Foods, John Radcliffe Hospital (see case study on Appendix IV) and
Gateway Food markets are some of the organisations which recorded, and continue to
record, step-change improvement in performance through organisational reengineering.
A review of these organisations' case studies makes clear that the dramatic improve-
ments in performance could have been achieved only through reengineering, and not by
modifications or enhancements in the context of existing organisational structures.
9.5.4 The Drawbacks of Reengineering
The concept of organisational reengineering, particularly in its more formalised mani-
festations (most commonly business process reengineering, or BPR) has not met with
universal acceptance. In the first instance, as Tapscott and Capston show, there are at
least fifty methods and approaches to what is known as business reengineering. They
add that many companies involved in reengineering have developed their own programs
(223). Paul Strassman maintains that what passes for new thinking on reengineering is
nothing but old industrial engineering methods of process analysis, activity costing and
value-added measurement rebottled as a new science (224), while Earl and Kahn raise
similar issues on originality (225).
Specific drawbacks have been identified in the following areas:
(a) Risk: All change assumes a degree of risk. The profound changes which a reengi-
neering initiative attempts to implement suggest that such an initiative should be classed
as high risk. Such changes demand the capacity for individuals to visualise their busi-
ness in process terms, which in turn calls for a comprehensive understanding of the busi-
ness and its people. Such individuals are difficult to find, and reengineering undertaken
by less capable managers courts disaster. Hall et al. in a study on the impact of reengi-
neering state "in all too many companies reengineering has not only been a great success
but also a great failure" (226).
Self-contradictions: Reengineering literature and case studies endlessly cite the need for
active staff involvement, discussions, flexibility, empowerment of the individual in the
cause of greater organisational effectiveness. Equally common have been massive
redundancies, outsourcing, loss of job security as exemplified by the sharp increase in
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the instance of short-term contracts, and other negative factors in terms of staff morale,
(227). In effect therefore, reengineering demands staff to act like "turkeys voting for
Christmas", in that they are expected to enthusiastically support initiatives with unfore-
seeable consequences for their own job security. Tom Watson, an acquaintance of the
author, who played a leading role in British Nuclear Fuels' reengineering programme,
made this point to the author in 1992. By a twist of fate, Tom was shortly to go the same
way 4,000 of his colleagues had gone over the previous few years.
Legacy systems: Most organisations have a substantial proportion of their asset bases in
the form of so-called legacy systems, (see Chapter 9) which, being based on older soft-
ware and hardware platforms, are inherently inflexible (228). These systems embed key
business processes in their software, so introducing radical change inevitably calls for
radical change in the supporting systems. Yet redesigning and/or downsizing legacy sys-
tems represents a colossal job for any organisation (229).
Separation of work design from execution: This rather more profound objection to
reengineering has been identified by Tom Davenport on the strength of much practical
experience and academic research in the field (230). Davenport claims that "the classic
form of reengineering calls for a small group of people to design work processes for a
much larger group; there is little participation in the process by those who actually do
the work". He adds that this is inherently inefficient in that no group, no matter how well
informed, can possibly anticipate all eventualities in work design, but more fundamen-
tally, the omission of those doing the work from the design phase can and does generate
serious, possibly fatal, alienation.
There is little doubt that the success rate of reengineering has been questioned, and there
have been a huge number of failures, to the extent that Jain, referring to 1994, suggests
that "corporate America faces the prospect of $20 billion worth of BPR efforts going
down the tube this year" (231). Nevertheless, even its most trenchant critics do not
seem to claim that reengineering per se is unnecessary. The literature fails to show any
significant body of opinion or research to support the contention that conventional
approaches will met the demands of today's business environment. While many serious
drawbacks to reengineering have been identified, and many expensive failures have
occurred, these should be seen as part of the learning process in the move to a new busi-
ness paradigm. It is proposed therefore that despite its shortcomings, reengineering in
some (or possibly many) forms will continue to play an increasingly important role in
corporations' attempts to adapt to the new business environment.
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Conclusion 2: Organisations must restructure to meet the challenges of the new
business environment, and reengineering is a vital element in this restructuring
8.6. Process Redesign and IT Investment Appraisal
8.6.1 The Need for a New Approach
The case will now be made that IT investment will be optimised when it is applied as an
enabler in the context of reengineering business processes, and as such the reengineer-
ing perspective must form part of the appraisal process.
The weaknesses of the task-based, hierarchical organisational model were referred to
earlier to demonstrate that it is unsuitable to meet the demands of today's business envi-
ronment, particularly in the context of applying IT effectively. A new approach is there-
fore called for.
8.6.2 The Limits of Conventional IT Approaches
The evidence that only minimal, and decreasing, gains were being achieved by trying to
make the old business model run faster gave rise to the need for a radical solution, hence
the concept of reengineering. As was shown earlier, only by applying reengineering
techniques could improvements such as those demonstrated at IBM Credit, Ford and
Kodak could been accomplished.
A parallel can be made with IT. Irrespective of the computing power applied to make
existing processes more effective, few if any would have been fundamentally improved
in the absence of process reengineering. In the case of Ford, for instance, executives cal-
culate that with enhanced computer support for the existing vendor payment process,
headcount savings would have been in the region of 20%, rather than the 80% achieved
by reengineering (232).
Hammer and Champy put it even more strongly: "As an essential enabler in reengineer-
ing, modern information technology has an importance to the reengineering process that
is difficult to overstate" (233). Describing IT as "most relevant to BPR", Peppard and
Rowlands state that "technology plays a leading role, along with processes and people"
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in the success of BPR (234). Venlcatraman suggests that "while a new set of principles
of organising (businesses) has not yet emerged, it is clear that the basics for business
process redesign should at least be reassessed in the light of the new capabilities offered
by IT" (235). John Donovan, one of the leading exponents of client-server technology in
reengineering projects, sees IT as essential in all reengineering projects (236).
Conclusion 3: IT is an essential element in the reengineering process
8.7 Process Redesign - a new role for IT
Change the Mindset
The first requirement in achieving reengineering benefits through IT may be as funda-
mental as a changed mindset for IT staff, who have been conditioned to approach pro-
jects from the perspective of existing processes. In fact, in the author's experience work-
ing with Ford, the word "automate" was often used when referring to a systems devel-
opment project, embedding the concept of automating existing processes in IT thinldng.
At its most basic, this new mindset will accommodate IT staff in redesigning or reengi-
neering new business processes rather than automating them. In this, IT skills such as
analytical minds, structured methodologies, understanding information flows, and pro-
ject management skills are invaluable resources in a reengineering project. IT as a busi-
ness force can also contribute enormously, as Bartram's taxonomy shows (237).
Move From Deductive to Inductive Thinking
This new mindset should form the basis for an approach which offers the most spectac-
ular possibilities for IT in the context of reengineering. This approach can be described
as a move from deductive to inductive thinking or technology visioning.
Traditionally, most business problems, (especially those related to IT) have been
addressed by way of deductive thinking. That is, the problem is defined, possible solu-
tions are explored, and the optimum solution is selected on the basis of a variety of cri-
teria. This is described by Teng et al as "automation typically uses machines and com-
puters to speed up existing procedures, and the capabinty of the techno!ogy is appned
within the constraint of the current business procedure" (238). Inductive thinking
turns this approach on its head, in that it calls for the capacity to envisage the capabil-
ities of a particular technological development, and then seek the business problems it
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might address (239).
This may appear to be breaking the golden rule of systems development, that solutions
should be business rather than technology driven - the so-called "solution looking for a
problem" syndrome. Whereas this is undoubtedly true for applications related to con-
ventional DP or automation, it becomes valid, indeed a requirement, in the context of
reengineering (240). This is because certain redesign possibilities will become apparent
only if seen in the light of what Hammer and Champy call the disruptive power of tech-
nology. They go on to underline both the difficulties and importance in "recognising the
new, unfamiliar capabilities of technology instead of its familiar ones". This difficulty
stems largely from the propensity of organisations to view technology through the prism
of their existing processes and practices.
Hammer & Champy provide a rich taxonomy of potential applications for this disruptive
power of technology, but an example often serves best to illustrate the concept. One of
the best known relates to the invention by the Xerox Corporation of the photocopying
machine around 1958. Feeling it was not adequately resourced to undertake the com-
mercial marketing of the product, it offered the patents to IBM, which commissioned a
leading American firm of consultants to undertake a market research study. The study
was postulated largely on the basis of the copier replacing the use of carbon paper (the
standard copying mechanism at the time), and was no doubt carried out efficiently. The
conclusion, again undoubtedly correct, was that even if 100% of the market for carbon
paper were captured, the proposal would not be commercially viable. IBM rejected the
chance to enter the photocopying business. It is clear, with the benefit of hindsight, that
the photocopying technology created a market, one that was not envisioned at the time.
It created a market because by enabling many people to simultaneously use, and retain,
a copy of a document, the first Xerox photocopier opened up a whole new way of doing
business. Inductive thinking or technology visioning, properly applied by IBM at the
time, could have identified the enormous potential for the technology. Instead, by view-
ing it through the prism of existing processes, the opportunity was lost (241).
Provide an Appropriate IT Architecture
Frank O'Marrs, partner-in-charge, continuous improvement at KPMG Peat Marwick,
sees an appropriate IT infrastructure as a prerequisite in a reengineering project. This
organisation undertook a radical reengineering project, and O'Marrs emphasises that
"the first step... is to develop a standard computing infrastructure throughout the firm
that will allow our professionals to effectively share information and communicate
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across lines of business". This is supported by that company's chief executive Jon C.
Madonna, saying that "information technology is fundamental to our new strategy"
(242).
Key requirements for reengineering have been identified as:
Flexibi4: The capacity to develop an IT solution quickly is an essential element of
many reengineering initiatives, and this in turn calls for a flexible and responsive IT
architecture (243). Donovan argues that the flexibility provided by a client/server envi-
ronment is essential for successful reengineering projects, and as has been shown earli-
er, the inflexibility of legacy systems poses a major threat to reengineering projects
(244).
Robustness: Business process reengineering will often impose significant strains on an
IT infrastructure, as, of its essence, process redesign entails change of a fundamental
nature (245). New or untried operating or database systems, an assortment of networks
or communications protocols, low levels of integration between applications, inadequate
security and backup procedures all undermine the robustness of an infrastructure.
Openness: The capacity to look outside the confines of the firm (primarily to customers
and/or suppliers) often provides the best reengineering opportunities (246). An open
architecture and an adherence to industry standard communications protocols are key
features in this regard.
Conclusion 4: The role of IT in the context of business reengineering is different to
that in conventional applications
8.8 Consolidation
The four conclusions drawn so far are:
Conclusion 1: Traditional business methods do not adequately meet the challenges of
today's business environment.
Conclusion 2: Organisations must restructure to meet the challenges of the new business
environment, and reengineering is a vital element in this restructuring
Conclusion 3: IT is an essential element in the reengineering process
Conclusion 4: The role of IT in the context of business reengineering is different to that
in conventional applications
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It is reasonable to propose therefore that the potential impact of reengineering should be
taken into account when appraising new investments. A striking example of this
occurred at one of the 'smokestack' industries which formed part of the research. A
product handling system which was at the sign-off stage was assessed under the reengi-
neering perspective. It was found that the capacity to reengineer processes (although this
was not the terminology used) had a high priority within the company, particularly in
those departments interfacing with the customer. Flexibility, adaptability, and the capac-
ity to respond rapidly to customer or legislative initiatives was deemed highly important.
Yet the proposed new system, while offering cost savings, enhanced customer service
and improved management information, in effect embedded underlying work practices
in the software. Inefficient as the old manual system was, it nonetheless could be altered
by simply instructing the workers, and/or by introducing new workers. The net effect of
the system being introduced would be a sharp diminution in reengineering enablers.
This finding resulted in the introduction of the system being postponed, although it was
introduced later with significant modifications. Roach has also demonstrated that the
huge investment in service industries in the USA in recent years has resulted in a loss of
flexibility. "The bottom line is that service companies have moved from a variable-cost
to a fixed-cost regime, thereby sacrificing flexibility without gaining any concomitant
productivity benefits" (247).
For reasons such as this, reengineering has become a major issue for IS managers, and
is assuming increasing importance as is borne out by some of the latest research avail-
able. A project conducted recently in the United States by Lederer and Mrani to assess
the most important factors driving IT investment found that business redesign outnum-
bered the three next most important factors combined, as is shown on Table 8.1. (248).
Table 8.1 Most
Important Factors
Factors	 	 Number of Projects
Bustess redesign 98
Improved information 29
Staegic alvanne 17
Reduced workforce costs 20
Reduced tecilnolou costs 16
Return on twestment 27
Better applicaions dgveloprnsat 15
Adherence to Govt. regulaIbns 35
R CAI [rad tmval ert<tc ;q
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Process redesign is therefore proposed as a perspective in its own right in the evaluation
framework, and it is suggested that the foregoing provides strong substantiation for this.
Somewhat surprisingly, given the high profile of the reengineering concept, and its
accepted dependence on IT, it forms part of none of the frameworks reviewed. The only
framework assigning any significance to the concept is Information Economics. In the
discussion on the value concept, the authors state that "the real benefit of information
technology results from change in the business. IT changes products, markets, manage-
ment styles and organisational structures. Without change there is no benefit" (249).
Summary
The competitive pressures of today's business environment have rendered traditional
models of business organisation obsolete. Attempts to improve performance of this
model, even when enhanced by IT, have resulted in only marginal improvement, and
have contributed to the poor performance of IT in terms of investment returns. Only by
reengineering operations around processes rather than tasks can this problem be
addressed. IT is seen, not only as an essential element in achieving this objective, but
its powers must themselves become a catalyst for change. In other words, IT must be
deployed in new and original ways under reengineering. Despite the importance of the
reengineering concept, little attention has been applied to it in existing frameworks.
129
Chapter 9. The IT Architecture
9.1 Introduction
IT architecture is a term which, though widely used, suffers from a range of interpreta-
tions. Earl describes it somewhat lyrically as the "processing power of computers, the
highways of telecommunications, the foundations of data, and the fabric of basic busi-
ness systems" (250). In practice this means a company's computers, software, databas-
es, telecommunications, programming languages and operating systems and the relevant
standards for each of these entities. The architecture to a large extent defines what a
company can achieve, not only in IT, but also in business terms. As Brandt Allen, a lead-
ing American business analyst put it recently, "the decisions managers make today about
their IT architecture will determine their organisation's ability to respond to challenges
and opportunities for many years to come" (251).
9.2 The requirement for an Architecture perspective
1. Enabler of core business functionality
Almost all businesses today rely heavily on IT to enable their core business applications.
Accounting, order processing, manufacturing, inventory control and payroll are now
almost universally computerised. The architecture must be adequate to support these
requirements not only currently, but for a number of years hence. Waiting until forced by
circumstances to provide the appropriate elements is likely to result in less than optimum
investment performance. The author witnessed this in the course of two consultancy
assignments in which companies were forced, due to an exclusive attention to applica-
tions software and immediate financial payoff, to replace fundamental components of
the IT architecture without the benefit of adequate planning or investment appraisal.
This decision gave rise to major problems in the medium term (see Appendix I).
2. Support for Business Flexibility
Heraclitus is not a name that readily springs to mind when discussing IT architectures,
but he identified in 470 B.C. what is becoming increasingly apparent to every business-
man, and IT specialist today - "nothing is permanent but change". Shorter time to mar-
ket, shorter product development and life cycles, rapidly changing organisational struc-
tures, deregulation (with its unpredictable outcomes), and volatile consumer will repre-
sent at various times, threats or opportunities. However, they will always impose
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demands on IT to provide rapid and adaptable business solutions. Whereas impressive
results can be achieved in the short term by adopting a case-by-case approach indepen-
dent of the architecture the inevitable obstacles they pose to systems integration suggest
that the desired flexibility can be achieved only on the basis of an appropriate architec-
ture.
3. Support for Competitive Positioning
Competitive positioning is more often associated with applications than architecture, but
the latter can be crucially important here as well. Whilst the architecture itself may not
be the crucial factor (it can after all be replicated by competitors), taken in conjunction
with innovative applications software it can be the source of decisive competitive advan-
tage. The reverse side of this of course is that such competitive initiatives can be
employed by competition as well. The range of potential considerations is graphically
outlined in Fig 10.1. (252).
Fig 9.1 Business Impact of Competition
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One of the most widely quoted examples of IT architecture deployed for competitor
lockout is that of American Hospital Supply (AHS). By installing a vast telecommuni-
cations network with their customers, giving them direct access to their inventory and
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order-replacement systems. During the years 1978-1983, AHS's revenue grew by an
annual average of 17%, while the industry overall suffered a decline (253). Even more
impressive has been American Airline's SABRE online reservations system, which
rivals the airline itself in terms of profit contribution, greatly reduced the airline's oper-
ating costs, and was so successful that legislation was introduced in the US Congress to
force American to share the facility. Braniff Airlines and People's Express both went
bankrupt due (at least in part) to the impact of SABRE and to corporate decisions not to
invest in similar infrastructure facilities (254).
4. Enabler for Strategic Realignment
It has been demonstrated throughout this work that turbulence and unpredictability char-
acterise today's business environment to an unprecedented degree. One notable affects
has been the blurring of boundaries between hitherto clearly differentiated industries and
market sectors (255). A second has been the extent to which traditional manufacturing
industries have struggled to adapt to this new environment (256).
These outcomes have resulted in many corporations (particularly those engaged in tra-
ditional manufacturing) realigning their strategies towards service activities. This has
been described as industrial-age firms moving into information-age markets. A notable
example is the move by major publishers such as Simon and Schuster into software
retailing as well as electronic publishing and electronic distribution of data services,
newsletters and books (257). GM and Ford have moved into the financial services, by
way of funding dealership parts and vehicle inventories, as well as computer assisted
manufacturing and software services (258.) The capacity to undertake these moves has
been dependent to a greater or lesser extent on an IT architecture which has had to be
flexible, expandable, and robust. An examination of the 10 routes that Canton has iden-
tified for making the transition to services shows that IT architecture is an essential
enabler (259).
5. Enabler of Alliances, Mergers and Take-overs
Electronic linkages between the information systems of different companies are rapidly
increasing in number. Keen states that "in the 1990s, on-line operations will naturally,
rapidly, and inevitably be extended across organisational boundaries, with IT as the key
enabler. A firm whose IT base meets only its internal needs will be at an obvious dis-
advantage" (260). The capacity of the IT architecture to adapt to the demands of EDI
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and the numerous industry-specific standards such as the US grocery industry's uniform
communications standard (UCS) will therefore be crucial. Keen goes on to cite the
example of a US bank which lost a $400 million client because it could not link its pay-
ments system to that of the customer.
Mergers acquisitions and divestitures are now an everyday fact of life (see Chapter 7)
Hardware platforms, operating systems, network protocols and database management
systems are just some of the architectural elements which are capable of making or
breaking a proposed merger. When British Airways took over Caledonian, the two air-
lines' systems were integrated over the space of a weekend, due to the compatibility and
flexibility of their IT structures. By way of contrast, the mergers of Continental and
People Express brought chaos due to incompatible IT structures (261).
6. Potential to Optimise Supplier Alternatives
The selection of suppliers of the IT architecture is much more problematical in the 1990s
than it has been in earlier times (see Chapter 3). Up to about the mid-1980s, most archi-
tectures (apart from those in very large organisations) would be dominated by one, or at
most two, suppliers. Those suppliers would have provided a stable development envi-
ronment, and, due to the relative stability of the marketplace, generally have been finan-
cially sound, and would have provided a relatively stable growth path. Today, even the
giants of the IT industry, such as IBM and Digital, have had to struggle, not just for their
market positions, but for their very survival (262).
These conditions underline the increased importance of choosing carefully when select-
ing the suppliers of the IT architecture. It is now much easier to (end up in) a techno-
logical cul-de-sac, or with a supplier whose current financial stability may prove to be
short-lived. In today's competitive trading conditions, these possibilities could be cru-
cial.
For these reasons it is proposed that architecture represents an essential element of the
investment appraisal process.
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9.3 Architecture issues in the appraisal process
9.3.1 Outsourcing
Definition
Outsourcing may be described as the transfer of all or part of a firm's systems/DP oper-
ations to an outside contractor. It is one of the most widely discussed issues in recent
years, and while the number of firms which have engaged in major outsourcing opera-
tions to date has been small, interest is high. A US survey of 500 IS managers found that
only 2% of respondents were actively using outsourcing, but 20% were considering such
a move (263).
Outsourcing Drivers
Pressure on IT costs: The lack of any demonstrable proof of payback from IT, despite
falling hardware process, has led to pressure from senior management on IS managers to
reduce costs (264). Looked at solely from this perspective, outsourcing will undoubted-
ly reduce costs, at least in the short term.
Greater IT complexiV: Trends such as distributed computing, multi-vendor installa-
tions, and a profusion of "standards" have greatly complicated the lives of IS managers,
as have the presence of different operating systems, incompatible applications software
and development tools in the one site (265). The rate of technological change demands
that IS managers risk losing their grip on their environment when they become bogged
down in administrative details (266). "A growing number of consultants, corporate
executives, and IT professionals say a solid understanding of technology is once again
becoming crucial for ... IS managers.. .to help companies (develop) an infrastructure for
the 21st century" (267). Outsourcing is seen as enabling IS managers concentrate fully
on such issues.
Hedging infrastructural risks: IT infrastructural planning has become much more diffi-
cult to predict than heretofore (see Chapter 3) as different architectures, operating sys-
tems and platforms struggle to achieve supremacy. Decisions taken on architecture
investment could result, not only in significant financial losses direc tly related to the
investment, but, given the pervasiveness of IT through all business operations, could
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seriously undermine a firm's ability to competei (268). Outsourcing is seen as a form of
insurance, or less charitably, a way of avoiding risky decisions.
Even though in many ways it can be seen as harking back to the 'bureau' activities com-
mon in the 1960s, the appeal of outsourcing is very much a function of current trends in
IT. To an IS manager faced with the difficulties outlined above, it has many appealing
qualities, not least in that it can avoid or postpone difficult decisions in the investment
appraisal process. The following are issues which should be considered if outsourcing
is being considered as an alternative to purchasing:
Timespan: For very good reasons (from their perspective) outsourcing contractors will
seek to long term contracts, usually for a minimum of five years, and most outsourcing
contracts are for ten or even fifteen years (269). The rapid rate of technological change
as well as the need to align business and IT strategies, and the INDUCTIVE role of tech-
nology in enabling process redesign have already been considered in Chapter 8. Clearly,
tying a company to a long term contractual arrangement, based on today's technology, is
potentially highly restrictive in terms of these requirements. Irrespective of how careful-
ly an outsourcing contract is constructed, it is difficult to see how a "partnership" could
be satisfactorily maintained over this length of time unless the outsourcing organisation
is prepared to forego future flexibility.
Staffing: Outsourcing decisions, involving staff being redeployed either internally or
externally, or laid off, "can lead to personnel problems and even class-action lawsuits"
(270). Staff who are redeployed to the outsourcer may in theory remain available, but
this ignores the possibility that they may not remain with the outsourcer, or might stay
but pursue a different career path. The possibility of breaking up a good in-house team
is therefore strong, and At a minimum, in-house staff morale will almost cer tainly be
adversely affected.
Confidentiality and Integrity of Data: One of the reasons which contributed to the vir-
tual disappearance of computer bureaus related to reservations about data security, con-
fidentiality and integrity (271). With the vast increase in the amount of data, and the
introduction of new legislation governing privacy and use of data, these reservations
assume increased significance. Notwithstanding. much talk of "partnerships", an out-
sourcing arrangement involves handing over control of a vital corporate asset to
strangers.
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Data deluge: One of the main advantages of personal computing, the availability of
large amounts of additional information, could turn out to be a problem of assimilation.
The Gartner Group put it strongly "With some IS organisations opening the data flood-
gates.. .giving users unbridled access to data - a problem far worse than restricted access
has risen: data deluge. Data deluge will reduce user decision-making capability by more
than half' (272).
Impact on Architecture Investment Perspective 
It is too soon yet to determine the full impact of outsourcing, as there are few if any such
arrangements which have been in place longer than a few years. On the basis the advan-
tages and risks detailed above, it would appear that the real impact will only become
clear after several years (five or more) years. On balance it would seem that outsourc-
ing all or a substantial part of the IS function would impose unacceptable limitations on
organisational flexibility, outweighing the apparent benefits. Even routine transaction
processing can give rise to problems, as enterprise-wide information systems increas-
ingly gain currency.
On balance, then, it is suggested that, if IT is to act as a strategic resource, the IT infra-
structure should remain in-house, despite the attractive short term advantages associated
with outsourcing.
9.31 Legacy Systems
Definition
Legacy systems may be described as applications which were developed on older tech-
nologies, usually minis or mainframes, using old programming languages (such as
COBOL, FORTRAN, and Assembler), and "is past its prime but is too critical to disrupt"
(273). In terms of the Four Phase historical development of IT (see Chapter 3 ), legacy
systems would relate to those at Phases II and II. This would be similar to Stages 1 and
2 of the Butler Cox Foundation's Four Stage IT Impact framework. Stage 1 relates to
functional automation applications, such as replacing clerical processing of payroll.
Stage 2 systems are characterised by sharing data.between different business functions,
as for example payroll transactions being integrated into the general ledger system (274).
Such systems are typically ten to fifteen years old and are characterised by enormous
growth throughout this lifespan. Information Week cites examples of applications which
136
JU
25
20
15
10
5
0 	
complete Active Surtp Pendim RAM NA
have grown tenfold over their lifetime, including one for the Chevron Corporation where
one COBOL programme grew to encompass over 3 million lines of code (275). This
growth suggests an enormous expenditure on maintenance tasks over time dwarfs the
original cost (and cost justification) of the original application. More seriously, it sug-
gests that essential business requirements may remain unfulfilled due to development
staff's involvement in maintenance.
The scale of existing investment in such systems is enormous (estimated at up to $2 bil-
lion), as is the cost of moving from them ($17.6 billion in the US alone for 1993), and
to compound the problem, the cost is increasing at the rate of 18% per annum due to con-
tinued growth in size and complexity (276). It is little wonder then that the issue is
becoming one of increasing concern for IS Managers. This concern is reflected in the
number of departments planning legacy systems replacement projects, as indicated in
Fig9.2.
Fig 9.2 Firms Contemplating Legacy System Replacement
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The Imperatives for moving from legacy systems 
In many ways, the problems associated with legacy systems parallel those of the minis
and mainframes on which they operate:
They go back to a time when the proportion of cost related to hardware as distinct from
staff costs was much higher than it is today. This facilitated the build-up of an inflexi-
ble bureaucracy around both the hardware and the systems (277). Both the hardware and
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applications were geared towards high volume batch processing, with minimal end-user
interaction. The basic architectures of both hardware (particularly mainframes) and soft-
ware have changed little over twenty years (278). Many of the biggest suppliers of minis
and mainframes have experienced severe financial difficulties as their market eroded
(see Chapter 3). Most seriously however, they are singularly unsuited to the demands of
today's business environment:
Shorter product development cycles and market life demand flexibility and speedy soft-
ware development.
The spread of IT through all business processes calls for hybrid skills among systems
staff. Such skills are in notably short supply among those who develop, maintain, and
operate legacy systems (279).
Process Redesign has been shown (Chapter 8) to be one of the key business requirements
of the nineties. "As business reen&eering moves from definition to implementation, IS
managers find legacy systems standing in the way. Business processes are like bricks,
they can be stacked and sorted any which way. But a legacy system is like mortar
cementing the bricks in place. BPR can't be done without chipping away the mortar"
(280).
Empowering of end-users, a key business requirement of the 1990s, calls for intuitive
interface, easy access, and attractive output.
Eroding profit margins call for cheaper operating platforms.
The growth of IT-enabled links between companies (e.g. EDI) requires open standards
and flexible response.
Clearly legacy systems, and their concomitant hardware platforms, have limitations in
meeting such requirements. Hence the compulsion to move to a more appropriate envi-
ronment. Paradoxically, some of these pressures may have the effect of prolonging the
life of legacy systems. For instance, eroding profit margins and general business uncer-
tainty have resulted in a reluctance to undertake the large and risky investment required
in moving from legacy systems, and the demands of users for the speedy provision of
information results in further maintenance, rather than a "ground up" shift to a modern
environment (281).
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Balancing the Benefits 
Processing Costs: Despite frequent claims to the contrary, moving from mainframes to
client/server does not automatically imply cost savings. This depends very much on the
type of applications in use. When there are large numbers of users, and computing
requirements of the user are low. An example would be an airline reservation system
with a high number of agents involved in simple inquiry and update tasks. This reflects
the fact that terminals are much cheaper than workstations (282).
Storage Costs: While client/server storage devices are substantially lower than those for
mainframes in terms of direct cost versus capacity, this masks variances in performance.
For a database application, client/server technology often requires that the database
reside on a single disk. This curtails the potential efficiency gains applicable in a main-
frame environment, where disk performance can be optimised by allocating the database
over numerous disk drives (283).
Jig 9.3  Relative Costs for Mainframe and Client Server
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Interfaces: A client/server environment usually involves implementing interfaces
between networks, databases, different operating systems, user interfaces, and hardware
platforms. The laws of complexity come into play here, invariably adding dispropor-
tionately to costs and maintenance.
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Systems Management: Tools such as performance monitoring, capacity planning, print
management, library management and security are essential for efficient operations, and
are standard in a mainframe environment. These are either unavailable, or still relative-
ly immature in the client/server environment (284).
Despite these seemingly unfavourable comparisons to mainframes, the move to
client/server must be seen as inexorable. Herb Edelstein, a leading consultant in this
area, summarises the reasons as follows: "the benefits ultimately outweigh the costs".
He cites these as a better user orientation, scaleability of applications, and the flexibili-
ty to meet a dynamic, distributed business environmenf' (285).
Impact on Architecture Perspective 
In terms of investment appraisal, the move from legacy systems must be seen as com-
plex and time consuming. Computerworld states that "(u)sers and industry analysts say
even relatively straightforward integration projects, such as a simple client/server query
application, can easily take more than a year". It goes on to cite other difficulties, most
notably those related to keeping corporate data shared among different platforms syn-
chronised, and the "culture shock" for IS staff maldng this transition (286). Probably the
most important issue from an investment appraisal perspective is whether to continue to
invest in legacy systems, or "bite the bullet" and downsize or outsource. Given the scale
and scope of existing legacy systems, and the trend in technology, this is likely to be one
of the key factors facing management over the next number of years.
9.3.3 Centralisation versus Decentralisation
This is one of the most enduring and widely-discussed issues, and has been debated at
length for many years now, and some researchers see it as a key determinant of IT invest-
ment effectiveness (287). Lincoln describes the centralised organisation as one which
"determines to retain central control over resources, planning, service delivery, etc. In
spite of processing some elements of multi-divisionalism". The decentralised organisa-
tion on the other hand "runs its divisions at anns.length, and operates as a remote hold-
ing company" (288). The fact that it remains a subject of such debate suggests that IS
managers should afford it careful attention as part of the Architecture perspective.
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Considerations 
Advantages of a decentralised architecture
• Meets a key requirement of modern business in that it empowers the end-user by pro-
viding flexible and fast response, as well as shorter and less demanding development
cycles (289).
• Can be upgraded progressively flexibly in line with changing organisational require-
ments.
• Does not require a large number of expert (and therefore expensive) staff to operate
and develop the applications.
• Is more likely to creates a sense of ownership of systems.
• Reduces corporate exposure to major centralised disaster (e.g. fire)
Disadvantages of a decentralised architecture
• Fails to achieve the purchasing economies of scale obtainable with a centralised sys-
tem.
• Gives rise to problems of integration between different applications, and between
applications and host systems. These can be very severe. Even Digital, the leading
supplier of minis (the mainstay of decentralisation) had to undergo a major restruc-
turing in the UK in the mid 1980s to overcome this difficulty (290).
• Will almost inevitably incur hidden and unanticipated costs (training, business dis-
ruption, inefficient software development, etc., as detailed in Chapter 3)
Through unanticipated additional demands from users, hardware and network per-
formance may prove to be inadequate.
• Does not facilitate the development or running of large-scale applications.
Support from suppliers is unlikely to be as good as for centralised systems, due to the
lower purchasing levels.
• Standards of security and data integrity are likely to be lower than in centralised pro-
cessing (291).
• Despite widely held views to the contrary, moves towards decentralisation may result
in an increase in middle management bureaucracy and numbers (292).
Cash et al take a more strategic view of the issues, and neatly summarise them in Fig.
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9.4. (293).
Fig 9.4 Pressures on Balancing the Hardware/Data Distributions
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Impact on investment appraisal process
The issue of centralisation is seen by many practitioners as a key element in addressing
IT costs. Claude Marais, a director in a $multi-billion US pharmaceutical firm, says
"improving value from and containing costs in information technology are still among
the top priorities for corporate executives. The way to do this is through centralised IT'
(294). Others take a different view. "Decentralisation is the answer" claims Stuart
Lieberman, a veteran of exercises in centralisation and decentralisation (295).
9.3.4 Open Systems
Definition
The term `open systems' is not necessarily one which means the same thing to everyone.
Two characteristics described by Tapscott and Caston seem to have a wide acceptance in
the literature (296).
For a system to be open it should posses the following characteristics:
Portability: It should be capable of operating on a variety of hardware and operating sys-
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tern platforms.
Interoperability: It should be capable of communicating and transferring data with other
applications.
Other observers have included a standardised user interface, i.e., the capacity to min-
imise familiarisation requirements for users of other systems, as an additional character-
istic (297). The Institute of Electronic Engineers offer a single-sentence definition. "A
comprehensive and consistent set of international IT standards profiles that specify inter-
faces, services, and supporting formats to accomplish interoperability and portability of
applications, data and people" (298).
Development of Need for Open Systems 
The pressure for Open Systems derived almost exclusively from the user community,
increasingly dissatisfied with the 'vendor lock-in' syndrome which applied up to the mid
1980s (299). This occurred due to a lack of portability of applications, whereby those
developed for a particular manufacturer's hardware could not be ported onto that of an
alternative manufacturer without involving enormous redevelopment costs and staff
retraining and business disruption. This placed the customer in a weak position vis-a-
vis the vendor, was cost inefficient, and reduced flexibility.
The pressure for Open Systems was reinforced by the following developments:
• The growth in distributed and personal computing gave rise to what could be
described as a parallel world in which localised islands of processing and informa-
tion existed in tandem with that of centralised minis and mainframes. This led to
increasing demands for easy access to core corporate data resources, and for inte-
gration between the different operating environments (300).
• The growth in electronic linkages between suppliers and customers was hindered by
an inability of different systems to 'talk' with one another. Even where it was pos-
sible, it demanded costly and complex interface mechanisms (301).
• Business pressures of the 1980s called for IT flexibility and better value for money.
( see Chapter 8)
These developments have resulted in the rapid growth of open systems, making one of
the most important issues for IT managers to address today (302).
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There is a more profound dimension than this however to the concept of openness, in
that a different philosophical approach underpins it. This philosophy envisages an envi-
ronment where barriers are reduced, thereby enhancing connectivity and co-operation,
where dependence on powerful suppliers is eliminated, where, through open connectiv-
ity, co-operation with customers and suppliers is enhanced, and through supporting
greater flexibility and mobility of staff, where new technology and adaptive IT solutions
can be incorporated relatively seamlessly.
There are many parallels with the business environment, with openness underpinning
many of the elements of the Phase IV business imperatives (see Chapter 3). An open
business organisational structure suggests the following:
• the decision-making process becomes more transparent
• information becomes more readily available
• staff can move more freely between different tasks and processes
• supporting IT facilities can be altered more easily
• operating links can be more easily established - and broken - with customers, sup-
pliers and even competitors
• short-term requirements can be accommodated more easily
• process redesign and the formation of process-based teams are facilitated
Investment appraisal ramifications of open systems 
Although the Open Systems environment offers considerable benefits in terms of price,
flexibility, and independence, in terms of the IT architecture it presents a bewildering
array of alternative applications, operating systems, networks, and suppliers, all of which
claim to be 'open'. In terms of downsizing to an open (usually client/server) environ-
ment, there is no guarantee of cost savings. The Xephon Group and others have shown
that factors such as cheaper cost of MIT'S (millions of instructions per second) and lower
storage costs can be an inadequate way of assessing the full range of costs and benefits
(303). In one publication, the use of such criteria is described as "judging a forklift on
how fast it goes from 0-60 m.p.h.!" (304). A variety of hidden costs and poorer than
anticipated performance have been identified as possible downsides of this environment
(305), but the trend seems inevitable, and more a wide range of commentators sees the
benefits arriving when a critical mass of experience in the environment has been reached
(306).
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9.3.5 Client/Server
Client/server technology represents a fundamental shift from its host-based predecessor.
The host-based environment retained all power and intelligence at the centre - the host.
Users connected to it via so-called dumb terminals which made no allowances for users'
individual preferences or capabilities. The client/server model, by way of contrast,
enables processing power and information appropriate to the users needs to reside on the
users' workstation (the client), and additional information and processing capability is
made available from a variety of specialised, dedicated servers, such as database servers,
providing printing, database, document imaging, and other such services (307). Closely
allied to the principles of client/server are distributed computing and co-operative pro-
cessing, which involve locating applications and information on a variety of platforms,
geared to usage requirements (308).
The business parallels for client/server are less numerous than for openness, but are
nonetheless significant.
• Appropriate power and information is distributed to the user,
• Process-oriented work teams act as both as clients and servers
• Rapid, ad hoc solutions can be created when empowered staff have access to
"servers", be they other specialised staff, or the resources of other process-based
teams.
• Customised individually-tailored solutions are more easily developed in a
client/server environment.
Tapscott and Capston provide a useful description of client/server in action, based on the
Logical Service Unit (LSU) model (309). As the name implies, LSUs are based on the
concept of processes as defined in Chapter 8, or more accurately, as functions (e.g. Order
Processing as distinct from Order Department). A good example would be the Clinical
Directorate function as described in the case study in appendix IV, and a typically an
LSU would be a high level process such as production and delivery or promotion and
selling.
Referring to the relationship between LSUs and external business associates, they rec-
ommend that "(i)t is useful to view these relationships as client/server interactions. For
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example, a request for product availability from a prospective customer would be ser-
viced by a customer service LSU, which would then become a client of a warehouse
management LSU to determine the in-stock status, which, if not in stock, becomes a
client to the production management LSU to request an expedited production allocation.
Each of these client/server interactions proceeds (it is hoped, in real time) using the
established request-for-service format with expected responses and time frames pre-
established."
Investment appraisal ramifications of client/server technology 
Given the significance of the changes that client/server technology introduces to not only
the IS department but throughout the organisation, it clearly has major ramifications for
the investment process. It impacts other perspectives more than any other of the archi-
tecture issues, particularly those of risk and reengineering. The issue of costs and pay-
back in a client/server environment are also a matter of serious contention at present,
with one side claiming major cost savings, while the proponents of more centralised,
host-based systems claming that a move to client server involves considerable addition-
al costs (310).
9.3.6 Object-Oriented Programming Systems (OOPS) or Object Technology
Object technology defined 
Object technology has been defined in a special edition of I/S Analyser as follows: "The
reusability of software components into modular, interoperable pieces, which when put
together accomplish a desired process, is the mother of object technology. ... an Object
Request Broker (ORB) provides mechanisms by which objects (a combination of a state
and a set of methods that embodies an abstraction) transparently make and receive
requests and responses (e.g. an application object, or client, sends a message to another
application object or server, requesting some action or service. The ORB fields the
request and finds the object, conveys the request and selects a method to perform the
requested operation" (311).
How is object technology different? 
Unlike conventional procedural programming languages, an 00 based program is corn-
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prised of numerous objects, which are made up of both program code AND data, there-
by making them internally self-reliant. These objects can pass messages to one another,
and as different programming requirements arise, can be amended slightly to meet these
needs (312).
Thus a screen design object which would have the code and data inbuilt, could be taken
and adapted slightly to provide the new screen design object for a different application.
This is the concept of inheritance, central to 00 theory.
The significance of 00 
According to DataPro, "Object technology has become one of the most important new
technologies of the decade" (313). Christopher Stone, President of the Object
Management Group, claims that "open technology will change the way we develop,
market, and sell computer technology" (314). The literature reveals a range of benefits
and dis-benefits associated with this technology (315).
Benefits
• provides reusable code
• imposes a consistent development environment
• reduces development lead times
• reduces maintenance burden and errors in the maintenance process
Drawbacks
• calls for fundamental retraining of programmers
• payback is slow
Investment appraisal ramifications of object technology 
Although properly a technical issue, the accepted importance of object technology over
the full software lifecycle, from design through to marketing, must make it an issue for
management when investing in information technology (316). The relatively slow pay-
back and subsequent reduction in software maintenance costs directly impact on the
investment appraisal process.
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Summary
The review of the five perspectives suggests that management should seek to achieve the
following when investing in the architecture. The architecture should:
• be flexible enough to accommodate the rapidly changing demands of today's busi-
ness environment, yet sufficiently robust to support mission-critical applications
• provide the basis for competitive advantage through the application of technology,
yet include the capacity to respond rapidly in the event of a threat of competitive
technological lockout - in other words to be able not only to apply competitive lock-
out but also to respond to lockout initiatives by competitors.
• maximise the economic benefits and independence stemming from utilising a range
of vendors, yet avoid the risks of incompatibility and vendor financial instability.
• provide adequate security and data access controls while minimising user inconve-
nience.
• provide maximum practical protection for existing investments yet be in a position
to exploit new technologies as they come to fruition.
Investing in the architecture calls therefore for a skilled balancing of resources in meet-
ing what are in effect competing business requirements. What meets one objective may
conflict with others (e.g. flexibility conflicts with integration and security). And this
must take place in the context of great uncertainty regarding future technological direc-
tions and continued rapid technological advances. Furthermore, current operational
requirements have to be fully accommodated. If one takes into account the wide range
of potential starting positions (the spectrum ranges from that represented by long-estab-
lished legacy systems, to a greenfield site), the scope for prescriptive solutions is clear-
ly limited. This perspective therefore provides considerable challenges to management
seeking to optimise investment, and has particular relevance for the issue of investment
scope raised in Chapter 11.
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Chapter 10. Evaluating Risk
10.1. Introduction
As for all investment decisions, those related to IT incur an element of risk and uncer-
tainty to a greater or lesser degree. Some textbooks differentiate between risk and uncer-
tainty, but this distinction is not regarded as relevant to the purposes of this research. A
more management-focused approach is offered by Loudon and Loudon, who describe
risk as a negative outcome that has a known or estimated probability of occurrence based
on experience or some theory (317). Further references to risk will therefore be in the
context of what is commonly understood to be risk. Typical examples would be failure
to implement on time, costs being greater than anticipated, poor performance of the hard-
ware, system specifications not meeting user requirements, and organisational disrup-
tion.
The high level of failures identified in Chap 1 demonstrates that level of risk associated
with IT investments, and a study by the OTR Group in 1992, quoted by Willcocics,
showed that for projects in excess of 1660,000, 90% were over budget, 60% were over
time, and 20% were inappropriate" (318). The scale can also be enormous. For instance,
projects abandoned in 1992 by the Wessex Water Authority and the London Stock
Exchange resulted in billions of pounds being wasted. Emphasising the importance of
risk assessment, Strassman claims that "performing risk analysis of computer opportu-
nities is the most urgent challenge facing executives who must make informed invest-
ment decisions" (319).
Despite this, the proportion of companies applying risk analysis is low. The OTR Group
report cited by Willcocks, indicates that only 30% of companies surveyed applied any
structured risk analysis in evaluating projects (320). Studies at ICL suggest that in gen-
eral, people are uncomfortable with the concept of risk, and tend to veer towards undue
optimism or pessimism (321). Griffiths and Willcocks state that "overall, it appears that
risk factors are not considered a main variable in projects, and consequently they are
massively underplayed and under-assessed (322). Clearly therefore, there is consider-
able room for improvement in this aspect of investment appraisal.
The explanation for this could reside in a study by Pike and Ho, which revealed the fol-
lowing as the main barriers to risk assessment, in their order of significance: (323)
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• Managerial understanding of techniques
• Obtaining input estimates
• Time involvement
• Cost justification techniques
• Human/organisational resistance
• Trade-off between risk and return
• Understanding of output and analysis
The forces which have given rise to the need for a new paradigm in IT investment
appraisal have had a similar impact on risk assessment The increased importance of
organisational and human resource considerations, a turbulent business environment,
rapid and unpredictable change, and the emergence of quality and service as key perfor-
mance criteria have added a new dimension of complexity in assessing risk, even though
this is undoubtedly offset to some degree by cheaper and more reliable hardware. The
pervasiveness of IT in organisational structures, giving rise as it does to a move from
financial criteria towards those of a more subjective and qualitative nature, has created
a similar requirement in the area of risk assessment.
It seems clear therefore that a formalised evaluation of risk must be a factor in the invest-
ment appraisal process.
10.2 Risk issues in the appraisal process
Recent studies by Willcocks and Margetts, Bessant, Ward and Earl have identified the
following shortcomings in IT projects (324).
• lack of a unified strategic framework
• lack of organisational adaptation to complement technological change
• IT supplier problems with hype preceding delivery
• poor management of change leading to inappropriate organisational and project
structures, processes and culture
• over emphasis on the 'technical fix'
• a misguided belief in technology leading to unwanted products or services
• lack of skills to support implementation
• lack of exploration of a wide range of options, resulting in the exclusion of lower
technology alternatives
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10.3 Specific Risk Categories:
It would seem likely that any structured approach to risk assessment would require some
form of risk classification. Such classifications exist in abundance, many in the form of
Cost/Risk matrices, such as that from the CSC Index Group shown in Fig. 10.1. (325).
These matrices have the advantage of simplifying complex issues, but this strength also
represents their weakness, in that such simplicity could be misleading.
rig, 10.1 CSC Index Cost/Risk Matrix
Comfort
Low Cost / Low Risk
Confidence
High Cost / Low Risk
Caution
Low Cost / High Risk
Confusion
High Cost / High Risk
To develop an approach to risk which can contribute to the overall investment frame-
work of Chapter 12, a more comprehensive classification, which recognises the unique
challenges posed by today's business environment, is proposed. These categories can be
summarised under four headings, Organisational, Project, Staff, and External.
10.3.1 Organisation Risks
Strength of alignment with business objectives 
The risk of the project not aligning with business objectives is potentially one of the most
serious. The rate of business and technological change which characterises today's busi-
ness environment makes this consideration at once both more important and more diffi-
cult. A further complication arises from the capacity of an IT investment to act as a cat-
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alyst for business change (see Chapter 6), and conversely, to act as an impediment if it
turns out to embed outdated practices in software or hardware (see Chapter 8). To
address this category of risk effectively, it appears clear that top management commit-
ment is called for. Factors adding to the risk would be imprecise or contradictory objec-
tives, a turbulent external environment resulting in the need for frequent revisions of
objectives, or inadequate processes for linking business and IT strategies (see Chapter
6).
Culture 
The risk cultures of organisations vary considerably. For example, the attitude to risk
taking in a government department, to take one extreme, is likely to be considerably dif-
ferent to that in a high technology company seeking to enter or even create new markets.
The government department, or a similar type organisation, is more likely to set a high
premium on a careful, well documented approach to risk, using well known and reliable
suppliers, applying a minimum of innovation. Such an organisation would set a high pre-
mium on following prescribed guidelines and procedures, against which any subsequent
failures or shortcomings in the project would be evaluated. By way of contrast, the
organisation on the opposite end of the spectrum would see risk taldng as an essential
element of competitive advantage. This may result in purchasing relatively untried hard-
ware or software, perhaps from financially unstable suppliers, or specifying ambitious
implementation deadlines. The organisational culture is such that risks such as these are
deemed to be acceptable.
Organisational preparedness 
The organisational impact of many systems can be considerable. Earl has shown how
such impact can be reflected in changes in job definition, power structures, career
prospects, the degree of job security, departmenta: influence or ownership of data (326).
Any one or combination of these factors could have an impact on the success of the pro-
ject, and as IT becomes increasingly embedded in core business processes, such con-
siderations assume greater importance (327). There is much research to show that organ-
isations vary widely in the extent of their preparedness for such outcomes (328). For
example a long-established, hierarchical, task-oriented organisation may find it much
more difficult to adapt compared to an organisaiion which is modern and flexible, with
a flat organisational structure (329).
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Management support
The degree of management support for an investment in IT may be crucial, and as IT
plays an increasingly important role in organisational redesign, such support assumes
added significance (330). The extent of this support varies considerably with the type of
application. For instance, such support for projects related to business reengineering and
Executive Information Systems is crucial, but will be less important for infrastructure
investments such as the implementation of a new network.
10.3.2 Project Risks
Project management skills 
Project management skills are crucial for a successful implementation, yet appear to be
often overlooked, or confused with general development staff capabilities. The author
has experienced a project where the staff were all high-calibre and well motivated. Yet
the project ran both behind time and over budget, due to a fall-down in project manage-
ment. The assumption was that with staff of such a calibre, strong project management
skills were not required. In the author's experience, skilled developers often lack the
capacity and willingness to engage in project management and testing.
Size and duration 
Cash eta! have demonstrated how the exposure to risk can be said to vary markedly with
the size and duration of the project - the bigger the project, and the longer it takes to com-
plete, the bigger the risk, and Ward states this to be "almost self evident" (331).
Sometimes this can be offset by dividing it into sub-sections, outsourcing some of the
components (although outsourcing can itself be a risk, see Chapter 9) or by hedging the
risk by entering into a co-operative development arrangement. As Brooks has shown in
his seminal work The Mythical Man-Month, the laws of complexity apply to the number
of components or individuals associated in a project (332). That is, the difficulties and
problems increase exponentially with the number of factors (see below).
An accurate estimation of size and duration calls for a realistic appreciation of develop-
ment staff output. This is often postulated on the "best case" principle at the planning
stage, i.e. each member of the development team has his or her contribution determined
on the basis of what he or she is capable of producing in a given day. What is capable
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of being produced, and what actually is produced, can vary widely however. A major
study by Charles Portman of ICL showed that such productivity was in fact about half
what it should have been in theory (333). "Machine downtime, higher priority unrelat-
ed short jobs, meetings, paperwork, other company business, sickness, personal time etc.
accounted for the rest".
Complexity 
As with size and duration, the risk varies closely with the level of complexity (334).
Ward states that "complexity can arise in both the business and the technology and is
usually compounded by the number of business functions which need the new system,
and the number of other systems with which it must be integrated or interfaced (335).
Complexity can often be a function of an attempt to reduce costs. The author has expe-
rience of a company which sought to implement Executive Information System func-
tionality through the use of existing applications such as spreadsheets and e-mail, with a
Visual Basic user interface. The project cost a lot less than a standard EIS, but built-in
complexity stemming from version control and integration issues created many unantic-
ipated problems.
Functional uncertainty 
As the objective of applications moves from cost saving and automation of existing tasks
to the broader meeting of corporate objectives, the risk of functional or definitional
uncertainty inevitably increases. This could be reflected in the imprecise or incomplete
definition of the business problem, and/or the proposed business solution. Systems that
fail to fully address the business problem are now commonplace (336). This may stem
from an inability of the system users to define requirements accurately, or an inability of
the analysts to accurately assess those requirements. The operating system, program-
ming language(s), and development tools all have a bearing on technical uncertainty.
The level of risk is closely related to the level of maturity of these components (see
Chapter 9).
Hardware and vendor related risk 
As organisational and business issues assume increased importance, hardware depen-
dence has shown a commensurate decline. Risk associated with the hardware component
of an investment relate to meeting delivery date, performance, reliability, financial
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strength of supplier, potential redirection of supplier strategy (e.g. a move from propri-
etary to open systems) during the life of the project, the newness of the technology (337).
A move to a client/server environment may pose particular risks in terms of capacity, the
number of interfaces between different platforms, the number of protocols used, the
number of hardware and software vendors, and performance planning (338).
Capacity for testing
It is obvious that the degree of testing capable of being applied for a new application will
have a major impact on its eventual success, but this capability can vary significantly.
The main determinants are time constraints and the extent to which existing functions
are being directly replaced by the new system. The introduction of an invoicing/debtors
system would represent an example of this. In this instance it is likely that test output
can be compared to pre-determined values, possibly even in the context of a parallel run,
whereby the new and old systems run in parallel, allowing for comprehensive, real-life
testing (339).
As the automation of existing manual or part-manual applications declines in relative
terms (see Chapters 3 and 7) such clear-cut opportunities are becoming less frequent
however. As IT becomes increasingly applied to the redesign of existing work practices,
such opportunities for testing and trialling become reduced. Most process redesign ini-
tiatives, must of their nature, be implemented in a real-time environment (see Chapter
8). This increases technological, organisational, and cultural risk.
New Technology 
Griffiths and Hochstrasser state that "working with new technology always introduces
heightened levels of risk (340). They apply special significance to the tendency of time
pressures resulting in experimentation passing into fully-fledged implementation before
the completion of an adequate testing phase, leading to sub-optimal results. They point
out that this development often leads to higher than anticipated maintenance costs. New
technology will in addition, of its nature, not be as tested or robust as the older variety.
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10.3.3 Staff Risks
User commitment 
The level of user commitment is a key element in determining the success, and hence the
level of risk, of most projects. Textbooks abound with examples of applications which
failed due to user opposition or lack of support (341). These can be influenced by fac-
tors such as the general quality of industrial relations, job security, standards of IT train-
ing, user-friendliness of the new system, and the degree of user involvement in design or
selection.
User capabilities 
Increasingly, the success of applications depends on the capabilities of users to exploit
them. This is a direct consequence of the rush towards end-user computing, which in
turn derive from the characteristics of today's business environment, which have been
described several times in this research. Even with the support of the users, inadequate
training, experience, or the implementation of an application too complex for the calibre
of the user, will increase the risk of failure.
Staff stability 
A high turnover of staff, particularly development staff, increases the level of risk in a
project. This posed a severe problem in the 1970s and early 1980s, but appears to have
declined as a problem in recent years. Nonetheless, the staff most likely to be lured away
are likely to be the best - thus posing the greatest risk to the project. The capacity to
recruit new staff should be a factor in the risk assessment, but induction time into a
development team can be an important consideration.
10.3.4 External environment
Competitive action 
This is likely to represent the most important external risk for most organisations. This
is born out in a 1990 survey of 80 US, UK, Australian and New Zealand companies,
which showed that 61% of respondents used "response to competitive systems" as an
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investment criterion, and that this percentage was growing (342). Action taken by a com-
petitor may have direct impact on an IT project. For instance, an insurance company
may be planning to introduce a claims processing system which will provide greater
internal efficiencies and information. This project could be jeopardised by a competitor
introducing a system which provides enhanced service levels to the customer. This com-
petitive development could result in the project being abandoned and replaced by one
incorporating matching levels of service.
Government legislation 
New legislation, or changes to existing legislation, can impact the risk profile of a pro-
ject. The potential impact varies according to the industry. A good example relates to the
deregulation of the aircraft industry, which had far-reaching ramifications for every air-
line, affecting IT by way of generating requirements for new applications, changes to
existing ones, and greater emphasis on cost control and payback. Government initiatives
can have even more impact in the public sector. The author has personal experience of
how a change in the building planning regulations required changes to an application
which had been purchased, and was in the process of being implemented.
The economy 
Economic performance can impact the financial well-being of a company in a variety of
ways, and therefore its capacity to allocate project resources. The economy can also
influence the competitive environment, either favourably or unfavourably, with possible
impact on project requirements or resources.
10.4 Additional considerations
History 
Willcocks and Margetts attribute considerable significance to the organisational history
of previous projects in the risk assessment process, and cite a number of case studies
where this had an impact (343). Experience gathered from projects can be applied effec-
tively to the risk reduction process in new projects. The suspicion must remain howev-
er that, given the continuing scale and frequency of failure, the adoption of such lessons
still leaves a lot to be desired. This is underlined by a case history undertaken by the
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author in an agrochemical company. Despite having invested close to 1500,000 in an
earlier system which failed to deliver the expected benefits, the company repeated the
same mistakes to an uncanny degree. The main lessons learned - that purchasing 'the
right system' will not in itself guarantee the successful deployment of IT, and the need
for management involvement at all stages of the process - were ignored the second time
around. This suggests while history can indeed by valuable, it may not attract the atten-
tion that it merits from management.
10.5 Refining the Risk Analysis
The analysis derived from the foregoing framework can be refined by the application of
sensitivity and probability analysis techniques. Whereas these will be most appropriate
where financial values or other forms of quantitative criteria are involved, they may be
suitable for wider application. While these techniques can be applied manually, they are
only practicable with the use of computerised simulation tools
Summary
The high level of risk attached to IT investments, particularly when related to corre-
spondingly high levels of expenditure, merits inclusion as a separate perspective in the
overall evaluation framework. The inadequate levels of risk assessment currently pre-
vailing suggest the need for a structured approach to the problem. The framework pro-
posed in this chapter seeks to incorporate the key issues, while addressing the current
inhibitors in the area. Evaluating risk in terms of the organisation, project, staff and the
external environment should ensure consistency between applications, as well as a rea-
sonable level of completeness. Ideally, this should lead over time to an 'organisational
memory', which could provide a valuable resource when undertaking risk assessment for
future projects. The sub categories proposed are not seen as prescriptive, rather as
thought starters, which may vary between organisations, and even between projects.
The application of Sensitivity and Probability Analyses is recommended, in that the
potentially disproportionate impact of some elements may be highlighted, while the
identification of the 'worst case scenario' will also be enhanced. The value of such tech-
niques, restricted as they are to quantitative criteria, has declined however, as the impact
of IT becomes embedded in most organisational processes.
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Chapter 11. Scoring and Weighting, and Other Criteria
11.1 Introduction
The criteria reviewed in the previous five chapters are complex and wide-ranging in their
potential impact on IT investments. A number of other criteria, less complex and nar-
rower in scope, were identified in the course of the review of current approaches to
investment appraisal (Chapter 5). These are reviewed below.
11.1 Weighting and Scoring
Clearly, the relative importance of the perspectives described in the previous five chap-
ters will vary between organisations. For instance, a company with severe cashflow
problems is likely to assign a high weighting to payback (particularly direct cash sav-
ings), and to assign a low weighting to architecture. By way of contrast, a financially
strong company, seeking to position itself for future expansion, would be likely to
reverse these weightings. Therefore the component elements of each perspective need
to be assigned relative priorities in order for potential projects to be evaluated. For the
exercise to be realistic therefore, a set of weightings reflecting corporate values and pri-
orities seems called for.
While the weighted perspectives may provide a comprehensive coverage of the factors
upon which successful investments are based, in themselves they do not provide a frame-
work which identifies the respective merits of projects, or a baseline on which accep-
tance or rejection can be decided. A scoring system or other set of criteria must be
assigned to each proposal to evaluate the extent to which the proposed investment
matches the weighted criteria for each perspective. Such a scoring system, using the
multiple attribute decision model, was developed by Berliner and Brimson in 1988, and
subsequently adapted for Information Economics (344).
Many of the leading theorist and practitioners in this field take the need for a weighting
and scoring mechanism virtually for granted (345). The Information Economics
approach, for example, gives little or no theoretical justification for the use of these fac-
tors. In the case of the weighting principle, the authors simply state that the key evalu-
ation criteria "are weighted" before assigning scores. Considerably more attention is
paid to scoring, although for the most part this attention relates to scoring techniques for
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' Score :
The project has NO direct or indirect relationship to the achievement of
stated corporate (or departmental) strategic goals
The project has no direct or indirect relationship to such goals, but will
achieve improved operational efficiencies
The project has no direct or indirect relationship to such goals, but the
project is a prerequisite system (precursor) to another system that
achieves a portion of a corporate strategic goal
The project has no direct or indirect relationship to such goals, but the
project is a prerequisite system (precursor) to another system that
achieves a corporate strategic goal
The project directly achieves a portion of a stated corporate strategic
goal
The project directly achieves a stated corporate strategic goal
0
1
2
3
4
5
individual components of the exercise rather than a justification per se. The authors say
that "projects can be ordered or ranked by their (weighted) scores, providing a more bal-
anced assessment of a truer economic value to the enterprise. This provides a consistent
yardstick or measurement for establishing logical investment priorities..." (346).
When scoring on Strategic Match, for example, the authors provide five possible scor-
ing alternatives, ranging from 0 to 5. These are outlined in Fig 1 1 . 1 :
Liz. 11,I Scoring Example for Strategic Match (Information Economics)
The scores range from zero (having no linkage to strategic goals) to 5 (having a direct
linkage). In order to apply the scoring, the authors assume a corporate strategy is in
place, and that "it is clearly stated and understood by participants in the scoring process".
They add that participants in the process "must work towards a consensus of under-
standing". An essential element of the Information Economics scoring technique is that
it be performed by experts in the relevant area. Staying with Strategic Match, the par-
ticipants are seen as being from the business, as distinct from the technical domain.
"Those scoring Strategic Match are those who understand the nuances of the business
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thrust".
Remenyi, et al provide a spreadsheet program to assign weights and scores to a range of
prescribed variables, which the authors say are linked to Information Economics princi-
ples, but again do not provide a theoretical foundation for the weighting and scoring con-
cepts (347). The authors state that "such techniques are popular, and are therefore used
extensively in business". The inference from these and others in the field is that the
need for such techniques is self-evident (348). Based on research undertaken in the UK
insurance industry, Serafeimidis and Smithson came to see scoring and weighting as
essential to a balanced investment approach, and provide strong support for the theory.
"Conflicts of interest often emerge within as well as between stakeholder groups which
can affect evaluation, much of which is subjective, based on stakeholder value judge-
ments. It also means examining the mechanisms of representation of different interests,
the institutional means by which divergent evaluations can be discussed". They also
emphasise the importance of the evaluation process to take on board the "fundamental
values of the organisation" and the need for "assessments by managers, IS professionals
and users at all stages" of the process. A scoring and weighting approach is then applied
to identify a "benefits profile" from the planned investment (349).
Weighting and scoring also form a central element of Ward's portfolio approach but sees
them as being applicable only to critical success factors (CSFs) (350). While acknowl-
edging their limitations, including the possibility that 'he who shouts loudest will obtain
priority' he sees some form of weighting and scoring as essential in the evaluation
process. The difficulty with assigning different criteria for financial performance and
CSFs however is the risk of comparing 'apples with oranges', as identified by Hares and
Royle (see below). Another researcher/practitioner to apply scoring and weighting prin-
ciples in investment appraisal (this time in the context of assessing intangible costs and
benefits) is Vaid-Raizada, but again, these are simply taken for granted as part of the pro-
posed methodology, no justification is provided (351). Money et al provide a compre-
hensive framework for evaluating intangible benefits using conjoint measurement and
self-stated utility which in effect are firms of weighting and scorings (352).
The application of weighting and scoring is not confined to academics and commenta-
tors. Many organisations use such techniques as part of their normal evaluation process,
such as the Prudential Insurance (353) a European Port Authority (354) and the Swiss
airline company Swissair (355). The Swissair method appears to work satisfactorily,
even with what would appear to be a rigid set of weights which remains unchanging for
all investments over a protracted period of time. The weighting and scoring mechanism
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defines projects as belonging to one of three approved priority classes, priority one,
which should be started first when ever possible, priority two, which are of medium
strategic and commercial significance, and priority three which are of less importance
than the others.
11.1.1 Limitations of weighting and scoring
However, the use of weights and scores is not without its critics. Strassman is in strong
disagreement. He bases his criticism of Information Economics (an appellation which
he refuses to acknowledge, referring to it instead as P.B.T. after the initials of the
authors) on the technique used to calculate return on investment element. In particular
he sees as "implausible" the recommended scoring whereby a score of 1 is allocated to
an investment returning a rate of 1% to 299%, with every additional 200% adding 1 to
the score. He argues that to assign the same score to a range spanning 200 percentage
points, given that average returns are in the range of 8.6% to 25.6% (Strassman's fig-
ures), renders such scoring meaningless. This criticism is somewhat unreasonable, in
that it selects out the one dimension (ROI) which is most convincing in dealing with
"hard" figures, and least convincing when handled by a score. In the really difficult
aspects of IT investment iike !inking teemical and business requirements, so-caHed
"hard" figures are very difficult to apply, and here the Information Economics tools are
much more appropriate. Strassman does not mention these aspects however. In addi-
tion, he neglects to mention that the figures he quotes are examples only. The authors of
Information Economics allow for individual practitioners to apply their own variations,
and there is no intrinsic requirement for the scores or the ROI ranges to be as allocated
in the example.
Hares and Royle go to considerable length to demonstrate that the only meaningful
method of evaluation is to apply a financial value to all potential benefits from a pro-
posal, in the process rejecting the weighting/scoring technique "..in order to construct
a structured method for IA (investment appraisal) all business activities should be mea-
sured in money terms, enabling a single financial model to be developed. The usage of
... scorings and weightings for the units of business measure (is) rejected. If one did use
the non-financial scorings/weightings approach it would result in two parts to the model
for investing - the monetary and the non-monetary. Being based on different paradigms,
the two measures could not be judged as to their relative significance. Investment deci-
sions would be correspondingly based on inconsistent information - a dangerous situa-
tion" (356).
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Direct Benefits
* Labour saving (930k) 7 0.6 0.9 3.78
* Stock reduction (150k) 1 0.6 0.9 0.54
Intangible benefits
* Improved Quality 2 0.05 0.5 0.05
* Quicker delivery 8 0.2 1 1.6
* Greater reliability 2 0.05 0.5 0.05
Net value 6.02
Weight 0-10Investment bene
The authors warm to their task by examining a worked example provided by Berliner
and Brimson (see Fig. 11.2). They see considerable significance in the fact that the
direct financial benefits of £1,080,000 are assigned a score lower than the intangible ben-
efits. They see the inadequacies of the approach not only between the lack of a common
basis for comparing direct and intangible benefits, but what they see as three separate
units of measure for the intangibles. They conclude that this is "an artificial situation".
Filly. 11.2  Limitations of Weighting and Scoring
Similarly they believe the allocation of weights in column three should be "treated with
grave suspicion", because the intangible benefits are assigned greater weight than those
delivering direct financial payback. As was demonstrated in Chapter 7, there is no rea-
son why a company should not see intangible benefits as more important than those pro-
viding direct payback, and indeed the authors in other sections of this book go to con-
siderable lengths to demonstrate the inadequacies of techniques which emphasise finan-
cial payback! The authors contrast this approach with one which has finance as the only
criterion. This they claim provides a unit of common measure, without which compar-
isons are meaningless.
This is quite simply incorrect. There is no reason why a finical payback cannot be
assigned a value to a company in the same way as one which cannot be measured. For
instance, an investment in IT might result in a company winning a prestigious industry
•
163
award. It is not unreasonable to suggest that company management could state the value
of this achievement in terms of a cash equivalent. They might, for example, say "we
would as soon win this award as be presented with a cheque for £50,000". Management
is faced with such trade-offs every day, and the logic of it is that a financial payback can
be evaluated or scored in terms of contribution to corporate objectives in the same way
as other possible benefits. In any event, as Willcocics, Keen, Strassman and others have
shown, so-called "hard" benefits often camouflage the fact that the precise mathematics
are based on figures (such as "anticipated increase in sales volume") which are just edu-
cated guesses (357).
This is borne out by some of the examples Hares and Royle cite to support their argu-
ment. They claim for instance that 'speed of service' and 'product presentation' "can be
converted into monetary terms in their ability to maintain sales, sell more, charge a high-
er price, or create new business". Financial values can be assigned by calculating fac-
tors such as the number of additional sales and multiplying this by the average
value/profit of sale, or by multiplying the increased price by sales volume. In doing this,
they fall neatly into the trap identified by Keen, Strassman and Willcocks and referred
to in the previous paragraph.
Finally, a worked example of the method as applied to an IT investment appraisal exer-
cise in a harbour authority is provided. The exercise is followed through in great detail,
and the result defined in financial equivalents is presented, and ends with the statement
"the quantification technique proved its worth". They go on to ask however, astonish-
ingly, in the light of their earlier claims, "can the figures presented have been (sic)
finessed even further? It is becoming clear that the answer is yes - the pure monetary
measure was not adequate". Later on they state "But the financial figures did not show
the true extent to which business objectives were being achieved. The financial figures
were therefore weighted and re-expressed as a score". (italics mine).
Further comment seems unnecessary. As Hares and Royle found, some issues simply
cannot be expressed in financial terms. This would apply to most of the issues coming
within the strategic alignment, architecture and risk perspectives (such as company rep-
utation, investments in enabling technologies such as backbone networks, or the poten-
tial impact of trade union opposition), and attempts to assign financial values to them
become increasingly implausible and unsustainable. There is nonetheless some support
for this approach in the literature. One of the strongest is provided by the University of
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UM:EST), which boldly claims "Work
164
done at UMIST in 1985 showed for the first time, that there should be no such thing as
an intangible benefit. Since that time, no one has described a benefit that could not be
redefined into quantifiable terms" (358). The somewhat brash nature of this claim is
underlined in the following paragraph when the authors state that "the nature of intangi-
ble benefits is such that they do not appear in the department where the investment is
made, but occur elsewhere in the company". Such unsupported sweeping statements
undermine one's confidence in the ability to directly value intangible benefits, and when
one analyses what the author terms "intangible" one finds that they are in fact quite tan-
gible (e.g. reduced rework, reduced stock levels).
Despite its imperfections, a set of weights and scores, developed (as suggested by Parker
and Benson) "by communication and consensus between the business and technology
domains of the enterprise" and facilitated by the active involvement of the Chief
Executive Officer, appears a very realistic way to evaluate IT investments. This does not
seek to minimise the necessity to tie down intangible benefits in financial terms wher-
ever possible (see Chapter 7), but attempting to quantify all the impacts of an IT invest-
ment in financial terms alone is not supported by the evidence. Therefore a weighting
and scoring approach is proposed.
::.2 :ssues of :nvestment Type
11.2.1 Should different appraisal methods be applied to different investment types?
Many researchers and practitioners have proposed methodologies or approaches partic-
ularly applicable to different forms of investment. Weill and Henderson, for instance,
provide methods specifically for evaluating infrastructure or architecture investments,
while the DataPro Group do the same for strategic investments (359). While the authors
see their methodologies as particularly suited for the relevant forms of investment, they
do not claim that each investment type requires its own methodology. Others take the
view that attempts to evaluate all investment types with the same technique are futile.
CSC Index Group 
The CSC Index group propose that systems can be evaluated under four classifications
(360).
Systems where the cost is low and the possibility of achieving the benefits high are
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placed in the comfort cell. More expensive systems with a high degree of certainty of
achieving benefits are placed in the confidence cell. Where the cost and benefits cer-
tainty are both low, the system should be placed in the caution cell. Finally, where sys-
tem have a high cost and uncertain value they should be placed in the confusion cell.
Guidelines are provided for each category. For instance, systems in the confidence cell
are seen as appropriate for conventional finance-based criteria, for those in the caution
cell prototypes and experimentation are recommended, while business reengineering is
seen as typical of a confusion category investment, for which there is little by way of
methodological support.
Farbey. Land and Targett
Farbey et al propose a series of parameters through which potential investments may be
evaluated, what they call matching the project with an evaluation method (361).
The role of the evaluation 
This determines whether the evaluation is taking place early or late in the project, or
whether the evaluation is being carried out at the tactical or strategic level.
Environment
This refers to the "decision-making/cultural environment" of the project, and is seen to
have four sub-components:
• • The decision process: whether it is standard or ad hoc
• The types of benefits, tangible or intangible
The importance of numbers - will an attempt be made to attach numbers to all ben-
efits and costs
• The cost of the approach: Whether simple and cheap methods can be used or whether
they must be expensive and comprehensive
The system 
This addresses whether the system is a specific application or whether is provides an
infrastructure, or whether it is core (at the heart of the company's production and deliv-
ery chain) or supporting (financial, documentation).
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Organisational characteristics 
This takes in another two variables, the first being the industry, whether it is stable or
turbulent, the second is the leadership role of the company (i.e. market position, or
whether it is a leader or a follower).
Cause and effect relationships 
This is based on the extent to which the anticipated benefits are directly related to the
system being evaluated, and the degree of uncertainty with which the impact of the new
system can be predicted.
The authors seek to relate these criteria to a set of potential evaluation techniques, such
as cost/benefit analysis, payback, information economics, return on management (ROM)
etc. In some instances they suggest that several techniques can be used for the one pro-
ject. They acknowledge that their proposal is a speculation, "derived by trial and error
from the factors which seem most relevant to the choice of evaluation method. It has, at
present, no theoretical foundations, and is not based on any tested rationale".
Ballantine. Galliers and Powell
The authors devote a paper to assessing the respective merits of standard and non-stan-
dard approaches to investment appraisal (362). They agree initially, quoting Lumby,
that "using the same yardstick or measure of value to decide among alternative invest-
ments, is one that has dominated the investment decision making process within organ-
isations for years" (363). They go on to claim that "as a result, organisations
have.. .focused primarily on the use of financially-oriented techniques of appraisal", and
conclude this point by demonstrating the limits of finance-oriented techniques (see also
Chapter 4). The assumption that a standard technique is synonymous with a finance-ori-
ented one crops up on several occasions in this paper. No support for this assertion is pro-
vided, other than anecdotal evidence that companies using standard approaches also use
finance-oriented ones. This does not mean that because companies are using single-
measure techniques, that these have of necessity to be finance-oriented ones. The pri-
mary objective of this research is to develop a framework which can be standardised, yet
will take into account all issues relevant to IT investment appraisal.
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The authors also claim that the use of a standardised approach may be the result of "a
lack of knowledge of the process of appraisal/evaluation, or of the project itself, or to a
lack of knowledge regarding the tools available for appraisal/evaluation by the evalua-
tors themselves". This may well be true, but it does little to invalidate the merits of a
standardised approach. Just because many organisations use the wrong standard
approach for the wrong reasons, does not mean that a standard approach can never be the
most appropriate.
The authors argue that standard procedures can be manipulated "in such a manner that
the results are fruitless". This is undoubtedly true, but there seems no reason, other than
lack of familiarity, why non-standard techniques cannot also be manipulated. In fact, in
a sense they provide additional scope for manipulation, in that they allow the possibili-
ty of selecting the most appropriate non-standard technique for getting the result wanted
- to produce the 'right' figures.
Another argument is to the effect that firms allocate "a budget in respect of IT/IS invest-
ments, and an additional budget for other capital investments. In this case the argument
for similarity of treatment between IT/IS and other capital investments is weakened".
This is true, but does not have meaning when comparing potential n investments - the
purpose of this review.
The authors provide strong evidence to show that organisations are driven by multiple
goals, (citing Parrow, Ezzamel and Hart), and as such "the argument for similarity of
appraisal.... is no longer a sustainable one". They quote these sources further to support
the-thesis that "official goals are not, in themselves, adequate for understanding organi-
sational behaviour. Operative goals may be inconsistent with official goals, in some
cases they may even subvert official goals" (364). They conclude by claiming that
"given that organisations are likely to hold multiple goals, the argument for similarity of
appraisal and evaluation.., is no longer a sustainable one". The authors position
assumes that a standard methodology cannot accommodate a variety of organisational
goals. There is no obvious basis for making this claim, and the current research will seek
to demonstrate that a standard methodology can in fact accommodate multiple goals. If
the point is taken that many organisations have both multiple and conflicting goals, and
the authors cite convincing research to support this, then indeed a standardised approach
will not prove fruitful. Then again, it is difficult to envisage how any approach, either
standard or non-standard, can guarantee an effective appraisal if organisational goals are
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contradictory.
Whilst the authors come down in favour of a non-standardised approach, they do offer
the following supporting the principle of standardisation:
• It provides a consistent "benchmark of performance through which competing pro-
jects, irrespective of their nature, are capable of comparison"
• It ensures that the resource allocation process within a firm is "both perceived to be,
and is in practice, impartial in that it does not discriminate against any one type of
investment to the exclusion of the other".
• It facilitates a comparison of the potential and actual returns achieved.
• Alternatives identified in the decision situation can only be compared when they
have the same measure or "yardstick of value" and are hence, capable of compari-
son
Earl's Four-Way Framework
The very basis for Michael Earl's investment framework is that different forms of invest-
ment require different approaches (365). Whereas the author provides a framework, and
a detailed prescription for its application, he does not address the theoretical underpin-
nings. He does say however in conclusion that it is based on three premises:
1. Different IT uses have different attributes
2. In reality, many investment and strategic decisions are not made as finance theory
prescribes
3. T appraisa: shou:d not differ fundamenta:ly from investment decisions in genera:
According to the four way framework, different forms of investment have different
objectives, and such objectives are better evaluated through specific techniques. For
example ifproductiviol and performance are being pursued, efficiency and effectiveness
are likely to be the goals, and financial appraisal methods are most appropriate.
Consolidation 
Even though many leading practitioners in the field adopt a standard approach to invest-
ment appraisal (Strassman, Remenyi, Hares and Royle), and others such as the
Information Economic approach have achieved widespread use, some commentators
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continue to argue for a multi-standard approach. As has been seen earlier, much of the
opposition to the single standard stems from the assumption that such approaches are
usually finance-oriented - and therefore inadequate (see Chapter 4). However, there is
no logical reason why this has to be, and those techniques referred to earlier in this para-
graph underline that the single standard not only does not have to be finance-oriented,
but that it can be, and has been, successfully applied in practice.
This still leaves open the question of whether the standard approach is the best Once
the "finance only" misrepresentation has been removed, there do not seem to be strong
grounds remaining to reject the standardisation. Farbey et al demonstrate a range of dif-
ferent investment types, and how issues related to the company and the business envi-
ronment can impact the investment process. However, there is no reason why a standard
approach cannot address these issues. The five perspectives proposed in chapters 6 to
10 fully incorporate all the elements referred to by the authors, as does the Information
Economics method, and indeed others as well - all using a standard methodology. Other
reservations expressed by Ballantine et al have been addressed above, and do not appear
to provide a sustainable case for a non-standardised approach.
There are a large number of factors however to support standardisation, and the follow-
ing have been admitted by Ballantine et al (366).
• It provides a consistent platform on which competing projects can be evaluated, one
would have though an essential requirement for investment fund allocation.
• It provides transparent evidence of fairness in resource allocation
• It facilitates a comparison of actual results achieved between projects
The following additional factors have been identified by the author in the course of con-
sultancy assignments and as part of the current research:
• Management are reluctant to apply unfamiliar techniques, even when a standard
method is applied. This has been identified by Hochstrasser and Griffiths, and also
became clear in the course of implementing the framework developed as part of this
research (367). For the most part, management tended to lose interest and commit-
ment once unfamiliar concepts were introduced. Clearly, the practice of introducing
different techniques for different investments would generate an even greater adverse
reaction. (See Part DI).
• The possibility of building a store of 'corporate wisdom' for application in later
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appraisals is reduced when non-standard techniques are applied.
For these reasons, a standard framework capable of general application was proposed.
11.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis, a technique applied to optimise the prospects of a successful invest-
ment, is frequently used in the investment process, and has been described as "the most
common technique for measuring risks and robustness" (368). Sensitivity analysis in
this context is defined by Vause and Woodward as "an assessment of which factors have
the greatest impact on its success" (369), or as "a tool for evaluating specific factors to
be closely monitored" by Parker and Benson (370). The latter propose growth, return on
investment and revenue protection as typical subjects for sensitivity analysis, but rec-
ommend it only for large projects, seeing it as inappropriate for "the typical information
systems nomination call". Typically, sensitivity analysis involves assigning a number of
possible outcomes to the key variables, and recalculating the investment appraisal for
each of the assigned values. This may identify vulnerabilities not evident by way of the
standard calculations.
Whereas formal sensitivity analysis techniques are easily understood and equally easy to
apply (all that is required is the assignation of a series of different values to key vari-
ables, and a recalculation of the appraisal), it does suffer from drawback. Hares and
Royle have identified the following:
• It can deal with only one variable at a time, whereas in reality nothing varies in iso-
!ation, so "one te&-'que !s not suffEcient to :node accuretey 4 e prob'en and 4-e
technique breaks down". The authors see this as an serious limitation to formal sen-
sitivity analysis techniques.
• It does not show how likely the outcomes are, that is, the probability.
• It does not readily show how flexibility can be applied to minimise risks or exploit
opportunities
While there is no doubt that projects are more susceptible to the impact of some factors
than others, the formal application of sensitivity analysis techniques, mainly through its
limitation to one factor at a time, does suffer from serious drawbacks. Nonetheless, the
objective of the technique, identifying key factors and their potential impact under dif-
ferent conditions, is a valid one. As demonstrated in Chapter 12, this consideration will
be incorporated in a de facto way in the proposed methodology, but not by way of for-
mal sensitivity analysis.
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11.4 Probability analysis
Sensitivity Analysis represents an improvement on a single range of forecast values, but
does not address the issue of the degree of certainty with which the various forecasts can
be made.
The forecast values for most components within a project are likely to vary from the
eventual actual values. It is possible to forecast many with a considerable degree of
accuracy (for example, hardware costs), while forecasts for other elements (typically,
software development costs) are often subject to significant variation.
It is possible therefore to assign degrees of certainty to ranges of values for individual
components. In other words, to assign their probability distribution. For example, a new
order processing system is planned to give rise to overtime savings in the despatch
office. The most likely range of savings might be in the $10,000 to $12,000 range. This
could be assigned a probability of 0.6. The next most likely range would be 5,000 to
10,000, and would be assigned a probability of 0.3, and the least likely outcome would
be in the range of 12,000 to 15,000, which would be assigned a probability of 0.1.
Therefore the most likely range would be twice as likely to occur as the next most like-
ly, which in turn would be three times as likely to occur as the least likely.
Representing this probability distribution in terms of NPV IRR and Payback Period
would be helpful in assessing the likely viability of the project. The Monte Carlo
Simulation, developed by Hertz in the 1960s, is a commonly-used technique for this pur-
pose (371). This performs complex, repetitive calculations, hundreds or even thousands
of times, which taken together provide a risk profile of the proposed investment. The
term Monte Carlo Simulation derives from the element of chance which forms the basis
for the exercise. Any project evaluation involves forecasting values based on various
assumptions. Certain assumptions may be made with a reasonable degree of certainty,
while others may be subject to a wide range of possible outcomes. The purpose of sim-
ulation is to try to reproduce the randomness inherent in this concept, thus giving a "most
likely picture" to emerge in a real-life situation.
This is achieved by having the system generate random values for selected components.
Although random, these values reflect weightings specified by the user. This is impor-
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tant, because while in a real-life situation various unpredictable outcomes may occur,
some possible outcomes are clearly more likely to occur than others.
After Simulation has been run, it is possible to make judgements such as "there is a 90%
chance that the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) will be above 15%, and a less than 1%
chance that it will be below 5%". Used in conjunction with the "what-if' facilities, it
provides a useful additional tool for evaluating the risk factor involved.
The simulation generates random numbers within the probability ranges defined. It then
recalculates the model repeatedly, each time arriving at a different possible outcome
(often defined in terms of NPV, IRR, or Payback Period).
To revert to the example above, for every ten random numbers generated, the system will
generate 6 for the range 10/12,000, 3 in the range 5/10,000, and 1 in the range 12/15,000.
The full model will be recalculated each time. The requirement of randomness is met,
while simultaneously the weighting ensures that the requirements of probability are also
met. Thus a large number of recalculations based on this methodology provides the clos-
est approximation to a real-life situation, and will represent the most comprehensive pic-
ture of the range of possible outcomes, and their likelihood.
Even though the simulation will be performed repeatedly, the final picture produced will
consolidate all of the possible outcomes into a single graphical representation (his-
togram) which will elucidate the risk profile for the project. Only those elements iden-
tified through Sensitivity Analysis as likely to have a significant bearing on the outcome
of the project should undergo this simulation.
The Monte Carlo simulation is an advance on basic sensitivity techniques.
• It forces consideration of all the major uncertain variables
• It allows these variables to vary independently
• It forces quantification of the risk and variability of outcomes
• The results indicate how likely the expected, best and worst outcome is likely to be
It does have a drawback in relation to the difficulty of interpreting the result. For exam-
ple, is it better to select a project with a high spread of results (high risk) but with a high-
er expected value, or a low spread of results (low risk) but with a lower expected value?
The concept of probability on balance then must be seen as a valid requirement for pro-
ject appraisal. However, given the very limited extent of the techniques currently being
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applied to IT investment appraisal, and the tendency of management to avoid sophisti-
cation, it was felt that a sophisticated technique such as Monte Carlo simulation was
unlikely to be applied in a conventional organisational setting. Subsequent fieldwork
(see Chapter 13) confirmed that such an interpretation was correct. Given that the
acceptability of the proposed framework in such a setting has been defined as a key
objective of the research, this must be seen as an important consideration.
11.5 Investment Scope
The four phase evolution of IT has been demonstrated in Chapter 3. This showed that
by Phase III, IT had become part of the fabric of business, underpinning most if not all
business processes. It a l so traced the growth of end user computing and the extent to
which networking and communications had grown in relative terms to computer hard-
ware and software. Systems were also shown to have become highly integrated, with
data and resources being shared between different applications. These developments
have lead to a situation whereby it has become difficult to define where and when a par-
ticular investment ends, and indeed what elements of expenditure relate to that invest-
ment
A further complication stems from the increasing importance of communications in rela-
tion to computers. As Bob L. Martin, former CIO of Wal-Mart's International Division
says, "I see fewer investments ahead for us in computing and more in communications.
By this I mean we are shifting our emphasis away from processing systems ... and
towards technologies that are more integrated with the work of our associates" (372).
It was seen in Chapter 5 that several commentators (Weill, Norton and Nolan, Farbey)
saw the time factor as an important consideration in IT appraisal. However, this was for
the most part in the context of infrastructure or architecture investment, for which pay-
back was long-term and less clearly defined. Keen, Willcocics and Strassman take the
time factor into consideration, and make the point that the time frame of benefits might
be uncertain (373). Weill and Curley identified a more profound issue in relation to the
development of a methodology for investment appraisal (374). They showed the limita-
tions of the commonly-applied 'once-off' approach to investment appraisal, and empha-
sised that they saw investment as a process, not a single event. Although presented in the
specific context of risk assessment, this point is also raised by Hay and Williamson, who
emphasise that once-off assessments are inadequate in that they fail to take into account
the significant changes that can occur during the course of IT projects, and the dynamic
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aspects of risk management (375). Although the literature does not show this to be a
major concern (see Fig. 11.1) it does raise an important issue in the context of the devel-
opment of an evaluation framework.
Essentially, the question is: if a system grows and evolves during its lifetime, adding new
and unanticipated functionality, spreading into different areas of the business, and pro-
viding core data for other unrelated applications (such as end-user computing), how can
it be evaluated in an effective way? There is no simple answer.
It is probably more meaningful to address the problem from the opposite perspective,
i.e., given that there is no perfect solution, does this mean that the attempt to apply a
structured framework should be abandoned? It would appear self-evident that a frame-
work that addresses all factors other than this must be better than a totally non-structured
approach, particularly if this limitation is kept in mind during the evaluation process.
This is borne out by the research. A.T. Kearney, Willcocks, and Hares and Royle all
show that the lack of an appraisal framework has contributed to poor payback, and/or
that the use of a structured approach improves payback (376). In fact Hares and Royle
emphasise that "the major cause of all current problems with valuation is therefore
judged to be the absence of a comprehensive structured method of investment opportu-
nity identification an investment appraisa:" (377). The position taken therefore is that
while this factor to an extent undermines the value of structured calculations, the limita-
tions are outweighed by the proven gains from a structured approach, particularly when
they are explicitly recognised during the course of the appraisal exercise.
11.6 Timing
The timing of the investment may be an important element in determining its success or
failure. Cash et al state "get there too early, as Chemical Bank did with its electronic
home banking product in the early 1980s...and you can create a real fiasco. Get there too
late, as the regional airlines and hundreds of drug wholesalers did, and you may lose
your life" (378). Keen also emphasises the potential impact that timing can have on the
success of the project (379). On balance however it was felt that explicitly incorporat-
ing this factor into the framework would give rise to unjustified complexity, and in any
case it would appear that it can be adequately accommodated as part of the Risk per-
.
spective.
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Summary
Some of the criteria reviewed in this chapter on the evidence seem to form an essential
part of the evaluation process, others less so. Weighting seems the most clear-cut.
Factors in the evaluation process (e.g. cash-flow, quality) which may be vitally impor-
tant for one organisation may be of little importance to another. It follows that a mech-
anism must be found to represent these priorities in the evaluation process, and a form
of weighting is proposed as the most appropriate one. The case for scoring is less obvi-
ous, with many commentators identifying limitations of one kind or another. However,
to paraphrase Churchill on democracy, despite its limitations, the evidence shows that it
represents the best way to assess a project's potential contribution to organisational
objectives.
The necessity for sensitivity and probability analyses is less clear-cut, yet, as has been
shown, these concepts can have a significant impact on the outcome of an evaluation.
They are thus incorporated (indirectly, in the case of sensitivity analysis) in the first
fieldwork applications of the framework. Issues surrounding investment scope and tim-
ing, as raised by many commentators and researchers, represent legitimate areas of con-
cern. However, there appears to be virtually no capacity to formally incorporate these
criteria without introducing unacceptable levels of complexity. As the minimisation of
undue complexity is a key objective of the research (part of the need for acceptabiliv),
these criteria have not been explicitly incorporated in the framework, but, as described
earlier, their ramifications can in many cases be indirectly addressed.
176
Chapter 12. Consolidation of Concepts
12.1 Introduction
Before attempting to develop a framework based on the material developed in Chapter
5, it seemed appropriate to revisit the objectives of the research as defined in Chapter 2.
The objectives of the research are to develop a _framework for IT investment appraisal
appropriate for present conditions, and to test the acceptability and suitability of the
framework in a range of orgamisational settings.
Given the reluctance of management to apply formalised investment appraisal tech-
niques (see Chapter 1, 2.3), the requirement of acceptability assumed considerable
importance, and demanded that the framework not be over-burdened with complexities
or be too time-consuming to implement On the other hand, the requirement of suit-
ability in a range of organisational settings called for a considerable degree of compre-
hensiveness and flexibility. The approach taken was to integrate those concepts identi-
fied as essential or important in Chapter 5, and to discard or incorporate in other forms
the remainder.
The result is shown in Table: 12.1
Table 12.1 
Concept Classification
Strategic Alignment
Payback
Architecture
Risk
Business Redesign
Weighting
Scoring
Probability
Sensitivity Analysis
Investment Scope
Essential
Essential
Essential
Essential
Essential
Important
Essential
Important
	 .
Somewhat Important
Somewhat Important
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Strategic alignment
Payback
Architecture
Risk
Business Redesign
TOTAL 100
Perspective
12.2 Selecting the criteria
Based on this tabulation, five perspectives through which the potential investment must
be evaluated were identified. These were:
• Strategic alignment
• Payback
• Process redesign
• Architecture
• Risk
These would be weighted (an essential criterion) by appropriate management of the par-
ticipating organisations to reflect their relative importance to that organisation, as illus-
trated in Table 12.2.
Table 12.2 
The extent to which the proposed system(s) would meet its objectives would be accom-
plished by appropriate management scoring it/them against a set of sub-components for
each perspective. Finally, a probability factor related to the probability of achieving the
scores would be allocated.
Keeping form-filling to a minimum was also seen as essential in the light of the require-
ment for simplicity, particularly as management would be providing most of the mater-
ial. Preliminary discussions with participating management indicated that time-con-
suming tasks were unlikely to be completed. This lead to the decision to distill a small
number of key determinants from each of the chosen perspectives, and standardise on
these for each appraisal exercise. For the first exercise this took the following form:
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12.2.1 Strategic Alignment
Category Selection Rationale 
(a) The importance of IT to the organisation: The extent to which organisational per-
formance is dependent on IT is a key determinant of the Strategic Alignment weighting.
The 'strategic grid' developed by Cash, McFarlan and McKenny is helpful in establish-
ing an appropriate position (380). When IT is a support activity it means it plays no sig-
nificant part in present or future plans, and therefore represents a low priority. When IT
is crucial for current operations, but is not, or is not planned to be, of strategic impor-
tance, it is classed as factory. IT is placed in the strategic quadrant when it has had long-
standing significance in the success of the organisation, and where the future of the firm
is likely to depend increasingly on IT. The difference between companies in the strate-
gic quadrant on those classed as turnaround is that in the latter case, while IT may not
have been significant in the past, it is liable to show a dramatic increase in importance
in the future. Such firms are characteristics by leadership in IT matters from the board
and the fostering of an IT culture.
(b) Liquidity: Only in the event of a company being in a liquid position is strategic
alignment likely to achieve a high weighting. Even turnaround companies, highly
dependent on IT for future success, will have to bias their weightings in favour of pay-
back or risk if cash is in short supply.
(c) Market turbulence: Turbulence and unpredictability are now routine features of
today's business environment. However, the extent to which organisations are impacted
by this turbulence varies. For instance, the "market" for a hospital's services is likely to
be more stable than that of a firm engaged in selling leading edge technology products.
The greater the turbulence and instability, the more difficult it is to achieve and maintain
strategic alignment. This should be reflected in the weighting for this perspective, but
will be dependent on the importance of IT to the organisation, as described in (a) above.
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Importance of IT
Liquidity
Market turbulence _
Table 12.3 Strategic Alignment Sub-components
12.2.2 Payback
Category Selection Rationale 
(a) Liquidity: In the event of a company being in an illiquid position, or where policy
calls for immediate improvement in profit figures (for example to fend off a take-over)
direct financial benefits will assume added importance, giving rise to a higher weighting
for this perspective. The converse also holds true.
(b)Price sensitivity: The price sensitivity of a company's products may vary consider-
ably between markets. A high weighting will be applied if the company is in a price-
sensitive industry, such as grocery or petrol retailing.
(c)Market threat: By way of contrast, if a company's market, as distinct from its com-
petitive positioning, is under threat, payback will assume reduced significance, as short
term benefit will eventually prove ineffectual if the market itself is under threat. Steel
or shipbuilding would be representative industries, and in such conditions the relative
weightings for strategic alignment and reengineering would be increased.
(d) End-user computing: The extent to which end-user computing is adopted varies
widely between organisations (381). On the basis that end-user developed applications
will not be strategic or infrastructural, financial payback should be afforded greater
importance. High usage should therefore be reflected in a relatively high weighting.
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Return on investment
Price sensitivity
Market threat
End-user computing
Table 12.4 Payback Sub-components
12.2.3 Process Redesign
Category Selection Rationale 
(a) Current business environment: As described earlier, driven largely by developments
in technology, organisational structures are undergoing radical change. Flexibility, rapid
decision making, and customer responsiveness are but some of the qualities called for to
meet these new demands. Whereas few organisations are immune to such pressures, the
degree of pressure does vary (382). Hardware or software producers could be said to
represent one extreme, while government departments would represent the other. The
extent to which these pressures apply would be a key determinant in the weighting
applied to reengineering.
(b) Competitive trends: Medium to long term competitive trends may demand radical
organisational restructuring. For instance in Ireland the associated banks, although cur-
rently earning high profits, face unprecedented competitive pressures over the next few
yeirs. Largely due to EU competition policy, foreign banks, and Irish and non-Irish
building societies will be able to offer direct competition. This has resulted in reengi-
neering-style initiatives now being afforded high priority in these banks, and where such
trends apply to a firm, reengineering should be given a high weight.
(c) Redesign opportunities: In terms of suitability for reengineering, operational
processes will vary widely between organisations, and even within the one organisation.
Among the key indicators identified by Hammer & Champy are high inventory levels,
extensive re-entry of information, a high proportion of checking and control to value
added work, a high incidence of complexity and "special cases" (383). A preponder-
ance of these dysfunctions suggest that reengineering should be weighted highly.
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Current business environment
Competitive trends
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(d) Management commitment: The commitment of senior management is an absolute
prerequisite for successful reengineering (384). If this commitment is missing, reengi-
neering does not represent an attractive proposition, and should be allocated a low
weighting.
Table 12.5  Process Redesign Sub-components
12.2.4 Architecture
Category Selection Rationale 
(a) Importance of IT to the organisation: As with strategic alignment, the importance of
IT to the organisation will directly impact the weighting for architecture. The McFarlane
McKenny grid is again useful in determining this. In firms where dependence on IT is
high, the architecture represents a key business driver and success factor. The concept
can be refined to take into account the likelyfiiture dependence on IT.
(6) Mergers, take-overs, strategic alliances: Although apparently in decline since the
late 1980s, the majority of companies would still seem at least to be mentioned as sub-
jects for merger or take-overs. Strategic alliances, whereby companies (quite possibly
competitors in the normal course of events) partake in joint ventures for a limited pur-
pose represent an alternative course. The IBM/Apple alliance on the Power PC would
be representative of this. In such instances the architecture assumes major importance,
as inter-company workings are self-evidently facilitated by open, flexible architectures.
(c) Operational links with suppliers or customers: There is a growing trend towards
companies integrating their production, supply and sales activities - the so-called 'virtu-
al corporation' (385). Such initiatives can be greatly facilitated or hindered by partici-
pating firms' IT infrastructures. WalMart and McKesson are celebrated success stories,
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Dependence on IT
Risk culture
Organisational risk
Supplier reliability
Sub-component
but even on a more humble level the infrastructure can be significant (386). A review of
the author's consultancy notes identified a GM motor dealer which had to effectively
sideline an expensive mini-based infrastructure which failed to provide adequate linkage
with GM operations.
(d) Reengineering enabler: As has been seen earlier, an appropriate IT architecture is a
vital determinant for successful reengineering initiatives. If reengineering is a high pri-
ority, then so also should architecture.
Table. 12.6  Architecture Sub-components
12.2.5 Risk
Category Selection Rationale
(a) Level of dependence on IT: Organisational dependence on IT has been discussed
earlier, and can vary significantly between organisations. The greater the extent of this
dependence, the greater the weighting assigned to risk.
(b) Risk culture of organisation: Some organisations are conservative and risk-averse,
others have a culture which encourages bold initiatives and risk-taking. The latter would
assign a low weighting to the Risk factor. An added element in this context is the extent
to which risk management and assessment processes are in place, the greater the extent,
the lower the weighting.
(c) Customer impact risk: Some companies. in sensitive industries such as banking
could incur serious negative customer reaction as a result of systems failure, either by
way of failure to provide needed services on time, or embarrassment arising from incor-
rect information. By way of contrast, companies facing the risk of collapse can take a
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Significance of IT
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Reengineering enabler
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very cavalier attitude to risk, on the basis that they have nothing to lose. This was the
case with the heavy industry company taking part in this research.
(d) Exposure to supplier reliability: Some risk attaches to almost any supplier of IT
solutions today, as the horrendous losses incurred by even the likes of IBM and Digital
underline. Exposure to supplier viability is reduced in mluti-vendor sites, and increased
in single-vendor sites, with some vendors representing a greater risk than others.
Table 12.7  Risk Sub-components
12.3 Scoring and probability
As referred to earlier, the proposed scoring mechanism envisages the assignment of a
number of scoring categories to each perspective. In order to maintain consistency, the
proposed elements for each perspective were proposed as static criteria - that is, they
were to be maintained for each appraisal exercise. The score was assigned on the basis
of the extent to which the proposed system met the objectives of each category on a
range of 0 to 10.
The issue of probability was also included, on the basis of assigning a probability factor
(0.0 to 1.0) on the basis of the likelihood of the estimated score being achieved. This
was then applied to the score, giving an adjusted score. Thus an element achieving a
very high score on the basis of the potential impact could be outweighed by an element
with a lower score, but for which the probability of achievement was higher.
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12.3.1 Strategic Alignment
Sub-component Selection Rationale 
(a) Business enabler: The extent to which the proposal addressed organisational objec-
tives by enabling new ways of doing business. As was shown earlier, making old organ-
isational structures operate more efficiently no longer suffices in itself - effectiveness is
now the key requirement.
(b) Cultural/educational: The extent to which the proposal supported the cultural and
educational objectives of the organisation. As organisations undergo radical restructur-
ing, these requirements assume added significance. Does the system undermine impor-
tant elements of corporate culture?. For example, an interactive multimedia based cus-
tomer information system may, while providing many operational advantages, be out of
character in an organisation which prides itself on personalised customer service.
(c)Rapid adaptation: Could it adapt quickly to the rapid changes demanded by today's
business environment?. Irrespective of how good a system may be, its value will be
diluted if it lacks the capability to adapt quickly and cheaply to the changes the business
will inevitably undergo in today's turbulent environment.
(d) Development/implementation timeframe: The greater the length taken to develop
an/or implement the system, the greater the chances are that it will deviate from corpo-
rate objectives.
(e) Clarity of relationships: The clarity and cohesiveness of business plans and objec-
tives vary considerably between organisations. It is difficult to assign a high score when
a lack of clarity exists. This will be compounded when the objectives of the system are
also unclear or inadequately specified.
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Cultural/educational
Rapid adaptation
Timeframe
Relationship clarity
Total Adj. Score
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Table 12.8:  Strategic Alignment Scoring Sub-components
12.3.2 Payback
Sub-component Selection Rationale 
(a) Cost savings: Cost savings are easily identified, and include staff reductions, less
overtime, lower inventory carrying costs, better quality (less rework and warranty).
(b) Revenue generation: This can result from new product introduction, product
enhancement or differentiation, faster billing, better bad debt control.
(c) Management support: Benefits can be created by way of, traditional management
support, through systems which facilitate strategy and the management of performance,
and strategic management monitoring.
(d) Competitive positioning: Payback can be created through sales and marketing sup-
port systems which enhance a company's position in the marketplace (payback), or
which help to lock in customers through the provision of IT-enables services (payback).
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Cost savings
Revenue generation
Management support
Competitive positioning
Total Adjusted Score
Table 12.9  Payback Scoring Sub-components
12.3.3 Process Redesign
Sub-component Selection Rationale 
(a) Process impact: The extent to which a proposal complemented the transition to a
process, as distinct from task-based organisation represented probably the most impor-
tant feature in scoring the reengineering perspective. Conventional corporate systems
are generally divided into sub-systems which reflect departmental boundaries such as
Sales, Order Processing, Manufacturing, and Accounting. Whereas these are usually
integrated, they do tend to reinforce departmental divisions, thereby undermining
attempts to reengineer along process lines. By way of contrast, distributed databases,
based on client server technology, provide an open and flexible access to corporate data,
facilitating adaptable work practices and the transition to process based operational
modes.
(b) Simultaneous processing: One of the primary causes of delayed response times is
caused by sequential as distinct from simultaneous handling of transactions. Good
examples are applications for bank loans or insurance cover. Typically, only one person
works on the application at a time, whereas a high proportion of the tasks could in fact
be worked on simultaneously, greatly reducing processing time. High scores should be
allocated to facilitating IT investments such as workflow systems.
(c) Expert/rule based systems: Business process redesign frequently results in a realign-
ment from low to relatively higher skilled (and higher value) tasks (387). However, bot-
tlenecks may be caused by a lack of suitably skilled personnel. This can be addressed
by way of expert or rule-based systems. As Hammer and Champy put it "this fact has
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Process impact
Simultaneous processing
Expert based systems
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Total Adjusted Score
profound implications for the ways in which we can structure work" (388).
(d) Devolved decision support: The capacity to make on-the-spot decisions is a key
facilitator of reengineering. Systems with strong decision support capability, allied to an
integrated corporate data repository, provide this functionality. Modern executive infor-
mation systems (EIS), whose usage is now spreading down to lower organisational lev-
els, would represent an example of this.
Table 12.10 Process Redesign scoring sub-components
12.3.4 Architecture
Sub-component Selection Rationale 
(a) Consistency: How consistent are the hardware, software, programming language
and data bases of the proposed system with the organisation's infrastructure. The degree
of consistency, which probably represented the most important element in architecture,
determined the score. A refinement could relate to infrastructure planning, whereby
plans are in place to replace or significantly upgrade the existing facilities. In such
instances, a balance could be struck between current and planned requirements.
(b) Enabler of other applications: Some systems while enhancing the infrastructure on
their own right may also add by way of enabling or improving other systems. To revert
to the example of the point-of-sale system, this could, by way of capturing additional
data, or existing data earlier, improve the quality of current sales and order processing
systems, or enable them to develop additional functionality. Such functionality was seen
as a scoring plus.
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Consistency
Other applications
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(c) Mandatory component: The proposed system may have been a mandatory compo-
nent of the planned architecture. For example, the system under review (perhaps a
revised General Ledger application) could be dependent on the provision of a new cor-
porate relational database. This database may also represent a mandatory component of
architecture planning, and as such should be allocated a score over and above that relat-
ing to the system's other impact on architecture.
(d) Reliability of vendor: This issue assumed greater importance for architecture than
for any other perspective. Failure of a vendor, particularly where the vendor provided
key elements of the architecture, would be likely to cause considerable business disrup-
tion.
Table 12.11 Architecture Scoring Sub-components
12.3.5 Risk
Sub-component Selection Rationale 
(a) Scale: This was seen as probably the most important risk issue. While the failure
of a small project might represented an acceptable risk, a large one could resulting in
potentially crippling operational or financial impact. Scale is dependent on the strategic
impact of the system. Some systems while large, may have limited operational impact
(e.g. a human resources application), exposing the organisation to lower risk than a
smaller one affecting core activities.
(b) Technical risk: There is an almost limitless array of technical risk., with uncertain-
ty in definition of requirements, development problems, hardware and software perfor-
mance, and systems integration being the most common. As with so many other issues,
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Sub-component Score
Scale
Technical risk
Risk management
Management support
Total Adjusted Score
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the rate of technological change plays a key role here - today's success story could be
on tomorrow's scrap heap. The trend towards multi-vendor sites, while reducing the risk
of a "big bang" failure, adds a new dimension by way of added complexity.
(c) Effectiveness of risk management: The exposure to risk can be greatly reduced by
way of risk management (389). Examples would be prototyping, staged development
and implementation, the possibility of a fallback position (e.g. can the previous system
be reintroduced?), the possibility of parallel running, and the use of sub-contractors
and/or temporary staff. A high score reflectspoor anticipated risk management, and vice
versa.
(d) Top management support: Willcocks and others have shown that the success of IT
projects is closely linked with the commitment of top management to seeing it through
(390). Whereas this varies according to the project, increasingly, success depends on
human and organisational considerations, for which top management commitment is
essential. A high score reflects a low level of top management support, and vice versa.
Table 12.12 Risk scoring sub-components
Note: Risk scores are negatives. The higher the score, the greater the risk, and the total
is subtracted from the scores under the other perspectives.
Summary
In summary therefore the kernel of the framework would be applied on the basis of an
organisation's management team applying weightings, reflecting that organisation's pri-
orities, to the five perspectives, Strategic Alignment, Payback, Architecture, Process
Redesign, and Risk. The proposed system would be scored against criteria applicable to
each of these perspectives. These scores would be adjusted to reflect the weightings
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assigned to the perspectives, and the probabilities of the scores being achieved. The total
adjusted score would reflect the viability of the proposed investment. This obviously
has most significance when ranking alternative proposals - that with the highest score
representing the most attractive investment. However, the score can also be meaningful
for single investments where a minimum score is set, ideally based on corporate wisdom
accumulated over a number . of investment appraisal exercises.
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Summary of Part II and Introduction to Part III
The review of the literature and the methods applied by practitioners identified a wide
range of criteria being applied, of which a number predominated. Each of the criteria
identified was critically evaluated in the light of the research objectives, and a number
were deemed essential for the framework. One criterion, reengineering,, or business
process redesign, was of particular interest, in that while barely featuring in any of the
methodologies reviewed, it was nonetheless deemed essential for the proposed frame-
work.
The review of the criteria could be summarised as follows:
Strategic Alignment, "a state of harmony between the goals and activities of a business
and the computer systems that support them" was seen as essential due to the extent to
which IT has become a key enabler of all business processes, and the rate of technolog-
ical and business change.
Payback needed little justification, in that it bordered on self-evident that the possibility
of achieving direct benefits should be a factor when evaluating IT investments. The var-
ious kinds of benefit were analysed, and an appendix provided a mechanism for estab-
lishing firmer business value for so-called 'intangible' benefits. Given the trend from
man-.:factaring to services, t tae reative decfine !n the importance of direct benefits was
highlighted, nonetheless, the importance of performing some form of benefits measure-
ment was stressed.
Process Redesign introduced a perspective which was almost totally missing from other
approaches identified in the literature. The inclusion was justified by establishing that
today's business organisational structures remain based on theories originally formulat-
ed over 200 years ago, theories which emphasise a hierarchical form of control. This
was shown to be unsuited to the requirements of today's business environment, which
must respond to calls for short product development and life cycles, tougher competi-
tion, volatility, and a rapid increase in the incidence of mergers/demergers, acquisi-
tions/divestitures. This can often be accomplished by a form of radical business process
redesign, usually underpinned by IT, and frequently driven by IT capabilities. The wide-
spread application of process redesign concepts, and the unique role of IT, suggested that
potential IT investments should be evaluated under this perspective
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The IT architecture, which could loosely be described as a company's computers, soft-
ware, databases, telecommunications, programming languages and operating systems
and the relevant standards for each of these entities, was shown have become much more
complex in recent years, with the likelihood of this complexity increasing. The main
issues contributing to this complexity were reviewed, and it was established that neglect-
ing the architectural ramifications of IT proposals could seriously undermine their busi-
ness value.
Risk is another perspective whose incorporation in the framework should have been
almost self-evident, yet it was shown that comparatively few organisations formally
apply risk evaluation techniques. This was despite the high level of failures and disap-
pointing outcomes associated with IT investments. It seems clear therefore that a for-
malised evaluation of risk must be a factor in the investment appraisal process. The
types of risk were reviewed, with special emphasis on the relative increase in importance
of human and organisational considerations.
Having reviewed the five primary perspectives, other issues were then evaluated.
Weighting and scoring were deemed essential in establishing the degree of acceptability
of proposals, and there was compelling evidence to support the inclusion of some form
of probability analysis. Other factors, such as longitude (how does one establish a cut-
off date for a system?) and scope (with the growth of distributed and end-user comput-
ing, most systems tend to grow almost organically beyond the original scope) were
reviewed, but, on balance were deemed inappropriate for inclusion as discrete elements
of the framework.
Consolidating these criteria into a practicable framework was then addressed. It was
proposed to view every investment through the five primary perspectives, Strategic
Alignment, Payback, Architecture, Process Redesign, and Risk. Given that the relative
importance of these criteria would vary between organisations, it was deemed essential
that management apply a weighting to each. The proposed system would then be scored
against each of the criteria, with the score adjusted to reflect the respective weightings.
A form of scoring based on management's business and technical judgement was
deemed to be the only practical way of evaluating an investment's potential value.
Attempts by researchers to assign monetary values to all potential benefits were
assessed, but found to be unrealistic. Finally, the issue of probability was addressed by
assigning a probability factor to each of the criteria, reflecting the degree of certainty
with which the various scores were predictable.
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A framework appropriate for field work research was therefore available and mapped
onto a set of working papers for field application. A number of suitable organisations
was identified, and, applying the research methodology identified in Chapter 2, the field
testing commenced.
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Part III Field Research
Chapter 13.
Field and case application of framework, review of findings
13.1 Introduction
An essential objective of the research was that the proposed framework be applicable by,
and acceptable to, general management as part of their normal operations, ("to test the
acceptability and suitability of the framework in a range of organisational settings" -
Chapter 2).
The participating organisations had to be selected carefully. The first issue was size. A
very large organisation would have given rise to problems in that the decision making
process was likely to be slower, and the possibility of bringing together the relevant man-
agers would be more difficult. On the other hand, a very small organisation (say, fewer
than 50 staff) could present difficulties in terms of the size of the investment, the likeli-
hood of decisions being made in an informal manner by the chief executive, and a gen-
eral unsuitability for the kind of structured research required. The organisations chosen
therefore had staff numbers in the range of 100 to 500, with volume turnover reflecting
these staffing levels.
To test the general applicability of the framework, the organisations chosen differed
widely, from a local authority at one extreme, to an advanced high-technology telecom-
munications company at the other. As indicated in Chapter 2, where the field research
indicated changes or additions to the framework, these were incorporated and tested in
the next organisation, and if successful, incorporated into subsequent trials.
The framework underwent a fair degree of change in the course of the fieldwork, but
none of the changes were fundamental. All major changes occurred as a result of field-
work in the first two organisations. Subsequent amendments and enhancements were
of a more cosmetic/utilitarian nature, resulting in the framework remaining largely con-
sistent from Organisation 3 onwards. To illustrate the operation of the framework in live
settings, two full worked examples have been included in Appendices V and VII. These
examples had a direct bearing on the systems selected by the companies concerned.
The field application of the framework was supplemented by two further initiatives.
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The first of these was a survey undertaken among Ireland's leading companies. This sur-
vey sought to put the fieldwork application of the framework in perspective by focusing
on background issues such as IT budget control (i.e. who controls the budget?), degree
of satisfaction with existing investments, investment appraisal methods being used, and
the extent of management understanding of key investment appraisal issues.
The second took the form of Executive Briefing Days undertaken by the National
Institute for Management Technology (NWT). These were workshops involving a
small group of managers from individual companies who were briefed on the framework
and worked through its possible application in their organisations. This forum provided
tremendous opportunities for the interchange of ideas and for practical applications of
the frmaework.
The results of the field research are detailed below.
13.2 Organisation 1
13.2.1 Background
The first organisation participating in the research, which took place between February
and April 1995 inclusive, was a local authority. In terms of size, degree of computer lit-
eracy, and overall operational practices, the selected body would be representative of an
average Irish local authority, and a small one in the UK. The County Manager made
clear that profound changes were on the way for local authorities, with performance-
related measures due to be put in place, with a consequent ending of many of the old
comfortable attitudes to work and the 'customer'. In fact, with the likely privatizing of
many of the local authority's services, there was now a likelihood of compulsory redun-
dancies within a few years - something unimaginable a few years ago. IT was seen as an
essential element in meeting these new challenges. IT investment appraisal therefore
assumed a correspondingly high importance, particularly in the light of the limited suc-
cess of previous initiatives. The objective of the exercise was to evaluate the feasibility
of a proposed investment in a Building Planning system for the Planning Dept., amount-
ing in total to approximately 1250,000.
13.2.2 Research Chronology
An initial meeting was held with the County Manager, the Finance Manager, the
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Planning Manager and the IT Manager. The County Manager stated that he was unhap-
py with the return the authority was getting from what had been substantial investment
in IT in recent years, and while he was not criticising anyone in particular, he felt that
the justification procedures used heretofore were inadequate. He now wanted a differ-
ent approach to be applied before substantial amounts of additional funds were allocat-
ed to the Building Planning system.
There was general agreement that there had not been an adequate return from the invest-
ment in IT, but much of this meeting was taken up with explanations for this failure, and
points scoring between the participants. Nonetheless, there was full acceptance of the
need to apply a new approach, and in broad terms, all participants felt the proposed
method looked promising. However, once the workings of the methodology began to be
explained, it became clear that the participants were very focused on issues of costs and
direct benefits. A major knowledge gap applied with the other four perspectives, to a
greater or lesser degree. It was felt that the best approach was to provide each partici-
pant with a written rationale of the principles underlying the framework, and, upon being
reviewed, a second meeting would take place. The written rationale is contained in
Appendix II.
This meeting took place within two weeks. It was clear that the County Manager and
the Planning Manager had a very limited understanding of the document, while the
Finance and IT Managers had achieved a reasonably good grasp of the issues. It was
decided to press ahead with the exercise, notwithstanding the disparity in understanding.
The view taken was to the effect that full interest and therefore participation would not
otherwise be achieved.
13.2.3 Weightings
The first task was to assign weightings to the five perspectives. This showed up an
immediate limitation of the approach, in that several of the sub-components provided
were deemed to be unsuitable or not fully relevant to a local authority. These were as
follows:
• Liquidity and market turbulence
• Competitive positioning
• Competitive trends
• Mergers/takeovers
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Perspective Weight
Payback 30
Risk 20
Strategic Alignment 20
Process Redesign 20
Architecture 10
This development somewhat undermined the credibility of the exercise, and a diminu-
tion of enthusiasm became apparent. A number of alternative sub-components were sug-
gested as being more appropriate for a local authority. For instance, "market turbulence"
was adapted to represent the likely medium term initiatives by central govermnent to cut
costs and make local authorities more responsive to the "customers", and more respon-
sible for generating their own income. Weightings were assigned to each perspective
and are summarised in Fig. 13.1, but there was a general lack of conviction about the
process.
Fig, 13.1 Organisation 1: Summary of Weightings
13.2.4 Scoring
While the revised sub-components provided for scoring were more appropriate, there
remained a perception of their being less than fully relevant to a local authority. Perhaps
because of this, one meeting, lasting approximately two hours, was sufficient to com-
plete the exercise. It was found that participants were reluctant to contribute to aspects
that they did not understand. For instance the IT Manager completed almost all of the
scoring for the Architecture perspective, whilst he had little contribution to make to
Strategic Alignment.
The following is a summary of the scores assigned, adjusted by the relevant weights:
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Fig. 13.Z Organisation 1: Summary of Scores Adjusted by Weights
Perspe.cti Weight
Strategic Alignment 20 7 140
Payback 30 5 150
Architecture 10 3 30
Process Redesign 20 4 80
Risk 20 (5) (100)
Total 100 300
There was no enthusiasm for applying probability factors. The reasons given were that
it was "unnecessary" or "too detailed". Possibly the real cause was tiredness, or a feel-
ing that enough had been done, which in reality was hardly the case. No probability fac-
tors were therefore allocated, and the calculations proceeded without them.
13.2.5 Summary and Conclusions
The weightings were somewhat predictable, and were assigned without much disagree-
ment. Payback was, as expected, assigned the highest weight, based largely on the need
for existing staff to undertake an anticipated major increase in planning applications over
the coming years. It was equally predictable that Architecture would be assigned the
lowest weight, partly on the basis that few of the participants really understood its sig-
nificance. The weight of 20 to Process Redesign was somewhat disappointing, in that it
was quite obvious from everything that was said that the authority would have to radi-
cally redesign its processes over the coming years. Again, the low score could mainly
be attributed to a general lack of understanding.
An interesting feature of the exercise was the surprise that the adjusted score was, at 300,
so low. The county council team had assumed that the proposed system would make an
excellent investment. It is possible to infer from this that the potential benefits of the
system envisaged by the management team prior to undertaking the exercise outweighed
perceived unfavorable factors, or, more likely, that these unfavorable factors were not
identified by them until the framework was applied. However, even when the scores
were revisited, only slight adjustment were proposed to the original set of scores, and
were so insignificant that the originals were maintained.
The practice of scoring Risk negatively and subtracting the figure form the total gave rise
to some confusion when the management team was assessing the scores. The negative
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scoring of Risk was subsequently revised when applying the framework for Organisation
3.
The proposed approach was outside the range of experience of the managers involved.
Even the Finance and IT Managers, while having a much better grasp than the other two,
nonetheless had difficulty in taking in many of the concepts. This problem was com-
pounded by the demonstrable diminution of interest shown by the participants when
challenged by new concepts.
A preponderance of emphasis was given to the Payback perspective during the evalua-
tion process. This was possibly because it was best understood, even though much prior
explanatory work had been done before the research exercise was adopted, but clearly
the participants felt most comfortable when discussing tangible issues.
In the event of elements being seen as lacking in relevance to the organisation applying
the methodology, the interest and commitment of the participants declines to a consider-
able degree.
Achieving a balance in the scoring is made difficult when the degree of interest in and/or
knowledge of the perspectives varies between individual participants, with the commit-
ted/informed ones exercising disproportionate influence.
The concept of probability, especially in terms of numerical assignments, did not gener-
ate interest or commitment from the participants. This however could have derived in
part from the lack of direct relevance of many of the elements forming the basis for the
evaluation.
Once the concept of the framework was understood (to the extent that it was) the actual
investment appraisal exercise was undertaken quite quickly. This was seen as a positive
aspect by the participants. However, there must be a suspicion that the exercise was too
fast, and that many contributions were made (or not made, as the case may be) to keep
up the momentum.
A highly significant outcome of the exercise was the surprise felt by the participants that
the proposed system achieved such a relatively low score, in view of their original per-
ception that the system represented an excellent investment. This could be said to reflect
the framework achieving its objectives, namely, providing new insights to the investment
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process. The value was somewhat diminished however by the lack of direct relevance
of some of the framework's components in relation to local authority circumstances.
13.3 Organisation 2
13.3.1 Background
The second organisation is a medium-sized private company in the pharmaceuticals sec-
tor, which specialises in the manufacture and sale of products whose patents have lapsed.
The company is reasonably profitable, but operates in a somewhat volatile environment,
where competitive actions can have significant and immediate impact, and where distri-
bution and marketing channels are constantly being revamped. The main driving forces
for the company are cost control and the capacity to react quickly to competitive actions.
At the time of the exercise, which took place in the period April/June 1995, the compa-
ny had made a decision to replace their existing order processing/accounting/stock con-
trol package, which handled all transaction processing. This package, based on propri-
etary Nixdorf hardware and software, had been very expensive, and despite major sub-
sequent expenditure on modifications, had proved unsatisfactory. The company wanted
to replace this with a more flexible client/server based solution which facilitated end-
user computing and staff empowerment.
13.3.2 Research chronology
A number of preliminary meetings were held with the Finance Director and the IT
Manager. It should be noted that the IT Manager was a relatively junior staff member,
with all major IT decisions being made by the Finance Director. Both the IT Manager
and Finance Director, conscious of the very poor returns from the existing system,
expressed considerable interest in any framework which could help them make better IT
investment decisions. Given that the proposed new system would impact every depart-
ment, and wod have ramifications for organisaone c-2t-.;re and customer readons
(totally new order processing and discounting), the author recommended that the evalu-
ation team be extended to all senior management. This was at first resisted by the
Finance Director, but he subsequently agreed.-
The Managing Director, indicating the importance being applied to the exercise, called
a special meeting of the board, and also included a representative from the firm's audi-
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tors. The author addressed this meeting, and explained the proposed framework in some
detail. A long discussion followed, and it became clear that, while some managers had
achieved a good grasp of the issues, others had not. It was agreed that, instead of the full
team entering into the full exercise immediately, a form of 'halfway house' question-
naire would be drawn up, with the objective of getting management to address the issues
likely to arise in the course of the exercise, but in terms with which they would be famil-
iar. This would have the added value of assisting those carrying out the exercise to focus
on issues of concern.
While all of the management team returned the questionnaires, only the Finance
Director, IT Manager and Operations Managers took a meaningful part in the investment
appraisal exercise, the weighting section of which was completed in about two hours.
The participants were reasonably comfortable with the five perspectives and their
respective sub-components, which were still those which made up the original frame-
work (Chapter 12) and subsequently applied in Organisation 1. Nonetheless, some of
the sub-components (most notable End-user Computing) were found to be not fully rel-
evant, while others, not directly covered in the taxonomy provided, but domain specific
to the pharmaceutical sector (in particular issues relating to compliance testing) were
suggested for inclusion. This suggestion had merit in that it would have made the exer-
cise more relevant to the participants. However, the view taken at the time was to the
effect that framework cohesion took precedence over relevance. This was based on the
belief that changing sub-components for either the Weighting or Scoring exercises could
result in the framework being manipulated to provide results desired by some partici-
pants, or could result in key sub-components being overlooked. (This restrictive
approach was however discontinued in subsequent fieldwork - see Organisations 3, 4
and 5).
13.3.3 Weighting
The weightings were assigned in the course of a two hour meeting and are shown in sum-
mary form in Fig.13.3:
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Perspecti 'Weigh
Payback 35
Risk 25
100Total
Strategic Alignment 10
Architecture 15
Process Redesign 5
Fig. 13.3 Organisation 2: Summary of Weightings
The weightings assigned accurately reflected management's priorities. Whether they
best represented the company's medium to long term interests is another matter. Cost
cutting and avoidance predictably dominated, with the new system being seen as having
much cheaper maintenance costs, requiring less skilled (and therefore cheaper) staff to
operate it, and, providing staff cost savings through the provision of faster information
and decision support facilities. With all sections of the company strongly dependent on
the system for transaction processing, and the memory of the earlier unsuccessful invest-
ment still strong, risk was understandably afforded a high weighting. As a result of the
limitations imposed by the limited, closed architecture of the Nixdorf system, this per-
spective was afforded a relatively strong weighting.
The low weightings for strategic alignment and process redesign did not sit well with the
challenges and opportunities the company faced. With a competitive business environ-
ment, unpredictable developments in the areas of links with suppliers and customers, the
possibilities of customer lock-in or lock-out enabled by IT, and the company's existing
'command and control' organisational structure, strategic alignment and process
redesign could reasonably be expected to have been afforded high weightings. The
weightings they did receive underlined the somewhat limited understanding manage-
ment had of the true impact of IT, still seeing it essentially in terms of transaction pro-
cessing and cost savings.
13.3.4 Scoring
The scoring exercise went very smoothly, even though the IT Director, inexplicably,
insisted that the supplier of the proposed system be included in the process. His contri-
bution on scoring sub-components such as 'reliability and financial strength of supplier'
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was predictable! Nonetheless, the exercise was very useful, in that a comprehensive
evaluation was performed, all involved played an active role, and many hitherto uniden-
tified issues were revealed. Clearly however, strong-willed participants had much more
impact on the scoring than the less assertive ones. This was seen as an issue of some
importance, and in subsequent exercises was addressed by holding fewer group sessions,
and more interviews with individual managers.
The final adjusted scores are tabulated in summary form below:
Fig 13.4 Summary of Scores Adjusted by Weights
Perspective Weight Score Adj. Scor
Strategic Alignment 10 8 80
Payback 35 6 210
Architecture 15 7 105
Process Redesign 5 5 25
Risk 25 (5) (125)
Total 100 21 395
The scores presented a reasonably accurate assessment of the proposed system's invest-
ment potential. The flexibility provided by client/server was seen as a major contribu-
tor to the medium/long term alignment of the system with company objectives.
Interestingly, the possibilities for direct benefits were much less than originally antici-
pated. This discovery was largely as a result of applying the end user computing bene-
fits analysis approach identified on Appendix DI. This exercise was undertaken by the
author, and revealed that many of the projected 'benefits' would in fact provide little
practical advantage to the company. Even though process redesign is greatly facilitated
by the flexibility of client/server, this was nonetheless afforded a fairly low weight, in
this writer's view due mainly to a lack of understanding of the issues. Despite the con-
tributions of the supplier, risk was seen to be relatively high, given the scale of the pro-
ject, the totally new technical environment, the organisational impact, and the general
lack of IT skills in the company.
13.3.5 Summary and Conclusions
This exercise was much more effective than that for Organisation 1. While full man-
agement participation declined over time, in all there was a considerable commitment of
time and a degree of collaboration which set clear ground rules for the appraisal process.
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While management awareness of the full impact of IT improved considerably both as a
result of the preparatory work and the exercise itself, this nonetheless remained inade-
quate, and to an extent limited the value of the exercise. Nonetheless, the exercise was
seen as of considerable value by management, and the company plans to apply it for all
future IT investments.
As with Organisation 1, providing a rigid set of pre-defined sub-components for each
perspective was seen to have introduced a degree of artificiality into the weightings.
Participants took the view 'why this and not that?' in many cases, and the emphasis on
the need to maintain consistency appeared less convincing as time went on. This devel-
opment introduced the requirement to experiment with assigning the weightings for each
perspective on the basis of a review of the underlying principles relating to each per-
spective, and their impact on the company, rather than scoring sub-components sepa-
rately. This approach was introduced in Organisation 3.
13.4 Organisation 3
13.4.1 Background
The research at Organisation 3 took place between June and December 1995. The com-
pany has continued to apply the framework as part of its project justification process
since that time. Organisation 3 is a company operating in heavy industry, which has been
downsized over a period of five years from 1,500 to 550 employees. At the commence-
ment of the research it was state owned, but in the process of being privatised. Most of
the wdstEr_g manage:r_er_t team had departed, and tr_ar_y of those re:r_erir_g were or_ ar_
uncertain footing. An executive chairman and chief executive (CEO) had been recruit-
ed in a consultancy capacity to oversee the final stages of the downsizing and cost-trim-
ming prior to privatisation, at which stage their contracts would end. In the interim, they
effectively ran the company, with the remaining management team largely in an order-
taking role.
While cost-cutting was seen by the new management team (the chairman and CEO) as
the number one priority, they also realised that some investment would be required to
make the company competitive, and IT was one of the areas being considered. This
stemmed in part from the poor state of the company's existing IT resources. Inflexible
terminal-based legacy systems predominated, while PCs and distributed computing
facilities were very limited. The IT Manager had been one of those made redundant,
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and his place had been taken by a very capable but inexperienced analyst/programmer.
Prior to the on-site research being undertaken, an IT strategy for the company had been
drawn up, which identified a number of areas indicating investment potential. The
research project was seen by senior management as very much a 'working example'.
They wanted it to be a useful contribution towards helping them to arrive at an effective
investment decision, rather than as an academic exercise, although they did agree to ful-
fill the necessary research requirements.
13.4.2 Research chronology
Some initial exploratory meetings were held with the senior management team. The
CEO had a negative attitude to IT, stating that in his experience it had provided minimal
return on investment. He also opined that there was no mechanism for bridging the gulf
between IT management and general management, and that decisions made on IT by
general management were 'hit or miss'. Nonetheless, he was agreeable the try out the
methodology on three proposed projects, one being a Rolling Mil Reporting System.
A fully worked implementation of the framework as applied to the Rolling NM
Reporting System is provided on Appendix V.
13.4.3 Weighting
As with earlier research attempts, it was found that only the Payback and Risk perspec-
tives were understood in any detail by the management. Considerable time had to be
spent in an education process relating to the other perspectives. This spanned a number
of meetings, and the written material provided for the local authority case (Organisation
1) was accepted, but on the evidence of subsequent discussions, not adequately absorbed
(if in fact it had been read at all). It was found that practical examples, ideally where
they related to the company itself, were essential in elucidating the principles. After four
meetings, and a number of informal telephone conversations, the senior managers
accepted the validity of evaluating from the perspectives other than Payback and Risk,
and were in a position to allocate weightings to all perspectives.
This approach clearly differed from the earlier research exercises, in that no sub-com-
ponents for the five perspectives were provided. As indicated above, the weightings
were based on discussion with senior management, written material, and relevant mate-
rial from within the company. This resulted in management achieving a general under-
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standing of each perspective, and weighting on the basis of this understanding.
whereby individual 	 fl_s_sk. jLILLImhs_Q.112mr .,ne he a i of the weightings
Based on these criteria, the following weights were assigned:
Fig, 13.5 Organisation 3: Summary of Weightings
Perspectiv Wei
Strategic Alignment 20
Payback 40
Architecture 10
Process Redesign 20
Risk 10
Total 100
Interpretation of weightings 
These weightings should be seen as being relatively sophisticated, especially when relat-
ed to the starting position. Whereas Payback was as anticipated given the highest
weighting, this realistically reflected the company's position, and at 40, was significant-
ly below what was originally proposed, when it was seen as being virtually the only
meaningful criterion. Process Redesign, a concept which was virtually unknown at the
outset of the exercise, was assigned a relatively respectable score of 20, reflecting the
recognition of the need for flexibility in this highly competitive industry.
These weightings were to form the basis against which a number of potential projects
were to be evaluated. The CEO let it be known to middle management, who would be
assigning the scores, that this would not be just a "once-off" exercise, that each project
would be continually re-evaluated on the same criteria, so that scores and values
assigned to get projects approved would eventually be compared to actual results. It was
observed that following this, line management became quite conservative in assessing
benefits and risks.
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13.4.4 Scoring
Again, the practice of providing pre-defined sub-components was amended, but not as
drastically as with the weightings (in which no sub-components were provided). In an
effort to achieve a degree of consistency, and a mechanism against which management
could work with, sub-components were identified by outside consultants, the company's
IT Manager, and the relevant line managers for each perspective. These were broadly
based on the principles underlying the development of sub-components in previous
research, but differed in that they were customised to the environment in which the
investment were being made. These revised sub-components are treated in detail in the
full worked example in Appendix V. As will be seen, some perspectives, (e.g. Risk) are
very similar to the generic categories used in earlier research, while others were signifi-
cantly customised.
When the exercise was completed, the scored evaluations were reviewed by senior man-
agement. Whereas there was no specific cut-off score for acceptance/rejection (some
form of corporate history needed to be built up), the application under review scored rea-
sonably well, and was approved for funding.
A summary of the weightings and adjusted scores ins shown on Fig. 13.6.
Fig. 13.6 Organisation 3: Summary of Scores Adjusted by Weights
Perspective Weight Score Adj. Score
Strategic Alignment 20 7 140
Payback 40 9 360
Architecture 10 6 60
Process Redesign 20 7 140
Risk 10 5 50
Total 100 34 750
13.4.6 Some comments on the worked example
The worked example on Appendix V as well as being the first application of the frame-
work in which the author did not participate, had some new characteristics:
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• As will be seen, two perspectives, Payback and Process Redesign, were designated
"Direct Benefits" and "Re-engineering" during the course of this exercise. This had
no particular significance, other than that these terms were deemed by the consultant
to be less open to misinterpretation than those they replaced. The original designa-
tions were retained for future exercises.
• The evaluation team appear to be generous in the number of maximum scores they
assigned. Applying the maximum score implies that the system could not be
improved in the way it meets the relevant sub-component. This could be valid for
'hard' concepts such as `financial strength of supplier' under the Risk perspective.
But it is hard to see, for example, how a maximum score could be allocated, as it was
under the Process Redesign perspective, to a criterion as `soft' as "facilitation of
process approach to business". The participants justified their approach on the basis
that, given the price of the proposed system, and the stable conditions in the Rolling
Mil Department, the scores were reasonable in the circumstances.
This approach however could give rise to a situation in which, in the context of a
number of potential investments competing for limited funds, generous markings
would provide an unmerited comparative advantage. The risks could be largely mit-
igated by applying such criteria to all projects being reviewed - that is, consistency
could be maintained if the underlying principles of scoring were clarified and agreed
on a company-wide basis.
13.4.5 Summary and Conclusions
Summary 
Three major departures from the earlier research exercises took place in the case of
Organisation 3. These were:
• The allocation of weight to the five perspectives was determined, not by an aggre-
gation of sub-component scores, but by an overall score for each perspective based
on discussions and the provision of other 'educational' material to senior manage-
ment.
• The sub-components used for scoring were not generic as in prior research exercis-
es, but customised to the environment in which the investments were made (see
Appendix V). The number of sub-components per perspective varied considerably,
with Payback applying 10, while Architecture applied only 3. This was addressed
209
by determining an average for each perspective.
• A brief, non-technical description of the five perspectives supplemented by a taxon-
omy of considerations for weighting and scoring under the five perspectives was pro-
vided for the first time While not forming part of the formal evaluation process,
they were used by management (and the consultants implementing the framework)
as thought-starters and in addition ensured that the coverage of issues was compre-
hensive. It proved very popular with both management and consultants. This tax-
onomy is outlined in Appendix VI. This provided a series of practical thought-
starters for participants for each of the perspectives. Under Payback, for instance,
potential cost savings were provided, split under Direct Savings, (e.g. reduced inven-
tories), Quality (e.g. fewer warranty claims), Productivity (e.g. less rekeying of data),
Employee Performance (e.g. reduced need for training) and Management
Performance (e.g. improved decision support capability). This greatly speeded the
appraisal process and added to the acceptability of the framework.
• The concept of Probability was dropped. Whilst the original theoretical require-
ment for some form of probability analysis is still seen as valid, the earlier research
showed that this was a major impediment for management, and when the subject
was broached with this organisation's management, the response was even more neg-
ative than that encountered in earlier exercises. As management acceptability was
seen as an essential research objective, this took precedence over the theoretical
requirements. This shortcoming was addressed, at least partially, by the participants
taldng !:to account t!:e reHabE!ity of :He scores we: assIgnEng ter. For exan:p!e
if a particular benefit merited a score of 9 under Payback, it would have been reduced
to a lower figure if the probability of achieving the benefit was low. While this was
not a perfect mechanism, it did address the probability factor whilst providing a
framework acceptable to and workable by user and IT management.
Another innovation related to the Risk perspective being scored positively, whereas in
previous research it had a negative value, which had caused confusion when assessing
total system scores. Under the revised approach, where high risk applied, the compo-
nent was awarded a low score, when the risk was low a high score was awarded - in
direct reversal of previous applications. In terms of scoring the overall project, this was
perfectly valid, and in fact could be seen as an improvement, in that it simplified the
process and made it appear more consistent. .
A new dimension was also added in that for the first time an exercise was undertaken
without the direct involvement of the author. Consultants (admittedly work associates
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of the author) and line managers were able to effectively apply the framework in an actu-
al business setting, in which reasonably large sums of money were involved.
Conclusions 
The following conclusions could be drawn from these developments:
• The discarding of generic sub-components in determining weights resulted in a dra-
matically more positive reaction from senior management. In fact it is probable that
had there been an attempt to build up weightings on the basis of sub-components, the
senior management would simply have declined to become meaningfully involved.
It was only through semi-structured discussion, supplemented with other explanato-
ry material, that management achieved a level of understanding which enabled real-
istic weights to be assigned.
• Similarly, the customising of the sub-components for scoring made the exercise
much more realistic for the IT Manager, and in particular, line managers, who for the
most part did not relate, and/or were resistant to, generic concepts.
• These advances came at a cost however, in that a certain degree of consistency
between proposals was lost. Comparative accuracy becomes more difficult to
achieve when criteria are customised, irrespective of the qualities of those undertak-
ing the investment. There is no doubt however that the exercises were far more real-
istic and effective in a business sense than those undertaken earlier.
• As with the earlier research exercises, management almost without exception is not
well equipped to evaluate investments in IT. Payback is the only criterion which is
understood in any meaningful sense, or in which an interest is shown. It takes time,
effort, and the capacity to link generic principles to the participants' particular cir-
cumstances to undertake a meaningful IT investment appraisal exercise.
13.5 Organisation 4
13.5.1 Background
Organisation 4 is an international mail order business specialising in high quality goods.
Even though IT is central to its operations, at the commencement of the research man-
agement saw IT almost exclusively in transaction processing terms. Following a peri-
od of prolonged growth, the company in 1994 invested in new software and hardware
facilities, supporting stock and mail order processing. Based on a recommendation of
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the supplier, the company chose a mini-based 'solution', which in fact turned out to any-
thing but a solution. The systems, largely custom written, due the company's specialised
requirements, had major problems, both in terms of quality and performance, and many
issues of data integrity were also encountered.
The investment appraisal process, if it can be called that, was totally inadequate. It was
made very rapidly, and was based mainly on system functionality, and to a lesser extent,
price. Little else was taken into account. The development and implementation process,
was not much better, with the development team operating in isolation from the users,
who eventually had a system in effect 'dumped' on them. The subsequent failure should
not have come as a surprise. In late 1995 management decided to abandon the system
and to redevelop new software with a new supplier. This proposed investment was the
subject of the research exercise.
13.5.2 Research chronology
Management did not learn adequately from their original experience, and going into the
research exercise their primary goal seemed to be gaining retribution on the suppliers,
and those internal staff (mainly the IT people) whom they saw as responsible for the dis-
aster (which it was, with the investment being a virtual write-off after less than two
years). As with all previous exercises, considerable preparatory work had to be under-
taken before management became convinced of the need to apply a formal investment
appraisal methodology. Again, abstract concepts achieved little resonance, and interest
could only be gained by relating the elements of these concepts to their own experience.
The participants in the process, apart from the author, were the Managing Director, the
Finance Director, and the IT Manager (who was weak and partially discredited due to
the failure of the original system). The investment being appraised was the development
of a new stock control system, and a new mail order system, to be run in a client/server
environment. The total cost was estimated to be £300,000.
13.5.3 Weighting
The Finance Director, and particularly the Managing Director, showed little enthusiasm
for the exercise after the first few sessions. Interest increased when they were shown
some examples for each perspective. For instance, a demonstration of the Internet which
identified immense potential for mail order brought home the importance of Strategic
Alignment and Process Redesign. A demonstration of interactive, 3-D multimedia
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showed how the right Architecture could provide the basis for exciting new sales sup-
port, while a combination of the latter two, combined with other telecommunications
facilities, identified the possibility of moving sales support in-house, and eliminating
sales agents in each country, as is now the case. This underlined the importance of
Strategic Alignment, Architecture, Process Redesign, and indeed, Payback. Given their
experience with the previous system, there was little need to convince the management
team on the need for evaluating Risk.
As with organisation 3, specific sub-components were not weighted. The difference here
was that a fairly comprehensive series of sub-components under the five perspectives
was provided - these are outlined on Appendix VI This underpinned both the weight-
ing and scoring processes. This differed from Organisation 2 in that an attempt was
made to make the concepts somewhat more generic. This worked reasonably well, but
it was found essential to relate the sub-components to the company own circumstances.
Once that was done, the management team was quite comfortable undertaking both exer-
cises
A summary of the weightings is outlined in Fig. 13.7.
Fig. 13.7 Organisation 4: Summary of Weightings
Perspective Weight
Strategic Alignment 25
Payback 25
Arc!,
 ; tea' ire 10
Process Redesign 20
Risk 20
Total 100
13.5.4 Scoring
The Managing Director played little part in the scoring exercise, leaving it to the other
participants in the exercise. Much of the initiative had to be taken by the author, with
the company's management for the most part responding to questions and prompts.
Nonetheless, each perspective, and the related sub-components, was examined in detail.
A by-product of this was a significant increase in interest on the part of the Finance
Director in architectural issues. At the end of the exercise he considered himself almost
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an expert on client/server technologies.
The final summarised scoring profile, which achieved a score of 635, is as follows:
Fig. 13.8  Organisation 4: Summary of Scores Adjusted by Weights
Perspective Weight Seam Sea
Strategic Alignment 25 8 200
Payback 25 5 125
Architecture 10 7 70
Process Redesign 20 7 140
Risk 20 5 100
Total 100 635
13.5.5 Summary and Conclusions
The weightings reflected the realities of the investment environment reasonably well.
From a position in which management saw virtually no significance in concepts such as
strategic alignment or process redesign, their thinldng had advanced to the point where
strategic alignment was jointly afforded the largest weighting. Understandably, R
was also afforded a relatively high weighting, and the management team found the exer-
cise of scoring this category particularly useful, in that it identified for them a number of
risk issues, especially in the areas of organisational impact and management commit-
ment, which they saw as vital in their circumstances.
Iii being less enthusiastic and less well-equipped to carry out the exercise than any of the
other participating organisations, this company imposed unique demands in terms of
implementing the framework in an actual business setting. Nonetheless, the framework
was app:iec:, and, whi:e the company panned to invest in any case, the investment deci-
sion arrived at was on the basis of its findings. In addition, management's understand-
ing of the issues which underpin successful IT deployment have been greatly enhanced.
This implementation was achieved however at the cost of a limited approach, in the
sense that the perspectives and sub-components were treated somewhat cursorily. There
was little evidence that the framework would form a long term component of the com-
pany's business processes, in the way it is likely to with other participants. In summa-
ry, the exercise represented a definite advance on existing approaches for the company,
but fell well short of what could have been achieved. There is no way of squaring this
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particular circle, as effective IT investment appraisal in the absence of management com-
mitment is a contradiction in terms.
13.6 Organisation 5
13.6.1 Background
Organisation 5 is a company in the telecommunications sector. It is technologically
advanced, designing and developing a range of sophisticated PABX and network prod-
ucts for major providers such as BT and its Irish equivalent. The company previously
undertook all its own manufacturing, but a few years ago took the decision to outsource
this. It has also outsourced the delivery, installation and maintenance of its products,
while retaining overall control and responsibility. In many ways therefore it could be
regarded as a 'virtual corporation', a structure which demands unique requirements of
IT, which plays a vital role in the effective running of this company, being heavily
applied in every aspect of its operations.
The company's business and IT planning processes are also sophisticated. They devel-
oped a five year business strategic plan in 1992, and a corresponding one for IT. Both
plans are seen as having contributed to the company's success, but at the time of the
research taking place (early 1996) were deemed to be in need of updating. The lack of
a structured approach to investment appraisal was seen as a significant limitation in the
1992 IT strategic plan, and management were keen to participate in the research. The
company planned major investments in IT, specifically to replace the existing account-
ing and manufacturing systems with completely new applications. The objective was to
apply the framework with a view to optimising these investments.
13.6.2 Research Chronology
The management team at this company was substantially different to those at all of the
previous organisations. They were literate in IT issues, progressive, and anxious to learn
everything they felt was necessary to arrive at the optimum decision for their company.
It was decided to retain the variation of the framework used with Organisation 3, given
its success with that company.
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Perspective Weight
Payback 15
Risk 15
100Total
Strategic Alignment 30
Architecture 25
Process Redesign 15
13.6.3 Weighting
An initial meeting was held with the IT Manager, Finance Director and Managing
Director. The overall thrust of the project was reviewed, and it was felt that the best
approach to working through the methodology was to undertake individual reviews with
each of the senior management team, notwithstanding the additional time demands that
this imposed. Each of this team devoted a considerable amount of time to understand-
ing the principles underpinning the framework, and had achieved a thorough grasp of
these principles before assigning weights to the five perspectives.
The composite weighting profile was as follows:
Fig, 13.9  Organisation 5: Summary of Weightings
These weightings confirm the relatively sophisticated standards of this company's senior
management team. The high weightings for Strategic Alignment reflected the team's
appreciation of IT as a contributor to company objectives by means other than providing
direct or tangible benefits. In saying this however, it must be noted that the Finance
Director had assigned a weight of 30 to Payback, but in a group discussion held to ratio-
nalize the assigned weightings, accepted the revised composite scores. Again, while the
IT Manager assigned a relatively high weight to Architecture, the unusually high score
of 25 underlined the advanced level of IT awareness on the part of senior management.
13.6.4 Scoring
Three major applications were short-listed for appraisal, SAP, Oracle Financials, and
Scala. A very comprehensive review of these products was undertaking using the frame-
work, and the findings were debated in great depth with the management team. The
main input was from consultants with the National Institute for Management
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Technology, who directed the meetings and initiated activities. However, the manage-
ment team was involved at all stages and played an active part in the exercise.
The full work-papers for this exercise are detailed on Appendix VII
13.6.5 Some Observations on the Worked Example
• The application of the framework has become more sophisticated
The field work undertaken for Organisation 5 was the most recent and it will be
readily seen that the application of the framework is both more comprehensive
and more sophisticated. Much has been learned since its initial somewhat tenta-
tive application in Organisation 1 and the full report on the exercise represents a
respectable document upon which management can base business decisions. In
particular it will be noted that the exercise has become broader in scope, placing
then investment appraisal issues in a more general business context. Earlier exer-
cises were confined to direct investment appraisal issues.
• The taxonomy from Appendix VI formed the basis for the sub-components used.
This was comprehensive enough to provide the bulk of material, which required to
be supplemented only by elements specifically related to the company's business
environment (e.g. the need for product data management) and specific technical
issues (e.g. SQL and OLE compatibility).
• The total scores for each system were very close.
The particular example shown, while of considerable value to the firm (eliciting
a letter form the IT Manager to this effect) would have been more demonstrative,
both form the company's perspective and for the purposes of this research had a
clear winner emerged. However, while SAP scored the highest, the exercise
could not be said to have presented management with a definitive choice. In fact,
an analysis of the worked example shows that the Process Redesign perspective
was crucial in providing SAP with its margin. This was mentioned by the
Finance Director at the final meeting. His point was that he had hoped for a deci-
sive result from the exercise. The reality however was that in terms of address-
ing the company's overall requirements, there simply was not a clear-cut winner.
217
13.6.6 Summary and conclusions
The framework applied for this exercise was almost identical to that used for
Organisations 3 and 4. The investment appraisal process underlined again the follow-
ing:
• Management are not comfortable with weighting on the basis of individual sub-com-
ponents. They become quite confident, and indeed almost enthusiastic, about
weighting their company's objectives and priorities when the concepts are clearly
explained, ideally assisted by relating these concepts to their own experience and
business environment. In this regard, the Taxonomy in Appendix VI was invaluable.
• Formal assignations of scores for probability would not have been acceptable to the
management team. When broached, they described it as 'artificial' or 'academic'.
No attempt was made to force the issue.
• The management team found it both useful and enlightening, and it lent greater con-
fidence to the decision-making process. (The Finance Director stated that the
process would be mandatory in future, and requested the relevant support documents
for future evaluation).
• The full value of the framework will only be achieved when a 'corporate memory'
of cases is built up for comparative purposes.
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Postal Survey: IT Investment and Payoff Issues
Introduction
The original research methodology envisaged the requirement to set the findings of the
fieldwork exercises in a broader context (Chapter 2.1.1). The objective was to ascertain
attitudes to IT investment, trends in responsibility for IT expenditure, the state of current
practice in terms of methods being applied, the degree of satisfaction with the invest-
ments themselves, and the methods applied in making those investments.
This survey was carried out in the period April/May 1996. The survey questionnaire was
posted to 100 large/medium-sized companies, and the response rate was 41%. A con-
solidation of replies is provided on Appendix VIII. This very high figure reflected the
increasing importance attributed to the subject by management. While the forms were
posted to the Finance Directors, in many instances the IT director was the respondent.
This ratio is not possible to quantify fully as, being a confidential survey, many respon-
dents chose to remain anonymous.
The survey sought to address four main themes:
1. Current responsibility for budgetary control of IT, and perceived trends
2. The problems experienced, and the degree of satisfaction with IT investments
3. Investment appraisal methodologies currently in operation
4. The degree of understanding of IT investment appraisal issues by management
Summary of findings
Budgetary control 
The control of IT expenditure remains firmly centralised, with 87.5% of respondents
having their budgets either fully controlled centrally (42.5%), or in combination with the
business units (45%). In contrast, only 10% of companies have business divisions
responsible (see figure 13.10). While there is a trend, as anticipated, towards more
devolved control, one in four of the companies shows an increase in centralised control.
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Fig, 13,10 Control of IT Investment
When broken down by categories of investment, the results are predictable, with respon-
sibility for mainframes and data centres residing strongly with the IT department
(77.5%), with this control declining steadily through networks (72.5%), personal sys-
tems (52.5%), PCs (40%) and IT education/training (30%). (see figure 13.12)
Fig, 13.12 Budgetary Responsibility of IT Function
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Figure 2.
Budgetary Responsibility of IT Function
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IT Investment Appraisal
Problems and levels of satisfaction with IT investments 
The replies suggested a high degree of satisfaction with companies' ability to assess IT
costs and benefits. 85% of respondents claimed they were fairly successful or very suc-
cessful in assessing IT costs, while the corresponding figure for IT benefits was 60%.
The problems related to assessing IT costs and benefits were identified in free text for-
mat, but have been broadly summarised as follows:
• No problems
• Administrative (inadequate accounting and identification of costs)
• Identification of hidden and end-user costs
• Technical considerations (development/implementation time scales, changes in tech-
nologies, unanticipated complexities)
The main problem identified by the overwhelming majority of respondents in assessing
benefits related to the lack of metrics in relation to intangible benefits. Again, several
respondents saw this area as not being a problem.
Appraisal methods currently applied 
Over half of respondents (52%) have a standardised appraisal method in place, of which
50% in turn applied their own in-house method. Simple return-on-investment (ROT),
represented by far the most common standardised technique, with a small minority sup-
plementing this approach with discounting techniques such as net present value (NPV)
or internal rate of return (1RR). The corollary of this of course is that almost half of
respondents do not apply a standardised approach. Details provided on in-house meth-
ods were rather sketchy, but there is little to suggest significant use of comprehensive
approaches. Regarding the success of these methods, 87.5% described them as success-
ful or fairly successful.
Management understanding of IT investment appraisal issues 
When asked to evaluate whether management had an adequate understanding of these
issues, the aggregated response put IT professionals at 62.5%, line managers at 20%, and
top management at 37.5% (see figure 13.13). It was noticeable that IT directors scored
IT professionals' knowledge very highly, while Finance Directors rated that of top man-
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agement almost as high. With line managers being underrepresented, it is perhaps not too
surprising that they achieved such a low score.
Fig, 13.13 Management Understanding of IT Issues
Management Understanding of IT Investment Issues
Figure 3.
Strategic alignment, architectural considerations, process redesign (BPR) and formalised
risk assessment are complex considerations in investment appraisal, and, on the face of
it, management seem to have recogiused this, with 95% seeing strategic alignment as
fairly important or very important, with architecture (77.5%), Process redesign (72.5%)
and risk (85%) being designated as important or fairly important (see figure 13.14).
Fig. 13.14 Criteria Important to Evaluating Investment
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Some observations on the survey
• Centralised control still very much alive
The results underlined the predominance of centralised control among most organisa-
tions. While about one company in three envisaged more devolution to the business
units, one in four expected that centralised control would increase. This latter statistic
will surprise many observers, who see budgetary control devolving inexorably to the
business units. It could perhaps reflect concerns by senior management at the huge
(some would say uncontrolled) growth of hidden costs in end-user computing, the so-
called 'cost iceberg'.
• Unwarranted satisfaction on ability to track costs and benefits
The satisfaction felt by respondents in their ability to assess IT costs and benefits mir-
rors that in the UK. Unfortunately this satisfaction may be unfounded. Given the evi-
dence cited in Chapter 1 to the effect that only a minority of projects provide the antici-
pated return, the survey itself raises doubts as to whether such satisfaction is merited. For
instance, a mere 5% of respondents saw their investment appraisal methods as being fair-
ly or very successful, only 27.5% of systems delivered targeted or above-targeted
returns, while only 30% of projects were completed to budget.
It is difficult to reconcile these responses with the optimistic assessments on the ability
to assess costs and benefits. The response from the Finance Director of a major retailer
in relation to costs, benefits and project performance - 'I'd hate to find out' - suggests a
More realistic view than those professing 'no problem'. This raises questions on the
extent to which management understands the key investment appraisal issues.
• Much work still to be done on management awareness
Research has shown that the factors identified in Question 6, strategic alignment, IT
architecture, BPR and risk, are essential components of the appraisal process, and the
relatively high degree of importance assigned by the respondents seems to underline this.
However, apart from two mentions of strategic alignment, not one of those factors fea-
-
tured as part of the methods currently applied amongst responding companies. One pos-
sible explanation is that while there may be a vague feeling that such factors are impor-
tant, there is no mechanism to incorporate them as part of the appraisal process. In the
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course of a number of investment appraisal exercises undertaken by the NIMT, IT
Directors claimed that while they saw these factors as highly important, they were reluc-
tant to broach them with senior management due their lack of awareness, and the conse-
quent risk of muddying the waters.
• Investment appraisal methods remain rudimentary .
Almost half of respondents apply no consistent or structured approach to investment
appraisal, while the bulk of the remainder apply techniques such as payback and ROI
which capture direct financial benefits only. It is possible that such a focus may be worse
than useless, in that by lending a spurious authenticity to the exercise, it forces out con-
sideration of potentially more important issues such as strategic alignment, architecture
and BPR.
All in all, the findings give some cause for concern. Despite IT now absorbing up to 50%
of new capital expenditure, and the investment environment having changed substan-
tially, the number of companies applying appropriate techniques remains very small, in
all likelihood reflecting the inadequate levels of awareness on the part of senior man-
agement.
This closely relates to findings in the fieldwork elements of the research, which showed 
that inadequate investment appraisal methods were being applied. leading to unsatisfac-
tory returns, and originating in large part from an inadequate understanding of the true 
impact of IT on the part of management. 
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Executive Briefing Days
Executive Briefing Days are geared towards creating awareness for a small group of
managers on specific IT issues. Typically, these will be attended by four or five senior
managers from a single company, and a workshop style of organisation applies. These
occasions have provided an excellent forum for airing and evaluating the framework,
especially as the National Institute for Management Technology (NIMT) now addresses
other IT activities (e.g. strategy) from the standpoint of the five perspectives. The
framework has achieved widespread acceptance as a tool for investment appraisal, once
the concepts are understood. This latter requirement frequently takes a lot of time.
Other areas which paralleled the findings from the five full applications of the frame-
work were the desirability of expressing concepts in terms of issues with which the par-
ticipants are directly familiar, and the lack of enthusiasm for formal assessments of prob-
ability.
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Summary
In line with the original research objectives, the framework was applied in a range of
organisational settings. The organisations ranged widely in terms of appreciating IT
issues and management commitment. The local authority was least advanced, but to be
fair, having completed the research in the five organisations and held a large number of
Executive Briefing Days, it is clear that the final version of the framework (that which
applied from Organisation 3 onwards) would have been far more acceptable and practi-
cable from the local authority's perspective. The refinements made to the framework,
together with the supplementary aids (in particular the taxonomy in Appendix VI) result-
ed in it being seen as far more relevant to management. The framework had fully bed-
ded down by the time the research was begun in Organisation 5, and this very advanced
and demanding company was able to apply it with virtually no alterations. The main
refinements were:
• the allocation of weighting to the perspectives on the basis of discussions with man-
agement, (which in turn was based on a review of business objectives) rather than on
pre-defined sub-components.
• The replacement of pre-defined sub-components for scoring with a taxonomy of
investment considerations under each perspective, with the additional flexibility of
allowing these to be customised to reflect individual company requirements.
• The dropping of the formal application of probability factors.
The end result was that the framework was successfully applied in a number of compa-
nies, and was adopted by most participants in the Executive Briefing Days. Since the
end of the formal field research it continues to be applied in its present form in a large
number of companies. Despite this progress, the survey on IT investment issues shows,
inter alia, that management understanding of key issues still leaves a lot to be desired.
As long as this situation applies, difficulties in achieving business benefit from IT are
likely to remain.
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Chapter 14. Summary
The global context in which the research commenced was one in which cultural, eco-
nomic and commercial realities were undergoing rapid and fundamental change. This
change was shown to have been largely driven by rapid development in technology, par-
ticularly information technology (IT). Despite its impact, and the vast sums of money
being spent on it, it was failing, by many orders of magnitude, to provide appropriate
improvements in productivity. A very high proportion of IT projects were shown to have
provided minimal return, and dissatisfaction with IT investments was expressed by man-
agement. This raised a question on the appropriateness of investment appraisal tech-
niques.
Despite the radical commercial and economic changes which had occurred, with real
value being increasingly represented by the control of information rather than physical
assets, investment appraisal techniques continued to be dominated by finance-based cri-
teria, so-called 'hard benefits'. A review of these, and conventional accounting and
finance-basec: approaches to IT in general, showed them to be not only inadequate, but
possibly counter-productive, in that misleading results could occur. Their continued
widespread use was explained, at least partially, by way of a review of the historical
development of IT and its changing role and application within organisations.
This set the scene of the research focus, which was to develop an IT investment appraisal
framework, and to test it in field conditions under two criteria:
• Suitability: Would it meet the requirements of the present economic and technolog-
ical environment? In other words would it be an advance on current techniques?
• Acceptability: Given the general practice of management up to now to apply tradi-
tional techniques, would the new framework be acceptable? The validation of this
objective would be the extent to which the framework would be applied in actual
organisational settings.
The decision was taken to focus field testing on medium-sized organisations. This was
based on employee numbers being in the range of 100 to 500 employees, and/or a
turnover in the range of £50 million to £300 million. This was seen as being particular-
ly appropriate in the Irish context, and also providing a greater degree of consistency
when comparing the results of the fieldwork.
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A detailed review of IT research methodologies and practice was undertaken, and while
action research was seen to be the most appropriate, other methods were to be incorpo-
rated as the circumstances demanded. The research programme chosen was to first
develop a theoretical framework based on relevant literature and practice in the field.
This framework was to be applied in a number of operational settings. This would be
further refined in the light of field results, until an acceptable and consistent framework
had been established.
Before defining the framework it was felt necessary to examine the evolution of IT and
place the current research objectives in their historical context, from the transaction pro-
cessing of the earliest installations, though inter-departmental systems, then personal and
distributed computing, through to the business transformation capabilities of IT in cur-
rent times. The relevant investment appraisal techniques that applied in each phase were
analysed. This analysis showed that while the application of IT, and the price perfor-
mance ratio of computing power both showed dramatic changes, investment appraisal
techniques had not evolved to reflect these changes.
The analysis also identified that business value arising from TT investment was increas-
ingly represented not so much by direct benefits (such as cost reduction or direct revenue
enhancement) but in an indirect and less tangible way. Conventional investment
appraisal approaches were seen to be singularly unsuited to identifying and placing a
business value on this type of benefit. The growth of distributed, personal and
client/server computing also rapidly increased the growth of multi-vendor IT establish-
ments. This was in contrast to earlier phases when most establishments were dominat-
ed by one or two large vendors. This development meant that architectural consistency
assumed much greater significance, and in addition broadened the variety of risk to the
investment and project management process.
A literature review and an analysis of current practice formed the next step. Many
researchers and practitioners focused on particular aspects of the appraisal process (e.g.
strategic systems) rather than on providing comprehensive frameworks. Nonetheless, a
range of key criteria or determinants for the appraisal process was identified, as was the
degree of importance attached to them by the various researchers and practitioners.
These criteria, and their suitability for inclusion in the proposed framework, were then
reviewed in detail. It was established that a number of key elements were essential for
the framework. These were:
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Strategic Alignment, "a state of harmony between the goals and activities of a business
and the computer systems that support them" was seen as essential due to the extent to
which IT has become a key enabler of all business processes. Linking IT and business
strategies therefore has assumed considerable importance, especially in the light of the
rapid rate of technological change.
Payback needed little justification, in that it bordered on self-evident that the possibility
of achieving direct benefits should be a factor when evaluating IT investments. Given
the trend from manufacturing to services, the relative decline in the importance of direct
benefits was highlighted, nonetheless, the importance of performing some form of ben-
efits measurement was stressed.
The IT architecture was shown have become much more complex in recent years, with
the likelihood of this complexity increasing. The main issues contributing to this com-
plexity were reviewed, and it was established that neglecting the architectural ramifica-
tions of IT proposals could seriously undermine their business value.
Risk is another perspective whose incorporation in the framework should have been
almost self-evident, yet it was shown that comparatively few organisations formally
apply risk evaluation techniques. This was despite the high level of failures and disap-
pointing outcomes associated with IT investments. It seems clear therefore that a for-
malised evaluation of risk must be a factor in the investment appraisal process. The
types of risk were reviewed, with special emphasis on the relative increase in importance
of human and organisational considerations.
Process Redesign introduced a perspective which was almost totally missing from other
approaches identified in the literature. The inclusion was justified by establishing that
today's business organisational structures remain based on theories originally formulat-
ed over 200 years ago, theories which emphasise a hierarchical form of control. This
was shown to be unsuited to the requirements of today's business environment, which
must respond to calls for short product development and life cycles, tougher competi-
tion, volatility, and a rapid increase in the incidence of mergers/demergers, acquisi-
tions/divestitures. This can often be accomplished by a form of radical business process
redesign, usually underpinned by IT, and frequently driven by IT capabilities. The wide-
spread application of process redesign concepts, and the unique role of IT, suggested that
potential IT investments should be evaluated under this perspective.
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These represented the five primary perspectives which would form the basis of the pro-
posed framework. Given that the relative importance of these criteria would vary
between organisations, it was deemed essential that management apply a weighting
using a range of sub-components for each perspective. The proposed system or systems
under review would then be scored against each of the criteria, with the score adjusted
to reflect the respective weightings. A form of scoring based on management's business
and technical judgement was deemed to be the only practical way of evaluating an
investment's potential value, as attempts by researchers to assign monetary values to all
potential benefits were assessed, but found to be unrealistic. Finally, the issue of prob-
ability was addressed by assigning a probability factor to each of the criteria, reflecting
the degree of certainty with which the various scores were predictable.
This framework formed the basis for the field research, which was aimed at validating
the research objectives, namely the suitability and acceptability of the framework in a
setting of small to medium sized organisations. The field work was carried out in five
different organisational settings; one local authority, one semi-state companies (just
about to be privatised) and three private companies. The research took the following
form for each organisation:
• a review of organisational objectives
• an explanation to management on the problems currently associated with IT invest-
ment appraisal, a presentation of the framework and the rationale behind it (the form
of which varied according to the management's awareness of the issues and the
degree of interest).
• the identification of an appropriate project for the application of the framework
• the application of the framework in this project by the management team, supple-
mented by the author and/or other consultants with the necessary skills and knowl-
edge
• a review with management of the suitability and acceptability of the framework
The experience with the first organisation, a local authority, was not encouraging.
Management was almost wholly unaware of the significance of all perspectives other
than that of Payback. An academic type paper (Appendix II) presented as an explana-
lion of the concepts was grasped by only a few of the management team, although in ret-
rospect it can be seen that an academic type paper was not the ideal format. A major
problem was encountered in that many of the pre-defined sub-components for eachper-
spective (e.g. market turbulence) were unsuited to a local authority. The relevant sub-
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components were redefined to reflect local authority circumstances, but the credibility of
the exercise had, to a certain degree, been undermined. The issue of probability was not
addressed as the management team felt that enough 'academic' weightings and scorings
had been undertaken. Despite all of the reservations, the exercise was completed. While
its acceptability had to a degree been reduced, the low score that the proposed system
achieved caused all concerned to revisit many of the assumptions on which the intention
to purchase was based. It was found that the original decision had omitted or under-
represented several important elements which had in fact been identified by the use of
the framework. This applied particularly under the Risk and, to a lesser degree, the
Process Redesign perspectives. To this extent the framework can be said to have had
some success in terms of relevance and suitability.
The application of the framework in the second organisation was much more successful.
This company, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, had previously had a very bad experience
with a IT investment and were anxious not to repeat the failure. The strength of their
intentions was underlined by their having a special board meeting to discuss the appli-
cation of the framework. The framework was explained in a question and answer ses-
sion and supplemented by a list of questions to enable the management team to define
organisational priorities. This team achieved a reasonably good grasp of the concepts
underlying the perspectives, although this varied considerably between individual man-
agers and departments, with marketing and sales being particularly weak. Again there
was an issue with the suitability of some sub-components, although in this case it relat-
ed more to the absence of pharmaceutical-specific criteria, such as those bearing on com-
pliance.
What was significant here was that the team suggested some sub-components which they
felt would have been more suitable. This made a lot of sense but the author took the
position that the framework as it stood should be applied in interests of cohesion. Again
there was no enthusiasm at all for applying probability factors, even though the validity
of the concept was accepted. These were omitted from the exercise. The exercise itself
was performed quickly and easily. Management felt that it had been worthwhile, had
revealed a lot of important issues, and had forced them to systematically think through
issues which would otherwise have been ignored or skimmed over. One notable finding
from the exercise was the relatively low weightings awarded to Strategic Alignment and
Process Redesign. This certainly did not correspond with the company's business envi-
ronment and priorities (as defined by the management team) and suggested that the sub-
components underlying these perspectives were not fully understood or appreciated.
231
Significant progress was made in Organisation 3, a company engaged in heavy industry.
Major advances in management appreciation of the cost/benefit dynamics of IT invest-
ments were identified, and acknowledged as such by the management team. Based on
the first two research exercises, a number of changes were introduced to the framework.
The principal initiative was to dispense with sub-components used for weighting the five
perspectives. In their stead, management was 'educated' on what the perspectives repre-
sented, in a semi-formal manner, with particular emphasis on relating their meaning to
the circumstances of their own company. This proved to be a major advance in terms of
understanding and acceptability, to the extent that it was incorporated in all future appli-
cations of the framework.
The other significant initiative introduced was to customise the scoring sub-components
to reflect conditions in the industry in which the company operated, while retaining the
basic principle of sub-components. This may have reduced the opportunities for com-
parisons between different exercises, and consequently the cohesiveness of 'corporate
memory'. Yet the resulting increase in acceptability and understanding more than com-
pensated.
The success of the framework :_r_ this cornpany can be judged by the fact that t was used
to evaluate several further projects (some of which did not involve the author in any
capacity), and at time of writing, is being considered by the parent company for use on
a world-wide basis. Formal approaches exploring this possibility have been made to the
author.
Organisation 4, a company with a world-wide mail order business, just had a bad expe-
riènce with their previous investment in IT. They were anxious to apply a more method-
ical approach, but it took the demonstration of a number of case studies in their own
industry, and based on the five perspectives, to bring home the significance of the pro-
posed approach. Once again it was seen that it is difficult to attract and retain manage-
ment's attention with abstract concepts. Once the relevance to their own industry had
been demonstrated, a marked improvement in interest and participation became evident.
Exactly the same form of the framework used in organisation 3 was applied with this
company, and the exercise showed no need to. change it. While the management team
did not spend an enormous amount of time on the exercise, it did nonetheless form the
basis of their purchasing decision. They also acknowledged that they had a far better
understanding of the investment appraisal process than previously, and that the frame-
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work had identified and helped address all the key issues. The overriding impression left
with the author however was one in which a less than fully adequate commitment by
management resulted in a less than optimum outcome.
The final company applying a full application of the framework was a fast-growing
enterprise in the advanced telecommunications sector, and the exercise related to the
selection of one of three major software packages. Their business and IT planning was
sophisticated, and little or no effort was required to persuade the management team of
the need for an investment framework. In fact, so much interest was taken by so many
managers that the project vastly exceeded the projected timings. Again, the same ver-
sion used in the previous two exercises was used here, and at the completion of the exer-
cise there appeared to be no need for changes. The exercise was carried out with great
rigour and precision. While no stone was left unturned in the interests of accuracy, like
all other participants, the management in this company were not enthusiastic about for-
mally applying probability factors. From conversations with senior management, it
seems likely that the framework will be applied in future investment decisions.
This developments suggested that the framework as amended for Organisation 3 has
achieved a good level of acceptability. And whereas it may be somewhat less cohesive
than the original, it is very much ahead in terms of acceptability and practicability.
These characteristics were also evident in the Executive Briefing Days held by the
Natior_a! Institute for Mar_agernent Tec!--_o!ogy (NLMT), w!"e• framework found
practical application, not just for investment appraisal, but in terms of overall evaluation
of companies' systems.
The postal survey on IT Investment and Payoff Issues was a useful component of the
research. Most importantly, it emphasised the extent to which management, even in the
largest and most advanced corporations, by and large still lack the requisite skills, expe-
rience and indeed mindset to enable them to successfully tackle these issues. While the
proposed framework undoubtedly helps to ameliorate these deficiencies, as long as they
exist the achievement of satisfactory returns from IT investment is likely to remain prob-
lematical.
Overall, it can be said that the framework was developed in the light of historical devel-
opments and existing research and practice, that field tests suggested modifications to
the original structure, and that these modifications resulted in its achieving widespread
acceptability in the organisations in which it was subsequently applied. In some organ-
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isations it seems that the framework will form part of future investment appraisal exer-
cises. The results should be of interest to both researchers and practitioners in seeking
to reconcile the need for comprehensive coverage of the key investment appraisal issues
with management's limitations in terms of both knowledge and commitment.
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Chapter 15.
Conclusions, limitations, and recommendations for further research
15.1 Introduction
When setting out on this research I had somewhat mixed feelings. The issue of IT
investment appraisal I had seen as one which I had not seen dealt with in an effective
way in a computer career that exceeded twenty years. The methods I personally applied,
and saw applied by a large number of very different organisations seemed to be unduly
mechanistic and inflexible. Almost all available data showed IT to be providing a poor
return on investment, with a high proportion of projects showing minimal return. As the
use of computing grew and spread, I saw the difficulties becoming correspondingly more
intractable. In particular, management seemed to be particularly ill-equipped to address
the increasingly complex issues, and financial considerations continued to dominate
despite what appeared to be their growing unsuitability.
Despite the growing importance of IT to their organisations, and the poor return on their
investments, management showed little inclination to come to grips with this issue,
either handing over the probl_em to technical_ stag or adopting a narrow simplistic
approach to it. While much research had been undertaken in the academic community
and by practitioners, and much that was valuable produced on aspects of the problem,
only a handful of comprehensive frameworks were available to assist management in the
decision-making process. It was with this background therefore that I undertook the
research, to define a framework that was practical, in that it would enhance the decision-
making process, but also that would be acceptable to management. This latter require-
ment was important given the widespread reluctance to engage the issues on the part of
management.
Having completed the research over several years, the following summarises the con-
clusions I have reached. Also included is a review of the framework's limitations, and
recommendations for future research.
15.2 Conclusions
1. The framework was found to be acceptable to, and applicable by, management in a
range of organisational settings
The framework, particularly as refined after Organisation 2, proved to be an acceptable
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and practical tool for management. In Organisation 3, 4, and 5, management were able
to link it to their operational needs, worked on completing the exercise, and in most cases
based the eventual investment decision on the results of the exercise. Indeed, in the case
of Organisation 3, approaches have been made by the company to make the framework
an international standard for IT investment appraisal.
2. Current standards of investment appraisal are inadequate and will continue to be
until management limitations in terms of knowledge and commitment are addressed
Management in all organisations partaking in the research, and in the NIMT Executive
Briefing Days, were, with a few exceptions, inadequately prepared to successfully
undertake investment in IT. Their thinking was rooted in the Industrial Age, with direct
benefits and financial considerations predominating. It was repeatedly found in the
course of the literature research that this form of thinking was not only inadequate, but
in the context of IT investment appraisal could possibly give rise to misleading results.
3. Process redesign (or reengineering) was accepted as a valid IT investment criterion
The comparatively recent emergence of process redesign (reengineering) has resulted in
none of the current methodologies explicitly incorporating it as an investment criterion.
Chapter 8 proposed that it was an essential criterion, and, while admitting the need for
considerable education on the subject, this was accepted by participating management.
In some instances (Organisations 2 and 4) this was scored much lower than circum-
stances appeared to indicate, but this was almost certainly due to the factors referred to
in Conclusion 1. The postal survey (Chapter 13 and Appendix VI) also provided strong
support for the concept's inclusion.
4: Generic concepts have little relevance for management
Weightings and scorings in the first two field experiments were based on generic sub-
components under each of the five perspectives. Management found it difficult to relate
to them, to the point of losing patience on occasions. It became clear that the underly-
ing principles could only be made relevant by way of an informal 'education' process,
and then defining them in terms directly related to management's operational conditions.
When this was done, commitment and understanding improved dramatically, although to
an certain degree the cohesiveness of the framework may have been reduced.
5. The framework has the potential for very wide application
The issue as to whether one framework can be appropriate for (a) different types of sys-
tem and (b) different types of organisations, has attracted much attention. It is proposed
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that the organisations in which the framework was applied differed substantially, from a
local authority to a very competitive high-tech communications company. It is further
suggested that if the framework as refined for Organisation 3 had been applied in
Organisations 1 and 2, the level of acceptance there would have been significantly
greater. This suggests that a single framework can have wide application. The one lim-
iting factor was size, with the largest participant having 550 employees, suggesting that
things could be different with much larger companies. Indeed, the postal survey, which
focused on large organisations, showed that they did have higher levels of sophistication.
Nonetheless, widely varying fields of operation did not seem to unduly challenge the
framework. In fact, within the National Institute for Management Technology (NIMT),
the framework is used to assess the value of investing in such things as training courses
and CASE tools. Furthermore, management education programmes are now based on
these concepts, with the emphasis being on the need to achieve a holistic view on IT's
impact. The framework also forms the basis for the development of IT strategies for
client organisations of the NIMT.
6.Applying the _framework deepened and broadened management :s understanding of the
key investment appraisal issues
Ahnost without exception, the participants Er_ the research cor_Enned that the experience
had added a new dimension to their understanding of IT and in particular IT investment
appraisal. This has lead, inter alia, to the five perspectives being used by the National
Institute for Management Technology (NIMT) in a much broader range of services such
as management education (see Conclusion 4).
7.Deeper analysis is required
Meeting the requirement for acceptability imposed limitations on the comprehensiveness
of the analysis, with the degree of acceptability declining almost in line with the extent
of the comprehensiveness. This was particularly evident in relation to the application of
probability factors. The research leading to the development of the framework strongly
suggested that the probability factor needed to be incorporated as part of the appraisal
process. Yet, without exception, participating management were reluctant to formally
apply such factors as part of the exercise.
8. The framework works best when the concept is first introduced to the management
team as a group, and subsequently refined by way of structured interviews.
While group discussions were valuable, the need for individual interviews became clear-
er as the research progressed. The latter approach mitigated the problem of forceful per-
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sonalities dominating the group sessions, and also enabled participants to clarify con-
ceptual issues on an individual basis. In this context, the taxonomy used in Appendix VI
proved particularly useful.
15.3 Limitations
The application of the research does suffer from a number of limitations, which should
be recognised.
I. Limited range of organisations researched
Whereas the range of organisations chosen was fairly wide (see Conclusion 4), it was
limited in terms of organisation size, with the largest employing 550 staff. This opens
the possibility that the research would not be replicated in large organisations. This is
borne out to some degree by the postal survey, carried out amongst Ireland's largest com-
panies. This suggested, inter alia, that concepts such as strategic alignment, process
redesign and architecture were accorded a degree of importance in excess of what was
afforded by the research participants.
2. Undue impact of influential participants
The research made clear that participating management who had respect and/or influ-
ence, and those who adopted an aggressive stance during weighting and scoring, had an
influence in excess of that which their contribution merited (this was particularly notice-
able in Organisation 3). Similarly the impact of managers with lower levels of commit-
ment to the appraisal process was less than their more committed counterparts, irrespec-
tive of the merits of their contributions. This however is always going to be a risk where
management judgement forms the basis for scoring and weighting. The inevitable dis-
tortions could be reduced by building up a bank of 'corporate memory' of investment
appraisal case histories, and by making the exercise more structured.
3. Boundaries on the focus of the appraisal
The issue of 'what constitutes a computer system' was discussed in Chapter 11. Rapidly
changing user demands during the development cycle, the sharing of data and resources
between different systems, the growth of end-user computing, the increasing proportion
of IT resources associated with telecommunications, and ongoing maintenance/enhance-
ments of functionality after implementation all combine to blur the distinctions between
applications. It is difficult therefore when undertaking an appraisal to be certain that the
subject of the appraisal (and hence the scores and weights assigned) can be viewed as
discrete elements.
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4. A single essential factor can be submerged in the overall scoring
As the framework stands, a single factor, which can be of overwhelming importance in
its own right, can be outweighed by a combination of other criteria. For instance when
evaluating the risk perspective at the local authority (Organisation 1), the possibility of
trade union non co-operation was seen as a strong possibility, and was assigned an appro-
priate score. Yet, when the exercise was finished, this had been partially submerged by
high scores on the other perspectives, and even within the risk perspective had had its
impact weakened by high scores on other sub-components. As things turned out subse-
quently, such opposition had major impact on all of the authority's IT initiatives. This
need not be a major weakness once the possibility of such a distortion is recognised and
catered for from the outset.
15.4 Recommendations for future research
This research suggests that management can gain considerable business benefit through
the application of formal methods in IT investment appraisal. It also provides the basis
for further research in a number of areas, not least those where limitations have already
been identified. The following are suggested:
I. Assess the appropriateness of the framework in large organisations.
In line with the research objectives, the framework has been applied only in medium-
sized organisations. Indications from the postal survey suggest that larger organisations
are more sophisticated and knowledgeable. Future researchers might adapt elements of
the framework, or add new ones, to reflect the requirements of large organisations. This
aisoider_tify whether deri yet:yes of the fra:r_ewo:ic cou!d be devised to
better match the demands of different industry groupings.
2.Address the problem of system scope
As indicated above (limitation 3), the definition of parameters on the scope of a system
is becoming increasingly difficult. This subject has received comparatively little atten-
tion from researchers up to now, and has implications beyond that of investment
appraisal. - project costing and internal billings are two activities that spring to mind.
Research which suggested ways of identifying parameters for the scope of systems could
prove useful.
3. Identify more acceptable method(s) for incorporating probability
The unwillingness of management to formally incorporate probability factors has been
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referred to above. Future research might seek to identify new methods or approaches
which would make management more receptive to formally applying this important con-
cept as part of the appraisal process.
15.5 Summary
During the course of the research the rate of change in the IT industry continued apace.
This change was paralleled in the manifold organisational settings in which IT was
applied, and continues unabated. The rate of change was accompanied by continued dra-
matic growth in IT usage, both in terms of depth and spread. Only the very smallest of
organisations can now get by without the use of IT, and in fact few do. The spread in
usage, particularly the growth in end-user computing, posed a whole new set of chal-
lenges in terms of achieving value-added from investments.
Given all of this, it would be assumed that management at all levels and in all organisa-
tions would designate successful IT investment as one of their top priorities. Yet, while
management may complain about inadequate returns form IT, they have done remark-
ably little to acquire the appropriate skills. If senior management displayed a similar
ignorance on finance and marketing matters they would be unlikely to survive (or get
there in the first place). Yet some seem to wear this ignorance almost as a badge of pride.
Perhaps it all really comes down to the fact that we really are undergoing a paradigm
shift, that we are now at the cusp of the Information Age. Although as profound and
traumatic as the Industrial Revolution (perhaps even more so) it is taking place in a frac-
tion of the time. It is to be expected therefore that accepted truths cannot be rapidly jet-
tisoned or displaced. It is in fact fully understandable that management, brought up in
an era of cost benefit analysis and financial justification, should struggle to find common
ground with the rush of technological developments swirling around them. This became
particularly clear during the research when Process Redesign was introduced as an
essential perspective through which IT investments should be evaluated. To accept this
first required the acceptance that we were in fact going through a paradigm shift, and
secondly that IT was an essential - if not the main - enabler of this shift. In most cases
these concepts were grasped only with great difficulty.
Providing the appropriate level of education and awareness must therefore surely rank as
one of society's primary objectives. For many senior managers approaching the end of
their careers, it is probably too late, but for the others the outlook, in the right circum-
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stances, appears promising. One of the most encouraging outcomes of the research was
the extent to which participants gained a rapid understanding of the key issues, and took
them on board. While not wishing to over-state the case, the research exercise created a
radically improved understanding of the issues, an understanding which did not take
copious amounts of time to acquire.
This increased understanding, welcome as it was, is only the beginning however. To
fully apply IT effectively requires a new mindset, one which sees IT as central to organ-
isational effectiveness. This mindset must also accept that purchasing the right hard-
ware, telecommunications and software represents but the first step. Added value will
only come when IT investment is underpinned by the correct strategy, and accompanied
by benefits management, accountabilities, information management policies, capable
and motivated personnel, and the capacity to accept change as normal.
Progress is usually based on learning from what others have tried, and benefiting from
their experience. It is hoped that the research presented here, based in turn as it is on the
learning and innovative thought of others, has gone some way to assist in the field of IT
investment appraisal. In particular it is felt that some of the techniques to aid better
understanding of the key issues, and the incorporation of process redesign as a discrete
appraisal criterion have cast some new light on the subject. While acknowledging that
many difficulties remain (and others are likely to arise) any contribution to the resolu-
tion of one of today's most intractable business challenges should be of value.
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Appendix I
Investment Appraisal Process: General Motors Main Dealer
Background 
The author was retained in 1986 to advise a large GM dealership on the purchase of a
computerised computer system for the motor trade. This company envisaged that this
package would:
1. Handle increased business without additional staff by way of automating existing
labour intensive routine tasks
2. Effect savings in the parts warehouse by reducing inventory levels and obsolete parts,
and
by capitalising on faster delivery of sales and stock data, to avail of special purchase
discounts from the manufacturer.
3. Achieve significant time gains in the issuing of invoices and statements, thereby
improving cashflow. The anticipated reduction in errors and inconsistencies in this area
would also improve cashflow and reduce time lost on investigations and corrections.
4. Provide the capacity for workshop costings to be undertaken at a level unfeasible
using
manual methods.
The Selection Process: 
An ad hoc group was set up for the purposes of selecting an appropriate systems solu-
tion. This was comprised of the author, the firm's financial controller, and a representa-
tive from the firm's auditors. Functionality and price were the primary considerations in
the selection process. The choice was narrowed down to three alternatives, a PC-based
solution, a Unix based solution, and one mini-based solution, with a proprietary operat-
ing system. The justification was based almost entirely on financial considerations. The
impact of automation in terms of cost savings in the relevant areas of the dealership were
analysed in detail, as were the cost elements of the proposals from the three suppliers.
Much attention was given to comparative costs for elements such as price-per-MIPS
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(millions of instructions per second), printers, storage devices, and annual maintenance
charges. Savings on headcount and overtime were studied in similar detail.
Costs and benefits were estimated over five years, and NPV and IRR calculations were
performed on the three alternatives, while their relative performance and functionality
were also compared at some length. More broadly-based issues relating to business
value added did not come into the equation. The PC-based solution was rejected on the
basis of functionality and performance, while that based on Unix was rejected on the
basis of cost. It was felt that the mini-based proprietary solution provided the desired
functionality at a very competitive price, being broadly in line with that of the PC alter-
native. This competitiveness stemmed in no small measure from the fact that at this time
manufacturers of minis saw the writing on the wall as it were, for these systems.
The author did not concur with the selection, due mainly, it must be said, for technical
reasons. These were based on the rapidly improving price/performance of PC solutions,
the continuing development of more robust LANs, and most importantly, the lack of
future flexibility associated with the proprietary solution.
The Result: 
Most of the objectives specified for the system were in fact achieved. However, costs
for
training and maintenance proved to be far in excess of what the manufacturer estimated
at time of tender, and the whole implementation process proved to be slower and more
disruptive than was envisaged. Hardware upgrades were required much earlier than
expected. Software amendments required to address defects stemming from inadequate
specifications at the implementation phase, and ongoing business requirements, proved
to be far in excess of what the dealership envisaged.
The system began to be progressively replaced after a few years, with more and more
functionality being transferred to at first individual PCs, and then to a LAN. This was
for the following reasons:
Ongoing maintenance costs were too high. -
Hardware, and particularly software, support from the supplier were poor (old technolo-
gy) and expensive. Being proprietary hardware and software, support could not be
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obtained elsewhere.
The performance economics of the PC/LAN environment became overwhelmingly
favourable.
Demand for office productivity tools (spreadsheets, word processors and desktop pub-
lishing) grew rapidly, but could not be integrated with the main system.
Most important, the dealership was compelled as part of his franchise agreement to set
up a link to automate the parts supply operation with the manufacturer. The costs asso-
ciated with implementing this on the existing platform were simply prohibitive.
Conclusions: 
In this case, the functional objectives of the system were clearly defined, and the poten-
tial financial savings quantified. In both instances, the target were largely met. It should
have been a very successful installation, yet the system had to be sidelined at great finan-
cial cost, in a little over two years. This underlines the limitations inherent in financial
evaluation techniques used on their own. The attention applied to the technology was
almost exclusively confined to cost/performance issues. Intangible benefits were not
taken into consideration in any systematic way (the author accepts his portion of blame),
and long-term technical considerations, despite being identified by the author, had little
impact on the final outcome. It was significant that in a selection committee of three,
two were accountants. In the author's experience, this was not exceptional.
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Appendix 11
Requirements for a New Approach to IT Investment Appraisal
A time of transition
There are rare occasions, perhaps as rare as two or three times in a millennium, when
society undergoes a change which is so profound and rapid that in the space of a few
decades it exceeds that which occurred over the preceding centuries. This is described
by Drucker. "Within a few short decades, society rearranges itself - its worldview, its
basic values, its social and political structures, its arts, its key institutions. Fifty years
later there is a new world. And the people born then cannot even imagine the world in
which their grandparents lived and into which their own parents were born." (1)
The invention of the printing press by Gutenberg in 1455 illustrates this. By enabling
books to be printed it resulted in an explosive growth in the dissemination of knowledge,
rapid and wide advances in education, literacy and scientific discovery. Fifty years later
America had been "discovered", and Martin Luther had launched the Reformation.
Geopolitics and society had changed beyond recognition. The invention of the steam
engine in 1776 set in train the Industrial Revolution, which decimated the worlcforces in
traditional industries such as boatbuilding and agriculture.
The following outcomes appear to be common to all such transitions.
(a) Economic entities and professional activities, fundamental to the old order, in the
new order either disappear completely, or incur a vast diminution in importance, for
instance the impact of the steam engine on horse-based transport and on the canals.
(b) New economic entities and professional activities emerge and become paramount.
Engineers and the factory were unknown before the advent of the steam engine.
(c) The scale of political and social change matches that of economic change. The
social, political and economic picture of Europe in 1825 was utterly different to that of
1775, as was that of the early sixteenth century to what had applied fifty years earlier.
(d) During the course of the transition, awareness of the significance of the changes is
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limited, understanding even more so. Many of the key expositions have only appeared
at the end of the phase.
There is every reason to believe that the latter years of the twentieth century have wit-
nessed the onset of another epoch-forming phase. The political evidence is underlined
by the breathtaking collapse of Communism, the speed of which was unimaginable a lit-
tle more than a decade ago. With equal suddenness, seemingly impregnable corpora-
tions such as IBM, Pan American and General Motors either collapsed, or began to incur
unimaginably large losses. Yet it was as recent as 1975 that a respected commentator
like Rex Malik could make a seemingly plausible argument that IBM was set to take
over the world! (2) Company structures transform from the hierarchical to the flat, shed-
ding vast numbers of employees in the process. As unemployment grows, and those in
employment adopt new values and attitudes to work, trade union power ebbs away.
Traditional manufacturing industry goes into decline, while services and knowledge-
based industries grow. The collapse of trade and tariff barriers brings in its wake oppor-
tunities but also casualties. The tried and tested methods of the past no longer work. In
desperate attempts to adapt, companies take measures inconceivable only a few years
previously, engaging in mergers and take-overs, or even collaboration with deadly rivals
- but only those who recognise what Drucker calls the 'decisive factor of production' are
able to adapt. This 'decisive factor of production' has been identified by the most inci-
sive minds of our age as information. We are at the beginning of the Information Age.
Tapscott and Caston identify information and information technology as central to these
developments. "Faxes provide students demonstrating in Tienazunen Square with infor-
mation about what is happening in their own country.. thousands of networked personal
computers become key battleground weapons (in the Gulf War). Global communica-
tions networks energise the metabolism of world commerce and move us inexorably
toward Marshall McLuhan's global village". (3).
The IT productivity paradox
This realisation has contributed to the explosive growth in the expenditure on informa-
tion technology (IT) - IT being defined as computers, telecommunications, and the relat-
ed software. This expenditure has grown by a compounded rate variously estimated as
between 200% and 350% during the 1980s, (a rate far in excess of normal business
growth) and now amounts to 50% of all new capital expenditure in companies in the US.
(4). US firms are expected to spend $200 billion on IT in 1993, (5) while the comparable
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figure for Germany tops $50 billion.p. In the US in 1992 the computer equipment and
services sector was larger than automotive steel, mining, petrochemicals and natural gas
combined - a truly staggering realignment in the profile of industry.
Over the same period, white collar productivity (the focus of the bulk of IT expenditure)
has risen by about 15% in manufacturing industry, and 3% in the services. Some stud-
ies suggest that at least 20% of expenditure is wasted, and that 30-40% of IT projects
realise no net benefits, however measured (8). The situation is therefore one in which a
huge and growing investment in IT is failing to provide anything approaching a satis-
factory return. The widespread disenchantment with the returns from IT among business
managers should not therefore be surprising (9). This is exemplified by the oft-repeated
quote of a leading American executive : "I only know two things about IT - it costs too
much and doesn't work". The point should be made that the overall lack of payback
demonstrated masks the many outstandingly successful strategic and departmental appli-
cations which have been recorded over the same period. Among these have been a
spreadsheet which made $76 million on for a chemical company (10), and an executive
information system which generated additional income of $100 million for Phillips
Petroleum in the US (11). This underlines, not only the extent of the failures, but the
potential business benefits arising from an effective evaluation framework.
Management appears to have recognised the importance of IT, but just as the old solu-
tions no longer supply the answers in overall business terms, existing approaches gov-
erning investment practice for IT are also failing. This is consistent with our being in
the state of transition to a new epoch. Flinging computing power at the current business
problems under the old parameters is doomed to failure, as was the attempt to breed big-
ger and faster horses to overcome the challenge posed by the steam and internal com-
bustion engines. Managers need to apply a radically new approach to address the prob-
lem.
But will a new approach be applied?. The picture today is not encouraging. For instance
a study by Peat Marwick in 1989 shows that 75% of companies lack any effective eval-
uation procedures for new IT initiatives. (12) The author's personal experience over
many years as an IS Manager with the Ford Motor Corporation and as a consultant, bear
out the findings of researchers in this field, which suggest that the problem stems from
the following:
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• the widespread use of traditional cost benefit analysis techniques, which, on their
own, lead to inadequate and misleading outcomes (13).
• the common perception that such techniques are inadequate, leading to a lack of
confidence in appraisal techniques in general (14).
• the perception that newer, IT-specific approaches are too time consuming or corn
plex.
• the slowness with which the accountancy profession appears to be adapting to the
new challenges(15)
Up-to-date research by the author with four participating organisations largely confirmed
these findings. What appears to be called for then is a convincing and practicable frame-
work which accommodates the new business paradigm. This calls for the following
characteristics:
• Flexibility to accommodate different investment categories, rapid technology and
business change, while maintaining adequate levels of consistency.
• Rigorous and convincing methods which do not place undue demands on man
agers' time and data resources.
• The presence of guidelines for moving to the IT organisation of tomorrow, while
optimising current investments in IT.
Such a formulation will not be easy to identify or implement. Change will always be
resisted, vested interests will defend their positions with great tenacity, and use a variety
of plausible stratagems to thwart progress. Even organisations and professional group-
ings (such as the accountancy profession, referred to above) whose interests lie in iden-
tifying such a formulation find the scale of change difficult to accommodate. The slow-
ness with which the accountancy profession has responded to the challenges posed by
developments over the period under review underline this. Despite the fact that IT
investments now account for about 50% of all new capital expenditure, and that such
expenditure is clearly not generating a satisfactory return, traditional accountancy invest-
ment appraisal techniques still dominate the evaluation process. (16) That profession has
also failed to come to terms with Balance Sheet issues of major importance, such as
depreciation of IT equipment, and the capitalising of IT- based assets such as software
developed in-house and information banks.(17)
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The Limits of Conventional Approaches
Before bringing forward the proposed framework, the limits of conventional business
and IT approached should be clarified. Traditional business organisational structures,
the so-called "command and control" paradigm, were (and still are) hierarchical, task as
distinct from process oriented, internally focused and inflexible. Decision making is
slow and cumbersome. These characteristics are the direct opposite of what is required
in today's business environment, which calls for flexibility in all areas of the business, a
customer-focus, with empowered staff operating under a team and process-based organ-
isational structure.
Such a transformation will not be accomplished by tinkering with existing structures.
Fundamental change will be required. Numerous models have been proposed to facili-
tate organisational redesign, for example, Senge's Learning Organisation, Quinn's
Intelligent Enterprise, Rothschild's Bionic Firm, and others.(18) It is not proposed here
that there is a "right" model as such for every organisation, but for the purpose of this
exercise that of reengineering, or business process redesign (BPR), as developed princi-
pally by Mike Hammer will be applied. BPR has achieved widespread recognition, and
the concepts and terminology would appear to be generally well understood. The main
issue is not the specific model, rather the concept that fundamental change, or some form
of "business reinvention" is required. Some of the most dramatic turnarounds in busi-
ness history in recent years have taken place at Ford, Xerox and Kodak. The improve-
ments accomplished in these companies could only have been achieved by applying
business redesign techniques rather than conventional remedies.
An exact parallel can be made with IT. Irrespective of the computing power applied to
make existing processes run faster, few if any would have been fundamentally improved
in the absence of process reengineering. In the case of Ford, for instance, executives cal-
culate that even with greatly enhanced computer support for the existing vendor payment
process, headcount savings would have been in the region of 20%, rather than the 80%
achieved by reengineering (19).
Therefore, it is suggested that effectiveness in TT, and thereby satisfactory returns on IT
investment, cannot be fully achieved by automating existing processes, only by reengi-
neering them.
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Achieving Benefits Through IT
(a) Change the Mindset
The first requirement is for a changed mindset for IT staff, who have been conditioned
to approach projects from the perspective of existing processes. In fact, in the author's
experience with Ford in the 1970s , the word "automate" was used when referring to a
systems development project, thus embedding the concept of automating existing
processes in IT thinking. Such a mindset remains widely prevalent.
This new mindset will provide the foundation upon which IT staff can redesign and
reengineer new business processes rather than take the traditional route of automation.
IT attributes such as analytical minds, structured methodologies, understanding infor-
mation flows, and project management skills still represent an invaluable contribution to
a reengineering project
(b)From Deductive to Inductive Thinking
Traditionally, most business problems, (especially those related to IT) have been
addressed by way of deductive thinking. That is, the problem is defined, possible solu-
tions are explored, and the optimum solution is selected on the basis of a variety of cri-
teria. Inductive thinking turns this approach on its head, in that it calls for the capacity
to envisage the capabilities of a particular technological development, and then seek the
business problems it might address.
This may appear to be breaking the golden rule of systems development, that solutions
should be business rather than technology driven - the so-called "solution looking for a
problem" syndrome. Whereas this is undoubtedly true for applications related to con-
ventional DP or automation, it becomes valid, indeed a requirement, in the context of
ree*neerEng. This Es because certaEn redesEgn possEbEEEtEes wEEE become apparent only
if seen in the light of what Hammer and Champy call the "disruptive power of technol-
ogy" (20). They go on to underline both the difficulties in, and importance of "recognis-
ing the new, unfamiliar capabilities of technology instead of its familiar ones". This dif-
ficulty stems largely from the propensity of organisations to view technology through the
prism of their existing processes and practices.
An example often serves best to illustrate the concept. One of the best known relates to
the invention by the Xerox Corporation of the photocopying machine around 1958.
Believing it was not adequately resourced to undertake the marketing of the product, it
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offered the patents to IBM, which commissioned a leading American firm of consultants
to undertake a market research study. The study was postulated largely on the basis of
the copier replacing the use of carbon paper (the standard copying mechanism at the
time), and was no doubt carried out efficiently. The conclusion, undoubtedly correct,
was that even if 100% of the market for carbon paper were to be captured, the proposal
would not be commercially viable. IBM rejected the chance to enter the photocopying
business. It is clear, with the benefit of hindsight, that the new technology created a mar-
ket, one that was not envisioned at the time. It created a market, as by enabling many
people to simultaneously use and retain a copy of the document, a whole new way of
doing business was opened up. Inductive thinking, or technology visioning, properly
applied by IBM at the time, may have identified the vast potential for the technology.
Instead, by viewing it through the prism of existing processes, the opportunity was lost
(21).
(c) Provide an Appropriate IT Infrastructure
Given the special requirements of business redesign, it is suggested that the following
characteristics should underpin the IT infrastructure
Flexibility: The capacity to develop an IT solution quickly is an essential element of
many reengineering initiatives, and this in turn calls for a flexible and responsive IT
architecture. One heavily dependent on mainframes and/or legacy systems is unlikely to
provide the appropriate degree of flexibility.
Robustness: Business process reengineering will often impose significant strains on an
IT infrastructure, as, of its essence, process redesign is likely to entail change of a fun-
damental nature. New or untried operating or database systems, an assortment of net-
works or communications protocols, low levels of integration between applications,
inadequate security and backup procedures all undermine the robustness of an infra-
structure. Any of these elements could give rise to serious problems if challenged by a
fundamental business redesign initiative.
Openness: The capacity to look outside the confines of the firm (primarily to customers
and/or suppliers) often provides the best reengineering opportunities. An open architec-
ture and an adherence to industry standard communications protocols are key features in
this regard.
The following framework will be based on the proposition that a comprehensive IT
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investment appraisal can only be undertaken when the evaluation is based on five per-
spectives. Even though it is only one of the five perspectives, reengineering (in the
broadest meaning of the term) has been given particular mention primarily because of its
omissions from every IT investment appraisal framework the author has studied. It is
essential because the competitive pressures of today's business environment, together
with the rapid rate of technological change, have rendered traditional models of business
organisation obsolete. Attempts to improve the performance of this model, even when
enhanced by IT, have resulted in only marginal improvement, and have contributed to
the poor performance by IT in terms of investment returns. Only by reengineering oper-
ations around processes rather than tasks can this dilemma be resolved, but success will
depend heavily on an appropriate IT infrastructure which should be flexible, open and
robust. IT must be seen, not only as an essential element in achieving this objective, but
its powers must themselves be applied as a catalyst for change. This in turn provides the
mechanism to finally deliver on the long-promised payback from IT, and as such must
represent an essential element of any investment appraisal technique.
The Framework
Definition of terms
Perspective: The highest level evaluation criterion.
Category: Each perspective will be represented by a number (usually between three and
five) categories.
Weighting: Each perspective will be allocated a weighting value out of 100. In the
example which follows, the Strategic Alignment perspective is allocated a weighting of
28, composed of values for categories :mportance of ::', Liquidity and Market
Turbulence of 5, 15, and 8 respectively.
Scoring: The extent to which the proposed investment addresses the requirements of the
five perspectives will be represented by a score from the range 0 to 10.
Element: The scoring will be based on a number of elements for each perspective. In
the case of Strategic Alignment, for example, one of the elements upon which scoring is
based is Timeframe. The extent to which the timeframe to implement the investment
proposal aligns with business objectives will determine the score.
Probability: The scale of potential benefits or risks will vary according to the laws of
probability. Accordingly each score will be adjusted by a probability factor, denominat-
ed in the range of 0.1 to 1.0.
Adjusted score: The original score adjusted by the probability factor.
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The proposed framework draws on some of the Information Economics concepts devel-
oped by Parker and Benson (22), which provide tools to bridge the business/technical
chasm, and which evaluate IT investments by way of weighting and scoring. It is almost
a truism to say that business rather than technological considerations should drive
investment decisions, but it is equally true to say that the gap between the business man-
agers and technology professionals remains wide. It is essential therefore for any pro-
posed solution to provide a language which transcends this gap, enabling both sides to
address issues both comprehend, in a format with which both are comfortable. This is
no easy task, and the problem is accentuated by what the author has found to be a reluc-
tance on the part of management to allocate a proportion of their time which reflects the
cost and potential business impact of IT investments. However, the scale of IT invest-
ment (plus the lack of payback) and its importance in positioning the firm for challenges
of the latter part of the 1990s now render it essential for management to accept their
responsibilities. A framework which is not unduly demanding on time would facilitate
this.
The Primary Perspectives
The basic assumption underlying the framework is that all investments in IT should be
evaluated in terms of five primary perspectives, the significance of each varying accord-
ing to the particular project. These perspectives are:
Strategic alignment: alignment of IT and medium to long term corporate objectives.
Strategic alignment, in this instance defined as a state of harmony between business
objectives and the systems that support them, has been an issue of leading concern for
IT executives in recent years (23). The causes have been the growing importance of IT in
terms of business strategy, and the increasing difficulty in achieving alignment. This dif-
ficulty in turn stems from the increasingly rapid rate of change in both business and tech-
nology, and the emergence of technology as a catalyst for business change in its own
right.
Payback: direct value, such as cost savings, revenue enhancement, better management
information.
This has been the most widely applied perspective used up to now, and has been corn-
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monly associated with cost/benefit analyses (CBA). As has been suggested earlier, in
terms of assessing business benefits, CBA on its own provides a very limited perspec-
tive. Nonetheless, the possibility of direct financial benefit should play an important role
in any investment decision. Systems which provide such benefits as enhanced manage-
ment decision support, and better market intelligence, although perhaps not directly
quantifiable in terms of business value added, would also come into this perspective. In
determining the level of business value added, it is important to take into consideration
not just the benefits, but possible negative factors, such as training or staff disruption.
Process redesign: enabling of business reengineering or process redesign.
As has been demonstrated earlier, it is no longer sufficient to evaluate new systems
exclusively in terms of meeting specific business requirements. The capacity to enable
new ways of doing business and/or to redesign business processes has to be a consider-
ation for each new project. One of the most intractable problems associated with reengi-
neering efforts has been the profusion of "legacy systems", which embed existing work
practices in their software. It follows that failure to evaluate new projects in terms of
their reengineering impact may not only ignore major potential benefits, but could result
in an inhibitor in future reengineering initiatives.
Architecture: support and alignment with the corporate IT infrastructure.
For this purpose, the IT architecture is defined as the computers, networks, databases,
and related software which make up an organisation's IT capability (this may not be
everyone's definition). The issue of architecture is assuming growing importance, as
more and more functionality is built into the operating systems, and as the move to multi-
vendor sites gathers momentum. Whereas these developments bring with them a range
of advantages, they have also given rise to a situation today where a profusion of incom-
patible software, hardware and communications platforms co-exist within single organ-
isations(24). Even the smallest IT investment therefore has an impact on the architecture,
for better or worse.
Risk: all potential risk exposure, such as technical, organisational and financial.
The poor return on IT investment has already been cited, and everyone has a favourite
disaster of cosmic proportions to relate, such as those at the Wessex Water Authority and
the London Stock Exchange. In the light of this, one might have expected that the issue
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of risk to have played a major role in IT investment appraisal. On the contrary, all evi-
dence to hand suggests that formal risk assessment is applied in only a small minority of
organisations, and the methods applied often miss out on crucial aspects.
It is proposed therefore that these five perspectives provide a comprehensive framework
for management in evaluating IT investments in the 1990s. All perspectives are linked -
indeed it could be said that there is a degree of overlapping. This suggests that all should
form part of each investment project to be evaluated.
Weighting
Clearly, the relative importance of these perspectives will vary between organisations,
between projects, and indeed may well vary for the same project over time. Nonetheless,
if the evaluation is to be realistic, some form of weighting must be applied. For instance,
a company with severe cashflow problems is likely to assign a high weighting to busi-
ness value added (particularly direct cash savings), and to assign a low weighting to
infrastructure. By way of contrast, a financially strong company, seeking to position
itself for future expansion, would be likely to reverse these weightings.
As the weightings will effectively reflect an organisation's values and priorities, it is
essential that a broadly based team, incorporating senior management, IT staff, and
users, be brought together to define the relative importance assigned to each perspective.
The author's experience shows that even managers in the business domain will often dis-
agree fundamentally on what are basic objectives. If business managers find difficulty
in agreeing on business objectives, so much the harder it must be for them to reconcile
business objectives with IT managers, and hence identify appropriate solutions. This
underlies the difficulty in achieving agreement which crosses over to technical man-
agers. The framework provided below details a series of sub-components for each per-
spective which can be weighted separately. In this, the objective is not so much to
achieve numerical accuracy, rather to provide a structure whereby the various team
members can, by way of discussion and other forms of communication, achieve a deep-
er understanding of each other's objectives and problems, and a mechanism whereby
these can be formally reflected by way of weightings. The importance of the role senior
managers can play in this process cannot be overstated.
The concept of weighting suffers from some drawbacks, not the least being the subjec-
tive basis upon which the weights are formulated. Given the changing nature of the
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impact of IT on business, and the difficulty in establishing causal relationships between
IT and business performance, an informed subjective approach is almost unavoidable.
This problem is minimised when top level management provide leadership in establish-
ing a strong corporate culture, and decomposing from this a series of management criti-
cal success factors, or corporate imperatives, as defined by Vincent (25). It would seem
to be self-evident that the exercise of having a broad cross-section of managers attempt
to arrive at a consensus on corporate imperatives, and the assignation of a relative order
of importance, must in itself be of value.
Scoring
The proposed scoring mechanism envisages the assignment of a number of scoring cat-
egories to each perspective. These may be industry or company specific, and are not
restricted by number. However, it is not envisaged that the categories detailed below
should be significantly altered. The score is assigned on the basis of the extent to which
the proposed system meets the objectives of each category on a range of 0 to 10.
The issue of probability must also be considered. Whereas this adds another dimension
to a process which sets out to be simple, there does seem to be a requirement. The sys-
tem under review might for example, justify a high score on the basis of its capacity as
a reengineering enabler. Process redesign in turn may have been assigned a high weight-
ing, which would result in this element having a very high positive impact in terms of
the overall evaluation. However, if there is a high probability that the reengineering
capacity of the system will not be applied, due to vested interests or whatever, it seems
logical that the score should be modified to reflect this. One alternative is to address the
issue under the risk perspective, i.e. that the probability of non-acceptance constitutes a
specific risk and should be marked down accordingly. Information Economics adopts
this approach, but it does have the drawback of either curtailing the number of elements
which can be addressed under risk, thereby weakening the analysis, or alternatively, to
include all the elements under risk, would seem to achieve no useful purpose.
Summary and conclusions
Myriads of considerations impact on the field of IT investment appraisal, each of which
could justify a paper in its own right. As such they are beyond the scope of this paper,
although they do form part of the author's research. This paper distils some of the key
elements, and seeks to capture them in a framework which addresses the circumstances
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of the new business environment. This environment has derived in large part from the
rapid rate of technological change, which has in turn given rise to the need for new ways
of evaluating investments in IT. These will have to depart in large measure from the
finance based criteria used up to now. The new criteria will of necessity contain a sig-
nificant component of unquantifiable or "soft" variety. To managers accustomed to
"hard" information, such a process may lack credibility, but as shown, so-called "hard"
data is not only becoming increasingly inappropriate for IT investment appraisal, but
more insidiously, focusing on such data can give rise to dangerous illusions of accuracy.
The role of business managers in achieving IT payback will be crucial, and the proposed
framework attempts to provide managers with a tool which goes some way towards
pulling together the disparate elements, and proving an alternative set of values to those
of the purely financial variety.
The framework will need to be adapted according to the organisation and the project
being evaluated. It should be seen as a continuing process, to be amended and updated
as conditions change. It is expected that over time, as management experience is built
up, consistency and accuracy will be improved. The approach does not attempt to be
prescriptive, and does suffer from limitations. One common to all methods applying
subjective judgements is the risk of influence by factors such as lack of understanding or
vested interests. Additionally, the research to date has demonstrated the difficulty in
achieving consistency throughout the process. A more serious drawback relates to the
possibility of a high score "burying" a single, potentially fatal, drawback. A mission-
critical application could, for instance, be based on a newly introduced operating system
and hardware, thus carrying a perhaps unacceptably high risk exposure. The potential
benefits could however result in the proposal achieving a very high score, masking a
potentially fatal downside.
The exercise should however be worthwhile if it does no more than co-ordinate think-
ing, educate, and bring home to management elements of risk and opportunity not
heretofore identified. Furthermore, by in effect forcing management to address issues
such as process redesign and architecture it introduces essential investment elements for
today's environment.
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Appendix III
Quantifying End-user Benefits
The problems of end-user computing
Phase 3 of the Four Phases of Evolution in Chapter 3 described the explosive growth in
distributed and end-user computing beginning with the introduction of the personal com-
puter in 1981. This growth has continued to the present day, and some commentators
estimate that the number of applications developed, and software packages purchased by
end-users is beginning to match those developed and purchased by professional IT staff
(1). This chapter went on to demonstrate how these developments gave rise to new and
additional difficulties in evaluating IT investments, and in determining value added. The
relative cheapness of hardware and software at end-user level masked a wide range of
hidden costs which seldom show up in IT budgets. Charles Babcock (3) Editor of
Computerworkl described the problem as follows:
"There is the hidden cost for support - $6,000 or more per PC per year. There is the cost
of networking. And a soon-to-be-released study from the Microcomputer Managers
Association says there are hidden costs to moving to a graphical user interface. Making
invisible costs tangiie and keeping a realistic tab is the mark of a good manager. What
is often forgotten however, is that savings gained should be tracked just as aggressive-
Quantifying end-user benefits
The research has shown that this latter consideration (tracking savings) has proven par-
ticularly difficult to resolve. Traditional interviewing techniques have been shown to be
inadequate in identifying, and more particularly in quantifying, savings and other gains
from end-users, particularly from managers, given the nature of their work. (3) Based on
interviews undertaken in the course of this research, the following seven stage approach,
which proved useful throughout the research, has evolved.
1. Preliminary information
As much preliminary information as possible should be gathered about the user's job and
key performance indicators. These should ideally be derived from a number of sources,
not just the individual. The sources could include the corporate strategic plan (assum-
ing there is one), company annual reports, and departmental or management review
meetings.
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2. Opening the meeting
The research suggested that a heavily structured, questionnaire-style interview is unlike-
ly to be fully effective. Better results were achieved when the effort was directed
towards determining what the interviewee does, and what he perceives as the factors
which determine success for him personally. Experience showed that this will not come
easily, as individuals frequently provide "company line" or self-serving answers, or
those that he feels the interviewer wants to hear. Therefore it is important initially that
the interviewer expresses interest in the job in the broadest sense, and gives the inter-
viewee adequate opportunity to discuss the job/project, and give his views freely.
Asking whether his job or department is afforded due recognition, or how he feels his or
the department's performance could be improved can be fertile sources of information,
as can a discussion on his likely career path. The objective is to gain an enhanced appre-
ciation for what he believes his objectives to be, and to be in a position to evaluate
whether these are in accordance with corporate objectives as determined earlier. Given
the variety of jobs and the range of personality types, a structured questionnaire is
unlikely to provide the requisite scope and flexibility. This is not to say that a certain
structure should not underlie all interviews. Such a structure is necessary, but should be
used more as preparation for the interview than in the form of a questionnaire.
3. Resolution of inconsistencies
Where an answer has been given which appears at variance with information received
earlier (either as part of the preliminary investigation, or as part of the interview), a direct
challenge was found to be inappropriate. A subsequent gradual raising of the same point
via another route proved to be more effective. An example might be where both organ-
isational objectives and the interviewee define "100% fulfilment of customer orders" as
the critical success factor. However, the interviewer may have the perception that low
inventory carrying costs may be what really matters. A more realistic response might
then be obtained by redirecting the conversation onto, for instance, the pressures that
apply in performing his tasks efficiently. A short discussion of this could be followed
by a statement like "it must be very important, and very difficult, to keep down invento-
ry carrying costs when you are providing such a high level of service". Given plenty of
time and encouragement, he will probably reveal his real motivational factors more
accurately.
4. Non-se quitors
The field research was plagued by the constant introduction of side issues and non-
261
sequitors by participating managers. To this could be added potentially contentious
comments, or remarks which could derail promising lines of inquiry. It was found that
the potential problem can be avoided if the interviewer simply ignores the comment and
continues literally as if nothing has been said. If the interviewee became particularly
negative, silence while he spoke, followed by a careful acknowledgement (not necessar-
ily acceptance) of his position, was found to be the best reaction.
5. Quantifying the benefits
Quantifying benefits in the realm of end-user computing, particularly when it relates to
managers, is recognised as an unpromising task, with benefits generally being classified
as of the intangible variety (see Chapter 7). Yet, as stated earlier, the scale of investment
in these areas calls for the maximum endeavour to be made in seeking to firm up on the
benefits where possible. Direct pressure on the user to quantify benefits was shown to
give rise to defensiveness and a lack of frankness, or a retreat into vagueness. One of
the most common reactions identified during the research is that when asked to specify
the benefits of a new system, the response will be" better and faster information", pos-
sibly with the rider that it is impossible to quantify the value of such benefits.
Rather than focus in on the specific benefits, an approach which sought to identify one
specific benefit which would have been achieved with the system, with a view to expand-
ing this into identifying the full scope of the benefits. The following simulated dialogue,
beginning with a response to the "better and faster information" reply, demonstrates a
typical scenario:
Interviewer: "That must be useful. How does it specifical4) help you in your work?.
Some specifics may be provided, for example, sales quotations can be submitted earlier,
and be more effective through the use of better information.
Interviewer: "I can see why you like the system. I wonder how often does this actually
result in additional or better deals? For instance, can you recollect even one occasion
in which the system made a difference, or were there close calls before the system was
introduced when it could have made a difference?"
If no instance is provided, it can reasonably be assumed that the system is not providing
tangible benefits, unless the extra time the user now has is being availed of by way of
additional tasks, or enhanced decision-making capability (see below). The user is in fact
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more likely to name one or more instances where the system has, or could have, made a
difference. Rather than seeking to quantify as this stage, the user should be encouraged
to talk more about it, without undue prompting. This could be followed by a comment
such as "from what you say, there could have been other examples as well", and if appro-
priate, suggested possibilities could be advanced. In the discourse which inevitably fol-
lows, further possibilities may be identified.
Now is the time to attempt quantification of benefits.
Interviewer: "It seems you'll make great use of the system. Looking back, it seems that
maybe up to five additional sales may have been made over the last year had you had it
at the time. Would you think this is realistic?"
Clearly, this runs the risk of putting words in the user's mouth. The risk must be set
against the need for quantification, and if the interviewer has established a reasonable
degree of trust, should not present undue distortion.
It is now possible to quantify the profit potential of the additional sales (taking average
margin per sale and multiplying it by the number of sales). This can be used for subse-
quent measurement on how the system actually performed. If the benefits are subse-
quently not realised, the process should be repeated along the original lines. The objec-
tive would not be to apportion blame, rather to learn from the process, and incorporate
what was learned into future evaluations and proposals.
Refine quantification
As described earlier, benefits are often presented, especially by managers, as intangi-
bles, frequently along the lines of 'faster information'. Receiving the information faster
does not automatically translate into business benefit. An appropriate response would
be "how do you find that useful?" This provides a sharper focus, and frequently, what
seems to be a clear-cut benefit turns out to be no benefit at all, once the user has the time
to think the process through by responding to the question. In the example quoted, it
may turn out that getting the information faster has no practical impact on achieving the
user's objectives.
Additional degrees of refinement can be achieved by focusing on the constituent ele-
ments of the claimed benefits. For instance, should the user say "the system saves time"
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it should be established, using the techniques described above, whose time and how
much is saved, and how often. Again, it is essential that this be established without the
introduction of a confrontational element.
A somewhat surprising finding in the research relates to the effectiveness of ignoring an
unsatisfactory answer, and virtually repeating the question. This is particularly effective
when the reply is long, rambling, or inconsistent. This is a somewhat risky tactic how-
ever. On one occasion, when mishandled by over-repetition, and when the answer had
in fact been short and unambiguous, introduced a somewhat confrontational element
which was counter-productive.
Cross-verification
Continuous cross-verification of the information given during the interview(s) is impor-
tant, but this should be done tactfully. For instance, if, reverting to the example last
described, the user claims the system "saves time" it has been found that, rather than ask-
ing "what do you do with the extra time?", there and then, a more effective approach
was to raise the issue at a later stage, ideally in a different form. This could be present-
ed as "do you find that the system enables you to do things now that you could not do
before?". If the reply is in the negative, it does not necessarily mean that he had been
wrong in claiming it saved time, or that he is wasting the time saved. A further question
subsequently along the lines of "have you found in any way that the system gives you
more time to actually do the job better?" can reveal the true benefits. In the case of an
affirmative answer, a follow-up question such as "That's good Do you find yourself
doing things now that you did not do before?" proved useful. This may reveal definite
ber_ents, aiterr_ativeiy, tat the supposed enhanced czaiity isargeiy ir_ ±e user's
mind. The principle is one of self-checking, without making it appear to be self-check-
ing.
Hypotheticals
On occasions, asking the following hypothetical questions have been found to be infor-
mative:
(a) How exactly would the user manage if the system were taken away? Although this
may appear to be repeating the same questions, the research has shown that new insights
can be provided. It could indicate an inability to do the job, or even suggest that the job
could be done quite well without it.
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(b) Ask how much the user (preferably at manager level) would be prepared to pay for
the forecast benefits of a system. This is a useful if somewhat unscientific means of
determining a system's value. In terms of quantifying a system's worth, the value of a
manager saying for example "if the system gives me what the vendors say it will, it would
be worth £15,000 a year to this department" should not be underestimated, particularly
when set against the other cross-checking techniques mentioned earlier.
4.3 Summary
This seven point interviewing technique should not be regarded as an end in itself, rather
as an added resource for determining system benefits. Results should be validated
against other yardsticks, which will vary considerably between organisations.
The approach does have its limitations. It is dependent to a considerable degree on the
knowledge and judgement of the users, the skills of the interviewer, and on the person-
ality interplay between the interviewer and the user. Furthermore, it runs the risk of
"leading" the leading the interviewee. However, given the extent of the difficulties
experienced in quantifying end-user benefits, less than scientifically rigorous methods
may have to be tolerated, especially in the light of the frequently amorphous and intan-
gible nature of those benefits.
Clearly, the technique is not one which can be "learned" as such. It requires practice and
experience for each interviewer to fine tune his or her techniques, and these will
undoubtedly need to be tailored to adapt to different individual and organisational char-
acteristics. Lessons learned from the exercises should contribute to organisational learn-
ing, and be incorporated into future appraisals of system proposals.
An important conclusion to be drawn from the research would seem to be that when
seeking to establish how a user hopes to benefit from a system, do not ask him what he
wants from the system! In a high proportion of cases this gives rise to unstructured,
incomplete, or unrealistic demands. The approach should be along the lines of the seven
steps defined: establish what the real business objectives of the user are, and then seek
to translate these into systems functionality and quantified benefits.
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Fig 1.  The Seven-Stage Approach to End-user Benefits Measurement
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Appendix IV
Process Redesign Case Study: John Radcliffe Hospital
Introduction
John Radcliffe Hospital is an acute hospital located in Oxford. It provides a wide range
of medical, emergency surgical and maternity services, as well as housing the teaching,
library and research facilities for the Oxford University Clinical School. Faced with
steadily increasing costs for health care, supplemented by an ideological commitment to
cost-cutting in the public service, the early years of the Thatcher administration saw
heavy pressure on hospital to introduce new administrative structures which would result
in a more "business-like" approach to hospital organisation. A key element was to adopt
the Clinical Directorate organisation structure, which would involve assigning control to
clinicians in the control of resources. John Radcliffe Hospital responded to these devel-
opments by appointing a general manager to oversee what was in effect a process
redesign exercise.
The first attempt
The hospital was positive about the proposed changes, but the initial results were not sat-
isfactory. Six clinical directorates were set up, and senior clinicians were assigned to
each directorate to act as co-ordinator for its activities and represent the directorate at
hospital level. Regular meetings identified the key issues and much progress was made
in moulding cultural attitudes - no easy task when operating with highly skilled profes-
sionals. Nonetheless, fundamental shortcomings were identified, in that whereas there
may have been de jure power, there was no de facto power.
This arose because the underlying operational systems had not changed. The comput-
erised information system was typically "legacy", in that reflected divisional boundaries,
and was centred on the finance and administration departments. Clinicians therefore
found great difficulty in deriving the information on which to allocate and control
resources. In addition, while in theory administration staff were available for clinical
directorate activities (as much of the administration previously undertaken on a cen-
tralised basis was now dispersed) in practice this did not happen. As the administration
staff continued to report to the same managers, in the same centralised location, it is
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hardly surprising that a step change did not occur. Starved of practical resources, the
directorates achieved relatively little on the ground change.
The second attempt
Learning from this initial effort, a three strand approach was then introduced to the pro-
ject.
(a) Define the clinical work in process terms.
The meetings which took place during the first attempt proved to be useful here, in that
the initial barriers to thinking in process terms had been breached. Dr. Chris Bunch,
director of the resource management programme, told the author that the method adopt-
ed was to first define the process in simple, overview terms, then decompose it to the
lowest practical level. This task was complicated by the clinical duties which all clini-
cians had to attend to. Many of the meetings had to take place very early in the morn-
ing, or late in the evening.
(b) Define an appropriate organisational structure.
Learning from the difficulties initially encountered, the objective here was to define the
structures, resources, and support mechanisms required to support the defined process-
es. It was realised that tampering with existing structures would not work - a radical
transformation was called for.
(c) Having defined the new processes and organisational structures, to develop new sup-
porting information systems.
An appropriate IS support capability had been identified as crucial to the success of the
clinical directorate initiative. Existing systems could not be adapted to meet the new
requirements, so radically new developments were called for. Dr. Bunch told the author
that the biggest single obstacle related to the practice of allocating funding on an annu-
alised basis. Theoretically, no funding for systems could have been advanced when the
new year's budget was announced, thus rendering planning and development most haz-
ardous.
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Achievements
(a) Defining the processes
In September 1990, six pilot areas were established to get the project operational. A lead
clinician was identified for each area. A multidisciplinary team was established in each
of the pilot areas, which, with the help of outside consultants, and building on the work
already achieved, held a series of meeting in which the main processes were identified.
The method was to ask each member to describe the services they provided in terms of
discrete activities. Each of the areas defined between 12 and 20 processes. This exer-
cise enabled the participants to obtain a much better feel for the resources they required,
and were in fact consuming. The main objectives were achieved, in that the processes
were identified, as well as the related resource requirements.
(b) Defining organisational structures
Significant progress was made in defining new organisational structures to support the
process redesign initiative. The following new elements were defined:
Service Delivery Units (SDUs): This is the lowest level operational unit within the new
structure, and is based on the provision of a specific service. Reflecting the reengineer-
ing thrust, SDUs are based not on where the activities take place, rather on the process.
This departed from normal practice in hospitals. An SDU (for example, the cardiac ser-
vices SDU) will have a management team comprised of a head clinician and a head nurse
(although in the case of the clinician he/she is really more primer inter pares) which will
be responsible for the allocation and use of resources. It is estimated that such manage-
ment work takes up about two days a month each.
Service Centres: The high number of SDUs called for some kind of grouping arrange-
ment, and this was done on the basis medical disciples which have a natural affinity. Six
such grouping were identified. It was found that this new arrangement avoided many of
the personnel and interdisciplinary clashes which characterised the original clinical
directorates initiative. As with the SDUs, each Service Centre is managed by a clinician
(Chairman) who spends about four days a month on management tasks.
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Hospital Board: This is comprised of the Chairmen of the Service Centres, together with
key hospital executives. At its monthly meetings it formulates strategy, and executive
level decisions are made by this group.
(c) Developing new information systems:
In recognition of the fact that inadequate IT support systems were a major contributor to
the initial lack of success, an Information Strategy Steering Group was set up, with Chris
Bunch as Chairman. Bunch told the author that the new arrangements would have col-
lapsed in a short time if operated under the old systems. It was decided to develop a
totally new open, client-server architecture which will support the distributed processing
requirements demanded by the new organisational structures. This is known as the "clin-
ical workstation". The author has had the opportunity to evaluate the system, the devel-
opment of which has been hit by uncertain funding. Certainly, in terms of information
access and presentation it was far ahead of its legacy counterpart, although several bugs
became apparent, and in the author's opinion, the existing hardware, database and net-
work capability seems likely to suffer from severe performance degradation as more
users are added and more information made available.
Lessons for process redesign:
(1) Getting everyone associated with the project to agree is an essential requirement.
However, unless the logistics and other support are available, such initiatives will
founder.
(2) The case again confirmed the importance of an appropriate ITarchitecture, in partic-
ular the relevance of open, client-server based solutions.
(3) Initial enthusiasm can often lead to opposition when the full ramifications of a
reengineering exercise are felt by some of those affected (conversation between C.
Bunch and the author).
(4) The annual budget approach adopted in the public service poses particular difficul-
ties for systems development (difficult to project manage development in the light of
possible large cutbacks).
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This specification records the views of the authors on the scores which should be award-
ed to the Rolling Mill Control System under the following investment justification head-
ings:
• Strategic Alignment
• Direct Benefits
• Architecture
• Re-engineering
• Risk
The weighting of the scores awarded by the authors needs to be completed by top man-
agement in (Company) to provide a complete investment justification against the busi-
ness context in which (Company) operates. 
Under the heading of Strategic Alignment, the system was examined against the follow-
ing criteria (scores out of 10 shown in brackets):
• its capacity to enable (Company) to do business in new ways	 ( 4 )
• its adaptability to a changing business environment 	 ( 6 )
• the duration of its implementation	 ( 5 )
• the clarity of its strategic objectives 	 ( 10 )
• the impact of its introduction on the following:-
O Staff Morale	 ( 8 )
O Corporate Image	 ( 8 )
O Customer Service	 ( 9 )
O Safety	 ( 5 )
O Quality	 ( 5 )
The strategic objectives of increasing efficiency and productivity are clear for this sys-
tem. Staff morale and healthy competition will be boosted by the ready availability of
performance information. Corporate image will be enhanced by the high-tech approach
to process monitoring and customer service will benefit from improved production sta-
tus information and better production planning. Hence, the awarding of very good scores
under the appropriate headings above. Areas such as safety and quality will also benefit,
but to a lesser extent.
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The second heading under which the system was evaluated is titled "Direct Benefits".
The specific criteria in this area are identified as the ability of the system to achieve the
following:
• displace current costs or avoid future costs 	 ( 10 )
• make better use of existing and future investments
	
( 10 )
• handle increased volume with similar staff numbers 	 ( 8 )
• create additional revenue	 ( 10 )
• facilitate links with customers and/or suppliers 	 ( 10 )
• enable initiatives by competitors to be offset or emulated 	 ( 3 )
• facilitate product differentiation or new product introduction 	 ( 8 )
• reduce errors, re-submissions and re-runs 	 ( 8 )
• improve management control 	 ( 10 )
• provide management time savings	 ( 8 )
This system scores very well under the heading of direct benefits. It will help Mill man-
agement strive for improved productivity and efficiency with consequential improve-
ments in revenue generation. It will make full use of existing investment in PC and PLC
technology. Customer service will be better supported through the ready availability of
production information. The production of new products will more readily monitored
and management control tightened.
The third category of evaluation is "Architecture" i.e. the information systems and net-
works used to support the information management requirements in Irish Steel. The fol-
lowing criteria are used to evaluate the system under this heading:
• impact on other applications 	 (8)
• consistency with existing and planned architecture 	 ( 5 )
• support for future applications	 ( 5 )
The system will have a very positive impact on other applications by making accurate
information available to areas such as Shipping, Purchasing, Production Planning and
Sales. Future applications which require a more detailed approach to process reporting
will be easily catered for. The consistency of the system with existing and planned archi-
tecture was awarded a medium score as the Sheerness system has yet to be appraised.
The fourth category of system evaluation is "Re-engineering" i.e. the ability of the sys-
tem to cope with and assist in changing work practices and processes in the future. The
following criteria were used to evaluate the system under this heading:
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• provision of greater flexibility in work practices
	 ( 5 )
• embedding of existing work practices 	 ( 8 )
• facilitation of process approach to business 	 ( 10 )
• capacity for modification	 ( 5 )
On balance, this system will add to (Company) capacity to re-engineer in the future if
required. The ready availability of Mill information on a plant-wide basis coupled with
the process insights which should be gained as a result of system usage will certainly
support the process approach to business and highlight areas where work practices are
faulty. The capacity for modification was awarded a medium mark on the basis that the
Sheerness system has not yet been formally appraised.
The final evaluation category is "Risk". The criteria encompassed by "Risk" cover the
most common reasons for IT project failure and are listed here.
• Project scale ( 7 )
• Vendor reliability ( 2 )
• Platform stability ( 2 )
• Technical risk ( 2 )
• Employee and management ability, attitude and availability ( 8 )
• Top management support ( 10 )
The system scores relatively poorly under the heading of "Risk". There are few, if any,
problems in the areas of top management backing, employee support and project scale.
However, questions must be asked of the ability of Sheerness to offer system support at
the level required in (Company). Recent reports from Sheerness indicate that the current
system is being substantially modified, further reducing confidence in its stability.
The following sections of this report show the evaluation results in detail.
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2. STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT Score
Could it enable new ways of doing business?
This system is geared more towards refinement of the current process
rather than supporting a new process.
4
It could be easily adapted to monitor new processes.
Can it be easily and quickly adapted in the event of change associated
with today's business environment?
This type of system can be quickly adapted to measure new parameters of
interest.
6
Is the thneframe acceptable? Long timeframes increase the likelihood of
deviation from corporate objectives.
The timeframe has yet to be clarified and depends to a large degree on
the ability of Sheerness to modify & install the system in (Company). 5
A "medium" score is awarded in these circumstances.
_
Are strategic goals clear and consistent? If not alignment will be difficult
irrespective of the value of the system.
The purpose of the Rolling Mill Control System is to allow
Rolling Mill management increase efficiency and productivity 	 through
improved process control.
10
Impact on staff morale? - higher-tech environment, ownership (pride or
resentment), reduction in boring or repetitive tasks, more pressure due to
lack of confidence.
Better information available to operators on Rolling Mill performance
should encourage clear focus on process improvement and encourage
competition.
8
Impact on corporate image?
Positive impact - real-time and historical process control infonna
tion readily available demonstrates management commitment to
Continuous improvement
8
Impact on customer service?
Should make Rolling Mill production more predictable, thus ensuring
that supply to customers is as smooth as possible and mill slippage is
minimised.
9
Impact on safety?
The insights provided by the system will allow management
improve
	 plant reliability and availability. This, in turn, will lead to a reduc-
tion in accidents. 5
Impact on quality?
A positive impact. Will help reduce the levels of non-prime material
through tighter process control. 5
278
3	 DIRECT BENEFITS Score
Does it displace costs or avoid future costs?
Will assist Rolling Mill management in the attempt to reach the following targets:
102% increase in yield
3 -4 Tonnes/hr increase in production
Reduced energy consumption
Does it make better use of existing and future investments?
Existing PLCs can be accessed and the data used to a far greater extent than is
presently the case. 10Existing PCs can also be fully utilised for information presentation and analysis.
Future	 PLC	 investment	 will	 also	 be	 fully	 exploited.
Information from the Rolling Mill can be distributed to all other interested parties
in (Company)
Does it handle increased volume with similar staff numbers?
The system increases the probability of achieving mill output standards
with no increase in headcount.
8
Does it create additional revenue?
The achievement of production targets will increase revenue. 10
Does it facilitate links with customers and/or suppliers?
Shipping and production planning will make full use of the accurate production
information available from the system. Customers will ultimately benefit through
improved status reporting on their orders and through improved planning.
10
Competitive response: does it enable initiatives by competitors to be offset or emu-
lated?
Plant configuration is of far more significance in this context than the proposed
system.
3
Does it facilitate product differentiation or new product introduction?
The system would provide valuable information on process performance during
production of the new product.
8
Has it a capacity to reduce errors, resubmissions and reruns?
The system will certainly reduce manual data collection errors. 8The system will increase the accuracy of management judgement on process
issues.
Has it a capacity for improved management control?
Improved management control is a key objective of the system through the pro-
vision of improved information capture and analysis facilities. This will lead to
improved process control and understanding of Rolling Mill performance.
10
Does it provide management time saving?
Management time spent on data collection and analysis will be reduced as the new
system will automate most of this work.
8
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4 ARC'HITECTURE Score
Consequential impact: does it have potential impact on other applica-
tions, (links, provide information sources or hardware functionality)
The EIS will certainly extract information from this system. 
Shipping, purchasing, production planning and sales will also use
mill information to the full.
Is it consistent with existing and planned architecture?
The Sheerness system is currently envisaged as providing the basis
for a solution in this area. 
However, latest news is that Sheerness are modifying their system
to achieve improved performance. Implications of this for
(Company) are, as yet, unclear. 
A medium score is awarded in the circumstances.
Does it form the basis for future applications?
When the system is fully operational, mill management will cer-
tainly wish to refine reporting on relevant areas of the process and
the system will facilitate this.
8
5
5
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5, RE-ENGINEERING Score
Could it provide greater flexibility in work practices?
The more ready availability of mill information to a wider audience
than currently, combined with an open door management policy
will certainly facilitate greater flexibility in work practices through
the increased debate and incorporation of new ideas.
5
Could it embed existing practices?
The system would provide insights into the effectiveness of exist-
ing practices rather than embedding them in a concealed fashion.
8
Does it facilitate a process approach to business rather than reinforce
function-based operations?
The plant-wide availability of information from the Rolling Mil
will certainly support the process approach to business while still
allowing the Rolling Mill attain its specific targets.
10
Can it be easily amended to reflect new requirements?
An analysis of the Sheerness system is required to answer this ques-
tion. It is to be hoped that this system will be easily amended to
reflect new reporting and analysis requirements. In some cases it
will be dependent on the availability of suitable sensory equipment.
A medium score is awarded in the circumstances.
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6. RISK Score
Does the scale of the project contribute to the risk of failure (0 = Yes,
10 = No)?
This is a medium scale project and, as a consequence, is awarded
a "slight risk" score.
7
Is the vendor reliable in terms of technical capability, financial
strength?
The ability of Sheerness to support the system in (Company) must
be questioned. It is not clear at the moment if Sheerness has any
experience of selling this or any other system to third parties in the
past.
2
On the assumption that this is Sheerness' first venture into soft-
ware sales, a low score is awarded under this heading.
Are the hardware or software platforms stable and current?
It is reported that Sheerness are currently modifying their system
to use more modern and robust technologies. 2
This indicates a lack of stability in the product at this point in time.
Are the levels of technical risk low?
It appears that the Sheerness system has been specifically designed
with Sheerness requirements in mind. On the assumption that this
system is not in operation at any other sites, the level of technical
risk involved in the installation of this system in Irish Steel is rel-
atively high, due to the fact that it may not have been designed
from this perspective from the outset.
2
Are employees and managers well equipped in terms of ability, atti-
tude and availability for the task?
Management and employees are keen to improve the performance
of the Rolling Mill and will use this system to achieve this goal. 8
It may be a little difficult to get some of the older workers to use
the system to the full.
Is top management supportive?
Top management is very supportive of the overall TT strategy and
is keen to achieve the promised benefits in the Rolling Mill.
10
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Perspec
Strategic Alignment 20 7 140
Payback 40 9 360
Architecture 10 6 60
Process Redesign 20 7 140
Risk 10 5 50
Total 100 34 750
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Appendix VI
Considerations for Weighting and Scoring under the Five Perspectives
The forthcoming investment appraisal exercise is based on evaluating the proposal under
five different perspectives. Outlined below is a brief description of the five perspectives,
together with a range of thought-starters which will assist you in performing a compre-
hensive review. Finally, in recognition of the fact that most organisations still see IT
investments primarily in the context of providing a payback, this section concluded with
a series of examples, based on actual events, which seek to show how limiting your
review to Payback alone could give rise to a faulty investment decision.
Strategic Alignment: alignment of IT and medium to long term corporate objectives.
Strategic alignment, is defined as a state of harmony between business objectives and the
systems that support them.. The inference here is that the linkage and support are seen
in the medium to long term perspective. As IT becomes increasingly influential in every
aspect of business, strategic alignment has assumed ever greater importance. It is also
becoming increasingly difficulty to achieve alignment in the light of the increasingly
rapid rate of change in both business and technology, and the emergence of technology
as a catalyst for business change in its own right.
Considerations
mergers/acquisitions/alliances
suppliers moving up (becoming competitors - possibility of pre-emptive lockout)
better alignment with peaks and troughs
empowerment/reduced need for supervision
easier to recruit staff (system environment in wide usage)
improved self-image of staff (staff applying high-tech)
better corporate image
new geographical markets
reduced dependence on individual suppliers or customers
enhanced linkages with customers and/or suppliers
new distribution channels (agents, direct sale)
284
outsourcing (IT, distribution, telesales)
cash flow/liquidity
timeframe of strategy - the longer the more difficult the alignment
how clear are strategic goals
how adaptable is the strategy
reduced dependence on individual employees/customers/or suppliers
Payback Demonstrable value, such as cost savings, revenue enhancement, better man-
agement information.
This is the most widely applied and best understood perspective, and has been com-
monly associated with cost/benefit analyses (CBA). Used on its own, Payback can be of
limited value in assessing business benefits. Nonetheless, the possibility of direct finan-
cial benefit should play an important role in any investment decision. Systems which
provide such benefits as enhanced management decision support, and better market
intelligence, although perhaps not directly quantifiable in terms of business value added,
would also come into this perspective. In determining the level of payback, it is impor-
tant to take into consideration not just the benefits, but possible negative factors, such as
training or staff disruption.
Considerations
Direct cost savings: 
staff reduction
overtime reduction
reduced level of h/w investment
reduced h/w or s/w maintenance
reduced use of consumable (e.g. stationery)
reduced inventories
reduced stock write-offs (obsolescence, scrap, etc.)
reduced travel costs (video-conferencing, e-mail, multimedia products)
reduced communications costs (e-mail)
improved stock security (e.g. better audit features)
improved cashflow
reduction in production sales or stock storage space
less need for specialised (i.e. more expensive) staff
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Quality:
Reduction in backorders
fewer recalls/returns
fewer customer complaints
better response from customer surveys
fewer mistakes in invoicing/delivery etc.
reduced order/delivery time span
less reworking
Productivity:
higher sales per employee
more throughput per employee
fewer phone calls, memoranda, etc.
fewer queries (employees handle their own problems better)
better alignment with peaks and troughs
revenue earnings
reduction in or elimination of production or delivery bottlenecks
reduction in or elimination of non-value adding tasks
reduction order turnaround time
reduction in audit costs due to better information and/or documentation
faster access to information (not necessarily a benefit)
better on-line help to reduce support costs
less rekeying of data
less manual aggregating of data
Employee performance:
better quality of information (less wasted time)
reduced frustration
empowerment/reduced need for supervision
fewer occasions for mistakes
easier to recover from mistakes
reduced need for training (system more intuitive or provides enhanced function-
ality)
easier to recruit staff (system environment in wide usage)
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more flexible working conditions
improved self-image (staff applying high-tech)
safer environment
Management performance:
better information
faster information
improved decision support capability
reduction in number of meetings due to better information
Architecture : support and alignment with the corporate IT infrastructure.
For this purpose, the IT architecture is defined as the computers, networks, databases,
and related software which make up an organisation's IT capability (this may not be
everyone's definition). The issue of architecture is assuming growing importance, as
more and more functionality is built into the operating systems, and as the move from
vendor-specific houses gathers momentum. Whereas these developments bring with
them a range of advantages, they have also given rise to a situation today where a pro-
fusion of incompatible software, hardware and communications platforms co-exist with-
in single organisations (is). Even the smallest IT investment therefore has an impact on
the architecture, for better or worse.
Considerations
is the proposed investment consistent with existing/planned architecture
pre-emptive use of technology (workflow, EDI, on-line marketing, expert sys-
tems, electronic cash)
cater for increased volumes
capacity to link with third party products (spreadsheets etc.)
support new and/or additional applications (hardware, data, interfaces)
cater for new lines of business
degree of flexibility required
mergers/acquisitions/alliances
centralisation/decentralisation
outsourcing
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Process redesign (Reengineering) the capacity to enable business reengineering or
process redesign.
It is no longer sufficient to evaluate new systems exclusively in terms of meeting spe-
cific business requirements. The capacity to enable new ways of doing business and/or
to redesign business processes has to be a consideration for each new project. One of
the most intractable problems associated with process redesign has been the profusion of
"legacy systems", which embed existing work practices in their software. It follows that
failure to evaluate new projects in terms of their process redesign impact may not only
ignore major potential benefits, but could result in an inhibitor in future reengineering
initiatives.
Considerations
more flexible work practices
reduction/elimination of non-value adding activities (unnecessary checks)
does it facilitate a process approach
can it be easily changed to reflect new business requirements
capturing data more than once
can existing data be leveraged (B&L)
Risk all potential risk exposure, such as technical, organisational and financial.
In terms of IT investment everyone has a favourite disaster of cosmic proportions to
relate, such as those at the Wessex Water Authority and the London Stock Exchange. In
the light of this, one might have expected that the issue of risk to have played a major
role in IT investment appraisal. On the contrary, all evidence to hand suggests that for-
mal risk assessment is applied in only a small minority of organisations, and the meth-
ods applied often miss out on crucial aspects. Risk can take many forms.
Considerations
scale of project
definitional uncertainty
supplier technical or financial uncertainty
hardware new/untried or old/outdated
software new/untried or old/outdated
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organisational preparedness
time frame - the longer the greater the risk
number of departments involved
support of top management
Some actual examples to support the need for the use of all five perspectives
• It is possible to buy an economical system which will do the job today, but will not
accommodate future growth or changes in the business environment. If this happens,
the 'cheap' system will have to be replaced, writing off the investment, and the
whole implementation process will have to be gone through again. (The Strategic
Alignment perspective).
• It is possible to buy a powerful business application (say COMET running on
Nixdorf 8870) for a very low price. This would give great payback, but the tech-
nology is going nowhere, leading to support and maintenance problems, difficulties
in recruiting and keeping staff, lack of connectivity and integration, all leading soon-
er rather than later a totally new system with the original investment effectively a
write-off in terms of money and time spent. (The Architecture perspective).
• A system can generate great labour savings and provide other benefits, but could
mean your processes become inextricably embedded in the software. This is now
being recognised as a potentially huge problem world-wide, with companies unable
to redesign their processes to accommodate changing business conditions. One com-
pany was unable to introduce a major new product line on account of this. (The
Process Redesign perspective).
• A system might promise major payback, but could be subject to unacceptable levels
of risk. For example, the suppliers/developers might be financially insecure, the sys-
tem might be based on new and relatively untried technologies, it might be exces-
sively complex to implement and run - the list of potential risks is endless. (The Risk
perspective).
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ORGANISATION 5 
Benefits Management Study
September 17, 1996.
Prepared by: Joe Flynn
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Tony Murphy
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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
Business Management SystemBMS
Bill Of MaterialBOM
Business Process Improvement
Business Process Redesign
Engineering Change Order
BPI
BPR
ECO
Engineering Change RequestECR
Executive Information SystemEIS
First In First OutFIFO
Goods Received NoteGRN
Management Information SystemMIS
NIMT National Institute for Management Technology
PDM Product Data Management
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1L EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.1 Introduction
This document defines the views of the authors on the scores which should be awarded
to the Business Management System (incorporating Product Data Management func-
tionality) under the following investment justification headings:
• Strategic Alignment
• Direct Benefits (Payback)
• Architecture
• Process Re-design (Redesign)
• Risk
During the IT Strategy consultancy project, the senior management team at
ORGANISATION 5 assigned weightings to the 5 perspectives (averaged and rounded to
the nearest 5% increment) which were as follows:
Eva/nation Perspective	 .... . Management Weighting (%)
Strategic Alignment 30
Direct Benefits Added 15
Support for Reengineering 25
Conformance to Specific IT Architecture 15
Blisiness Process Sensitivity to if Risk 15
'TOTAL 100
I
There were 3 business systems evaluated under the 5 perspectives - SAP R/3,
Scala and Oracle Manufacturing / Financials. These systems have all been scored
against the detailed benefits under each of the 5 perspectives and then these scores have
been adjusted based on the weightings above.
1.2 Generic Business Benefits
The generic business benefits of implementing an integrated business management sys-
tem include:
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• Imposing control on operational disorder. This includes handling business activities
consistently across the enterprise, centralising command and control, and forcing a
process organisation structure.
• Improving efficiency and lowering the cost of doing business. This means upgrading
processes to follow best industry practices and eliminating redundancies.
• Improved information management across the enterprise providing timely, accurate
and appropriate information delivery for more effective decision making.
1.3 Specific product evaluations
1.3.1	 SAP R/3
1.3.1.1	 Benefits
• Tight integration. R13's applications are tied together into a disciplined whole. This
means that all of R13's modules — purchasing, payables, general ledger, etc. - work
together instead of functioning as separate applications. This eliminates time-con-
suming and error-prone activities like matching invoices to purchase orders, vendor
ID translation, and ledger posting.
• Single view of the business. All applications in a single instance of R/3 share the
same database. This eliminates the possibility of duplicate or redundant data - pro-
viding one consistent view of the information across the organisation. This allows R/3
to support consistent reporting and analysis across operational activities.
.• Process orientation. R/3 is based on a process model of business — focusing on
activities like order fulfilment - and not on traditional functions like order processing,
inventory management, and shipping. This approach forces attention on the end result
— not on incidental, incremental steps. This can drive a streamlining of business
processes.
• Rich functionality. R13 embodies proven best practices based on SAP's more than 20
years of experience supporting large companies. Initial releases of R13 were derived
from SAP's R12 legacy mainframe products. R/3 is a comprehensive product embody-
ing most business requirements.
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1.3.1.2	 Benefits - Other
• Out-scored the other business applications across the 5 perspectives.
• No. 1 business application world-wide installed in over 4,500 sites in 50+ countries.
• 6 out of the top 10 electronic companies use SAP RA.
• Has a solid track record for successful implementations with large organisations
• Complete solution for all business functions within a given enterprise
• Ships with 160+ business objects and 1000 business processes per module which con-
form to global best business practices Ease of domestic implementation
• Fully compliant with ORGANISATION 5 architecture
• Workflow enabled
• Document Management functionality
• Approved PDM vendor list
1.3.1.3	 Disadvantages
• High risk of implementation failure especially for multi-national organisations. Most
R13 implementations stretch the limits of both company and systems integrator pro-
ject management skills. They are huge - in time to complete, number of organisations
included, and number of people involved. Failing in an effort of this magnitude will
distract the entire company for years. This applies in particular to organisations
implementing across a number of locations.
• Missed new business opportunities. Corporate systems must thrive on change as IT
reaches out to build new customer connections and as Commerce moves far beyond
traditional EDI. R13's tight integration and complexity can make it difficult for
processes to change rapidly.
• Constrains scope for organisational initiatives. R13's everything-including-the-
kitchen- sink nature can cause atrophy of essential skills and capabilities. R/3 defines
how things get done, takes massive resources to implement and run.
• Lock in companies to its proprietary ABAP4 technology.
• Licence costs @ 1R£3,000 per user for up to 50 users. This does not include operat-
ing systems, networks, hardware, database or other licences.
• Implementation and consultancy costs can be expensive with an average ratio of 4 -
1 for spend on consultancy i.e. for every 100k spent on product licence 400k is spent
on added value consultancy. These costs have now been addressed by SAP and new
features in the latest release of R/3 have meant a reduction in the ratio to 2.5 - 1.
• Time-scales for implementation can be long due to nature of business process review
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and sophistication of application
• Resources for SAP can be difficult to source due to ongoing demand for same. These
resources are also very expensive.
• This product is not typically targeted at companies such as ORGANISATION 5.
1.3.2	 Scala
1.3.2.1	 Benefits
• International product installed in over 14,000 sites in over 20+ countries.
• Conforms to the ORGANISATION 5 IT architecture in principle but still awaiting
roll-out of all products on NT.
• Fully integrated manufacturing, distribution, logistics and financial application.
• Market leader world-wide solution for small to medium size enterprises
• Delivers all the key business functionality required by ORGANISATION 5 as defined
at present
• Implementation time-frames are much smaller with full implementations done in 6
months period for companies such as ORGANISATION 5.
• Has a number of key clients in the electronic sector including Nokia, Memorex Telex,
Erricsons, Dell and Old
1.3.2.2	 Disadvantages
.• Scala is not process orientated i.e. re-enforces the functional view rather than a
process orientation. It does not have a in-built redesign or workflow based architec-
ture and so amendments to the software to reflect business process change require sig-
nificant programming effort.
• No formal PDM approval process but have committed to integrate with one if
required.
• Scala is still porting product to NT.
• Would not usually compete with SAP as both products are targeted at different mar-
kets in terms of project scale and costs
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1.3.3	 Oracle
1.3.3.1	 Benefits
• Feature rich product with tight integration between all modules
• Facilitates process approach to business
• Supports Workflow technology
• International product installed in 4,000+ sites in over 15+ countries
• Strong international software developer
• Conforms to the ORGANISATION 5 IT architecture in principle but still awaiting
roll-out of all products on NT.
• Complete solution for all business functions within a given enterprise
• Integrates with a number of PDM applications particularly Sherpa.
• Popular choice for many small to medium sized organisations.
• Lists Motorola as one its key users in the electronics sector
• Supports CAD integration
1.3.3.2	 Disadvantages
• Weakness on functionality in some specific areas e.g. inventory (FIFO), Cash
Management and Accounts Receivable.
• Time-scales for implementation can be long due to amount of up-front consultancy
required to implement the application
• Costs for each module are IR18,900 (approx.). A ratio of 3.5 - 1 in consultancy is
then required to implement these. These costs do not include server or client licences.
• Costs for consultancy and implementation are high as are client licence costs
• This product is typically targeted at multi-national organisations or smaller organisa-
tions (1 location) who have a major commitment to IT.
1.4 Recommendations
In summary, SAP R/3 outscored the other products. It is a world leader in inte-
grated client server applications designed and built to boost competitiveness within
organisations. It has a high degree of integration and provides feature rich functionality
to cater for manufacturing, finance, sales and distribution, human resources, CAD inte-
gration, document management and workflow requirements within ORGANISATION 5.
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It is a powerful application in terms of business redesign capability and provides state of
the art functionality to allow users to model, map and re-engineer their business process-
es as required. It also ships with workflow and document management functionality as
standard. SAP may be prohibitive when costs, time-scales and resource requirements are
taken into consideration but it has an excellent client listing within the electronics sector
- 6 out of the top 10 electronic companies use SAP. Oracle is a close competitor of SAP
and also delivers much of the above functionality as standard. This excludes such prod-
uct as document management, workflow, system configuration tools, CAD integration
and Engineering workbench tools. The Oracle product is not as mature as SAP R/3 and
therefore, not as feature rich. Oracle is also expensive to implement. Scala is a power-
ful, feature rich and well respected integrated business application. It has many advan-
tages over SAP and Oracle in terms of time-scales, ease of implementation and costs.
Scala does not compete with these products normally and so comparisons between Scala
and SAP R 13 / Oracle may be unfair. It does not contain the flexibility of SAP or Oracle
particularly with respect to process orientation and reengineering capability. It does not
support workflow, document management or CAD integration. These are all important
building blocks in a flexible and adaptable business management system for a business
such as ORGANISATION 5s.
In an ideal world SAP would be the obvious choice for ORGANISATION 5 in
order to provide an enterprise wide integrated business solution. It is crystal clear that
the rich functionality that SAP delivers as standard would justify the significant invest-
ment required. However, ORGANISATION 5 need to establish if they are capable of
meeting the challenges that implementing SAP would present. Additionally, both SAP
and Oracle would have considerable organisational impact and ORGANISATION 5
-need to ensure that they are completely comfortable with the following issues before
committing to either product::
• Will senior management provide the necessary time, commitment and backing to
such a strategic project ?.
• Will the current ORGANISATION 5 personnel be in a position to utilise and capi-
talise on the online business critical information that SAP will provide ?.
• Are ORGANISATION 5 management currently equipped to identify the profound
changes that such a product will have on work practices, business information, organ-
isational structure and business processes within the organisation.
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The short-listed products, if implemented effectively, will provide fundamental
improvements to ORGANISATION 5s business performance. However, such improve-
ments will only be achieved if the above questions can be answered in a positive man-
ner.
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2. MAIN REPORT
2.1 Strategic Alignment
Under the heading of Strategic Alignment, the systems were examined against the fol-
lowing criteria (scores out of 10 shown in brackets):
	
SAP	 Scala Oracle
• Support for mergers / acquisitions / alliances 	 ( 8 )	 ( 8 )	 ( 8)
• Capacity to enable ORG 5 to do business in new ways ( 9 ) 	 ( 5 )	 ( 8)
• Better corporate image	 ( 9 )	 ( 6 )	 ( 8)
• The clarity of its strategic objectives 	 (10)	 (10)	 (10)
• Empowerment - reduced need for supervision	 ( 8 )	 ( 8 )	 ( 8)
• Support move to new geographical markets 	 ( 9 )	 ( 9 )	 ( 8)
• Enhanced linkages with customers / suppliers / sub-contractors (10) 	 (9)	 ( 9)
• Cash flow / liquidity 	 ( 9)	 (9)	 ( 9)
• The impact of its introduction on the following:-
Staff Morale	 ( 9 )	 (9)	 (9)
Corporate Image	 ( 9 )	 (9)	 (9)
Customer Service	 ( 9 )	 ( 8 )	 ( 9 )
Quality
	 ( 9 )	 ( 8 )	 ( 8 )
Sub-total	 (108) (98) (103) 
Average	 (9)	 (8)	 (9)
The strategic objectives of reducing time to market, improving customer service,
increasing efficiency and productivity are clear for the BMS. The reduction in time to
market will be facilitated by new functionality to automate ECRs, ECOs and BOM
maintenance. This will deliver a significant reduction in the administration time spent
on these tasks. Customer service will benefit from the availability of key customer and
order fulfilment information as well as from the implementation of various Internet
based applications from the respective software vendors. Quality of information and the
quality of work content will improve significantly removing a lot of the drudgery from
current work practices and reducing the effort associated with obtaining and reviewing
business information at present. Staff morale and healthy competition will be boosted
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by the ready availability of business performance information. Corporate image will be
enhanced by the high-tech approach to business management and control.
2.2 Payback
The second heading under which the system was evaluated is titled "Payback".
The specific criteria in this area are identified as the ability of the system to achieve the
following:
2.2.1	 Direct cost savings
SAP Scala
	 Oracle
•	 Reduced product cycle time ( 9 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Displace current costs or avoid future costs ( 7 ) ( 6 ) ( 6 )
•	 Reduced inventories ( 8 ) ( 7 ) ( 6 )
•	 Reduced stock write-offs (obsolescence, scrap, etc.) (7) ( 7 ) (7)
•	 Assist in component cost reduction programme (7) ( 7 ) (7)
•	 Implement tighter Project control ( 8 ) ( 6 ) ( 6 )
•	 Reduced communications costs (e-mail) (5) ( 5 ) (5)
•	 Improved cash-flow (9) ( 7 ) (6)
•	 Less need for specialised (more expensive) staff ( 6 ) ( 6 ) ( 6 )
Sub-total (66) (59) (57)
It is difficult to quantify specific direct cost savings for the BMS. It is often the
case that following the implementation of a BMS costs will actually rise for a short peri-
od. However, it should be possible to determine savings in inventory, reduced write-offs
and reduced stationery costs at ORGANISATION 5. The BMS should provide compo-
nent ana:ysis in order to contribute to the ongoing chaenge of reducing component
costs at both the design and implementation phase. Cash flow should improve signifi-
cantly due to tighter management and on-line integration between the various business
functions which impact cash flow (Sales, Manufacturing, Purchasing and Finance). The
implementation of a sophisticated financial application should reduce the requirement
for specialised staff at ORGANISATION 5. It should also ensure that ORGANISATION
5 can cope with increased levels of business with the same staff levels.
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2.2.2	 Quality
•	 Better information on recalls/returns
SAP
( 8)
Scala
	 Oracle
( 7 )	 ( 7 )
•	 Fewer recalls/returns ( 8) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Improved customer service ( 9) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Better visibility for customer on order fulfilment process (10) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Fewer customer complaints ( 8) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Fewer mistakes in invoicing/delivery etc. ( 9 ) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Improved invoicing information ( 9 ) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Reduced order/delivery time span ( 9 ) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Less reworking, re-keying of information ( 9 ) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Reduce errors, re-submissions and re-run ( 8) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Sub-total (87) (83) (83)
All of the proposed business systems will provide high quality business perfor-
mance information on-line. This will in turn lead to changes in work practices as much
time will now be saved in collating, organising and presenting data. The underlying
database will provide integrity constraints which will minimise errors and ensure the
validity of the data concerned. SAP will provide Internet' applets' which allow specif-
ic ORGANISATION 5 customer query order activity and progress. This benefit will be
minimised to some degree if the manufacturing process at the sub-contractor remains
off-line to the ORGANISATION 5 system. However, other sales, engineering (BOM,
ECO's) and purchasing data can be made available via these applets. This will provide
ORGANISATION 5 with competitive advantage and reduce the amount of time spent
answering customer / supplier / sub-contractor queries. It is expected that this will ulti-
mately result in improved customer perception of ORGANISATION 5 and a reduction
in customer complaints.
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2.2.3	 Productivity
SAP Scala Oracle
•	 Facilitate product differentiation or new product introduction ( 9 ) ( 6 ) ( 6 )
•	 Create additional revenue ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Higher sales per employee ( 9 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 More throughput per employee ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Handle increased volume with similar staff numbers (9) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Fewer phone calls, memoranda, etc. (5) ( 5 ) (5)
•	 Fewer queries (employees handle their own problems better) ( 6 ) ( 6 ) ( 6 )
•	 Better alignInent with peaks and troughs (7) (7) (7)
•	 Revenue earnings ( 9 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Reduction in or elimination of
production or delivery bottlenecks ( 6 ) ( 6 ) ( 6 )
•	 Reduction in or elimination of non-value adding task (9) (7) (7)
•	 Reduction in order turnaround time (8) (7) (7)
•	 Reduction in audit costs due to better information (5) ( 5 ) (5)
•	 Faster access to information (not necessarily a benefit) ( 9 ) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Better on-line help to reduce support costs ( 4 ) ( 4 ) ( 4 )
•	 Less re-keying of data (9) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Less manual aggregating of data (9) ( 9 ) (9)
Sub-total (129) (121) (121)
Productivity will increase as a result of implementing a BMS. The amount of
time spent at present in ORGANISATION 5 in obtaining data, then analysing and for-
matting this data is considerable right across the organisation. This applies to all depart-
ments, sales, manufacturing and distribution. The new application will present a central
point for data analysis and allow ORGANISATION 5 personnel to concentrate on using
the information to the benefit of the organisation. There is too much time spent right
now in obtaining the data rather than interpreting the information. Therefore, all of the
products score well in this regard.
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2.2.4	 Employee performance
SAP Scala
	 Oracle
•	 Better quality of information (less wasted time) (10) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
•	 Reduced frustration ( 8) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Empowerment/reduced need for supervision ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Reduce time spent on non-value adding tasks ( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
•	 Fewer occasions for mistakes ( 8) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Easier to recover from mistakes ( 8) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Reduced need for training (system is intuitive) ( 6) ( 7 ) ( 6 )
•	 Easier to recruit staff (system environment in wide usage) ( 4) ( 8 ) ( 4 )
•	 More flexible working conditions ( 7 ) ( 7 ) (7)
•	 Improved self-image (staff applying high-tech) ( 9 ) ( 7 ) (8)
•	 Safer environment ( 3 ) (3) (3)
Sub-total (80) (82) (78)
Employee performance will be boosted by the introduction of the new application.
There will be less time obtaining, analysing and presenting information. Key business
information will now be available on-line thereby reducing the level of time spent
obtaining this information in the present environment. This should reduce frustration
and improve the working environment for ORGANISATION 5 personnel. The central-
ising of the data in a structured manner will reduce the risk of errors, re-runs and wrong
•interpretation of data to a great extent. This is an area which will have a big impact in
the new application and consequently all products scored well here.
2.2.5	 Management performance
SAP Scala Oracle
e	 Better infor:m	 Iati on	
. 
1
- -
n 
I\ ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Faster information	 ( 9) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
•	 Improved decision support capability	 ( 9 ) ( 9 ) (9)
•	 Reduction in number of meetings due to better information ( 3) ( 3 ) ( 3 )
•	 Improve management control 	 (10) (10) (10)
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• Provide management time savings
	 ( 9 ) ( 9 )	 (9)
SulkiQtalWI
Sub-total 2(412 (392) (386) 
Average (8)	 (7)	 (7) 
Management performance should improve with the availability of key business per-
formance information at the touch of a button. This will facilitate better decision mak-
ing and improved business control. It should also significantly reduce the time spent by
management in data preparation and analysis as this can be done on-line within the new
application. Again, this is an area of major impact and all products scored well here.
2.2.6	 Payback - Direct Benefits Summary
All of the proposed systems score well under the heading of direct benefits.
Generally, a BMS will help ORGANISATION 5 management strive for improved busi-
ness control with the following business benefits:
Improved cash management / reduced costs.
Key management information will be available on-line and can be monitored on
an on-going basis. Workflow enabled applications will allow ORGANISATION 5 man-
agement to manage by exception thereby focusing on the real business issues on a daily
basis.
Centralised business system
The implementation should significantly streamline the information exchange
process within ORGANISATION 5 whilst capitalising on existing investment in PC and
NT server technology.
Productivity and efficiency
The BMS will eliminate tasks associated with data collection and presentation
and this will provide improvements in revenue generation.
Customer service
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This will be better supported through the ready availability of order fulfilment,
financial and statistical information as well as providing key ORGANISATION 5 cus-
tomers with Internet facilities to interrogate the Order Fulfilment process at ORGANI-
SATION 5.
Manufacturing
This will benefit from the implementation of the system through on-line demand
information, improved stores and stock management and direct connections to ware-
housing functions for business information exchange.
Engineering Change Management
This will be streamlined in both time and accuracy as will the generation, main-
tenance and modification of Engineering Change Orders, Engineering Change Requests
and Bills Of Materials. The automation of these tasks will speed up the introduction of
new products into the ORGANISATION 5 group.
2.3 Architecture
The third category of evaluation is "Architecture" i.e. the information systems
and networks used to support the information management requirements in ORGANI-
SATION 5. The following criteria are used to evaluate the system under this heading:
SAP Scala Oracle
• Conform to IT architecture as defined 	 (10) ( 8) ( 7)
• Pre-emptive use of technology (BPR, workflow, EDI, Intemet)( 10) ( 5) ( 7)
• Cater for increased data volumes 	 ( 9 )
	 ( 8) ( 8)
• Enhance flexibility by de-coupling applications from
infrastructure (operate in stand-alone or integrated mode). ( 5 )
	 ( 8) ( 8)
• Conform to Database standards (SQL level 2 compliant) ( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
• GUI enabled f8FEF-end (Windows 3.11, 95, NT client)
	 ( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
• Support open access to data through ODBC
(( 109
 )) (( 109
 )) (( 109
 ))• Available on leading network operating
environments (Ethernet, TCP/IP)
• Support for Object Linking & Embedding (OLE)	 ( 10 ) ( 5) ( 8 )
• Internet enabled	 ( 10 ) ( 4) ( 7 )
• Open to on-line integration with third party products 	 (10) (10) (10)
• Scaleable in terms of users supported 	 ( 8) ( 8) ( 8)
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• Integration of personal and corporate computing environments( 10) ( 6) ( 9)
• Impact on other applications 	 ( 8) ( 8) ( 8)
• Support for future applications	 ( 9 ) (
 9 ) ( 9)
Sub-total 	 (138) (118) (128) 
Average 
	 (9)	 (8)	 (9) 
The implementation of the BMS will have a very positive impact on other appli-
cations by making accurate information available to areas such as Shipping, Purchasing,
Production Planning, Sales, Finance, Banking and Distribution. The product which
scores best in this area is SAP which has placed much of its product success on the back
of MS NT. SAP R13 is optimised for NT and has sold well on this platform to date. It
is a true client server application supporting the three tiered concept of client, business
and database server. It is also work flow enabled thereby enabling business processes to
be created, amended and deleted as required. Scala and Oracle are essentially playing
catch-up in the area of technical architecture - Oracle have yet to release the manufac-
turing modules on NT.
Support of future applications is secure by virtue of the fact that SAP, Scala and
Oracle conform to open systems concepts and standards.
2.4 Process Re-design
The fourth category of system evaluation is "Process Redesign" i.e. the ability of
the system to cope with and assist in changing work practices and processes in the future.
The following criteria were used to evaluate the system under this heading:
SAP Sca!a Oraee
• Provision of greater flexibility in work practices ( 10 ) ( 6) ( 9)
• Facilitation of process approach to business ( 10 ) ( 4) ( 8)
• Supports ongoing changes in the business processes ( 9 ) ( 4) ( 9)
• Capacity to support new processes ( 1 0 ) ( 4) (1 0 )
• Capture data more than once ( 9) ( 9 ) ( 9)
• Can existing data be leveraged ( 9) ( 9 ) ( 9)
Sub-total 157) 1.361	 (54) 
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Average	 . (10) ,
	 (6) . (9) 
SAP scores extremely well with respect to redesign. SAP is built around busi-
ness processes (the application comes with 800 business processes as standard all of
which conform to global best business practices). SAP also ships with a workflow
engine as standard as well as document management functionality. Oracle supports
process redesign via its Oracle workflow engine as well through its Business Objects
applications. It is workflow enabled in the manufacturing and distribution modules but
not in the financial modules. Scala does not support a process based architecture (built
around business processes such as order fulfilment, distribution etc.). SAP ships with
functionality which support process analysis, design, redesign and optimisation.
However, all of this is purchased at a cost in terms of consultancy. On balance, SAP will
add to ORGANISATION 5's capacity to re-engineer in the future if required. The ready
availability of existing business process documentation will facilitate implementation
and the SAP Business Process Analysis tool-kits will certainly support the process
approach to business and highlight areas where work practices are not in order. Oracle
will provide similar functionality though not as comprehensive as SAP. Scala is weak
in this area but, are in principle committed to moving in this direction.
2.5 Risk
The final evaluation category is "Risk". The criteria encompassed by "Risk'
cover the most common reasons for IT project failure and are listed here.
•	 Project scale
•	 Time frame - the longer the greater the risk
•	 Top management support
•	 Vendor reliability
•	 Platform stability
•	 Technical risk
•	 Employee and management ability,
attitude and availability
SAP
(4)
( 5 )
(10)
(9)
(9)
(8)
( 6 )
Sub-total
Scala
(7)
( 8 )
(10)
(9)
( 9 )
(6)
( 7 )
(51)
Oracle
(5)
( 6 )
(10)
(9)
( 9)
(7)
( 6 )
(56) (52)
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Average	 (7)	 (8)	 (7)
The various systems score relatively poorly under the heading of "Risk". This is
due to the high risk normally associated with the implementation of a BMS particularly
in the areas of scale, costs, time-frame, implementation and resources. There are no
problems in the area of top management backing. Employee support may be an issue
due to the change of work practices which will arise due to the BMS implementation.
Also, there will be a reduction in the power associated with information gate-keeping for
some employees. This may hinder a successful implementation and will need to be
addressed. The implementation for both SAP and Oracle are usually of the 12-24
months time-frame for a company such as ORGANISATION 5. This is due to the con-
sultancy requirement in order to take full advantage of all product features. The risk with
project scale for Scala is much less as this product does not require the same level of con-
sultancy as SAP or Oracle. However, it may be that in implementing Scala, ORGANI-
SATION 5 would simply automate processes which have in-built inefficiencies.
The following sections of this report show the evaluation results in detail.
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3. STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT - DETAILED ANALYSIS 
Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
Support for mergers / acquisitions / alliances
All of the applications can cope adequately in this regard
through an open systems approach.
8 8 8
Capacity to enable ORGANISATIONS to do
business in new ways
SAP R/3 ships with sophisticated business modelling and
redesign functionality and is clearly superior to the other appli-
cations is this area. SAP ships with 800 processes defined but
users may model and define their own processes should they
so require. Scala and Oracle score poorly in this regard as
they are built around functional areas such as Accounts
Receivable, Inventory Management and Distribution.
9 5 8
Impact on corporate image?
Positive impact - the availability of on-line business critical
information clearly demonstrates management commitment to
continuous improvement. The implementation of a product
such as SAP or Oracle will also send out positive signals to the
market place that ORGANISATION 5 are committed to pro-
viding the best IT infrastructure for the organisation. A prod-
uct such as Scala will also be received in a positive light but
not to the extent that SAP / Oracle would be as these are the
world leaders in BMS.
9 6 8
Are strategic goals clear and consistent? If not alignment
will be difficult irrespective of the value of the system.
The purpose of the Business Management System is to assist
in the reduction of time to market for new product, to ensure
customer service levels are improved and to increase efficiency
and productivity through improved business management and
control.
10 10 10
Empowerment - reduced need for supervision
This type of system will provide real empowerment to business
users in their day to day tasks. All products score well in this
regard. It is worth noting that this benefit is contingent on
adequate training and education with respect to the BMS being
carried out.
8 8 8
Support moves to new geographical markets ?
Both SAP and Scala are truly international business systems
and conform to financial and legal accounting rules for over 15
countries. Oracle has only recently moved in this direction
and is in 'catch up' mode in this regard. Foreign language ver-
sions of the products are also available.
9 9 8
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SAP Scala OracleBenefits
Enhanced linkages with customers / suppliers and sub-con-
tractors
All of the products score well in this respect with all products
conforming to open systems standards as well as supporting
Electronic Data Interchange (ED!).
10	 9
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4. PAYBACK - DETAILED ANALYSIS 
4.1 Direct cost savings
SAP Scala OracleBenefits
Reduced new product cycle time
All of the products can contribute to a reduction in new prod-
uct cycle time. Key functionality for design engineers such as
Engineering Change Management (automated ECRs, ECOs
and BOM generation and maintenance) will ensure that key
manual tasks are automated and controlled. This will reduce
the amount of time spent keeping these documents up to date
in a manual environment. Project Management will be
empowered via the usage of Project Costing functionality
which will provide on-line visibility from a project control per-
spective. SAP scores particularly well in this regard due
mainly to its BPR capability to modify the core business
processes within the application. This could make a critical
contribution to any BPI projects in the future which were
geared to further streamline ORGANISATION 5s business
processes.
9	 8	 8
Does it displace costs or avoid future costs?
The products scored should reduce ongoing costs in adminis-
tration, data analysis and information processing. Staff levels
in accounting and administration should be stabilised and the
existing resources should be more than capable of handling
increased volumes of data. The availability of on-line business
critical data in user defined formats should reduce the need for
staff to spend vast amounts of time on data collection, analysis
and presentation. SAP does provide more business functional-
ity (Human Resources and payroll, no Irish payroll yet) than
' the other applications and that is why it out-scored the others
here.
7	 6	 6
Reduced Inventories ?
This should be facilitated by a tighter management control on
inventory within the organisation. The introduction of an on-
line business application will provide current and trend infor-
mation on stock levels, sales analysis and forecasting. It will
also provide connectivity to external warehousing and allow
management focus on stock levels and set in motion initiatives
to drive down stock levels within the organisation. This
should apply to all the companies within the group but in par-
ticular ORGANISATION 5 Communications Ltd. and
ORGANISATION 5 Communications Ireland Ltd. ORGANI-
SATION 5 Communications Systems Ltd. need to automate
their inventory control procedures immediately. Oracle
8	 7	 6
Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
Inventory does not support FIFO and scores lowest as a result.
Cash flow / liquidity?
The implementation of an on-line integrated BMS should con-
tribute significantly to an improved cash flow position. All of
the products score well in this area providing specific function-
ality to fial this requirement and collate the information
required from a number of key modules (Purchasing, Sales,
Manufacturing and Finance).
9 9 9
Staff morale
The implementation of a BMS which will significantly reduce
the work load will be received in a very positive light by all
staff. It will greatly reduce the time spent on mundane tasks
associated with data collection, analysis and presentation and
should ensure that present tasks are made much easier by the
new system.
9 9 9
Impact on customer service?
Should improve customer service through better visibility on
order fulfilment process. The ability to provide a customer
such as BT with Internet applications in order to query invoic-
es, orders, shipments will reduce customer queries via phone
and free key staff up to undertake more value added tasks.
9 8 9
Impact on quality?
A positive impact. Will help automate some key business func-
tions such as Engineering Change Management, Bill Of
Materials maintenance. The implementation of a Document
Management System with the relevant linkages to CAD will
mean tighter integration and automation across business units.
Workflow will promote the work-group ethic within the organ-
isation. It will also provide key business information in a reli-
able and professional format. The ability of a product such as
SAP to implement best business practice processes for elec-
tronic design should also raise the Quality standards within
ORGANISATION 5.
9 8 8
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Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
Reduced stock write-offs (obsolescence, scrap, etc.)
All of the applications provide comprehensive functionality to
plan a scrap factor per each material within a BOM and then to
analyse planned versus actual. This will provide ORGANISA-
TION 5 with the necessary information to manage this area
effectively.
7 7 7
Assist in component cost reduction programme
This will be enabled by the capability to build custom queries,
reports and alerts on the business system to view alternate
components based on user defined criteria e.g. cost, quality or
technical features. The fact that all products conform to open
systems standards makes this task much easier.
7 7 7
Implement tighter Project control
All 3 products ship with comprehensive project control and
costing modules. These provide the necessary features to cre-
ate, control and manage internal projects. These modules are
all integrated within the system to other modules (purchasing,
sales, GL).
6 6 6
Reduce communications costs e.g. e-mail
It is not envisaged that any of the products reviewed will have
a major impact in reducing communications costs.
5 5 5
Improved cash flow
This is an area that will be critical for effective business man-
agement. Cash flow should be improved by the fact that all
modules affecting cash flow are integrated providing detailed
analysis of sales forecasts, stock levels, purchasing and bank-
ing all of which ultimately impact on cash. SAP ships with a
comprehensive cash, funds and treasury management module.
Oracle have just released their cash management module
whilst Scala provides a standard cash management module
which is an optional extra.
9 7 6
Less need for specialised (more expensive) staff
The purchase of a complex business system will reduce the
need for specialised staff in the accounting / administration
areas. It is important to note that the current staff have an
important contribution to make especially in the implementa-
tion of the new system. Their knowledge of the ORGANISA-
TION 5 business and its accounting requirements will be
invaluable during the implementation project.
6 6 6
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4.2 Quality
Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
Better information on returns / recalls
This will be facilitated by better integration between
ORGANISATION 5 and sub-contractors. This informa-
tion is maintained at the moment by the sub-contractors
and then transmitted to ORGANISATION 5. There is a
time delay from 3 weeks to 3 months to obtain this data.
The sub-contractor should update the BMS on-line with
this information either via dial-up connection or an
Internet application. SAP again out-scores here due to its
Internet capability.
8 7 7
Fewer recalls / returns
It should follow that as a result of detailed analysis of the
reason for recalls / returns that ORGANISATION 5
should be in a position to rectify the reasons for same.
This will be enabled within the application by strong
decision support features. Again, this is a feature com-
mon to all the applications due to their conformance to
open systems standards.
8 8 8
Improved Customer Service
This is a critical benefit of any new business system for
ORGANISATION 5. Customer service will be improved
across many fronts - improved customer information, bet-
ter order fulfilment visibility, better recalls / returns
analysis, improved customer statistics and trending. The
capability offered by Internet based applications to pro-
vide such information to ORGANISATION 5 customers
on their own desktop will provide ORGANISATION 5
with significant competitive advantage. It will also result
in ORGANISATION 5 being perceived as a sophisticated
IT organisation thereby boosting the corporate image. A
further benefit from this will be the amount of time saved
by ORGANISATION 5 staff in providing this informa-
tion and answering phone queries re same. SAP again
comes out on top here due to its Internet and application
based functionality as well as its in built security features.
9 8 8
Better visibility for customer on order fulfilment
process.
The business systems scored are all customer centric
applications in that they all provide comprehensive func-
10 8 8
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Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
tionality in the order fulfilment process. This will allow
users to view all orders on screen for a particular cus-
tomer which will further break those orders down into the
relevant order lines. Order status will be available i.e. at
the warehouse, in production, to be completed which will
provide order fulfilment information to the user. Finance
specific information and statistics will also l-e available
displaying customers purchasing history, pajment trends,
average payment days, top 10 products and available
credit terms. SAP moves this a step further by providing
specific Internet applications to allow the customer to
process these enquiries from his / her own desk-top. SAP
- - - - - - -	 - --G, - - - -	 - - - - - - - - - -.I l- - - -	 - - - - -	 -
be processed via the Internet.
Fewer customer complaints
The improvements to customer service and better visibili-
ty on the order fulfilment process should logically result
in fewer customer complaints.
8 8 8
Improved Invoicing information
This will be a result of implementing an integrated busi-
ness system and will be achieved by tighter information
exchange between the distribution and accounts receiv-
able processes. Warehouses will be required to update
ORGANISATION 5 with products shipments and sales
invoice information. Standard invoicing functionality
will be available for on-line invoice processing.
9 9 9
Reduced order / delivery time span
This will be achieved by tighter integration between the
various business functions at ORGANISATION 5 which
manage the order fulfilment process. The implementation
of an integrated business system with a single view on
the business will play a vital role in achieving this busi-
ness goal. This functionality is standard with all applica-
tions_
9 9 9
Less re-working, re-keying of information
This is a major problem at ORGANISATION 5 and an
inhibitor to business growth. There are a number of man
days lost per day in this task. An integrated application
will require that data is only entered once into the appli-
9 9 9
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SAP Scala Oracle
cation and is available for analysis immediately across
the organisation. This will have a major impact at
ORGANI
SATION 5. This integration is now a standard feature
with all business systems.
Reduced errors, re-submissions and re-runs
The fact that users will only need to enter data once and 8
that because of the integration features that this data is
available across all business functions will reduce the
potential significantly for errors. Also, the fact that stan-
dard business enquiries and reports wi: be aveab i_e wi:
1
Ireduce 
in
the
spreadsheet
potential for
formulae.
data mis-interpretation due to
err rs 
8	 8
Benefits
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4.3 Productivity
Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
Facilitate product differentiation or new product
introduction
This will be achieved primarily by use of Engineering
Change Management, CAD integration, Document man-
agement, Workflow, Redesign and Manufacturing func-
tionality. This will be the IT tool-sets used by key
ORGANISATION 5 resources to automate and control
critical business processes. SAP is the winner here ship-
ping the above functionality as standard within its appli-
cation.
9 6 6
Create additional revenue
A number of key Account Managers at ORGANISA-
TION 5 spend too much time in data collection, analysis
and presentation. These people should spend their time
maximising commercial opportunities with ORGANISA-
TION 5 clients. The new BMS will provide the data in
an integrated on-line user defined format. It should be a
consequence of this that there would be an increase in
revenue to the organisation. This should be quantitative
benefit. The key application features required here are
supported across all three products.
8 8 8
Higher sales per employee
This is a follow on from the 'create additional revenue'
benefit. Higher sales per employee will happen if the
additional revenue benefit happens. This should be a
quantitative benefit. SAP out-scores the others by reason
that it provides specific sales analysis, billing and sales
support functionality.
9 8 8
More throughput per employee
The fact that data will only be required to be entered once
within the application will reduce the time spent in re-
keying data across all business functions. It would be
logical therefore to expect higher throughput per employ-
ee as a result of implementing the new system. However,
this would need to be closely monitored in order to deter-
mine the success or failure of same. All of the products
will facilitate this.
8 8 8
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Handle increased volumes with similar staff numbers
The BMS will automate many of the routine and mun-
dane tasks currently using up much of the staff time.
Therefore, current staff levels will be able to handle
increases in business volumes but this is dependant on the
automation and integration of key business functions.
Fewer phone calls, memoranda etc.
An integrated application may in fact promote a closer
workgroup type culture and also encourage staff to dis-
cuss key business issues based on better business infor-
mation.
Fewer queries (employees handle their own problems
better)
The fact all business data is centralised and is available to
all employees (security dependant) means that people are
empowered to resolve business issues as they arise i.e.
customer account enquiry, stock availability. The prod-
ucts score equally in this regard.
Better alignment with peaks and troughs
The implementation of an integrated system will provide
critical business information to management (sales
surges, fall off in demand, gross margins movements)
which will allow ORGANISATION 5 time to plan and
manage these situations accordingly. Again, this func-
tionality is common the all the scored applications.
Revenue earnings
This benefit is dealt with in detail under the heading
'Create additional revenue'. In summary, sales analysis
and product profitability information from the business
system may highlight opportunities for new business
across the different market sectors. This could be a criti-
cal benefit from the new system. SAP out-score its com-
petitors here due to the rich functionality within its Sales
Analysis module.
Reduction in or elimination of production or delivery
bottlenecks
This is a difficult benefit to assess as ORG XNISATION 5
outsource the majority of its manufacturing to sub-con-
tractors. Also, the delivery / distribution is managed by
SAP Scala Oracle
9 9 9
5 5 5
6 6 6
7 7 7
9 8 8
6 6 6
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warehousing / sub-contractor or freight agents dependant
on market and / or customer. There will be benefits from
a centralised system if there is data exchange to / from
sub-contractors and warehousing. This requires further
analysis and study before commitments can be made in
this area.
Reduction in or elimination of non value adding tasks
The implementation of an integrated business system will
reduce dramatically the amount of time spent by employ-
ees in data collection, analysis, preparation and interpre-
tation. This happens right across the business from sales
to manufacturing and has given rise to information gate-
keeping due to the political power associated with
employees who have access to critical business data.
This should not arise the new application will deliver sig-
nificant benefits in this regard. The capability of SAP
with respect to workflow and the ability to manage by
exception with workflow mean SAP outscores the other
products here.
9 7 7
Reduction in order turnaround time
This will be enabled by better visibility on the order fill-
filment process and the identification of bottlenecks with-
in same. SAP outscores due to its redesign and process
modelling functionality.
8 7 7
Reduction in audit costs due to better information
The implementation of a business system will provide
detailed financial and management accounting informa-
tion in a more stable manner than before. However, it is
not possible to determine that this will result in the
ORGANISATION 5 auditors reducing their audit fees. It
may be worth while senior management at ORGANISA-
TION 5 exploring this opportunity with their auditors.
5 5 5
Faster access to information
The fact that this will be an integrated application will
mean that all ORGANISATION 5 employees, depending
on security privileges, will have direct access to on-line
information once data is input to the application. This
will be a dramatic increase from the current situation
where data has to be transferred from Impcon, spread-
sheet, WP before any analysis is done on same.
9 9 9
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Better on-line Help to reduce support costs
It is not felt that on-line help will have a significant bear-
ing on support costs which are set at 15% of retail price
in any case. This system is critical to the future of
ORGANISATION 5 and so support for same will be
quite different to an off the shelf products (Word, Excel)
support structure. It will be crucial to ORGANISATION
5 to have support facilities available 12 hours a day for
this system.
Less re-keying of data
All the selected systems modules are fully integrated.
This will virtually eliminate the need to re-key data. This
will also mean that users can integrate with spreadsheet
technology on-line.
Less manual aggregating of data
The systems scored within this study all ship with com-
prehensive query and reporting tools. SAP ships with an
in-built EIS whilst Scala and Oracle provide same as an
optional extra. These tool-sets will facilitate the orderly
analysis of the on-line business data and reduce the need
for staff to spend days and days analysing and interpret-
ing data that is already out of date.
4 4 4
9 9 9
9 9 9
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4.4 Employee performance
Benefit SAP Scala Oracle
Better quality of information (less wasted time)
The implementation of an integrated, on-line business
system will provide better, faster and more accurate busi-
ness information. SAP ships workflow, CAD integration,
document management, engineering change management,
sales analysis and EIS modules within the standard appli-
cation. These will provide ORGANISATION 5 with crit-
ical business information and therefore outscores the
competitors.
10	 9	 9
Reduced frustration
There is a lot of frustration at the moment with respect to
the current information systems. This is mainly to do
with the inflexible nature of the current information sys-
tems and the amount of time required to obtain business
information from same. In fact, in a number of critical
areas the information processing is done via spreadsheet
which results in a number of different views on the busi-
ness. Frustration will be reduced by the implementation
of an integrated business system which can provide on-
line business performance information quickly and effec-
tively.
8	 8	 8
Empowerment / reduced need for supervision
The availability of key performance information online
• will reduce the need for employees to spend time in
obtaining information via telephone or direct discussion.
Business information specific to their job will be avail-
able allowing them to make basic business decisions
quickly and without the need to refer to other functions
within the business.
Reduced time spent on non value adding tasks
This will be resolved by the integrated business system.
Once data is entered on the system it will be available to
all employees (security privileges dependant). This new
system will ship with sophisticated enquiries and report
functionality as standard. These can be modified on a per
user basis if required. This will reduce significantly the
time spent on data management by all employees across
the business and allow them to focus on their specific job
8	 8 8
8 88
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functions (Account Management, Finance, Manufacturing
etc.) rather than on data manipulation.
Fewer occasions for mistakes
The fact that all information is stored centrally and that
this information is validated by appropriate business rules
stored at the database will reduce the potentials for mis-
takes and invalid data. Also, the reduction in re-keying
data will contribute here.
8	 8	 8
Easier to recover from mistakes
Once data is entered for a specific transaction (GRN) it is
then available to all users within the application.
However, should there be an error with regards to this
transaction then the system will provide specific function-
ality (stock adjustment, write-off)in order to rectify the
error. This information will then be made available to all
users and a full audit trail is generated of all transactions
for control purposes. This type of functionality enables
users to rectify errors in a controlled and orderly manner.
Reduced need for training (system is intuitive)
The implementation of a complex business system usual-
ly takes up to 1 year to complete (go live). These sys-
tems come with much functionality parameterised and
users will require education and training in order to fully
grasp the business logic behind the system. This will be
especially true for SAP and Oracle. GUI and on-line help
functionality will certainly contribute to the user friendli-
ness of the application.
6	 7	 6
Easier to recruit staff (system in wide usage)
Skilled staff for complex business systems are always in
short supply and this is especially true for products such
as Oracle and SAP. However, the impact on working
conditions, staff morale and image will certainly render
ORGANISATION 5 more attractive in recruitment terms.
Scala easily outscores the other products due to its wide
usage, ease of implementation and low requirement for
specific Scala skill-sets.
4	 8	 4
More flexible working conditions
The new business system will certainly improve working
conditions for staff with the availability of on-line busi-
7	 7	 7
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ness information, integration features, automation of rou-
tine tasks and reduced data manipulation. All products
score equally here.
Improved self image (staff employing high tech)
The implementation will mean that all staff using the new
system will be educated and trained in its features,
processes, capabilities and risks. This will have a posi-
tive effect on employees self image and will boost their
worth to the organisation. However, it will create a risk
that these employees may be recruited by other organisa-
tions for similar implementations. SAP is the No. 1 prod-
uct to implement in terms of image and prestige with
Oracle a close second.
9	 7	 8
Safer environment
This is not a strategic issue for ORGANISATION 5.
3	 3	 3
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Benefit SAP Scala Oracle
Better information
The implementation of an integrated business system will mean
that in information terms, there is one view on the business. The
capability of the new system to deliver user defined reports /
graphs on business performance and metrics will result in man-
agement being provided with better business information. SAP
scores top marks due to its rich functionality for senior manage-
ment particularly in the areas of EIS, DSS and graphics.
10 8 8
Faster information
The fact that all information is on-line and available once it is
input will ensure information is available much faster than
before. This wi'l profound impact on work practices at ORGAN-
ISATION 5. SAP is an on-line application e.g. once a GRN,is
entered the GL is updated. This tight integration is akey benefit
of the product.. However, it is important to note that all of the
products scored will deliver key benefits in this area.
-
9 8 8
Improved decision support capability
The ability of the system to interrogate, analyse and present busi-
ness information in a structured and professional manner is cm-
cial. The system must be flexible and adaptable to allow parame-
ters and business rules to change depending on the business situa-
tion. All of the products score well in this regard.
9 9 9
Reduction in number of meetings due to better information
It is felt that the implementation will have a minimal impact with
respect to this benefit.
3 3 3
Improved management control
Key business performance statistics will be available on-line
from the new business system. This will allow management to
act in a quick but effective manner to issues as they arise i.e.
manage by exception. Currently, there can be time delays of
more than one week in presenting business performance informa-
tion, in fact it can take up to one week to prepare this information
for management which will be available on-line in the new sys-
tem.
10 10 10
Provide management time savings
The ability to obtain and act on critical business information in a
	 	 .:11 n n n7
also empower senior management to obtain keY business perfor-
mance reports directly from the system via the EIS without hav-
ing to request same from Finance.
326
5, ARCHITECTURE - DETAILED ANALYSIS 
Benefit SAP Scala Oracle
Conform to ORGANISATION SIT architecture as defined
All products conform in principle to the ORGANISATION 5 IT
architecture (see ORGANISATION 5 IT Strategy report).
However, SAP R/3 has been targeted specifically for the NT and
NT SQL server environment (30% of SAP shipments in final 6
months of 1995 were NT based) and SAP and Microsoft have
worked in partnership on R/3 with respect to Internet functionali-
ty. Oracle are at present porting some of their product to NT.
Scala will work well on NT but is still in the early phases of run-
ning on SQL server 6.0.
10	 8	 7
Pre-emptive use of technology (process modelling and sup-.
r	 I-	 _ 7	 7
capability)
SAP R/3 easily wins this section as it ships all of the above fea-
tures as standard. Oracle has workflow technology and some of
its products are workflow enabled. However, it is still playing
catch-up in this area. Scala does not support any of these fea-
tures.
10 5 7	 I
Cater for increased data volumes
SAP has a three tiered client server architecture (client, business
rules and database). It has a 'thin client' approach with all trans-
action processing carried out at the server end. Oracle has just
moved in this direction with its new release called 'smart client'.
Scala is two tiered at present (client / server ) and builds different
products for different database environments. SAP is best posi-
tioned in terms of architecture and performance criteria to sup-
port increased data volumes but it should be stressed here that all
of the products perform well in this regard.
9 8 8
Enhance flexibility by de-coupling applications from infra-
structure (operate in stand-alone or integrated mode)
SAP ships as one tightly integrated application that runs on mul-
tiple platforms. Its tight integration between modules renders it
difficult to interface with third party business products. Scala and
Oracle sell individual modules (GL, AR, AP) which generally
will run stand-alone or integrated and are available on multiple
platforms.
5 8 8
Conform to database standards (SQL level 2 compliant)
Oracle is a SQL level 2 compliant database. All applications
scored will run under the Oracle database enviionment.
10 10 10
GUI enabled front-end (Windows 3.11, Windows95, NT
client)
All products conform to this standard. Oracle and Scala are corn- 10 10 10
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pleting the port to Windows95 and NT client and so availability
may be an issue. All of these organisations are 100% committed
to NT.
Support open access to data through ODBC
All of the products use proprietary access techniques to the data-
base from within the applications. However, all the databases
support ODBC.
9 9 9
Available on leading network operating environments
(Ethernet / TCP/IP)
All products conform to this standard.
10 10 10
Support for Object Linking & Embedding (OLE)
SAP supports OLE extensively and ships Microsoft Office
(Word, Excel and Powerpoint) as part of its core product. There
applications are embedded in SAP. Oracle supports OLE in some
of its modules (GL) but not all. Scala do not support OLE 100%
at present but are committed to OLE conformance.
10 5 8
Internet enabled
SAP ships with a number of business applications that are
Internet based and its present Internet capability and vision is far
superior to its competitors. Internet applications from SAP at the
moment allow customers view order status, shipment information
and other order fulfilment information. Oracle also provides
such functionality but at an extra cost. Scala does not provide
such features yet but are committed to Internet enabling their
application. SAP are committed to making R/3 available on the
Internet in terms of transaction processing (Order entry etc.) and
are working in partnership with Microsoft in this regard.
10 4 7
Open to on-line integration with third party products
All products conform to open systems standards which includes
ODBC compliance, database standards and business objects.
Therefore, integration should be a straight-forward process but
will be dependant on the other applications in the integration
process.
10 10 10
Scaleable in terms of users supported
This is database dependant but as all the systems run under the
market leader (Oracle) this should not be an issue.
8 8 8
Integration of personal and corporate computing environ-
ments
This is dealt with in the 'OLE compliance' benefit. In summary,
SAP ships with Microsoft Office and supports on-line integration
to these tool-sets. Oracle does support this feature but only in
10 6 9
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some modules. Scala is moving towards this environment (it
does facilitate outputs to Excel) and have committed to upgrading
users when the product is ready.
Impact on other applications
There will be minimal impact on other applications at ORGANI-
SATION 5 as the new business system will replace the spread-
sheet system, Impcon, PC software (bank reconciliation, Asgard)
and other EDI applications. This will happen over time and new
hardware resources will be required for the new system. All
products score equally here.
8	 8	 8
Support for future applications
All products conform to open systems standards and to the
ORGANISATION 5 IT architecture as defined by the NIMT.
This architecture has been defined with future-proofing in mind.
The owners of the 3 business systems spend millions of dollars
each year in R&D (Internet being a good example) and in new
enhancements. All products score equally here.
9	 9	 9
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6. PROCESS REDESIGN - DETAILED ANALYSIS 
SAP Scala OracleBenefits
Provision of greater flexibility in work practices?
SAP is process orientated and ships with thousands of pre-
defined business processes which conform to best business prac-
tices. Users may implement these processes or define and imple-
ment their own specific business process via the Engineering
workbench functionality. Workflow is also available enhancing
the redesign capability of the product. All of the above will
ensure that the IT applications underpinning the business process-
es are as flexible and adaptable as possible. Oracle is process
orientated and supports workflow capability and ships as standard
business processes applicable to the specific market sector of the
client. Scala is not process based. SAP and Oracle can accom-
modate BPR change mid-project or alternatively, completely new
processes may be defined and implemented.
10	 6	 9
Facilitation of a process approach to business
SAP ships with 1000+ business processes per module all of
which conforms to best business practice. SAP supports the
dynamic creation and amendment of business processes. Oracle
provides similar functionality. It is not clear if the financial mod-
ules within the Oracle suite conform to this model. The software
tool-sets supplied by Oracle for this are expensive whilst SAP
ships its tool-sets as standard. Scala does not provide such flexi-
bility as Oracle or SAP but Scala is not targeted at the same mar-
ket as the other products in terms of project scale and cost.
10	 4	 8
Supports ongoing change in the business processes
.SAP and Oracle support this feature through specific product fea-
tures. Scala does not provide such functionality. However,
changing or amending business processes post implementation
can be a complicated task for SAP or Oracle. Also, users are
locked into SAP and Oracle specific technology for this function-
ality.
9	 4	 9
Capacity to support new processes
SAP and Oracle support this feature. SAP supplies this capabili-
ty via its Engineering Workbench fimctionality. Oracle provides
this functionality through its Workflow engine and Object2000
product sets. Scala does not support these features in such a flex-
ible manner.
Capture data more than once
The integrated nature of all the applications ensures that data is
entered only once and then is available to all users of the applica-
9	 9	 9
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tion. It is important to note that the data is available subject to
users having the correct security privileges.
9	 9	 9Can existing data be leveraged
All products facilitate data import and conversions.
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7. RISK - DETAILED ANALYSIS 
Benefits SAP Scala Oracle
Project scale
Implementing SAP or Oracle is quite a challenge. Success
implementation requires business process redesign, a client-serv-
er environment, the ability to manage the systems flexibility, and
the ability to cope with high complexity levels. Trained technical
people are scarce and expensive. Therefore, the scale of the
implementation is immense due to the above factors. Scala is a
complex and feature rich application that does not require such
consultancy effort yet will not produce the benefits that the other
products could deliver. This is a critical issue for ORGANISA-
TION 5 - if they choose a SAP or Oracle then they need to
recognise the complexities associated with implementing such a
product will present many challenges to the company during
implementation but the benefits delivered to the business will be
significant.
4 7 5
Time frame - the longer the greater the risk
Time scales for SAP and Oracle implementation are usually
spread over a number of years. This can be prohibitive in terms
of time, costs and benefits delivered. However, both organisa-
tions now recognise this and have made considerable effort in the
last 2 years to reduce this time. It should still take ORGANISA-
TION 5 12-18 months to fully implement such a product. Scala
is a straight-forward product aimed at operations such as
ORGANISATION 5 and the time-frame for implementing this
application would be 12 months.
5 8 6
Top management support
Top management are fully supportive and committed to the
implementation of a new business management system. Top
management need to be involved on an ongoing basis on the pro-
ject.
10 10 10
Vendor reliability
All of the vendors listed (SAP, Oracle and Scala) are large multi-
national organisations delivering mission critical technology solu-
tions to business. These companies are highly profitable and are
expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.
9 9 9
Platform stability
NT is now one of the best selling LAN operating systems. The
product is feature rich and easily maintained. There is now a
number of leading companies providing NT support and training
in Dublin. SAP and Scala are available immediately under NT
(30% of SAP sales 2nd half 1996 were on NT) but Oracle is
9 9 9
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presently porting its application to NT. All vendors are commit-
ted to NT and therefore, platform stability is not a risk.
Technical risk
All of products conform to the open systems standard and include
the latest in technology features. SAP outscores its competitors
due to the depth of features available which are based on the lat-
est in technology (workflow, Internet, CAD, document manage-
ment etc.
8	 6	 7
Employee and management ability, attitude and availability
It is essential that management are available and contribute to the
implementation of the business system. This is particularly true
of SAP and Oracle where much time in spent in understanding
the business process, business process re-design, assessing the
impact of business process re-design on the organisation and the
implementation of same. It is essential that key management are
actively involved in this process. The ability and commitment of
ORGANISATION 5 personnel to capitalise on the better, more
accurate business information will be critical for the success of
the project. Scala does require commitment from senior manage-
ment but not on such a scale as the other 2 applications and so
out-scores them on this occasion.
6	 7	 6
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SUMMARY OF ADJUSTED SCORES 
Perspective .
	 - . Weight SAP Scala Oracle
Strategic Alignment 30 270 240 270
Payback 15 120 105 105
Architecture 25 225 200 225
Process Redesign 15 150 90 135
Risk 15 105 120 105
Total Adj. Score 870 755 840
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8. APPROVED PDM VENDORS 
8.1 SAP
Vendor : CAD & LAN Computersysteme
Product : AutoORG
Contact :	 Dr. Detlef Kahl
Address :	 Dr. Ernst-Mucke St. 8, D-02625 Bautzen, Germany
Phone	 :	 +49 3591 3744 0
Fax	 :	 +49 3591 3744 19
Remarks:	 Certified interface: AutoORG STL 1.0;
Tested functionality: Material master, Document information,
Bill of materials, Matchcode selection
Vendor :	 Computervision AG
Product : PORTA-X
Contact :	 Mr. Eduard Walther
Address :	 Hohlstrasse 534, CH-8048, Zurich, Switzerland.
Phone	 :	 +41 1 434 2145
Fax	 •.	 +41 1 434 2100
Remarks :	 Certified interface: PORTA-X 1.0;
Tested functionality: Document information,
Vendor : VW-GEDAS
. Product :
	 priamos
Contact : Mr. Bernhard Herzog
Address :	 Pascalstr. 11, D10587 Berlin, Germany.
Phone : +49 3 9971 189
Fax •. +49 3 9971 189
Remarks:	 Certified interface: priamos Online interface 1.0 for SAP system;
Tested functionality: Material master, Bill of materials, Matchcode selec
tion.
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9. PROJECT CO STINGS 
The following costs are outline costs only for each product. The people at SAP,
Controllers (Scala agents in Ireland) and CFM (Oracle business application partners) all
refused to provide detailed quotations to ORGANISATION 5 without first spending
some time understanding the business. This was not possible in the time-scale envisaged
for the report. However, all of the vendors will be delighted to meet with ORGANISA-
TION 5 to discuss their requirements in further detail at a later stage.
9.1 SAP
Contact: Jim Murray, SAP Ireland (01) 820 4446
Reference sites: AEG, Alcatel, AT&T, Fuji, Intel, Hitachi, Sony, Siemens.
Licence costs @ 1R13,000 per user ( 50 user licence) 	 1R.€ 150,000
Database licences / client licences	 IR.£ 10,000
Implementation & Consultancy costs (ratio 1.5-1) 	 Ifti 225,000
Total
	
IRE 385,000
9.2 Scala
Contact: Martin McFadden, Controllers Ltd. (01) 836 4188
Reference sites: Dell, Fujitsu, Nokia, Old, Memorex Telex.
Software application	 IRI100,000
Database licences / client licences	 IRE 10,000
Implementation & Consultancy costs (ratio 1-1) 	 IRL 100,000
Total
	
IR£ 210,000
9.3 Oracle
Contact: Phil Codd, CFM Ltd. (01) 475 1670
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Reference sites:	 Motorola.
Business System (16 modules * IR18,500 approx.) IR£ 136,000
Database licences IRE 25,000
Client Licences (50 *1R£1,300) 1R1 65,000
Implementation & Consultancy costs (ratio 1- 1) IR1 136,000
Total 1R£ 362,000
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10. PRODUCT FUNCTIONALITY LIST
10.1 SAP
Cross application
o Business Process Technology
o Document Management
o Classification
o CAD Integration
O Workflow
Financial Accounting
o General Ledger Accounting
o Consolidation
O Accounts Payable
o Accounts Receivable
O Asset Accounting
O Special Purpose Ledger
Treasury
O Cash Management
o Funds Management
O Treasury Management
Controlling
o Overhead Cost Control
o Product Cost Controlling
o Sales and Profitability Analysis
O Activity Based Costing
o Project Control
Capital Investment Management
O Tangible Fixed Assets
O Financial Investments
Enterprise Controlling
O Profit Centre Accounting
o Business Planning
O Management Consolidation
O Executive Information System
Logistics General
O Logistics Master Data
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o Forecast
o Variant Configuration
o Engineering Change Management
O Logistics Information System
Materials Management
o Materials Requirements Planning
O Purchasing
o Inventory Management
o Warehouse Management
o Invoice Verification
o Information System
O Electronic Data Interchanges
Plant Maintenance
o Equipment and Technical Objects
o Preventative Maintenance
O Maintenance Order Management
O Maintenance Projects
O Service Management
o Plant Maintenance Information System
Project System
o Basic Data
o Operational Structures
O Project Planning
O Approval
O Project Execution / Integration
O Information System
Quality Management
o Planning Tools
o Inspection Processing
O Quality Control
O Quality Certificates
O Quality Notifications
Planning Production
o Basic Data
o Sales & Operations Planning
o Master Planning
O Capacity Requirements Planning
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O Materials Requirements Planning
O Production Orders
O Product Costing
o Kanban / Just In Time (u11)
o Repetitive Manufacturing
O Assembly Orders
O Production Planning for Process Industries
O Plant Data Collection
O Information System
Sales & Distribution
o Master Data
O Basic Functions
O Sales
o Shipping
o Billing
o Sales Support
o Information System
o Electronic Data Interchange
Personal Planning & Development
o Organisational Management
O Seminar and Conference Management
O Personnel Development
O Workforce Planning
O Room Reservations Planning
Personnel Administration
o Employee Management
O Benefits
O Compensation Administration
O Applicant Management
O Time Management
o Incentive Wages
o Travel Expenses
o Payroll
International Development
o Asian & Pacific Area
O Europe
o North America
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O Africa / Middle East
O South America
10.2 Scala
Business application
O Windows clients
O Unlimited companies
O General Ledger (Report Writer, Cashbook, Bank Reconciliation)
O Company Consolidation
O Drill down / EIS
O Fixed Asset Management
O Accounts Receivable
O Credit Management
O Accounts Payable
O Sales Order Processing / Invoicing
O Stock Control
O Purchase Control
O Statistics (Sales, Purchases and Stock)
O Manufacturing, Planning and Control
O Costing
O Production Statistics
O Master Planning including Forecasting
O Materials Requirements Planning
O Scala Query
10.3 Oracle
Oracle Financials
O Assets
O Inventory
O Project Billing
O Purchasing
O General Ledger
O Payables
O Project Costing
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O Receivables
o Applications Data Warehouse
o Financial Analyser
Oracle Manufacturing
O Capacity
o Cost Management
o Master Scheduling
O MRP
o Work In Progress
o Order Entry
O Bill Of Material
O Engineering
o Quality
O Manufacturing Planning
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11. PDM FUNCTIONALITY CHECKLIST 
Document Management Yes No No
CAD Integration Yes Yes Yes*
Project Control Yes Yes Yes
Workflow Yes No Yes*
Quality Management Yes No Yes*
Electronic Data Interchange Yes No Yes*
Engineering Change Requests Yes Yes Yes
Engineering Change Orders Yes Yes Yes
Bill Of Material Management Yes Yes Yes
Bill Of Materials Routing Yes No Yes*
Component comparison analysis Yes Yes Yes*
Flexible data structures for BOM technical data Yes Yes** Yes**
Note:	 * = functionality not available in standard application so extra costs incurred.
** = Available re 'flex-fields' 
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Appendix VIII
Postal Survey: IT Investment and Payoff Issues
Summary of Findings
1. Investment in information technology controlled:
A. Centrally	 42.5%
B. By Business divisions/units	 10%
C. A combination of both A. and B.	 45%
D. In other ways	 2.5%
2. Budgetary Responsibility for the following categories of investment
•
•
IT Function
' i
Business
Unit.
Other
..
Mainframe/data centres 77.5% 17.5% 7.5% 5%
Network Installation/maintenance 72.5% 15% 10% 2.5%
Personal Systems (other than PCs) 52.5% 15% 32.5% 0%
Personal Computers 40% 47.5% 12.5% 0%
IT Education and Training 30% 40%
A 
22.5% 7.5%
3. Trend in budgetary responsibility in organisation to:
A. Greater central control 	 25%
B. More devolution to the business units 32.5%
C. Increased joint responsibility
	
35%
D. No change
	 7.5%
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lInsuccesifui
successful
4. How well does organisation assess IT costs and IT benefits: Scale 5 (very suc-
cessful) to 1 (unsuccessful)
IT Costs 12.5% 50% 35% 2.5% 0%
IT Benefits 2.5% 12.5% 47.5% 32.5% 5%
5. The biggest problems in accurately assessing
A. IT Costs
TT Costs (Problems)
No real problems
None - we do not engage external consultants!
Costs are easily identifiable
Identifying unanticipated costs
Size of Company 
Ensuring that all possible costs are included, especially consequential costs
Intangibles
Not a problem
Changes in technology
Estimates of work/costings
' Ensuring business units correctly code to nominal ledger 
Complexity/flexibility of factory systems and technology
Accounting for all costs
None
Ensuring all costs have been identified up front
None
Validation, training and support costs 
Difficult to predict beyond initial costs for support, integration etc.
Future obsolescence rate
User demand, training, changing technologies
Calculating net costs
Relating those costs to business benefits
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Development time
Implementation deadlines not being made 
Software development timings and costs 
No formal charge out mechanism for computer services
End-user costs
Projecting timescale estimation 
No real problems 
Without workflow studies, indirect costs are difficult to estimate
Hidden costs - support staff costs 
The rapidly changing technical environment
B. IT Benefits
IT Benefits (Problems) 
Measurement & Evaluation metrics in general 
Many of the benefits such as better customer service cannot be measured in L's 
Cannot always see the benefits - Technology change can propel an organisation forward,
which cannot be measured in reduced costs or increased sales 
Size of Company 
IT benefits are often very difficult to quantify, because it is often unclear what the real
benefits are
Intangibles
Measuring increased productivity
Changes in design during implementation - users unclear about requirements
Measuring value added to statistician
Constant change means when we review for benefits other factors come into play. 
No major problems 
Advanced measurement techniques and effort 
Tangible benefits
Evaluating commercial use of additional information
Measuring the true tangible costs of inefficiencies that have been removed
Some benefits are intangible 
Not a problem 
Value of improved quality and customer service benefits 
Benefits cannot be assessed in financial terms 
No particular difficulty 
Lack of any relevant/useable benchmarks
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Headcount reduction, volume impact
Predicting the logistic effect that IT systems will have on the business - Bus charges 
Intangible benefits
Assessing non-quantifiable benefits
What is the benefit of IT to the Business - How to measure the value it adds
Benefit never proven as no history full implementation audit. Role of business sponsor
only recently defined to clearly make accountable for benefit 
Management commitment
Re-organisational benefits re procedures, etc. 
Not necessarily quantifiable in financial terms
Tend to be quantifiable over a long term 
Value of information - how to assess
1.Benefits of application systems very difficult to quantify. Some are essential to the run-
ning of the business, others provide management information the use of which is diffi-
cult to quantify 2. desktop productivity difficult to measure due to PCs
6. Adequate understanding of IT cost/benefit issues among:
.	 „ Yes •	 . : Don't KnOw...:
IT Professionals 62.5% 10%
Line Managers
Top Management
20%
37.5%
22.5%
17.5%
7. Criteria Important to evaluating investments: Scale 5(very important) to
1(unimportant)
5 4** • 3 ' -
Strategic Alignment 75% 20% 2.5% 0% 2.5%
IT Architecture 7.5% 37.5% 40% 12.5% 2.5%
Business Process Redesign 17.5% 35% 27.5% 17.5% 2.5%
Risk 7.5% 42.5% 42.5% 7.5% 0
8.
A. Application of standard investment appraisal methods to IT
Yes 52.5%
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Some methods Used
If Yes, specify method
ROI
Linked to business objectives. Full cost benefit analysis. Payback period 
ROT and evaluation of information improvement 
Cost/benefit/ROI 
All investment in IT must give tangible returns within 12 months 
ROI, Cost avoidance, value added, process improvement, time to market
Value, IRR, NPV 
Value added, cost saving 
Net Present Value
ROI/CBA 
Informal: But ROI approx. unless the project raises other issues
ROT is used to a limited extent 
Economic Value Added
B. In-house method
Yes 25%
Some methods used
• If Yes, specify in-house method 
Budget for costs and monitor to budget. Agree benefits and time schedule as to where
benefits will be seen. Track benefits against time schedules. Review benefits continu-
ously
Appraisal considers non cash benefits also. There is no formal review of IT expendi-
ture/benefits
Align to objectives, integrate with total business
Provided by our head office 
Based on Corporate IT standards 
Not specified
The operating benefits are measured
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Effectiveness 7.5%30%57.5%2.5% 2.5%
'::100%:]
0
9. Effectiveness of investment appraisal methods: Scale 5 (very successful) to 1
(unsuccessful)
10.
A. Percentage of systems development projects that deliver expected, or above,
targeted returns:
0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99%
ITargeted returns* 2.5% 25% 40% 25%
B. Percentage of systems development projects completed to budget:
IC
0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99% 100% 
ompleted to budget*	 2.5%	 27.5%	 30%	 27.5% 5%
*Note: 7.5% of respondents did not complete this question
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